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EDITORIAL 
 
 
ix 
Four years on from the onset of the crisis, we still find ourselves in very challenging economic times. The 
economic recovery has not lived up to the expectations that existed at the time of the publication of last 
year's report. The EU is entering recession again and concerns over debt sustainability in some Member 
States, signalled by persistently high spreads in their sovereign bond yields continue to dominate the 
policy agenda. The vicious circle between sovereign debt and a still fragile banking sector added to the 
vulnerability.  
Member States remain committed to the consolidation of their public budgets, both in this and coming 
years, as is evident from their medium-term plans. These show that despite the worsened macroeconomic 
outlook, Member States are sticking with their consolidation plans and will continue closing their deficits 
this year and next. The composition of consolidation in terms of the expenditure/revenue split and types 
of measures that are being implemented is broadly consistent with a credible consolidation supportive to 
medium-term growth.  This is discussed in Part I of the Report. It shows that the significant increase in 
debt ratios seen since the start of the crisis alongside the still sizeable deficits mean that there is little 
scope for many Member States to ease off the fiscal tightening, despite the extra pressure that this might 
put on already faltering growth. Amid the debate about how best to continue to respond to the crisis, 
concerns have been raised that further fiscal consolidation amid weak growth prospects may have self-
defeating effects on debt ratios. Part III presents a detailed analysis that highlights how such effects may 
arise but concludes that such cases are rather theoretical and anyhow short-lived under reasonable 
economic assumptions. The analysis shows that for a large negative response of growth to consolidation – 
as captured by a high value of the fiscal multipliers – such undesired effects would be quickly reversed 
unless these multipliers have a high persistence. This happens in cases where the fiscal adjustments are 
repeatedly non-credible or if effects on interest rates are large and negative, contrary to what is normally 
expected in consolidations. So, in order for the consolidation driven increase in debt to persist, a high 
degree of financial market myopia alongside an implausible negative reaction of interest rates to 
consolidation are required. Such a situation would happen if factors that cannot be modelled influence 
heavily the reaction of financial markets, for example if financial markets come to believe that 
consolidation will be reversed based on the consideration that the short-term negative impact on growth 
will make consolidation too unpopular. Simulations based on projections for the EU Member States 
confirm the expectation that any negative response of debt to consolidation will be quickly reversed, even 
for high debt countries. 
As part of the response to the crisis, the EU has introduced a major overhaul of the EU system of 
economic governance. Economic and budgetary surveillance in the EU – and especially in euro area – has 
been largely reformed with the adoption of the legislative package known as the "Six Pack", which 
entered into force at the end of 2011. The new provisions that now apply put conditions on the debt level 
at the heart of the Stability and Growth Pact and will ensure that reducing the high public indebtedness 
that the crisis will have left behind is a key priority in Member States' fiscal policy setting. In addition, 
the introduction of an expenditure benchmark and the possibility of financial sanctions in the preventive 
arm of the Stability and Growth Pact will provide a framework that supports better fiscal policy-making 
when better economic times return, to ensure that the Member States public finances return to a position 
of underlying health. Despite these changes, increasing evidence of the scale of the spillovers between 
euro area countries has given impetus to the drive to further strengthen euro area economic governance. 
In November 2011, the Commission took a first step in this direction, proposing enhanced monitoring of 
budgetary policies of all euro area Member States as well as specific surveillance procedures for those 
experiencing financial stability risks. The Commission's proposals were followed by the signature of an 
intergovernmental Treaty by 25 Member States in March this year, committing the contracting parties to 
ambitious fiscal discipline including an appropriate mirroring of the core EU budgetary rule – namely, the 
requirement that each country's structural balance should be at its Medium-Term Budgetary Objective – 
in national legislation. The new architecture is not that of a perpetual fiscal austerity: after an initial effort 
to put their fiscal house in order, Member States have to ensure that their expenditure is financed. This 
should be normal practice to ensure sustainability of public finances but poses no constraints on the size 
or type of expenditure that governments undertake. All that is required is that there are sufficient revenues 
  
x 
to fund the spending programmes. The Report describes developments in budgetary surveillance in Part 
II.  
In a phase of consolidation, there are concerns that the increasing devolution of tasks from central to 
subnational tiers of government may jeopardise aggregate fiscal discipline. Part IV of the Report 
characterises fiscal decentralisation arrangements in the EU from both the expenditure and revenue side, 
based on Eurostat data and country-specific descriptions. It shows through econometric analysis that 
fiscal decentralisation is not in itself harmful for fiscal discipline, as long as subnational governments 
predominantly finance their expenditures with their own taxes and fees rather than with transfers from the 
central government. Policy concerns should therefore not focus on decentralisation as such but on 
decentralisations that are not accompanied by subnational responsibility on the revenue side. It is not who 
undertakes the spending that is important, but whether those spending are also those who are accountable 
to taxpayers. 
The reforms of fiscal governance adopted and proposed make the necessary budgetary consolidation at 
Member States' level more credible and equip the EU with much better tools to appropriately respond to 
future crises. Moreover financial backstops have been put in place since 2010 and progressively 
strengthened to guarantee the stability of the euro area, culminating in the adoption of a permanent crisis 
resolution mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism, in February of this year. While far-reaching, 
these measures still cannot solve all the current difficulties of the EU economies. While sound public 
finances are and will remain a cornerstone of the European Union's policy response to the crisis, 
complementary action on the fragile financial system is necessary. In this regard, the Euro Area Summit 
of 29 June affirmed that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.. These 
are all steps towards the achievement of a genuine economic and monetary union, for which a specific 
and time-bound road map is being prepared. 
 
Marco Buti 
 
Director-General 
Economic and Financial Affairs    
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Following the deep contraction the EU economy went through in 2009 
modest growth had returned in the third quarter of 2009 and with it came an 
expectation that albeit-slow return to normality had begun. While this seemed 
to be the case in 2010, by the end of 2011, the outlook had taken a downward 
turn. The expectation now is that real GDP will stagnate or go into slightly 
negative territory this year before picking up again in 2013 based on an 
appeasement of uncertainties linked to the situation in Greece and Spain. 
While there are some encouraging signs on the global stage in terms of the 
outlook for the world economy, the continued need for profound macro-
economic adjustment as a consequence of the imbalances that have built up 
during the last decade in the public and private sector weigh heavily on the 
growth outlook. 
The macroeconomic environment is thus characterized by considerable 
variation within the European Union..In 2011, economic growth exceeded 
3% in several Member States, but was negative in others like Greece, 
Portugal and Slovenia.  
Despite weaker growth in 2011 than forecast a year ago, overall public 
deficits were reduced thanks to strong consolidation efforts. In the euro area, 
the average general government deficit fell from 6.2% of GDP in 2010 to 
4.1% of GDP in 2011, and a similar improvement also occurred in the EU27. 
Around half of this improvement was structural, indicating that consolidation 
measures and economic growth played a roughly equal role in reducing the 
deficit. The better budgetary positions in the euro area were primarily 
expenditure-based. 
In the euro area, budget balances vary widely.  While the highest deficit 
amounted to 13% of GDP (Ireland), two countries were able to bring their 
deficit below the 3%-of-GDP Treaty limit in a sustainable manner (Bulgaria 
and Germany). Yet, twenty one Member States remain subject to the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure.  
Overall, the reduction in deficits is forecast to continue in 2012 and 2013. 
According to the Commission services' Spring 2012 forecast, public deficit is 
set to shrink to 3.8% of GDP in 2012 and then to fall further to 3.4% in 2013 
for the EU as a whole. The combination of continued falling deficits 
alongside a widening output gap for 2012 means that overall the fiscal stance 
is expected to turn pro-cyclical this year, before turning counter-cyclical 
again in 2013 with the anticipated return of stronger growth, although in an 
environment of large and negative output gap.  
In view of the substantial debt increase induced by the crisis, the Member 
States plan for pursuing ambitious fiscal consolidation plans. Their Stability 
and Convergence Programmes (SCPs), which were submitted to the 
Commission and Council in Spring as part of the European Semester, show 
that they have broadly the same expectations on growth than the 
Commission. They broadly maintain their nominal fiscal targets in spite of 
the foreseen protraction of the cyclical slowdown currently underway. On 
aggregate, both the EU27 and the euro area are projecting that they will 
significantly improve their fiscal positions every year between 2011 and 
2015, with the time profile of the consolidation being relatively front-loaded. 
Recent economic 
developments have 
been worse than 
expected… 
…and the differences 
across countries are 
particularly marked 
Despite disappointing 
growth developments, 
deficits have been 
reduced thanks to 
decisive expenditure-
based fiscal 
consolidation plans…. 
…and are expected 
to shrink further in 2012 
and 2013 
The budgetary plans 
submitted by Member 
States show continued 
structural tightening 
over 2012 and 2013… 
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This overall pattern conceals considerable variation across Member States, 
with Ireland, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and the United Kingdom showing the largest deficit reductions in 
their 2012 budgets. 
The consolidation plans set out in the SCPs rely on large structural 
tightening. The average structural balance in both the EU27 and euro area 
should fall by over 3 percentage points of GDP over the four years from 2011 
to 2015. For a number of Member States, the pace of consolidation tends to 
be more moderate as they move out of excessive deficits and embark on the 
adjustment path towards their medium-term objective (MTO). The marked 
structural improvement of around 1½ percentage points of GDP expected for 
2012, as opposed to the planned structural tightening close to 1 percentage 
point in last year's SCPs, indicates that the Member States have generally 
undertaken additional structural adjustments, while macroeconomic 
conditions are less favourable.  
It is evident, that economic growth is a key concern: this is the reason why 
the EU, in line with its Europe 2020 growth strategy, proposed in the context 
of the European Semester, country-specific recommendations for the reforms 
that need to be undertaken to deliver stability, growth and jobs. However, the 
weak growth environment poses a challenge to fiscal consolidation. One 
element that plays a role in the relationship between growth and 
consolidation is the composition of the consolidation. Consolidations based 
on expenditure rather than revenues tend in general to be more lasting and 
more growth-supporting in the medium-term, but more recessive in the short-
term. Indeed, the improvements in the budgetary positions in the euro area 
between 2010 and 2011 have been primarily engineered via expenditure 
restraint. However, this has been also achieved through phasing out the 
stimulus programmes of 2009, including reductions in public investment.  
According to plans set out in the SCPs, Member States project to base further 
fiscal consolidation on expenditure cuts, thus aiming at making it as durable 
as possible. 
The need to restore the credibility in the public finances and the danger posed 
by large deficits and debts are obvious and even more so now that growth 
prospects are looking weak again. However, while weak growth causes larger 
deficits, the effect of consolidation on growth must also be taken into 
account. As a country consolidates, in the short-term aggregate demand falls 
and this has a negative impact on growth before the positive impacts from 
reduced interest payments and reduced taxation kicks in.  
 
However, consolidation remains a must in view of the effect of several years 
of the worst economic and financial crisis since World War II on overall 
government debt figures. Deficits may be falling on average, but they remain 
significant, and public support to the financial system continues to drive up 
public debt. In 2011, the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro area reached 
88% of GDP – some 20 percentage points higher than at the start of the crisis 
in 2007. Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland saw the highest increases in 
2011. Further expected increases in debt in 2012 and 2013 point to a euro 
…with the 
composition of the 
consolidations being 
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medium-term growth. 
This is in line with the 
overall long-term 
European growth 
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through an adequate 
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area debt to GDP ratio of 92.6% of GDP by 2013, with a possibility of higher 
levels resulting from any further public interventions in the financial sector.   
A number of countries have faced strong pressure from financial markets, as 
doubts about their ability to finance their increased debt have led to 
unprecedented spreads on the interest rates on their sovereign debt. Within 
the euro area, Greece, Ireland and Portugal have been granted financial 
assistance, enabling them to access funds from outside the markets, subject to 
strict conditionality requirements. The case for strong and sustainable public 
finances no longer needs to be made – the events of recent times make the 
case for it evident. 
The aggravation of market tensions for some euro area countries led to the 
creation of financial backstops of last resort in order to safeguard stability of 
the euro area. The temporary firewalls that were gradually developed in the 
course of 2010 are currently providing financial support to Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal. At the end of 2010, the European Council decided to establish a 
permanent crisis resolution mechanism. Following technical and political 
decisions to enhance the mechanism's flexibility, euro area Member States 
signed a Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 
February 2012. The strict conditionality attached to the financial support 
provided by all these mechanisms implied a significant strengthening of 
economic and fiscal surveillance on the Member States concerned. 
The supervisory and regulatory framework of the banking system also 
underwent significant reforms. A new EU financial supervisory framework 
became operational in January 2011. In response to G20 commitments, the 
EU continues its financial regulation programme notably by strengthening 
the capital requirements for banks and by presenting a European framework 
for bank recovery and resolution. The proposed framework sets out the 
necessary steps and powers to ensure that bank failures across the EU are 
managed in a way which avoids financial instability and minimises costs for 
taxpayers. Moving towards a genuine banking union based on a single 
banking supervision mechanism, the June 29 Euro Area Summit confirmed 
that the Commission would present proposals to that effect. 
A major overhaul of the EU economic governance framework was proposed 
by the Commission in September 2010 and adopted by European Parliament 
and Council in the second half of 2011 (the so-called 'Six Pack'). With its 
entry into force in December 2011, the EU is now equipped with much 
stronger rules than before the start of the economic and financial crisis. 
The Six Pack legislation has strengthened a wide range of existing aspects of 
economic governance and introduced new ones. A new Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure has been set up to prevent or correct macroeconomic 
imbalances to reduce the risks of their unwinding resulting in sudden rises of 
government deficits and debt. In addition, the Six Pack introduced wide 
reforms to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which sets out the provisions 
according to which the Treaty requirements to ensure fiscal discipline are 
implements.  The SGP contains two arms – the preventive and the corrective 
– with the former setting the requirements for policy-making under normal 
circumstances and the latter dealing with the consequences of gross errors in 
fiscal policy making.  
…to a point where 
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As a result of the Six Pack legislation, the adjustment towards the medium-
term budgetary objective, which is the core concept of the preventive arm of 
the SGP, has a new dimension, easier to monitor. While compliance was 
previously assessed by looking at a country's structural balance, a new 
expenditure benchmark has been added, which will allow an early detection 
and correction of unsustainable expenditure developments. In the years prior 
to the onset of the crisis,  increases in expenditure were a key reason for a 
persistence of weak underlying public finances, which then left Member 
States with insufficient fiscal space to support their economies when the 
crisis hit.  As for the corrective arm, in line with the Treaty envisaging both a 
deficit and a debt criterion to examine compliance with budgetary discipline, 
a debt-reduction benchmark has been established to allow the opening of an 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) on the basis of an insufficiently 
diminishing debt-to-GDP ratio. Preceded by an assessment of the relevant 
factors, an EDP can now be launched for Member States whose debt exceeds 
60% of GDP and does not comply with the numerical debt benchmark, even 
if they show a deficit below 3% of GDP.  
The Six Pack also changed the provisions for enforcement of the SGP. For 
the euro area, enforcement is now ensured by an early and gradual system of 
financial sanctions, which can already be invoked in the preventive arm, in 
the case of inadequate measures to correct a significant deviation from the 
appropriate adjustment towards the MTO. Previously, the possibility of 
financial sanctions was limited to a very late stage of the corrective arm.  
The Six Pack also includes a new Directive on national budgetary 
frameworks aiming at promoting compliance with the SGP by introducing 
minimum standards for Member States' fiscal frameworks. Different 
frameworks can be compatible with EU budgetary framework, as long as 
their quality and the consistency of their rules is conducive to the 
achievement of the EU obligations. For this reason, the Directive requires 
only minimum standards, in particular with regard to accounting and 
statistics, forecasting, numerical fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary 
frameworks and transparency. But further initiatives have also been taken: in 
order to help countries that wish to go beyond the minimum requirements set 
out in the Directive, Member States also participate in an exchange of 
information in order to help identify best practices and provide examples of 
how to build stronger frameworks and institutions. The first meetings took 
place in November 2011.   
With the sovereign debt crisis intensifying over the course of 2011, the 
consensus in favour of deeper reforms, both at national and EU level, to 
support the euro area gained in strength and momentum. On 23 November 
2011, the Commission proposed two regulations further strengthening the 
budgetary and economic policy surveillance requirements and processes for 
the euro area. The first proposal aims at enhancing monitoring of budgetary 
policies of euro area Member States, including provisions specific to euro 
area Member States subject to Excessive Deficit Procedure, to which stricter 
monitoring requirements apply. The second proposal concerns euro area 
Member States experiencing severe difficulties with regard to their financial 
stability or receiving a financial assistance on a precautionary basis.  
The consensus for mirroring EU rules at national level is also behind the 
… reforms both the 
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Pact… 
….including a new 
toolbox of early and 
gradual enforcement 
mechanism… 
…and introduced 
minimum 
requirements for 
national budgetary 
frameworks. 
Since the euro area 
shares enhanced 
spillovers new 
proposals for 
additional surveillance 
requirements for euro 
area countries and a 
new procedure for 
countries 
experiencing severe 
difficulties, are 
underway. 
Summary 
 
 
5 
signature of the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance (TSCG) 
that was signed by 25 Member States (all EU countries except the United 
Kingdom and Czech Republic) on 2 March 2012 and that is currently 
undergoing the process of ratification. The TSCG commits participating euro 
area countries to the Fiscal Compact which reinforces the obligation to reach 
the MTO already envisaged by the preventive arm of the SGP through 
national rules and automatic corrective mechanisms. 
The adoption of these initiatives, has not, of course, solved the debt crisis. 
Whatever the extent of the improvement, a reform of the economic 
governance framework cannot suddenly solve a crisis which is fundamentally 
a (private and government) balance sheet problem. Overcoming the current 
crisis requires deleveraging in both the public and private sectors. The 
reforms adopted and proposed enhance the credibility of the planned fiscal 
adjustment and thus reduce its negative short term impact on real GDP 
growth and set up the framework for better policy-making in the years when 
growth has returned.  
It has been however claimed in some corners that there are circumstances in 
which consolidation can lead to dynamics where consolidating may lead to  
increase rather than reduce debt-to-GDP ratios, at least in the short-term. In 
particular, such counter-intuitive dynamics would play out when the effect of 
a consolidation has such a negative impact on the economy, that government 
debt as a share of GDP increases significantly due to the shrinking of its 
denominator (other things being equal, as GDP falls, debt as a share of GDP 
increases). This then has the effect of increasing the interest payments in 
GDP and requires further consolidation which further increases the debt 
burden. Part III shows that this would be the case only under very restrictive 
assumptions. 
The main factors driving the success of a consolidation in reducing the debt 
ratio are the value of the fiscal multiplier (which measures the reaction of the 
economic output to a budgetary expansion or consolidation by the 
government) and the reaction of sovereign yields to consolidation. The size 
of first-year multipliers is larger if the fiscal consolidation is based on 
government expenditures – and government investment in particular – if the 
measures taken are not credible and temporary, if agents are not financially 
constrained and if the monetary policy stance is such as to reduce real interest 
rates along with the fiscal shock. The negative output effects of 
consolidations are larger if consolidations are implemented at the same time 
worldwide. The composition of consolidation has an impact on long-term 
output with tax-based consolidations less supportive of long-term growth.  
However, there is a growing understanding that fiscal multipliers are non-
linear and become larger in crisis periods due to uncertainty about aggregate 
demand and credit conditions, the presence of slack in the economy, the 
larger share of consumers that are liquidity constrained, and to the more 
accommodative stance of monetary policy. Given these findings, it is 
reasonable to suspect that in the present juncture the multipliers for 
composition-balanced permanent consolidations are higher than normal. The 
simulations conducted show that it cannot be excluded that counter-intuitive 
effects on the debt ratio may arise under certain, very specific, strong 
In the current juncture 
consolidation is 
inescapable in many 
EU Member States. 
The success or failure 
of a consolidation 
depends on the 
reaction of the 
economy and on the 
nature of the 
consolidation pursued. 
Estimating the 
parameters for the EU 
economies shows that 
counterintuitive 
effects of 
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unlikely…. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
6 
assumptions. Such short-term effects are countered if the immediate reaction 
of interest rates to consolidation is very large.  
These effects, however, can only arise, if several factors play out at the same 
time: the effects of consolidation on GDP would last various years, the deficit 
reduction would induce a large increase on average effective interest rates 
(contrary to what is normally expected and estimated in consolidations) the 
increase in risk premia induced by a higher observed debt ratio are ten times 
the average estimates and, finally, financial markets would suffer from a high 
degree of myopia. Simulations based on projections for the EU Member 
States yield the result that given these extreme assumptions, such debt-
increasing effect of consolidations would in general be short-lived.  
Consolidation needs within the European fiscal framework is based on 
general government balance, which is the appropriate level as overall debt 
sustainability is the key element of the Stability and Growth Pact.  This is the 
reason why budgetary targets set within the EU fiscal surveillance framework 
apply to the whole of general government. However, the responsibility for 
their achievement rests on central government only.In recent years, EU 
policymakers have increasingly raised the concern that the behaviour of 
subnational governments may be one of the factors hindering the 
achievement of budgetary targets at general government level. The necessity 
of consolidation and the implementation of minimum requirements for 
national budgetary framework have given prominence to the necessity of 
designing carefully fiscal rules for subnational authorities within EU Member 
States, especially against the trend towards increasing fiscal decentralisation 
across most of the EU from both the expenditure and revenue sides. 
Part IV documents that, albeit with some cross-country heterogeneity, this 
trend concerns also traditionally centralised countries, with common patterns 
emerging with respects to the functions that are more frequently devolved to 
subnational tiers. In many cases, functions that used to be centralized along 
with expenditures that have a markedly local dimension have been devolved 
– fully or in part – to subnational tiers of government. However fiscal 
responsibility has not always followed, as transfers from the central 
government tend to predominate over taxes as the main revenue source of 
subnational governments across the EU and truly autonomous subnational 
taxes are quantitatively important mainly in the more decentralised Member 
States. However subnational governments are often subject to fiscal rules, 
but, generally, default of subnational entities in fiscal distress is de facto 
ruled out, although central government 'bailout' often comes at the price of 
much tighter central control on subnational policies. 
…and even so, they 
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Part IV also investigates the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
fiscal outcomes of general government in the EU through econometric 
analysis. It appears that fiscal decentralisation is not harmful for budgetary 
discipline at the general government level per se, although it is likely to have 
an adverse effect if predominantly financed by transfers from the central 
government and if not matched by subnational governments having the 
responsibility for financing the expenditures through their own taxes and 
fees. This is in line with theoretical predictions underlining the risk of a 'soft-
budget constraint' associated with a high reliance on transfers. Therefore, the 
policy concerns over possible adverse implications on budget balances 
should not focus on decentralisation as such but on a 'bad' design of 
decentralisation, i.e. one which is not accompanied by subnational financial 
responsibility. With respect to fiscal rules applying to subnational 
governments, borrowing rules appear to partly counteract the adverse effect 
of transfers on fiscal balances. 
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The recovery which had followed the worst 
economic crisis since World War II is now stalling 
with the euro area and the whole EU economy 
being estimated to have been in a mild recession 
over the last few months. After the deep recession 
in 2009 and the temporary rebound in 2010 
followed by a still favourable beginning of 2011, 
GDP growth started to slow again in the course of 
2011. In particular, the final weeks of the year 
brought about sluggish growth, tensions in many 
sovereign debt markets and banking sector 
fragility, which spread over the first months of 
2012. GDP is expected to slightly decrease in 2012 
in the euro area and to remain flat in the EU, with 
higher growth of the rest of the world leading to a 
slow recovery as of the second half of the year, 
assuming the resolution of present uncertainties in 
the sovereign and banking markets. Against this 
background, the Euro Area Summit of June 29 
stressed the necessity to break the vicious circle 
between banks and sovereigns and supported a 
proposal for an effective single supervisory 
mechanism for banks in the euro area allowing the 
European Stability Mechanism (see box I.1.1) the 
possibility to recapitalize banks directly relying on 
appropriate conditionality. The introduction of 
such a novelty and the financial support to Spain 
will help the return to financial stability. 
However, growth developments in the EU are now 
diverging more strongly across Member States 
than in previous years. In 2011, GDP growth 
ranged from high positive rates of over 3% in 
several Member States to negative growth in 
others. GDP growth is expected to be widely 
differentiated also in 2012, with a certain number 
of countries going back to negative growth. 
The public finances continue to be heavily affected 
by adverse GDP and labour market developments 
and the majority of EU countries posted a 2011 
government deficit above 3% of GDP, although 
Member States reduced deficits substantially in 
2011. The euro area headline deficit decreased by 
two points to 4.1% of GDP, with a similar 
improvement registered in the EU as a whole. 
Within the euro area, all Member States posted 
improvements, with the exception of Cyprus and 
Slovenia but with highly differentiated budgetary 
positions. The stronger budgetary positions in the 
euro area were primarily due to a lower 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio.  
According to the Commission services' Spring 
2012 forecasts, the improvements in the budgetary 
positions are expected to continue, although 
downside risks remain and country-specific 
developments differ widely. The aggregate general 
government deficit for the euro area and the EU is 
expected to shrink by 0.9 percentage points to 
reach 3.1% of GDP (3.6% of GDP for the EU) in 
2012 with a further improvement in 2013, despite 
the fact that the additional effect of high interest 
expenditures kicks in. As a consequence of 
continued structural fiscal tightening coupled with 
widening negative output gaps, in several EU 
Member States the fiscal stance is forecast to be 
pro-cyclical in 2012, albeit to a very different 
degree. 
High budget deficits and overall modest real GDP 
growth with public interventions in the financial 
system continued to drive up public debt. In 2011 
the debt-to-GDP for the euro area amounted to 
88% (83.0% for the EU) 2.4 (2.8 for the EU) 
percentage points up on 2010. A further increase in 
debt in 2012 to 92.6% of GDP in the euro area 
(87.3% in the EU) by 2013 is projected in 
Commission services' Spring 2012 forecast. 
Moreover a high risk remains of further public 
intervention in the financial sector in certain 
countries. Public finance developments and 
outlook in the euro area and in the EU are analysed 
in Chapter I.1. Consolidation can have a negative 
short-term impact on aggregate demand, as 
discussed in more detail in Part III. However, 
consolidation is necessary in many EU Member 
States, especially those under a macroeconomic-
adjustment programme or those under heavy 
pressure from the financial markets in order to 
avoid dangerously spiralling interest rates. It is 
therefore important that consolidation is done in a 
way that preserves growth prospects in the 
medium-term and accompanied by appropriate 
structural reforms.  
Chapter I.2 focusses on the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) and describes the developments 
in the application of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) in the first year following the major reform 
strengthening EU fiscal governance which was 
approved by the legislator, in late 2011. 
Developments in this area reflect the fact that in 
2011 the government deficit exceeded the 3% of 
GDP reference value in seventeen Member States. 
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The Council abrogated the Finnish EDP in 2011 
and the Bulgarian and the German EDPs in 2012.   
It is worth stressing that in the case of Hungary the 
Council took recourse in 2012, for the first time, to 
the possibility of suspending cohesion fund 
commitments following Hungary's non-
compliance with its EDP recommendation. Such a 
decision was lifted by the Council upon the 
conclusion that Hungary had made adequate 
progress towards a timely correction of the 
excessive deficit. 
Chapter I.3 provides an overview of the 2012 
updates of the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCPs) submitted by Member States 
in the context of the European Semester. As this 
round of SCPs and the related assessment is the 
first one based on the new provisions of the SGP, 
the Chapter provides, besides the examination of 
macroeconomic assumptions and budgetary 
objectives, an analysis of the SCPs also relative to 
the expenditure benchmark and the debt reduction 
benchmark.  
In view of the persistent pressure on the euro area 
sovereign debt markets but also the less favourable 
growth assumptions, the February 2012 ECOFIN 
Council had reaffirmed the principle of 
differentiated fiscal exit strategies taking into 
account country-specific macro-financial 
situations. Together with the EDP 
recommendations, these principles represent the 
basis for the assessments of the programmes. In 
the context of the European Semester, the Council 
recommendations are expected to feed into the 
national budgets for 2013. 
The overall picture emerging from the SCPs is one 
of stagnation of GDP growth in 2012, followed by 
some recovery in 2013, in line with the 2012 
Commission Spring forecast. Relatively large 
differences are found only for Bulgaria and 
Sweden.  
Member States plan to continue consolidating in 
spite of the foreseen protraction of the cyclical 
slowdown. On aggregate, both the euro area and 
the EU27 plan to improve significantly their fiscal 
positions every year between 2011 and 2015, with 
the time profile of the consolidation being 
relatively front-loaded. According to the SCP 
plans, the average structural balance in both the 
euro area and the EU27 should fall by over 3pps of 
GDP over the four years from 2011 to 2015.  
For a number of Member States, the pace of 
consolidation tends to be more moderate as they 
move out of excessive deficits and embark on the 
adjustment path towards their medium-term 
objective (MTO). The marked average structural 
improvement of around 1½ pp of GDP expected 
for 2012, as opposed to the planned structural 
tightening close to 1 pp in last year's SCPs, 
indicates that the Member States have generally 
reacted to less favourable macroeconomic 
conditions with additional structural contractions. 
Further structural improvements of similar size are 
projected for the remainder of the programme 
period.  
This overall pattern conceals however considerable 
variation across Member States, with Ireland, 
Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom 
showing the largest deficit reductions already in 
their 2012 budgets. On average, the consolidations 
set out in the SCPs for both the euro area and the 
EU27 are primarily expenditure-based. Also the 
composition in terms of revenues is tilted towards 
indirect taxes, thus favouring medium-term 
growth. 
The main risks are related to policy 
implementation as overall the national budgetary 
projections appear to rely on especially favourable 
assumptions on growth, revenue or expenditure in 
the cases of Belgium, Spain, France, Poland, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Sweden and the 
Netherlands, although, in the case of the last two 
Member States, favourable macroeconomic 
assumptions and optimistic expenditure projections 
are partially compensated by prudent estimates on 
the revenue side. 
The SCPs project that in the euro area debt will 
reach 85% of GDP (80% in the EU) at the end of 
the programme period after having peaked in 2012. 
Hence, as long as the consolidation measures are 
not reversed after 2014, debt should be on a 
declining path for the years beyond the 
programmes’ horizon. In all Member States except 
Denmark and Luxembourg, debt is projected to 
peak before 2015. However, in Spain and the 
United Kingdom, the projected reduction in 2015 
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is small and reaching back the pre-crisis debt 
levels is likely to take many further years. 
According to the new rules accompanying the 
evolution towards the debt reduction benchmark 
established by the reform of the Pact (and detailed 
in Part II), the structural government balance in 
Member States whose current debt-to-GDP ratio is 
above the 60% threshold and that are currently in 
EDP, has to evolve so that it is guaranteed that the 
respect of the debt benchmark will be respected 
three years after the end of the EDP. According to 
the plans set out in the SCPs all Member State 
concerned by this transition period would 
implement structural adjustments large enough to 
ensure sufficient progress towards the debt 
reduction benchmark by the end of their transition 
period. 
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1.1. A STALLING AND DIFFERENTIATED 
RECOVERY 
The recovery which has followed the worst 
economic crisis since World War II is now 
stalling, with the euro area and the EU economy 
being estimated to have been in a mild recession 
over the last few months. In early 2012, thanks to 
determined policy responses and a strengthening of 
the institutional framework underpinning 
economic policy in the EU, tensions in financial 
markets receded and private sector confidence 
returned. These developments are now subject to 
the effects of the persisting concerns about the 
situation in the sovereign market and in the 
banking sector. Following an assumption that 
confidence will strengthen over time, as the 
challenges raised by the crisis are successfully 
addressed, including through the strong 
implementation of the agreed determined policy 
actions, an expected higher growth of the world 
economy is set to lead to a slow recovery taking 
off in the second half of the current year, and 
further accelerating in 2013. In other words, the 
recovery might be stalling only temporarily and 
would resume, under the condition that funding 
costs in vulnerable Member States and risks 
related to the overall policy environment can be 
kept in check. Forthcoming proposals towards a 
banking union should mitigate financial instability. 
Graph I.1.1 shows the GDP growth projections 
according to the Commission services' Spring 
2012 forecast. (
1
) For the euro area the graph 
shows a deep recession in 2009 with GDP 
shrinking by 4.3% followed by a recovery in 2010 
(1.9%) and 2011 (1.5%) expected to stall in 2012 
(0.3%). For the EU27, the pattern of GDP 
developments looks similar, output shrunk by 
4.3% in 2009, grew by 2.0% in 2010 and by 1.5% 
in 2011 and is expected to stagnate in 2012. For 
both the euro area and the EU27, the outlook for 
2013 is for a rebound of growth of 1.3% and 1.0% 
respectively, driven by external demand. However, 
in spite of encouraging signs pertaining to the 
overall situation of the world economy, concerns 
about fiscal sustainability in several EU Member 
States weigh heavily on the growth outlook, by 
adding uncertainty and presenting downside risks. 
                                                          
(1) See Europen Commission (2012a). 
Correspondingly, output gaps in the euro area and 
the EU are expected to widen again to reach the 
negative levels of –2.6 and –2.7 respectively; in 
both cases this is slightly worse than in 2010 when 
the corresponding gaps were –2.4 and –2.5. More 
details are given in Section I.1.3 below. 
Growth developments in the EU are now diverging 
more strongly across Member States than in 
previous years. These wide disparities depend, 
inter alia, on different structural challenges and 
further domestic and external imbalances, with 
developments in competitiveness being 
particularly important. While some Member States 
are growing, others still remain in –or are re-
entering – recession. In 2011, GDP growth ranged 
from high positive rates of over 3% of GDP in 
several Member States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Poland, Sweden, Slovakia, Austria and Germany) 
to negative growth in Greece, Portugal and 
Slovenia. Within each of these two categories there 
was again considerable variation, with the 
extremes being growth of 7.6% in Estonia and –
6.9% in Greece. In the large Member States, real 
GDP is expected to grow by between 2.7% in 
Poland and -1.8% in Spain this year. In Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, the Netherlands, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Belgium and the Czech 
Republic the output change is forecast to stagnate 
or to be in the negative territory, sometimes 
markedly. 
The economic crisis has also had visible effects on 
the labour market. From the low of 7.6% in the 
euro area (7.1% in 2008), the euro area 
unemployment rate has risen rapidly, although 
reacting with a lag to real GDP developments. In 
the euro area  it stood at 10.1% in 2010, to increase 
marginally to 10.2% in 2011 (EU27 at 9.7% in 
both years). Unemployment is expected to remain 
at the higher level of 11% in the euro area (10.3% 
in EU27) in both 2012 and 2013.  
However, labour market developments differ 
markedly across countries, with weaker Member 
States hit by rapid deterioration of labour market 
and Member States with better growth observing 
an increase in employment levels. A very 
considerable deterioration in the labour market is 
expected in countries undergoing large-scale 
economic adjustments, while some others are set to 
experience some improvements, albeit of a mostly 
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limited order. Adverse labour market 
developments affect the sustainability of the public 
finances directly via the usual revenue and 
expenditure channels. Moreover, the current 
malfunctioning of credit markets in some Member 
States such as Spain further compounds the major 
policy challenge for the euro area and the EU 
economy to reduce unemployment. 
Graph I.1.1: Real GDP growth developments 
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Source: Commission services. 
1.2. SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR THE BUDGET BALANCE  
In 2011, the budgetary positions in the euro area 
and the EU improved significantly in comparison 
to 2010, when they had broadly stalled, and to the 
two preceding years where they had dramatically 
deteriorated. Table I.1.1 shows the budget balances 
for all EU27 countries from 2009 to 2013 on the 
basis of the Commission services' Spring 2012 
forecast, while Table I.1.2 breaks down the general 
government balance for the euro area into its 
constituent parts over the years 2008 to 2013. As 
Table I.1.1 shows, the euro area average headline 
deficit came in at 4.1% of GDP in 2011, down 
from the 6.2% in 2010. This is still far above the 
historical low of 0.7% posted in 2007 before the 
outbreak of the crisis. As shown in Table I.1.2, the 
average general government deficit in the EU 
decreased by 2 percentage points reaching 4.5% of 
GDP in 2011. In both the euro area and the EU, the 
decrease in the headline deficit was matched by a 
decrease about half this size in the structural deficit 
– headline deficit net of cyclical factors and one-
off and other temporary measures; by 1.0% and 
1.1% respectively.  This strengthening of the 
structural balance suggests that the improvement in 
the headline deficit was of both a structural and a 
cyclical nature, in roughly equal proportions.  
Within the euro area, all Member States posted 
improvements in 2011, with the exception of 
Cyprus and Slovenia. The deficit was highest at 
13.0% of GDP in Ireland, which had however 
experienced an unprecedented deterioration in the 
budget balance the year before. Several other 
Member States also posted significant 
improvements. Among these are Germany, 
Portugal and Slovakia. Improvements of between 1 
and 2 percentage points of GDP were recorded in 
Greece, France, Malta and Austria. In all euro area 
countries except Germany, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Malta, Finland and Estonia, the deficit in 2011 
exceeded the 3% of GDP reference value of the 
Treaty. Estonia is the only euro area Member State 
to have posted a surplus, of 1.0% of GDP. 
According to the Commission services' Spring 
2012 forecast, further improvements in the 
budgetary positions are expected in 2012 and 
2013, although downside risks remain and 
country-specific developments differ widely. 
Against the current growth outlook, the aggregate 
general government deficit of the euro area 
Member States is expected to reach 3.2% of GDP 
in 2012, 0.9 percentage points lower than the year 
before. A further improvement to 2.9% of GDP is 
projected for 2013. Broadly the same profile is 
expected for the EU as a whole. The aggregate 
deficit is forecast to decline to 3.8% of GDP in 
2012, from 4.5% in 2011, and to continue to 
decrease to 3.4% of GDP in 2013. 
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Outside the euro area, the general picture conveyed 
by the Commission services' Spring 2012 forecast 
is one of continued deficit reduction. The Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Romania are expected to bring down the general 
government net borrowing to 3% of GDP or below 
in either 2012 or 2013. Bulgaria is expected to 
continue running deficits below the 3% threshold 
over the forecast horizon, while in Sweden close-
to-balance headline budgetary positions are 
projected for both 2012 and 2013. While a further 
substantial budgetary improvement of 1.6 pps. is 
forecast for the United Kingdom in 2012, the 
deficit is expected to fall only by 0.2 pp. in 2013.  
Due in part to the one-off accounting impact of 
pension reforms, the deficit in Hungary is forecast 
to revert to 2.6% of GDP in 2012, following a 
surplus in 2011. 
The structural balance is estimated to improve in 
2012 by 1.3 pps. of GDP in the euro area and 1.1 
pps in the EU as a whole. For 2013, further limited 
improvements of the order of 0.2 pp. of GDP in the 
euro area and of 0.5 pp. in the EU as a whole are 
projected. The more limited reduction expected for 
2013 is linked to the no- policy-change scenario 
underlying Commission services' forecasts, which 
implies that only measures that have been 
specified in sufficient details have been taken into 
account. In several EU Member States, namely 
Bulgaria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, fiscal policy is forecast to be pro-
cyclically tightening in 2012, albeit  to a very 
variable degree. 
None of the euro area countries that had attained 
their medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) in 
2008 managed to meet their MTO in 2010. In 2011 
Finland was the only euro area Member State 
which had achieved its objective. Section I.1.3 
considers the MTOs, which are set to be updated in 
2012, in more detail. Structural fiscal positions are 
forecast to remain weak over the forecast horizon, 
and despite some improvements, very few EU 
countries will be near to attaining their MTOs in 
either 2012 or 2013.  
 
Table I.1.1: Budget balances in EU Member States (% of GDP) 
2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
BE -5.6 -3.9 -3.9 -3.1 -3.3 -3.7 -3.2 -3.4 -2.7 -2.6 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.7 0.7
DE -3.2 -4.3 -1.0 -0.9 -0.7 -1.3 -2.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3 1.4 0.2 1.8 2.1 2.0
EE -2.0 0.3 1.0 -2.4 -1.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.2 -0.8 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3
IE -14.0 -31.2 -13.0 -8.3 -7.5 -9.7 -9.6 -8.4 -8.1 -7.9 -7.6 -6.5 -4.9 -4.1 -2.4
EL -15.6 -10.5 -9.2 -7.3 -8.4 -14.7 -9.0 -5.7 -2.9 -4.5 -9.6 -3.4 1.2 3.4 1.9
ES -11.2 -9.3 -8.5 -6.4 -6.3 -8.7 -7.4 -7.3 -4.8 -4.8 -6.9 -5.4 -4.9 -1.6 -1.5
FR -7.6 -7.1 -5.2 -4.5 -4.2 -6.2 -5.7 -4.1 -3.2 -2.9 -3.7 -3.3 -1.5 -0.6 -0.2
IT -5.4 -4.5 -3.8 -1.9 -1.0 -4.0 -3.6 -3.6 -0.7 -0.1 0.7 1.0 1.3 4.7 5.5
LU -0.8 -0.9 -0.6 -1.8 -2.2 1.3 0.5 0.4 -0.6 -1.4 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.0 -0.8
NL -5.6 -5.0 -4.6 -4.4 -4.6 -4.1 -3.8 -3.5 -2.4 -2.5 -1.9 -1.8 -1.4 -0.3 -0.3
AT -4.1 -4.5 -2.6 -3.0 -1.9 -2.7 -3.3 -2.4 -2.2 -1.8 0.0 -0.6 0.2 0.5 0.9
PT -10.2 -9.8 -4.2 -4.7 -3.1 -8.6 -8.4 -6.2 -3.0 -1.3 -5.8 -5.6 -2.3 1.8 3.7
SI -6.1 -6.0 -6.4 -4.3 -3.8 -4.4 -4.5 -3.9 -2.2 -1.9 -3.0 -2.9 -2.0 0.3 0.7
FI -2.7 -2.8 -0.9 -1.0 -0.6 0.8 -0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 1.9 0.5 1.7 1.5 1.6
MT -3.8 -3.7 -2.7 -2.6 -2.9 -3.5 -4.4 -3.3 -3.5 -3.3 -0.4 -1.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.1
CY -6.1 -5.3 -6.3 -3.4 -2.5 -5.9 -5.0 -5.5 -2.7 -1.7 -3.3 -2.7 -3.1 0.5 1.6
SK -8.0 -7.7 -4.8 -4.8 -5.1 -7.7 -7.3 -5.1 -4.4 -4.6 -6.3 -5.9 -3.5 -2.5 -2.5
EA-17 -6.4 -6.2 -4.1 -3.2 -2.9 -4.6 -4.4 -3.4 -2.1 -1.9 -1.7 -1.6 -0.4 1.1 1.4
BG -4.3 -3.1 -2.1 -1.9 -1.7 -3.1 -1.5 -1.0 -0.7 -0.8 -2.3 -0.9 -0.3 0.1 0.2
CZ -5.8 -4.8 -3.1 -2.9 -2.6 -5.6 -4.6 -2.6 -1.8 -1.8 -4.3 -3.2 -1.2 -0.4 -0.3
DK -2.7 -2.7 -1.9 -4.2 -2.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 -1.7 -1.0 2.4 1.8 1.9 -0.1 0.4
LV -9.7 -8.1 -3.5 -2.1 -2.1 -6.6 -5.0 -3.2 -2.2 -1.7 -5.1 -3.5 -1.7 -0.6 0.1
LT -9.4 -7.3 -5.5 -3.2 -2.8 -7.2 -5.1 -4.6 -2.9 -2.1 -5.9 -3.3 -2.8 -0.8 0.0
HU -4.5 -4.3 4.2 -2.6 -3.0 -2.2 -3.6 -4.3 -2.1 -2.0 2.5 0.4 -0.2 2.0 2.1
PL -7.4 -7.9 -5.1 -3.0 -2.5 -7.4 -7.5 -5.0 -2.8 -1.9 -4.8 -4.8 -2.3 -0.1 0.9
RO -9.0 -6.8 -5.2 -2.8 -2.2 -9.6 -6.1 -3.3 -1.8 -1.2 -8.1 -4.6 -1.7 0.0 0.6
SE -1.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.5 -0.1 2.5 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 3.5 1.9 1.1 1.4 1.5
UK -11.4 -10.2 -8.3 -8.0 -6.9 -9.4 -8.8 -6.9 -6.9 -5.1 -7.4 -5.9 -3.7 -3.5 -1.6
EU-27 -6.9 -6.5 -4.5 -3.8 -3.4 -5.1 -4.9 -3.8 -2.7 -2.2 -2.4 -2.2 -0.8 0.4 0.9
Structural primary balanceBudget balance Structural balance
 
Note: The structural budget balance is calculated on the basis of the commonly agreed production function method (see European Commission 
(2004)). 
*Figure from Commission services' Spring 2012 forecast.  
Source:  Commission services. 
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1.3. CONSOLIDATION CONTINUES IN THE EU  
The previous figures are completed by the 
observation that the euro area primary balance is 
expected to be balanced in 2012 with the structural 
primary balance showing on average an 
improvement of roughly two and half points of 
GDP in only two years – the corresponding figure 
for the EU is of the same order of magnitude. 
While in some Member States fiscal exit had 
already started in 2010, in 2011 all EU Member 
States begun to withdraw the fiscal stimulus 
measures which they had put into operation in 
2009–2010 to support their economies. As a result, 
the structural balance improved and is set to 
continue to do so in 2012, despite the inertia linked 
to the level of non-cyclical expenditure. Similarly, 
in 2011 the average headline deficit has decreased 
along with the shrinking of the negative output 
gap, and is also set to continue to do so in 2012.  
These achievements are remarkable, since while 
the output gap was narrowing by more than one 
percentage point between 2010 and 2011, it is 
expected to widen in 2012 to reach again 2010 
levels – as noted in Section I.1.1. Therefore the 
fiscal stance is expected to be pro-cyclical in 2012. 
However, according to the Commission services 
Spring 2012 forecast, the expected growth rebound 
in 2013 would narrow output gaps, thereby 
entailing a countercyclical fiscal stance.  
Notwithstanding large differences across Member 
States, a restrictive fiscal stance stems from the 
fact that consolidation has become a necessity 
given the peak levels reached by debt from an 
historical perspective after the beginning of the 
financial crisis. Indeed the budgetary legacy of the 
economic and financial crisis of 2009–2010 has 
compounded already existing high debt levels in 
the EU. In some countries this has seriously put at 
risk fiscal sustainability. Thus overall, despite the 
short-term adverse effect on growth, consolidating 
in line with SGP requirements is the only option 
for many EU countries. (
2
) 
In particular, , as stipulated in conclusions of the 
ECOFIN Council from February 2012,(
3
)  Member 
States benefiting from a financial assistance 
programme should stick to the targets as agreed in 
the programme and should fully and timely 
implement the policy measures, including in 
particular structural reforms, agreed in the 
respective Memorandum of Understanding. 
Similarly, Member States facing close market 
scrutiny should continue to meet the agreed 
budgetary targets and stand ready to pursue further 
consolidation measures if needed.  
The strain that the crisis left on government 
finances (
4
) is explained by three factors: the role 
of the automatic stabilisers in reaction to the crisis, 
the introduction of discretionary measures 
including the large-scale support to the financial 
                                                          
(2) Successfully tackling the debt crisis as set out in the five-
point plan of the Council of October 2011 requires further 
bold consolidation efforts along these lines. 
(3) The conclusions of the ECOFIN Council are available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press/press-
releases/economic-and-financial-affairs?BID=93&lang=en 
(4) During the first phase of the crisis, between 2007 and 2009, 
the budget balance deteriorated from a deficit of 0.7% of 
GDP to 6.4% in the euro area and from 0.9% of GDP to 
6.9% in the EU. 
 
Table I.1.2: Euro area - The General government budget balance (% of GDP) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
Total revenue (1) 45.0 44.8 44.7 45.3 46.2 46.1
Total expenditure (2) 47.1 51.2 51.0 49.4 49.4 49.0
Actual balance (3) = (1) - (2) -2.1 -6.4 -6.2 -4.1 -3.2 -2.9
Interest (4) 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.2
Primary balance (5) = (3) + (4) 0.9 -3.5 -3.4 -1.1 0.0 0.3
One-offs (6) -0.1 0.0 -0.7 0.1 0.1 0.0
Cyclically adjusted  balance (7) -2.9 -4.6 -5.1 -3.3 -2.0 -1.8
Cyclically adj. prim. balance = (7) + (4)   0.2 -1.8 -2.3 -0.2 1.2 1.4
Structural budget balance = (7) -(6) -2.8 -4.6 -4.4 -3.4 -2.1 -1.9
Change in actual balance: -1.4 -4.3 0.2 2.1 0.9 0.3
              - Cycle -0.6 -2.4 -0.1 1.1 -0.4 0.1
              - Interest 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0
              - Cycl.adj.prim.balance -0.9 -2.0 -0.5 2.0 1.5 0.2
                    - One-offs -0.1 0.0 -0.6 0.8 0.0 -0.1
                   - Structural budget balance -0.8 -1.8 0.2 1.0 1.3 0.2  
Note: Differences between totals and sum of individual items are due to rounding. 
*Figure from Commission services' Spring 2012 forecast. 
Source:  Commission services. 
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sector, and, in some Member States, the fall in 
revenues due to the bursting of housing and/or 
credit bubbles. This latter effect is significant in 
countries where, before the crisis, real estate 
bubbles temporarily masked an underlying fiscal 
weakness because the buoyancy of tax receipts 
depended heavily on real estate transactions. As 
these revenues plummeted the underlying 
weaknesses of fiscal positions showed up. 
Automatic stabilisers (
5
) represented around half of 
the deterioration in 2009, and various types of 
support measures explain the other half. Many of 
these support measures then remained in place in 
2010, when average headline deficits persisted at 
levels above 6% of GDP in the euro area and EU. 
The increases in deficits led to corresponding 
increases in debt. In addition, the debt ratios have 
risen substantially on the back of below-the-line 
operations in the context of the support to the 
financial sector. While this extra effect on debt 
measured as capital injections to banks accounted 
for less than 2% of GDP in 2009 in both the euro 
area and the EU, it has been rising continuously 
and reached around 3% of GDP at the end of 2011 
in both the euro area and the EU(
6
) with a very 
differentiated impact by country. 
1.4. SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR PUBLIC DEBT 
Graph I.1.2 displays the increases in debt projected 
between 2007 and 2013. It shows that debt in the 
euro area is projected to rise from 66.3% of GDP 
in 2007 to 92.7% in 2013 and from 59.0% to 
87.3% in the EU. Within these totals, there is 
considerable variation in both the starting levels of 
debt, which ranged from 3.7% of GDP in Estonia 
to 107.4% in Greece, and in the overall increases. 
By contrast, a decrease in public debt is forecast 
for Sweden. At the EU level, debt will not start to 
decrease before 2014. 
                                                          
(5) The automatic stabilisers vary across countries in their size 
and composition. Overall, in bad times, governments 
receive less revenue from taxes while spending levels tend 
to rise due to an increased burden on the social security 
system. However, automatic stabilisation mainly works 
through the inertia of expenditure with respect to cyclical 
swings in output: their share in GDP increases 
‘automatically’ in downturns and declines in upturns.  
(6) These are Commission services (DG ECFIN) elaborations 
based on a survey made by Member States within the 
context of the Economic and Financial Committee.   
Table I.1.3 shows that despite the impressive 
performance of the euro area and the EU in 
reducing government deficits, the contribution of 
the deficit to the increase in the debt ratio is still 
the largest, larger than the snowball effect. (
7
) 
At a country level, Member States with higher 
starting levels of debt are more likely to face both 
a snowball effect  of debt and an increase in the 
interest rate as markets may doubt countries' 
ability to service their debt over the medium term. 
In the most difficult cases the country concerned 
might even be precluded from refinancing itself in 
the markets. For this reason, high levels of debt 
can increase the urgency to consolidate, even in 
spite of an unfavourable economic environment, if 
there is a realistic fear of a sovereign debt crisis. In 
these cases, there is no overall benefit from 
providing more support for the economy in the 
short-term, given the price that will be paid in 
terms of servicing the resulting debt. . 
But high debt is not the only reason why markets 
may doubt a country's likelihood of repaying its 
debt. Other factors such as the outlook for growth 
in the medium term, the presence of macro-
financial imbalance risks related to the overall 
policy environment are also key determinants of 
the reaction of financial markets. 
                                                          
(7) The snowball effect of debt stems from the interaction 
between the interest-growth rate differential and the debt 
level: if the difference between the interest paid on debt 
and the growth rate is positive – and it will in general 
increase with debt – the dynamics of debt are explosive and 
an increase in primary balances is required to escape from 
the resulting cycle. 
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The continually rising debt-to-GDP ratios reflect 
the still high budget deficits in certain countries, 
but also public interventions in the financial 
system. In 2011 the average debt rose by 2.4 
percentage points relative to 2010 to 88% of GDP 
in the euro area, and by 2.8 percentage points to 
83.0% in the EU27. Debt increases in Portugal, 
Spain, Greece and Ireland were particularly 
notable, with Greek debt increasing to an 
unprecedented 165.3% of GDP, resulting in private 
sector involvement in its containment. A further 
increase in debt to 92.7% of GDP by 2013 is 
projected in the euro area and to 87.3% in the EU, 
as primary deficits are coupled with a weak 
contribution from economic growth in 2012 and 
the additional effect of high interest expenditure, in 
some Member States in particular. There also 
remains the risk of further debt increases from 
further public intervention in the financial sector. 
Part of the heterogeneity in the rise in debt is also 
due to sizeable differences across countries in 
public interventions in the financial sector. In the 
case of Ireland, government debt was among the 
lowest in the EU before the crisis, but is projected 
to reach 120.2% of GDP in 2013. Countries with 
large public interventions in the financial sector 
typically have large debt-increasing stock-flow 
adjustments in Table I.1.3.  
On the whole, as new regulatory requirements 
strengthening the resilience of financial sector 
institutions are bearing fruit, the total current 
effective support level in the EU - measured as 
total aid to banks comprising also guarantees - has 
been declining from a peak of 13% of GDP in the 
Autumn of 2009 to 8% of GDP in early 2012. (
8
) 
That could signal certain financial sector recovery 
and reduced exposure of Member States to 
potential losses on the support provided. 
Nonetheless significant downside risks to public 
finances emanating from the financial sector do 
persist in some Member States. 
                                                          
(8) See footnote (5).  
Graph I.1.2: Short-term fiscal impact of the crisis - general government debt 
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Notes:  2012 and 2013 are forecast data. Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
20 
Aggregate figures tend to mask diverging 
developments at the country level. There are 
several Member States with low or very low pre-
crisis debt levels, which however have been rising 
sharply until 2012. This group of countries 
includes Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom, 
and, starting from lower levels, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Slovenia. Moreover, five euro area countries 
are expected to have debt above 100% of GDP by 
2012. Italy already had a public debt-to-GDP ratio 
above 100% of GDP before the crisis. In Greece 
the extremely high debt ratio of 165.3% of GDP is 
also expected to remain at such high levels over 
the forecast horizon, reaching 168.0% of GDP in 
2013 (under the usual no-policy-change 
assumption). In Ireland and Portugal the debt-to-
GDP ratio exceeded 100% of GDP in 2011 and is 
set to continue growing, while in Belgium it is 
forecast to stand again at triple-digit levels from 
2012 onwards (again under the no-policy-change 
assumption). Germany, France, Cyprus, Hungary, 
Malta, the Netherlands and Austria also had debt 
ratios above the 60% threshold in 2011 and further 
increases of these ratios are projected in all these 
countries except Germany and Hungary. 
Moreover, the debt ratio is projected to start 
declining in Italy, Poland and Sweden in 2013. 
1.5. GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND 
EXPENDITURE: A WELL BALANCED 
CONSOLIDATION 
The consolidation between 2009 and 2012 was 
reached via a relatively balanced composition of 
expenditure and revenue measures, with 
expenditures diminishing by broadly 1.8 
percentage points of GDP and revenues increasing 
by 1.5 percentage points. In 2010 and 2011, the 
improvement in budgetary positions in the euro 
area was the result of a lower expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio rather than tax increases; the reduction in 
spending was also due to lower public investment. 
Table I.1.4 shows the main components of 
government revenue and spending for the euro 
area from 2008 to 2013. It shows that that the 
revenue ratio remained stable overall between 
2009 and 2010, while expenditure fell. Despite the 
expectation of lower growth in 2012, a marked 
 
Table I.1.3: Composition of changes in the government debt ratio in EU Member States (% of GDP) 
Change in 
debt ratio
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 2008-3*
Primary 
balance
Interest &growth 
contribution
Stock-flow 
adjustment
BE 89.3 95.8 96.0 98.0 100.5 100.8 11.5 2.4 5.5 6.8
DE 66.7 74.4 83.0 81.2 82.2 80.7 14.0 -2.6 4.8 14.4
EE 4.5 7.2 6.7 6.0 10.4 11.7 7.1 3.7 -0.4 -3.8
IE 44.2 65.1 92.5 108.2 116.1 120.2 75.9 56.0 19.7 14.5
EL 113.0 129.4 145.0 165.3 160.6 168.0 55.0 20.2 51.9 4.7
ES 40.2 53.9 61.2 68.5 80.9 87.0 46.9 29.3 13.0 1.7
FR 68.2 79.2 82.3 85.8 90.5 92.5 24.3 15.9 5.2 2.0
IT 105.7 116.0 118.6 120.1 123.5 121.8 16.1 -8.0 20.6 3.2
LU 13.7 14.8 19.1 18.2 20.3 21.6 7.9 3.8 -0.5 13.9
NL 58.5 60.8 62.9 65.2 70.1 73.0 14.5 13.9 7.6 8.4
AT 63.8 69.5 71.9 72.4 74.4 74.5 10.7 2.7 4.7 6.3
PT 71.6 83.1 93.3 107.8 113.9 117.1 45.5 12.6 20.9 5.9
SI 21.9 35.3 38.8 47.6 54.7 58.1 36.1 16.5 10.4 2.7
FI 33.9 43.5 48.4 48.6 50.5 51.7 17.7 1.0 0.1 20.3
MT 62.3 68.1 69.4 72.0 74.8 75.2 12.9 -0.4 4.6 2.4
CY 48.9 58.5 61.5 71.6 76.5 78.1 29.2 9.9 8.7 -3.5
SK 27.9 35.6 41.1 43.3 49.7 53.5 25.6 21.8 2.5 -3.3
EA-17 70.1 79.9 85.6 88.0 91.8 92.7 22.5 7.7 9.7 7.0
BG 13.7 14.6 16.3 16.3 17.6 18.5 4.8 9.3 1.1 -4.7
CZ 28.7 34.4 38.1 41.2 43.9 44.9 16.2 12.2 5.3 -4.0
DK 33.4 40.6 42.9 46.5 40.9 42.1 8.7 4.9 4.5 14.2
LV 19.8 36.7 44.7 42.6 43.5 44.7 25.0 17.7 5.0 10.5
LT 15.5 29.4 38.0 38.5 40.4 40.9 25.4 19.4 3.2 1.8
HU 73.0 79.8 81.4 80.6 78.5 78.0 5.1 -11.1 9.5 5.1
PL 47.1 50.9 54.8 56.3 55.0 53.7 6.6 12.4 -1.2 -2.4
RO 13.4 23.6 30.5 33.3 34.6 34.6 21.2 18.0 0.8 0.2
SE 38.8 42.6 39.4 38.4 35.6 34.2 -4.6 -4.6 -0.2 3.0
UK 54.8 69.6 79.6 85.7 91.2 94.6 39.8 28.1 4.7 9.5
EU-27 62.5 74.8 80.2 83.0 86.2 87.3 24.8 10.3 8.2 5.6
Change in the debt ratio in 
2008-13 due to:
Gross debt ratio
 
Notes:  Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding. 
*Figure from Commission services' Spring 2012 forecast. 
Source: Commission services. 
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increase in revenues with stable expenditure ratios 
is being forecast 
Moreover,the composition of revenue increases is 
not likely to weigh on labour and production – 
social contributions and current taxes on income 
and wealth are broadly stable over the period, 
while indirect taxes increase, a change in the 
revenue mix which is found to be growth-
supportive in the medium term. 
Table I.1.5 shows the expenditure and revenue 
ratios for all EU countries and shows, that, 
according to the Commission services' Spring 
2012 forecast, the expenditure ratio in the euro 
area is expected to continue to decrease over the 
forecast horizon, while the revenue ratio is set to 
remain stable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I.1.4: Euro area - Government revenue and expenditures (% of GDP) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
Total revenue 45.0 44.8 44.7 45.3 46.2 46.1
Taxes on imports and production (indirect) 12.5 12.5 12.7 12.8 13.1 13.3
Current taxes on income and wealth 12.5 11.6 11.6 11.8 12.4 12.4
Social contributions 15.3 15.8 15.6 15.7 15.7 15.5
of which actual social contributions 14.2 14.6 14.4 14.5 14.5 14.3
Other revenue 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.9 4.9
Total expenditure 47.1 51.2 51.0 49.4 49.4 49.0
Collective consumption 8.0 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.1 7.9
Social benefits in kind 12.6 13.6 13.6 13.3 13.3 13.2
Social transfers other than in kind 16.0 17.6 17.6 17.4 17.5 17.5
Interest 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.2
Subsidies 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
Gross fixed capital formation 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1
Other expenditures 3.7 4.4 4.7 3.7 3.7 3.8  
Note:  Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding.  
Expenditure figures are corrected for the difference between the definition of expenditures according to ESA95 and according to EDP rules. This 
mainly reflects the interest expenditures related to swap transactions. 
*Figure from Commission services' Spring 2012 forecast. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table I.1.5: Government revenue and expenditure (% of GDP) 
           2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2013*
DK 55.2 55.1 56.0 54.5 54.7 57.8 57.6 57.8 58.6 56.6
EE 43.2 40.9 39.2 38.9 38.1 45.2 40.6 38.2 41.2 39.3
IE 34.8 35.6 35.7 35.8 35.5 48.8 66.8 48.8 44.1 43.1
EL 38.2 39.7 40.9 42.4 42.2 53.8 50.0 50.0 49.7 50.6
ES 35.1 36.3 35.1 36.0 35.7 46.3 45.6 43.6 42.4 42.0
FR 49.2 49.5 50.7 51.8 52.0 56.8 56.5 55.9 56.3 56.2
LT 34.3 33.7 32.0 33.5 33.1 43.8 40.9 37.5 36.8 36.1
MT 39.7 39.5 40.2 41.9 40.8 43.5 43.3 43.0 44.4 43.8
NL 46.0 46.2 45.5 46.3 46.1 51.6 51.3 50.2 50.8 50.8
PL 37.2 37.5 38.5 40.1 39.8 44.5 45.4 43.6 43.1 42.4
RO 32.1 33.4 32.5 33.4 33.2 41.1 40.2 37.7 36.2 35.4
SK 33.5 32.4 32.6 33.0 32.5 41.5 40.0 37.4 37.7 37.3
HU 46.9 45.2 52.9 46.1 44.6 51.5 49.4 48.6 48.6 47.6
IT 46.5 46.0 46.1 48.4 48.4 52.0 50.6 50.0 50.4 49.5
SI 43.2 44.2 44.5 44.4 44.0 49.3 50.3 50.9 48.7 47.9
UK 40.1 40.2 40.8 40.8 40.8 46.3 47.3 48.3 49.3 50.3
BE 48.1 48.9 49.4 50.9 50.4 53.7 52.7 53.2 53.9 53.7
BG 36.3 34.3 33.1 33.3 33.6 40.7 37.4 35.2 35.2 35.3
CZ 39.1 39.3 40.3 40.4 40.5 44.9 44.2 43.4 43.3 43.1
DE 44.9 43.6 44.7 44.7 44.4 48.1 47.9 45.7 45.6 45.2
CY 40.1 41.1 41.0 42.6 42.8 46.2 46.4 47.3 46.0 45.3
LV 34.7 35.7 35.6 36.0 34.9 44.5 43.9 39.1 38.1 37.0
LU 42.2 41.6 41.4 41.9 41.8 43.0 42.4 42.0 43.6 44.0
AT 48.7 48.1 47.9 48.4 48.6 52.9 52.6 50.5 51.4 50.6
PT 39.6 41.4 44.7 43.0 43.1 49.7 51.2 48.9 47.7 46.1
FI 53.4 52.7 53.2 53.6 54.3 55.9 55.2 53.7 54.3 54.7
SE 54.0 52.4 51.4 51.8 51.8 54.7 52.2 51.1 52.1 51.8
EA-17 44.8 44.7 45.3 46.2 46.1 51.2 51.0 49.4 49.4 49.0
EU-27 44.2 44.1 44.6 45.2 45.2 51.1 50.6 49.1 48.9 48.4
Revenue Expenditure
 
*Figure from Commission services' Spring 2012 forecast. 
Source: Commission services. 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The EU fiscal framework, as laid down by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), aims at ensuring 
budgetary discipline through two main 
requirements. Firstly, Member States are required 
by the Treaty to avoid excessive government 
deficit and debt positions, measured against 
reference values of respectively 3% and 60% of 
GDP(
9
). Secondly, they are required by the 
preventive part of the SGP(
10
) to achieve and 
maintain medium-term budgetary objectives 
(MTO), which are given as cyclically adjusted 
targets for the budget balance, net of one-off and 
temporary measures. Compliance with the MTO is 
meant to secure the sustainability of public 
finances and to allow the automatic stabilizers to 
work without breaching the 3% of GDP deficit 
threshold set by the Treaty.  
The EU legislator, in late 2011, adopted a major 
reform strengthening the framework of EU 
economic governance, including EU fiscal 
surveillance, as presented in Part II. Steps in EU 
budgetary surveillance launched after this date are 
subject to the new rules including transition 
provisions. 
This section reviews the implementation of 
budgetary surveillance since January 2011, 
                                                          
(9) Article 126 of the Treaty lays down an excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) which is further specified in Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 'on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure', amended in 2005 and 2011, which represents 
the corrective arm of the SGP. The Code of Conduct 
provides specifications on the implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and 
content of stability and convergence programmes, and has 
been updated on 24 January 2012. Relevant legal texts and 
guidelines can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sgp/legal_texts/index
_en.htm 
(10) The preventive arm of the SGP is contained in Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 'on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance 
and coordination of economic policies', which was 
amended in 2005 and 2011. This Regulation specifies the 
obligation for the Member States to achieve and maintain 
their MTO. Together with Regulation (EC) No.1467/97 
and the new Directive on requirements for budgetary 
frameworks of the Member States (Directive (EC) No. 
2011/85) and Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 on the 
effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro 
area, it forms the SGP. 
focussing, in particular, on the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP). 
Following the marked deterioration of public 
finances in EU Member States in the wake of the 
severe economic recession of 2009, many Member 
States have undertaken fiscal consolidation efforts 
in 2010, including in particular efforts to correct 
excessive government deficits under the Stability 
and Growth Pact. The efforts were intensified in 
2011 and led to a significant improvement of 
public finances in both the euro area and in the EU 
as a whole. Based on data notified by Member 
States and validated by Eurostat, in 2011 the 
government deficit exceeded the 3% of GDP 
reference value in seventeen EU Member States. 
This is somewhat better than previously expected: 
in Commission services' Autumn 2011 forecast 
still nineteen countries were projected to exceed 
this 3% of GDP reference value. However, not for 
all Member States that reduced the deficit-to-GDP 
ratio below the 3% threshold in 2011 the budgetary 
correction can be considered durable at this stage; 
in fact, based on Commission services' Spring 
2012 forecast (
11
), in some of these countries the 
deficit-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase again 
above the 3% of GDP reference value in 2012 or 
2013. As a result, the EDP abrogation cannot yet 
be considered for these countries.  
As shown in Chapter I.1, according to the 2012 
Spring forecast,(
12
) the process of fiscal 
consolidation is expected to continue in 2012 at a 
measurable pace with an estimated improvement 
of the structural budget balance in 2012 expected 
to be above 1% of GDP both in the EU and the 
euro area. The projected improvement of the 
budgetary situation in the EU is broad based across 
Member States. Only a limited number of 
countries would register an increasing headline 
deficit in 2012 and 2013, limit of the horizon 
covered by the Commission services' 2012 Spring 
forecast.  
At the beginning of 2011, a number of Member 
States were assessed to have taken effective action 
in response to the recommendations to correct their 
excessive deficit recently addressed to them the 
Council. In the case of Greece, which is the only 
                                                          
(11) See European Commission (2012a).  
(12) See footnote 9. 
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Member State currently subject to a notice under 
Article 126(9) to take (specific) measures to 
remedy the situation of excessive deficit, the 
review of the notices and the assessment of 
compliance with them occurred regularly, in 
parallel to the review of the macroeconomic 
adjustment program.  
In the summer, on recommendation by the 
Commission, the Council abrogated the Finnish 
EDP. However, in autumn 2011, the 
comprehensive assessment of budgetary 
developments in all EU countries undertaken in the 
context of the Commission services’ Autumn 2011 
forecast revealed that a timely and sustainable 
correction was clearly at risk in some Member 
States, specifically in Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, 
Malta and Poland, where the deadline for 
correcting the excessive deficit was imminent or 
close, that is 2011 or 2012. These five Member 
States were called to treat as a matter of urgency 
the adoption of a budget for 2012 and/or additional 
measures that ensure timely and sustainable 
correction of the excessive deficit.  
As stated in the Communication issued on 11 
January 2012, the Commission considered that the 
four Member States concerned (Belgium, Cyprus, 
Malta and Poland) had taken effective action 
towards a timely and sustainable correction of the 
excessive deficit. 
At the same time, on recommendation by the 
Commission, the Council stepped up the EDP for 
Hungary in March 2012 and set a new deadline – 
2012 – for bringing the general government 
balance below the 3% of GDP reference value of 
the Treaty.  
As a follow-up of this new Council 
recommendation under Article 126(7), on 30 May 
2012, the Commission adopted a Communication 
on the assessment action taken. .  
In June 2012, on the basis of a Commission 
recommendation, the Council abrogated the 
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
for Germany and Bulgaria (see below).  
Finally, also following a recommendation by the 
Commission, the Council addressed to Spain a 
revised recommendation under Article 126(7) on 
10 July 2012. Spain is recommended to correct its 
excessive deficit by 2014. The Council established 
the deadline of 3 months for the Spanish 
government to take effective action and, in 
accordance with Article 3(4a) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, to report in detail the 
consolidation strategy that is envisaged to achieve 
the targets. 
Currently, all EU Member States are subject to the 
EDP, except for Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden. For all 
countries under the EDP, except Spain, the 
procedure is now in abeyance. (
13
) 
Among Member States subject to the EDP, 
Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Romania are 
benefiting from financial assistance, while Spain, 
Cyprus and Hungary have recently requested 
financial assistance. Meanwhile, the Balance of 
Payment (BoP) programme for Latvia ended in 
January 2012.  
2.2. THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE (EDP) 
This section focuses on the implementation of the 
EDP since January 2011. The historical country-
specific developments are summarised in Tables 
I.2.1.-I.2.3. (
14
) 
2.2.1. EDP in euro-area member states 
Table I.2.1. shows the EDP steps taken for all 
euro-area countries except Greece, which is shown 
in Table I.2.2.  
Proceeding in a chronological order, on 6 January 
2011, the Commission assessed the action taken by 
Malta in compliance with the February 2010 
Council recommendation to end bring the  
excessive deficit situation to an end and concluded 
that effective action had been taken. While 
acknowledging that the Maltese authorities had 
taken fiscal consolidation measures to correct the 
excessive deficit by 2011, the Council noted that in 
spite of a better macroeconomic environment than 
                                                          
(13) Greece is subject to a notice by the Council under Article 
126(9). See subsequent paragraphs.  
(14) All the country-specific developments regarding the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) can be followed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governanc
e/sgp/deficit/index_en.htm. 
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expected in the Council recommendations, there 
had been no acceleration in the reduction of the 
deficit in 2010, and that considerable downside 
risks existed to the achievement of the 2011 deficit 
target.  
Malta notified a deficit of 2.7% of GDP for 2011. 
The Commission services' Spring 2012 forecast 
projected the government deficit at 2.6% of GDP 
in 2012 and 2.9% of GDP in 2013. The deficit was 
thus projected to remain below the 3% of GDP 
threshold over the forecast horizon, but very small 
margin. The Commission has not yet 
recommended to the Council to abrogate the 
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit, 
but the situation will be re-evaluated later in the 
year, subject to complementary information, 
including the results of the EDP dialogue visit to 
Malta conducted by Eurostat in May 2012. (
15
)  
In late January 2011, the Commission concluded 
that effective action had been taken by Cyprus and 
Finland in compliance with the July 2010 Council 
recommendations to correct the excessive deficit. 
On this basis, in mid-February 2011, the Council 
concluded positively on action taken by the two 
countries.  
Following Finland's first notification of 
government deficit and debt data, which notably 
reported that the general government deficit had 
remained below 3% of GDP in 2010, and given the 
durability of the correction, showed in the 
Commission forecast of a deficit ratio below 3% in 
the two subsequent years, the Commission 
recommended to the Council to abrogate the 
existence of an excessive deficit. The Council 
closed the Finnish EDP procedure on 12 July 
2011.  
On 24 August 2011, the Commission concluded 
that Ireland had made adequate progress towards a 
timely correction of the excessive deficit, in 
response to the December 2010 Council 
                                                          
(15) In accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 
on the application of the Protocol on the EDP annexed to 
the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
(16) The excessive deficit procedure for Ireland runs in parallel 
to the macroeconomic adjustment program agreed between 
Ireland and the Commission on behalf of the lenders, in 
liaison with the ECB and the IMF. See the 'Memorandum 
of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality' between the Commission and the Irish 
authorities that was signed on 16 December 2010. 
recommendation to correct the excessive deficit 
situation, and that no further EDP steps were 
needed. Based on the Summer 2011 review of the 
financial assistance programme for Ireland, the 
government deficit in 2011 is expected to remain 
below the target outlined for that year in the EDP 
decision, and to reach the respective target for 
2012. (
16
)  
In the case of Greece, the excessive deficit 
procedure runs in parallel to the macroeconomic 
adjustment program agreed between Greece and 
the Commission on behalf of the lenders, in liaison 
with the ECB and the IMF. (
17
) In the EDP 
context, the Commission has further assessed 
action taken in compliance with the February 2010 
Council decision to give notice to Greece in 
February 2011. (
18
) Based on Commission 
recommendations, the Council adopted further 
amendments to its February 2010 decision to give 
notice (recast in July 2011) to the Greek authorities 
under Article 126(9) TFEU, in March, July and 
November 2011. Further amendments of this 
decision in March 2012 included a revision of the 
fiscal adjustment path, in particular in light of 
worse than previously expected economic 
performance and newly announced government 
measures for the reduction of the primary deficit, 
while leaving the deadline for the correction of the 
excessive deficit in 2014.  
On 30 May 2012, following Germany's first 
notification of government deficit and debt data for 
2011 which reported that the deficit-to-GDP ratio 
returned well below the 3% of GDP reference 
value, and given that, according to the 
Commission services' 2012 Spring forecast(
19
), 
further improvements are expected over the 
forecast horizon, the Commission adopted a 
recommendation for a Council decision abrogating 
the decision on the existence of excessive deficit 
for Germany. On 19 June 2012, the Council 
                                                          
 
(17) See Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies and 
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic 
Policy Conditionality (both 3 May 2010). All the 
documents related to the implementation of the EDP in the 
case of Greece can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sgp/deficit/countries/
greece_en.htm 
(18) The noticed was revised in July, October 2011 and again in 
March 2012. 
(19) See footnote 9.  
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decided to abrogate the excessive deficit procedure 
for Germany.  
In the case of Spain, the Commission 
recommended on 6 July 2012 to the Council to 
adopt a new recommendation for correction of the 
excessive deficit adopted by the Council in 2009. 
In particular, it was recommended to extend 
Spain’s deadline for correction of the excessive 
deficit by one year, to 2014. To this end, the 
Spanish authorities shall deliver an improvement 
of the structural balance of 2.7pp. of GDP in 2012, 
2.5pp. of GDP in 2013 and 1.9pp. of GDP in 2014. 
The headline deficit targets should be 6.3% of 
GDP for 2012, 4.5% of GDP for 2013 and 2.8% of 
GDP in 2014. This recommendation was made in 
view of the fiscal effort undertaken by the Spanish 
authorities and, in line with Article 3(5) of 
Regulation (EC) 1467/97, in response to a 
substantial deterioration of the country’s economic 
situation and outlook, compounded by a less tax-
rich growth composition, compared with the 
projection underpinning the earlier Council 
recommendation. The Council adopted this 
recommendation on 10 July 2012. 
2.2.2. EDP in non-euro area Member States 
Table I.2.1. shows the EDP steps taken for the non 
euro-area countries. Proceeding in a chronological 
order, in February 2011 the Council concluded that 
Bulgaria and Denmark had taken effective action 
in compliance with its July 2010 recommendation 
to end the excessive deficit, and that no further 
EDP steps were needed at that time. In its January 
2011 assessment, the Commission had concluded, 
based on the Commission services' 2010 autumn 
forecast, that both countries had taken the 
necessary measures to correct the excessive deficit 
by the deadlines set by the Council. On 30 May 
2012, on the basis of the Bulgaria's first 
notification of government deficit and debt data for 
2011 stating that the deficit-to-GDP ratio returned 
below the 3% threshold and of the Commission 
services' 2012 spring forecast showing a further 
improvement of the budgetary situation over the 
forecast horizon, the Commission adopted 
recommendation for a Council decision to abrogate 
the decision on the existence of an excessive 
deficit. On 19 June 2012, the Council abrogated 
the excessive deficit procedure for Bulgaria.  
In the case of Hungary, in its assessment of action 
taken of 11 January 2012, the Commission 
concluded that Hungary had not taken effective 
action in response to the July 2009 Council 
recommendation. While the general government 
balance was expected by the Hungarian 
authorities, based on the 2011 autumn EDP 
notification, and by the Commission services' 2011 
autumn forecast, to turn into surplus in 2011 
(which actually amounted to 4.2% of GDP), this 
was exclusively due to one-off revenues of almost 
10% of GDP, linked to the transfer of pension 
assets from the private pension schemes to the 
state pillar. Moreover, according to the 
Commission services' 2011 autumn forecast, in 
2012 the 3 % of GDP reference value of the Treaty 
would have again been respected thanks to one-off 
measures of close to 1 % of GDP, while in 2013 
the deficit was expected to exceed the 3 % of GDP 
reference value. On the basis of the Commission's 
recommendation, the Council decided on 24 
January 2012 that the country had not taken 
effective action in response to its recommendation 
to correct the excessive deficit situation of 7 July 
2009. 
On 13 March 2012, on a recommendation from the 
Commission, the Council adopted a new 
recommendation addressed to Hungary to end the 
excessive deficit situation by 2012, by requiring an 
additional fiscal effort, i.e. additional measures of 
a structural nature, of at least 0.5% in 2012, on top 
of the 1.9% of GDP already expected. 
On the same date, the Council also adopted a 
decision suspending almost a third of scheduled 
commitments for Hungary from the EU Cohesion 
Fund in 2013, taking recourse, for the first time, to 
the possibility of suspending Cohesion Fund 
commitments in case of non-compliance with its 
EDP recommendation under Article 126(7) of the 
Treaty, according to Article 4(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 1084/2006. 
On 30 May 2012, the Commission concluded that 
Hungary had made adequate progress towards a 
timely correction of the excessive deficit, in 
response to the March 2012 Council 
recommendation to bringing an end to the 
excessive deficit situation, and that no further EDP 
steps were needed. On the same date, the 
Commission also adopted a proposal for a Council 
decision to lift the suspension of the commitments 
Part I 
Current developments and prospects 
 
27 
from the Cohesion Fund, in accordance with 
Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006 
establishing the conditions for lifting the 
suspension for the Cohesion Fund commitments, 
which the Council adopted on 19 June 2012. 
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Table I.2.2: Overview EDP steps - Non-euro area Member States 
Treaty Art.
HU UK LV PL LT RO CZ BG DK
Commission adopts EDP-report = start of the procedure 126(3) 12.05.2004 11.6.2008 18.02.2009 13.05.2009 13.05.2009 13.05.2009 07.10.2009 12.05.2010 12.05.2010
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 126(4) 24.05.2004 25.6.2008 27.02.2009 29.05.2009 29.05.2009 29.05.2009 27.10.2009 27.05.2010 27.05.2010
Commission adopts:
     opinion on existence of excessive deficit 126(5) 24.06.2004 02.07.2008 02.07.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 11.11.2009 06.07.2010 15.06.2010
     recommendation for Council decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 24.06.2004 02.07.2008 02.07.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 11.11.2009 06.07.2010 15.06.2010
recommendation for Council recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 24.06.2004 02.07.2008 02.07.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 24.06.2009 11.11.2009 06.07.2010 15.06.2010
Council adopts:
     decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 05.07.2004 08.07.2008 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 02.12.2009 13.07.2010 13.07.2010
     recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 05.07.2004 08.07.2008 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 07.07.2009 02.12.2009 13.07.2010 13.07.2010
          deadline for taking effective action 05.11.2004 08.01.2009 07.01.2010 07.01.2010 07.01.2010 07.01.2010 02.06.2010 13.01.2011 13.01.2011
          fiscal effort recommended by the Council* -
at least 
0.5% of 
GDP in 
2009/10
at least 
2¾% of 
GDP in 
2010-2012
at least 
1¼% of 
GDP in 
2010-2012
at least 
1½% of 
GDP in 
2009-2011
at least 
1½% of 
GDP in 
2010-2011
1% of GDP 
in 2010-
2013
at least ¾% 
of GDP in 
2011
at least 
0.5% of 
GDP in 
2011-2013
          deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2008 fin. year
 2009/10
2012 2012 2011 2011 2013 2011 2013
Commission adopts communication on action taken - - 27.01.2010 03.02.2010 - - 15.06.2010 27.01.2011 27.01.2011
Council adopts conclusions thereon - - 16.02.2010 16.02.2010 - - 13.07.2010 15.02.2011 15.02.2011
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action
126(8) 22.12.2004 24.03.2009 - -
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) 18.01.2005 27.04.2009 - -
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to 
end excessive deficit situation
126(7) 16.02.2005 24.03.2009 27.01.2010 08.02.2010
Council adopts NEW recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 126(7) 08.03.2005 27.04.2009 16.02.2010 16.02.2010
          deadline for taking effective action 08.07.2005 27.10.2009 16.08.2010 16.08.2010
          fiscal effort recommended by the Council* -
beyond 1% 
of GDP in 
2010/11-
2013/14
at least 
2¼% of 
GDP in 
2010-2012
1¾% of 
GDP in 
2010-2012
          new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2008 fin. year
 2013/14
2012 2012
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.07.2005 - 21.09.2010 21.09.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon - - 19.10.2010 19.10.2010
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action
126(8) 20.10.2005 -
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) 08.11.2005 -
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to 
end excessive deficit situation
126(7) 26.09.2006 11.11.2009
Council adopts NEW recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 126(7) 10.10.2006 02.12.2009
          deadline for taking effective action 10.04.2007 02.06.2010
          fiscal effort recommended by the Council* -
1¾% of 
GDP in 
2010/11-
2014/15
          new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2009 fin. year 
2014/15
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.06.2007 06.07.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 10.07.2007 13.07.2010
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action
126(8) -
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) -
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to 
end excessive deficit situation
126(7) 24.06.2009
Council adopts NEW recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 126(7) 07.07.2009
          deadline for taking effective action 07.01.2010
          fiscal effort recommended by the Council*
at least 
0.5% of 
GDP in 
cumulative 
terms in 
2010-2011
          new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2011
Commission adopts communication on action taken 27.01.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 16.02.2010
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing 
inadequate action
126(8)
11.01.2012
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) 24.01.2012
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council recommendation to 126(7) 06.03.2012
Council adopts NEW recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 126(7) 13.03.2012
          deadline for taking effective action 13.09.2012
          fiscal effort recommended by the Council
at least 
0.5% of 
GDP on top 
of the 1.9% 
of GDP  
foreseen 
          new deadline for correction of excessive deficit
2012
Commission adopts communication on action taken 30.05.2012
Council adopts conclusions thereon 19.06.2012
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision abrogating 
existence of excessive deficit 126(12) 30.05.2012
Council adopts decision abrogating existence of excessive deficit 126(12) 19.06.2012
Follow-up of the NEW Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Abrogation
Country
Follow-up of the NEW Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Follow-up of the NEW Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Follow-up of the NEW Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
Steps in EDP procedure
Starting phase
Follow-up of the Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
 
Notes: * Average annual fiscal effort, unless indicated otherwise. 
Source: Commission sources. 
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Table I.2.3: Overview EDP steps - Greece 
Treaty 
Art.
EL
Commission adopts EDP-report = start of the procedure 126(3) 18.02.2009
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 126(4) 27.02.2009
Commission adopts:
    opinion on existence of excessive deficit 126(5) 24.03.2009
    recommendation for Council decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 24.03.2009
    recommendation for Council recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 24.03.2009
Council adopts:
    decision on existence of excessive deficit 126(6) 27.04.2009
    recommendation to end this situation 126(7) 27.04.2009
         deadline for taking effective action 27.10.2009
         fiscal effort recommended by the Council -
         deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2010
Commission adopts recommendations for Council decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) 11.11.2009
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 126(8) 02.12.2009
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision to give notice 126(9) 03.02.2010
Council decision to give notice 126(9) 16.02.2010
         deadline for taking effective action 15.05.2010
         fiscal effort recommended by the Council at least 3½% of GDP annualy in 2010 and 
         new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2012
Commission adopts communication on action taken 09.03.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 16.03.2010
Commission adopts recommendation for NEW Council decision to give notice 126(9) 04.05.2010
Council decision to give notice 126(9) 10.05.2010
         fiscal effort recommended by the Council at least 10% in cumulative terms over 2009-
         new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2014
Commission adopts communication on action taken 19.08.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 07.09.2010
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision amending the Council decision 126(9) 19.08.2010
          to give notice
Council decision amending the Council decision to give notice 126(9) 07.09.2010
         new deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2014
Commission adopts communication on action taken 09.12.2010
Council adopts conclusions thereon 20.12.2010
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision amending the Council decision 126(9) 09.12.2010
          to give notice
Council decision amending the Council decision to give notice 126(9) 20.12.2010
         deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2014
Commission adopts communication on action taken 24.02.2011
Council adopts conclusions thereon 07.03.2011
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision amending the Council decision 126(9) 24.02.2011
          to give notice
Council decision amending the Council decision to give notice 126(9) 07.03.2011
         deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2014
Commission adopts communication on action taken 01.07.2011
Council adopts conclusions thereon 12.07.2011
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision amending the Council decision 126(9) 05.07.2011
          to give notice
Council decision amending the Council decision to give notice 126(9) 12.07.2011
          deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2014
Commission adopts communication on action taken 26.10.2011
Council adopts conclusions thereon 08.11.2011
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision amending the Council decision 126(9) 26.10.2011
          to give notice
Council decision amending the Council decision to give notice 126(9) 08.11.2011
          deadline for correction of the excessive deficit 2014
Steps in EDP procedure
Starting phase
Follow-up of the Council decision
Follow-up - 5th review
Follow-up - Second Adjustment Programme
Follow-up - 2nd review
Follow-up - 3rd review
Follow-up - 4th review
Follow-up - 1st review
Follow-up of the Council recommendation under Art. 126(7)
 
Source: Commission services. 
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This Chapter provides an overview of the Stability 
and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) that 
Member States submitted in April-May 2012. This 
round of SCPs and the related assessment is the 
first one based on the new provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact which entered into force 
in December 2011. Therefore, the present Chapter 
provides, besides the examination of 
macroeconomic assumptions and budgetary 
objectives, an analysis of the SCPs against the 
expenditure benchmark and the debt reduction 
benchmark (see Part II on Evolving budgetary 
surveillance). Recommendations based on the 
SCPs were adopted by the Council in July 2012 on 
the basis of a Commission recommendation. Prior 
to this, in view of the persistent pressure on the 
euro area sovereign debt markets but also of the 
less favourable growth assumptions, the February 
2012 ECOFIN Council had reaffirmed the 
principle of differentiated fiscal exit strategies 
taking into account country-specific macro-
financial situations. Together with the EDP 
recommendations, these principles represent the 
basis for the assessments of the programmes. In 
the context of the European Semester, the Council 
recommendations are expected to feed into the 
national budgets for 2013. For this reason, this 
Chapter gives special attention to 2013, examining 
the deficit targets set out in the SCPs against the 
background of the Commission services' Spring 
2012 forecasts. It then presents the adjustment 
paths, the time profile and the composition of the 
consolidation over the whole horizon of the 
programmes. The Chapter finally outlines the 
implications of the fiscal plans for the debt path. 
The Chapter consists of four sections. Section 1 
examines the macroeconomic scenarios with 
particular attention given to their sectoral 
implications. A decomposition of the gap between 
SCP projections and the Commission forecasts is 
presented. Section 2 highlights the fiscal 
consolidation strategy (pace, time profile and 
composition of the fiscal adjustment) and also 
assesses expenditure plans for 2013 and for 2014–
2015. In addition, it presents the convergence path 
towards Member States' medium-term budgetary 
objectives (MTOs), including an assessment of the 
respect of expenditure benchmark. Section 3 
assesses the short term implications of the 
macroeconomic scenarios and the consolidation 
plans on debt. This part also considers – where 
appropriate – whether sufficient progress towards 
compliance with the debt reduction benchmark is 
ensured according to the SCPs plans. Section 4 
assesses the longer term implications of the plans 
for fiscal sustainability, notably taking into 
account the projected changes in age-related 
expenditure. SCP data are taken from the SCP 
tables submitted by Member States. SCP data for 
Greece are not reported as Greece did not submit 
the relevant tables. (
 (20
) 
3.1. MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS 
On average, macroeconomic scenarios for 2012-
2013 are similar between SCPs and Commission 
forecasts, albeit slightly less favourable for the 
latter. The overall picture is one of stagnation in 
2012, followed by some recovery in 2013. 
According to SCPs, EU27 growth would average 
0.2pp in 2012 (Commission: 0.0pp) and 1.5pp in 
2013 (Commission: 1.3pp). Forecasts are slightly 
lower for the euro area (Graphs I.3.1-I.3.2).  
According to SCPs, except in a few countries, the 
slowdown implies a widening output gap in 2012, 
contrasting with projections made last year of a 
gradual pick-up in growth and a narrowing output 
gap already in 2012. With nominal budgetary 
projections for 2012 often remaining close to those 
of a year ago, this implies a tightening of the 
average fiscal stance. For 2013, some moderate 
reduction in the output gap is generally expected. 
At the EU 27 or euro area level, the output gap 
would remain large and negative over 2012-2013 
(above 2% in 2013), with some further closing 
expected by 2015 (up to about ¾ %). Output gaps 
are deemed to be largest (and remain so) in 
countries currently experiencing recessions (such 
as Portugal, Spain and Slovenia), with moderately 
large output gaps also in a number of other 
countries.  
In some countries there are notable differences 
between SCPs and Commission's growth forecasts. 
Some SCPs pencil in markedly more favourable 
assumptions (for either 2012 or 2013, or both), 
                                                          
(20) Since Greece did not present a Stability Programme in 
2012, it is not taken into account in SCPs weighted 
averages for the euro area and/or the EU27 presented in 
this note, as opposed to Commission services' Forecasts 
which cover all EU27 Member States. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
Graph I.3.2: Growth assumptions (euro area) 
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Note: "Potential growth - COM" refers to Commission's 2012 spring forecasts. "Potential growth - SCP" refers to potential growth based on the 
harmonised methodology and the growth assumptions of SCPs. The same conventions hold for "Output Gap – COM" and "Output Gap – SCP" 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
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especially so for Bulgaria and Sweden, and to 
some extent for Slovenia, Hungary, the 
Netherlands, France and Spain. A few countries 
project weaker growth than the Commission 
forecast over 2012-2013 (Estonia and Slovakia).  
The counterpart of improvement in government 
balances foreseen in the SCPs is, for nearly all 
Member States, an expected dissaving by the 
domestic private sector, which is particularly 
sizeable in Ireland, Lithuania, the United Kindom, 
the Netherlands, Romania, France, Poland and 
Belgium (Graph I.3.3). 
External balances also are expected to improve in 
the majority of cases. The bisector in Graph I.3.3. 
delineates the boundary between those countries 
where an improvement is expected vis-à-vis the 
Graph I.3.1: Growth assumptions (EU) 
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Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
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Graph I.3.4: Sectoral net lending and relative ULC changes in the COM forecast (2011-2013) 
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rest of the world – countries that lie above the line 
are expected to show an improvement in their 
external balances while those below are expected 
to show a deterioration. 
 An improvement in the external balance takes 
place when the sum of the changes in private net 
lending and public net lending is positive. This is 
the case in particular for Portugal, Cyprus, Spain 
and Ireland, with also significant changes in 
Graph I.3.3: Sectoral net lending and relative ULC changes in the SCPs (2011–2015) 
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Hungary (
21
), Malta, Italy, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. In some Member States 
however, the planned improvement in government 
balances is more than offset by private sector 
dissaving, resulting in a deteriorating external 
position. This includes Estonia, Denmark, 
Bulgaria, Sweden, Latvia, and to a lesser extent 
Germany. Portugal is the only Member State 
where both the public and the private sector are 
projected to deleverage. Member States expecting 
a very large improvement of their external balance 
also foresee large improvements in cost 
competitiveness as measured by relative unit 
labour costs (ULC). (
22
) However, there is no 
systematic correlation between the evolutions of 
relative ULC and external balances.  
Although not directly comparable in terms of time 
period, the Commission services' forecast over 
2011-2013 (Graph I.3.4) broadly confirms these 
projected trends. On average however, 
Commission services' forecasts tend to show less 
marked improvements in domestic private sector 
balances and a more balanced distribution between 
Member States improving and those deteriorating 
in terms of external balance. 
3.2. FISCAL CONSOLIDATION     
The conclusions of the 21 February 2012 ECOFIN 
Council stressed that all Member States should 
continue to respect their commitments in line with 
the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
While these rules allow the automatic stabilisers to 
work around the agreed path of structural fiscal 
adjustment, these conclusions highlight that the 
room for fiscal manoeuvre differs sharply across 
Member States, with those benefiting from a 
financial assistance programme or those facing 
close market scrutiny being called to exercise 
particular vigilance. Therefore countries benefiting 
from a financial assistance programme should stick 
                                                          
(21) In Hungary net public lending is adjusted for one-off and 
temporary measures in 2011. 
(22) The size of the a country's circle reflects the percentage 
change of the real effective exchange rate over the 2011–
2015 horizon relative to the EU27, with white circles 
indicating improvements in competiveness and black 
circles deteriorations. Formally, the indicator represents the 
percentage change in the nominal unit cost of labour over 
2011–2015 relative to the EU27 according to methodology 
in the Commission services' quarterly report on Price and 
Cost Competitiveness. 
to the targets as agreed in the programme and 
should fully and timely implement the policy 
measures, including in particular structural 
reforms, agreed in the respective Memorandum of 
Understanding. Similarly, Member States facing 
close market scrutiny should continue to meet the 
agreed budgetary targets and stand ready to pursue 
further consolidation measures if needed. Finally, 
the conclusions express a preference for 
expenditure-based consolidations – calling for the 
growth of expenditure (net of discretionary 
revenue measures) to remain below the medium-
term rate of potential GDP growth until they have 
reached their MTO – while advocating expenditure 
prioritisation in favour of growth-friendly items. 
Against this background, this section reviews the 
size and time profile of the planned consolidation, 
in terms of both headline targets and structural 
balances. It contains also an assessment of the rate 
of progress towards the MTO against the 
expenditure benchmark introduced by the reform 
of the Pact alongside the traditional approach, 
based on the improvement in the structural 
balance. The main risks to the achievement of the 
targets – both macroeconomic and policy-related – 
are highlighted on the basis of a comparison with 
the Commission forecasts based on a no-policy-
change scenario. This is followed by a more 
detailed analysis of the composition of the planned 
consolidation, including a disaggregation for broad 
categories of expenditure.  
3.2.1. Size and time profile of planned 
consolidation 
After the sizeable reduction in government deficits 
achieved in 2011(
23
) in both the euro area (from 
6.2% of GDP in 2010 to 4.1%) and the EU as a 
whole (from 6.5% to 4.5%), Member States plan 
overall to continue with ambitious consolidation 
against a background of the foreseen protraction of 
the cyclical slowdown, evident since the second 
half of last year.  
Graph I.3.5 shows the planned changes in 
government deficits over the 2011–2015 horizon, 
as set out in the SCPs. It shows that, on aggregate, 
both the EU27 and the euro area are projected to 
improve significantly their fiscal positions every 
                                                          
(23) This deficit reduction exceeded the plans in the 2011 SCPs 
by 0.4pps of GDP in both the euro area and the EU27.    
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year between 2011 and 2015. Overall, the time 
profile of the consolidation is relatively front-
loaded, as the largest reduction in the deficit, by 
about 1pp of GDP, is planned for 2012, while 
somewhat lower reductions are pencilled in from 
2013 on, in particular for the euro area.  
While the extent of the planned deficit reductions 
broadly reflects starting positions, considerable 
cross-country variations are observed, including in 
the profile of adjustment. In Belgium, Malta, 
Austria, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Denmark, the 
comparison between the first years (2012–2013) 
and the outer years (2014–2015) of the 
programmes suggests a relatively back-loaded 
adjustment. For Austria, Portugal, Finland and 
Denmark, the deficit is even projected to increase 
before resuming a downward path from 2013 
onwards. 
The same comparison suggests a frontloaded 
consolidation in Ireland, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
the UK, which show the largest deficit reductions 
already in their 2012 budgets. The largest 
reductions planned for 2013 are in Spain, Cyprus, 
France, Portugal and Denmark.  
Estonia and Sweden stand out for having achieved 
a budget surplus already in 2011, which according 
to plans would turn into a deficit (albeit of very 
small proportion for Sweden) in 2012, before 
moving again into surplus territory (already in 
2013 for Sweden, a year later for Estonia). The 
surplus recorded in 2011 in Hungary reflects large 
one-off operations and is planned to be followed 
by declining deficits. Finally, no apparent pattern 
of deficit reduction can be detected in the plans of 
Luxembourg, where the small deficit recorded in 
2011 is planned to be followed by deficits 
oscillating between 1 and 2% of GDP. 
3.2.2. Evolution of structural balances  
The Member States generally foresee substantial 
structural consolidations over the period. This can 
be seen in Graph I.3.6 which shows the level of the 
structural balance for the years from 2011 to 2015, 
alongside the respective medium-term objectives. 
According to the SCP plans, the average structural 
balance in both the EU27 and euro area should fall 
by over 3pp of GDP over the four years from 2011 
to 2015. This effort is somewhat frontloaded, with 
a more sizeable adjustment in the early years as 
compared to the later years covered by the SCPs. 
For a number of Member States, the pace of 
consolidation tends to be more moderate as they 
Graph I.3.5: Planned changes in government deficits over 2011–2015 in the SCPs 
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move out of excessive deficits and embark on the 
adjustment path towards their medium-term 
objective (MTO).  
For 2012 a marked structural improvement of 
around 1½pp of GDP is expected on average by 
SCPs. This compares with a structural tightening 
close to 1pp planned for 2012 in last year's SCPs. 
This indicates that the Member States have 
generally undertaken additional structural 
adjustments, while macroeconomic conditions are 
less favourable. The combination of a wider output 
gap and a significant structural adjustment leads to 
a pro-cyclical stance in 2012.  
According to the SCPs, a substantial policy 
tightening should still occur in 2013, with a 
structural improvement of about ¾pp for the EU27 
and close to 1pp at the level of the euro area. 
Structural adjustments should continue thereafter 
at a slower pace of close to ½pp for the EU27 
average, with slightly lower tightening for the euro 
area. 
Graph I.3.6 also shows that the Member States are 
moving towards their MTOs and some of them are 
set to have achieved it by 2015 or before. These 
countries are Portugal, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Poland and Romania, while Cyprus, Hungary, 
Italy, Germany, Sweden and Estonia expect tol 
overachieve it. Spain, Slovenia, Belgium, Latvia, 
and Austria are projecting that they will come 
close to their MTO by 2015. 
While almost all countries plan some consolidation 
over the 2011–2015 period, there are notable 
differences in terms of pace and timeline. The 
cumulated size of the structural adjustment tends 
to be related to the starting position of the 
countries (with a generally larger adjustment when 
the structural deficit is initially higher). Moreover 
and while there are exceptions, a correlation can be 
found between large cumulated consolidation and 
frontloaded adjustment (in the sense of taking 
place in 2012-2013 rather than in later years).  
Thus, over 2011-2015, substantial and rather 
frontloaded structural improvements are foreseen 
in Spain, Cyprus, Slovenia, Portugal, France, Italy, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the 
United Kingdom. Significant structural 
improvements are also planned in most other 
countries but in a more spread out manner. A 
loosening of the structural balance is expected in 
Finland, Denmark and Luxembourg. 
Graph I.3.6: Planned changes in the structural government deficits over 2011–2015 in the SCPs and the MTOs 
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Box I.3.1: The expenditure benchmark 
Since the entry into force of the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – the so-called Six-Pack – in 
December 2011, the appropriateness of the adjustment path of Member States towards their medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO) under the preventive arm, is assessed based on two pillars. (1)  
The first pillar is the analysis of the annual structural adjustment undertaken by the Member States, which 
should amount to 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark until the MTO is reached. The second pillar compares the 
evolution of government primary expenditure, net of discretionary revenue measures, to a reference rate, 
based on the medium-term potential GDP growth (see Section II.2.1). Countries that are at their MTO will 
have a reference rate equal to their medium-term potential GDP growth rate, while those not yet at their 
MTO will have a reference rate that is lower.  The second pillar will be used for the first time to assess 
adjustment towards the MTO based on the 2012 budgetary plans. (2)  
Table 1 presents the real growth rate of government expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, as 
planned by Member States in their SCPs for 2012 and 2013, in light of the benchmark they should respect 
according to the requirements of the preventive arm of the SGP (such periods are flagged with grey 
shading). Bold figures warn that the enforcement of such plans would not comply with the current 
benchmark: out of 15 Member States subject to the preventive arm in 2012 and/or 2013, 4 could be 
concerned (Germany in 2012, Romania in 2013, Estonia and Luxembourg in both years). If this materialises 
with an observed impact on government balance of at least 0.5% of GDP over one year (or cumulatively 
over two consecutive years), the deviation from the adjustment path towards the MTO might be considered 
to be significant (as defined in Art. 6 of Reg. 1466/97). 
Overall, EU Member States' policy choices, in terms of expenditure growth and discretionary revenue 
measures (3), as presented in the SCPs, would, in the great majority of cases, be consistent with medium-
term potential growth. The outliers are Luxembourg, which stands clearly over its benchmark rate in 2012, 
while Estonia, Denmark, Germany and Belgium also markedly exceed it; as far as the 2013 plans are 
concerned, Member States are expected to comply, at the exception of a clear deviation for the UK and 
Estonia, while Luxembourg stands again above its benchmark rate. 
However, a majority of Member States actually plan a larger adjustment than what is required by the 
preventive arm (by maintaining real net expenditure growth well below the benchmark); this reflects the 
undergoing correction of current excessive deficits and a large consolidation of public finances which is 
underway in the EU, and more specifically in the euro area. 
                                                          
(1) All results of this first exercise of the assessment of policy plans against the expenditure benchmark, presented in this 
note, are only based on plans as reported by Member States in their programmes, at the exception of corrections 
undertaken after bilateral contacts with the authorities. 
(2) Member States subject to the EDP are not formally concerned by this benchmark. 
(3) In accordance with Art.5 of Reg. 1466/97, the change in expenditure is recalculated in order to avoid taking into 
account non-discretionary changes in government expenditure due either to unemployment benefits or to EU 
programmes matched by EU funds revenue. To avoid penalizing peaks in investment, corresponding expenditure is 
also smoothed over four years. Finally, the effect of measures taken by the Member States on the revenue side is 
deducted, to obtain a net change in government expenditure. As for the benchmark, the reference rate used as a 
ceiling over expenditure growth corresponds to the 10-year average growth rate of potential GDP (2007-2016). 
Moreover, as long as the Member State is not at its MTO, this expenditure growth should remain below the reference 
rate, in order to support the required structural adjustment by 0.5% of GDP towards the MTO; this yields a lower 
benchmark (the "lower rate"). Member States which have overachieved their MTO could temporarily exceed the 
benchmark as long as, taking into account the possibility of significant revenue windfalls, the MTO is respected 
throughout the programme period. 
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Box (continued) 
 
 
Table 1: Growth of government expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and applicable benchmark 
2012 2013 2014 2015
BE 0.4 1.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7
BG 1.1 in 2012, 2.6 in 2013 -11 -2 -0.4 5.2
CZ 1.2 -3.3 -1.7 -2.4 0.2
DK 0.9 in 2012, 0 in 2013 2 -2.4 0.4 0.5
DE 0.0 in 2012, 1.2 in 2013 0.9 0.6 0.2 1.4
EE 1 2.2 4.6 2.5 -0.2
IE -0.8 -13.4 -5.3 -6.1 -4.6
EL -1.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES -0.2 -12 -7.4 -2.9 -2.1
FR 0.3 -1.4 -1.2 -0.3 -0.3
IT -0.8 -6.7 -3.5 -1.2 0.1
CY 0.3 -9.1 -5.2 -3.3 2.6
LV -0.1 -3 -0.5 -0.7 -1.1
LT 0.8 -6.3 -0.6 0.4 3
LU 1.8 in 2012, 0.6 in 2013 4.9 2 2.2 2.6
HU -0.6 -9.5 -2.5 1.7 2.2
MT 0.2 -4.4 -1 -0.5 -0.7
NL 0.4 -3.6 -0.1 -0.6 -1.1
AT 0.5 0.8 -0.3 0.5 0.1
PL 2.6 1 1.2 0.6 0.5
PT -1.1 -2.3 -3.3 -2.4 -0.6
RO 1.4 -4.3 1.5 1.4 2
SI 0.6 -9.2 -6.5 -2.6 -3.1
SK 1.8 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.3
FI 1.4 in 2012, 0.5 in 2013 0.9 -1 0.5 1.5
SE 1.8 2 1.5 0.3 0.8
UK
d 0.1 -4.3 2.8 -2.5 -1.5
EA17 -3 -1.7 -0.7 0
EU27 -2.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.1
Real growth rate of government expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures  presented in SCPs
Applicable benchmark for 2012 and 
2013
a
 (%)
 
a: for all Member States but SE (as well as DK, FI and LU in 2012 and BG and DE in 2013), the applicable benchmark is 
a rate below their reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth to support the adjustment towards the MTO. 
b: shaded rows correspond to years to which the requirements of the preventive arm are applicable.  
c: bold figures indicate an excess of net expenditure growth over the applicable benchmark (only indicative for 
2014 and 2015, also taking into account planned achievement of the MTO). Concerning  SE, the overachievement 
of the MTO over the programme period allows a temporary excess over the benchmark.. 
d: the deadline for UK to correct its excessive deficit corresponds to the fiscal year 2014/2015. 
Source: SCPs, Commission services  
 
Graphs 1 and 2 present expenditure plans for 2012 and 2013 (the net real growth rate is shown on the 
vertical axis) in comparison to their respective benchmark (to be read on the horizontal axis). To respect the 
benchmark, net expenditure growth needs to remain below the bisector. According to the requirements of 
the preventive arm, a few Member States would simply be required to keep the net growth of real 
expenditure at or below their medium-term potential GDP growth rate (depicted with a circle), in order to 
remain at their MTO. However, most of the Member States have to maintain it below a lower rate (depicted 
with a diamond), as they have to progress towards their MTO. 
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Box (continued) 
 
Graph 1: Real growth of government expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and applicable 
benchmark as presented in SCPs in 2012 
 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
 
Graph 2: Real growth of government expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures and applicable 
benchmark as presented in SCPs in 2013 
 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
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3.2.3. Risks to the SCPs targets: an assessment 
The budgetary targets outlined in SCPs can be seen 
as vulnerable to three risks: less favourable 
macroeconomic conditions may negatively affect 
the achievement of the targets throughout the 
programme period; the impact of the consolidation 
measures may have been overestimated; and the 
targets may not be supported by sufficiently 
detailed measures, especially for the years not 
covered by the current budget.  
Graph I.3.7 seeks to highlight these different risks 
by focusing on the gap between Member States' 
targets and the Commission services' deficit 
forecasts for 2013, in terms of the following three 
components:  i) the difference in the deficits 
projected for 2012 (labeled the '2012 base effect'), 
reflecting differences in the growth projections for 
2012 and/or the assessment of the impact of the 
measures in the 2012 budget; the effect of 
difference in the growth projections for 2013 
(labeled '2013 growth gap'), calculated using the 
standard semi-elasticities of budgetary balance to 
growth;  iii) the residual difference, (labeled the 
'2013 policy gap'), presumably mainly stemming 
from the absence of detailed consolidation 
measures for 2013 (and hence their non-inclusion 
in the Commission services' forecasts based on the 
no-policy change assumption).  
The base effect, reflecting a different assessment 
of the budgetary outcome for the current year, 
amounts to a relatively modest 0.3pp of GDP for 
both the euro area and the EU as a whole. There is 
however considerable variation across countries: 
the 2012 base effect explains 0.8pp of GDP of the 
higher deficit projected by Commission services in 
Cyprus and Slovenia while in Spain it attains 
1.1pp. Conversely, in Finland and Estonia and to a 
lesser extent in Germany and the Czech Republic 
there are small positive base effects.  
The gap stemming from different growth 
projections for 2013 is even smaller, at 0.1pp of 
GDP for both the euro area and the EU. While a 
possible favorable bias emerges for Spain, France, 
the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Sweden, only in the case of Sweden 
where it amounts to 0.6pp of GDP does this appear 
to be sizeable. By contrast, the macroeconomic 
scenario may impart a small prudent bias to the 
budget plans in Austria, Estonia, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia.  
 
Table I.3.1: Budgetary developments in the Member States up to 2014 according to the SCPs 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
BE 1.9 0.1 1.3 1.7 -3.7 -2.8 -2.2 -1.1 -2.9 -2.3 -1.4 -0.6 98.0 99.4 97.8 95.5
DE 3.0 0.7 1.6 1½ -1.0 -1.0 -½ 0.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 81.2 82.0 80.0 78.0
EE 7.6 1.7 3.0 3.4 1.0 -2.6 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 -0.8 0.0 0.5 6.0 8.8 11.0 10.6
IE 0.7 0.7 2.2 3.0 -13.1 -8.3 -7.5 -4.8 -8.2 -7.9 -7.4 -5.2 108.2 117.5 120.3 119.5
EL #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A - - - - #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
ES 0.7 -1.7 0.2 1.4 -8.5 -5.3 -3.0 -2.2 -6.9 -4.4 -2.2 -0.9 68.5 79.8 82.3 81.5
FR 1.7 0.7 1.8 2.0 -5.2 -4.4 -3.0 -2.0 -4.2 -3.1 -1.8 -1.2 85.8 89.0 89.2 88.4
IT 0.4 -1.2 0.5 1.0 -3.9 -1.7 -0.5 -0.1 -3.6 -0.5 0.5 0.5 120.1 123.4 121.5 118.2
CY 0.5 -0.5 0.5 1.0 6.3 -2.6 -0.6 0.0 6.9 -2.0 0.2 0.8 71.6 72.1 70.2 67.8
LU 1.6 1.0 2.1 3.3 -0.6 -1.5 -1.2 -0.9 0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 18.2 20.9 23.6 24.4
MT 2.1 1.5 2.0 2.0 -2.7 -2.2 -1.7 -1.1 -2.9 -2.2 -1.8 -1.3 72.0 70.3 68.7 67.4
NL 1.2 -¾ 1¼ 1½ -4.7 -4.2 -3.0 n.a. -3.5 -2.3 -1.5 -2.8 65.2 70.2 70.7 n.a.
AT 3.1 0.4 1.4 2.0 -2.6 -3.0 -2.1 -1.5 -2.4 -2.1 -1.6 -1.3 72.2 74.7 75.3 74.6
PT -1.6 -3.0 0.6 2.0 -4.2 -4.5 -3.0 -1.8 -6.0 -2.6 -1.0 -0.4 107.8 113.1 115.7 113.4
SI -0.2 -0.9 1.2 2.2 -6.4 -3.5 -2.5 -1.5 -6.2 -1.6 -0.9 -0.6 47.6 51.9 53.1 52.6
SK 3.3 1.1 2.7 3.6 -4.8 -4.6 -4.5 -4.2 -4.3 -4.1 -2.3 -2.0 43.3 50.2 52.0 53.0
FI 2.9 0.8 1.5 2.1 -0.5 -1.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.1 48.6 50.7 51.8 51.9
EA-17 (*) 1.7 -0.1 1.2 1.6 -4.0 -2.9 -1.9 -1.2 -3.3 -1.9 -1.0 -0.6 86.1 89.7 89.3 87.7
BG 1.7 1.4 2.5 3.5 -2.1 -1.6 -1.3 -0.5 -1.0 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 16.4 19.8 18.4 18.0
CZ 1.7 0.2 1.3 2.2 -3.1 -3.0 -2.9 -1.9 -2.7 -2.0 -2.1 -1.3 41.2 44.0 45.1 44.8
DK 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 -1.8 -4.0 -1.8 -1.9 0.1 -0.9 -0.3 -0.7 46.5 40.5 41.4 41.2
LV 5.5 2.0 3.7 4.0 -3.5 -2.1 -1.4 -0.8 -2.6 -1.2 -0.9 -0.7 42.6 44.5 45.8 46.7
LT 5.9 2.5 3.7 3.4 -5.5 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 -4.7 -2.6 -2.1 -1.5 38.5 40.2 38.6 36.7
HU 1.7 0.1 1.6 2.5 4.3 -2.5 -2.2 -1.9 -4.0 -1.9 -1.2 -1.1 80.6 78.4 77.0 73.7
PL 4.3 2.5 2.9 3.2 -5.1 -2.9 -2.2 -1.6 -5.1 -2.5 -1.7 -1.1 56.4 53.7 52.5 50.6
RO 2.5 1.7 3.1 3.6 -5.2 -2.8 -2.2 -1.2 -3.1 -1.7 -1.2 -0.5 33.3 34.2 33.7 32.8
SE 3.9 0.4 3.3 3.7 0.3 -0.1 0.5 1.7 -0.2 1.0 1.6 2.4 38.4 37.7 35.4 31.8
UK (1) 0.8 0.8 2.0 2.7 -8.3 -5.9 -6.0 -4.4 -6.9 -4.4 -4.6 -3.5 84.0 89.0 91.9 92.7
EU-27 (*) 1.7 0.2 1.5 2.0 -4.4 -3.3 -2.4 -1.7 -3.7 -2.2 -1.5 -1.0 81.1 84.3 84.3 83.0
Real GDP growth Government balance Structural balance Government gross debt
 
(1) Convergence programme and autumn forecast: financial years ending in following March. 
(*) In case of missing programmes: weighted average of the figures for those countries that have submitted a programme. 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
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For the EU27 as a whole, revenue-to-GDP ratios in 
the SCPs are 0.5 and 0.3pp of GDP lower in 2012, 
and 2013, respectively, than those projected by the 
Commission services, whereas for the euro area 
revenue ratios are higher than envisaged by the 
Commission services, by 0.1pp and 0.4pp in 2012 
and 2013, respectively. Revenue projections could 
be considered to be particularly cautious in the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Sweden and the 
UK. In the cases of Latvia and Estonia revenue 
projections appear somewhat on the high side in 
2012, but this possible bias is almost totally offset 
by apparently very conservative assumptions for 
2013. By contrast, revenues appear to be projected 
on the basis of especially favorable assumptions in 
Belgium, Spain, Italy, Malta and Bulgaria, where 
in these cases the revenue ratios in SCPs imply 
revenue growth rates that exceed those of GDP by 
more than 3pp in 2012.  
Expenditure projections are lower in the SCPs than 
in the Commission services' 2012 Spring forecasts. 
The expenditure ratios in the SCPs are on 
aggregate lower by 1pp in 2012 and by 1.2pp in 
2013 for the EU27, whereas for the euro area 
differences are narrower and amount to 0.2pp in 
2012 and of 0.5pp in 2013. This pattern is 
observed for most Member States, among which 
Spain, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
present in their SCPs the most sizeable differences 
when compared with Commission services' 
projections. At least part of the differences is 
accounted for by policy measures that are not 
included in the Commission services 2012 Spring 
Forecast.  
For the remaining countries, the size of the 
difference between the two sets of forecasts may 
be taken as an estimate of the required measures to 
meet the targets in the SCPs and hence provide an 
indication of the magnitude of the underlying 
implementation risks. By contrast, expenditure 
projections in Germany, Italy, Malta and especially 
in Austria and Bulgaria can be considered to lean 
toward the conservative side.  
In conclusion, balancing the different types of 
risks, overall budgetary projections appear to rely 
on especially favourable assumptions on growth, 
as well as on revenue or expenditure in the cases of 
Belgium, Spain, France, Poland, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
Graph I.3.7: General government deficit for 2013: decomposition of the gap between the SCP projections and the COM forecasts 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
Graph I.3.8: Envisaged variation in expenditure and revenue ratio 2011-2015* 
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* For IE and UK, the observed change in expenditure-to-GDP relies in part on one-off measures. 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
 
42 
However, in the case of the last two Member 
States, favourable macroeconomic assumptions 
and optimistic expenditure projections are partially 
compensated by prudent estimates on the revenue 
side.  
3.2.4. Composition of consolidation  
On average, the consolidations plans set out in the 
SCPs for both the euro area and the EU27 are 
primarily expenditure-based. Graph I.3.8 indicates 
the 2011 starting level for revenue and expenditure 
ratios, as well as the variation expected for both 
variables by 2015, as set out in the SCPs. It shows 
that, on average, general government expenditure 
is forecast to decrease from 49.4% of GDP in 2011 
to 47.2% in 2015 in the euro area, and from 48.5% 
to 45.7% of GDP in the EU27. Meanwhile, 
revenue is forecast to increase from 45.4 % of 
GDP in 2011 to 46.5% in 2015 in the euro area and 
from 44.2% of GDP to 44.7% in the EU27. The 
change in expenditure corresponds to nearly 2/3 of 
the overall change in the deficit in the euro area 
and over 4/5 in the EU27, making the 
consolidation plans broadly expenditure-based on 
average. 
The expenditure-to-GDP ratio is set to fall between 
2011 and 2015 in all Member States except 
Finland and Luxembourg. Ireland, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, Spain, Latvia, the United Kingdom, 
Portugal and Poland are forecasting reductions in 
expenditure of over 5pp of GDP. (
24
)   
While almost all countries are reducing 
expenditure, only 11 Member States plan an 
increase in the revenue-to-GDP ratio over the 
2011-2015 programming period. Belgium and Italy 
foresee an increase in revenue of over 2½pp of 
GDP, while France, Cyprus, Spain, Romania and 
Finland project an increase of over 1pp. In Ireland, 
an increase in the tax revenue ratio is offset by a 
reduction in non-tax revenues. In addition, 13 
Member States forecast a reduction in their 
revenue as a share of GDP. The largest reduction is 
foreseen in Hungary (8pp of GDP, largely 
reflecting one-off increase in revenues in 2011), 
while Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, Portugal and 
Lithuania forecast a decrease of over 2pp. 
                                                          
(24) For IE and UK, the observed change in expenditure-to-
GDP relies in part on one-off measures. 
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Table I.3.2: Fiscal adjustment for EU 27: 2012 SCPs vs. Spring 2012 EC Forecasts 
2014 2015
SCPs 
Planned Δ
EC Forecast  
Δ 
SCPs 
Planned Δ
EC Forecast  
Δ 
SCPs 
Planned Δ
SCPs 
Planned Δ
Revenue 0,6 0,8 0,1 -0,2 -0,1 0,0
Expenditure -0,5 0,0 -0,7 -0,5 -0,9 -0,8
Government Balance 1,1 0,9* 0,8 0,3 0,8 0,7
2012 2013
 
* Deviations are due to rounding. 
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
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Overall, fiscal consolidation is entirely 
expenditure-based in Denmark, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Estonia, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, Portugal, Germany, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, the UK and Sweden. In Spain, 
Austria, Cyprus, France, Malta and Romania, it is 
relatively evenly balanced between spending cuts 
and revenue increases, while it is primarily 
revenue-based in Belgium and Italy. (
25
)       
Table I.3.2 displays the yearly fiscal adjustment at 
the aggregate EU27 level and its expenditure and 
revenue components as foreseen in the SCPs 
between 2012 and 2015. Those are compared with 
the corresponding adjustment forecast by the 
Commission services for the years 2012 and 2013. 
The envisaged improvement in the primary 
balance exceeds Commission services forecast 
marginally for 2012 (by 0.2pp of GDP) and more 
strongly for 2013 (by 0.5pp of GDP). Therefore, 
the SCPs appear to be slightly more optimistic than 
Commission services forecast on the size of the 
budgetary improvement at aggregate EU level.  
The table also shows the composition of the 
adjustment. For 2012, the SCP adjustment is 
evenly balanced between revenue and expenditure, 
while the Commission services forecast 
consolidation only on the revenue side. For 2013, 
2014 and 2015, SCP consolidation is driven by 
expenditure cuts. Overall, in 2012, the adjustment 
appears to be front-loaded on the revenue side, and 
more uniform – if not slightly back-loaded – on the 
expenditure side. 
3.3. DEBT IMPLICATIONS     
This section assesses debt implications of the 
macroeconomic scenario and of the consolidation 
                                                          
(25) In Finland the small fiscal adjustment envisaged is entirely 
revenue-driven. 
plans set out in the SCPs, including an analysis of 
compliance with the new provisions concerning 
the debt reduction benchmark.  
3.3.1.  Evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
Graph I.3.9 shows the projected changes in general 
government debt over the period 2011–2015. In 
the euro area, overall debt is projected to reach a 
level slightly above 85% of GDP after having 
peaked at almost 89% of GDP in 2012; in the 
EU27 the corresponding figures are 80% and 84% 
of GDP. The implication for the medium term is 
that as long as the consolidation measures are not 
reversed beyond 2014, debt should be on a 
declining path for the years beyond the 
programmes’ horizon. In all Member States except 
Denmark and Luxembourg, debt is projected to 
peak before 2015. However, in Spain and the 
United Kingdom, the projected reduction in 2015 
is small and coming back to pre-crisis levels is 
likely to take many further years. 
Graph I.3.9 also shows that consolidations 
envisaged by the Member States does not ensure 
that debt-to-GDP ratios in 2015 will be lower than 
in 2011: Spain, Ireland, Slovakia, Luxembourg, the 
United Kingdom, Estonia, Slovenia, Finland, 
Czech Republic and Portugal will see their debt-to-
GDP ratio increase between 2011 and 2015.  
While consolidation is a necessary prerequisite for 
the debt to go down in the long-run, debt dynamics 
also depend crucially on the interest rate-growth 
differential. (
26
)  The larger the differential 
                                                          
(26) The change in the gross debt ratio can be decomposed as 
follows: 
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between real interest rate and real GDP growth (r-
g), the larger the increase in the primary balance 
required to stabilize a given debt ratio. Thus, (r-g) 
plays a key role in determining an appropriate 
strategy to achieve a given debt target. 
Graph I.3.10 show that the interest-growth 
differential is positively correlated with the level 
of public debt in normal times (2005 to 2008) and 
Graph I.3.11 shows that this is also true during the 
crisis (2009 to 2013): the larger the public debt 
ratio, the higher the differential tends to be. This 
might obey to two main elements. Firstly, a high 
debt ratio may trigger an increase in risk premia 
(
27
), thereby leading to higher interest rates. 
Secondly, higher debt levels and interest rates 
might weigh on economic growth, especially when 
debt exceeds a certain threshold level as a number 
of papers suggest. (
28
)    
                                                                                   
the average real interest rate and real rate of GDP growth. 
The term in parentheses represents the “snow-ball” effect, 
measuring the combined effect of interest expenditure and 
economic growth on the debt ratio. 
 
(27) See empirical evidence in Part III.  
(28) See for example Kumar and Woo (2010).  
The consolidation strategies envisaged in the SCPs 
have an impact on long-run debt-to-GDP ratios. 
The last column of Table I.3.3 shows the debt-
stabilizing primary balance, under the assumption 
that the interest-growth differential remains 
constant from 2015 onwards (column of the 
middle). If the 2015 structural primary balance 
projected in the SCPs (fourth column) is higher 
than the debt-stabilizing primary balance, this 
means that the planned consolidation over 2011-
2015 will ensure the stabilization of the debt-to-
GDP ratio from 2015 onwards. Table I.3.4 shows 
that it is the case according to all Member States' 
consolidation plans.  
How do the SCP debt projections compare with the 
Commission Spring forecasts? Graph I.3.12 
presents the projections for 2013 using a similar 
methodology as for Graph I.3.7. The figure shows 
the level of debt projected by both the SCPs and 
the Commission services and decomposes it into 
the '2012 base effect' which represents the 
difference in projected levels of debt in 2012, the 
'2013 growth gap' which quantifies the differences 
due to different growth assumptions for 2013 and 
the residual '2013 policy gap', which is assumed to 
reflect the contribution that policy changes 
included in the SCPs have on the debt projections. 
Graph I.3.9: 2011-2015 planned changes in general government debt 
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Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
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Graph I.3.11: Comparing average 2010-2013 interest-growth differential and debt ratio in 2009 in Euro Area Member States 
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The figure shows that for both the euro area and 
EU27, the Commission services forecast slightly 
higher debt-to-GDP ratios in 2013. For the euro 
area, the Commission services expect debt to come 
in at 92.6% of GDP, while the SCPs project 
89.3%. For EU27 the difference between the two is 
similar; while the Commission services expect the 
debt of 87.2% of GDP the SCPs forecast 84.3%. 
The '2013 policy gap' accounts for 0.8pp of the 
difference in the euro area debt, and 0.5pp in the 
EU27. A significant contributor to the difference is 
also the '2012 base effect' which accounts for 
2.3pp in the euro area and 2.2pp in the EU27. 
This overall '2012 base effect' is driven by a 
number of Member States that show very 
significant differences in their SCPs relative to the 
Commission services' estimates. The largest 
Graph I.3.10: Comparing average 2005-2008 interest-growth differential and debt ratio in 2004 in Euro Area Member States 
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Graph I.3.12: General government debt for 2013: decomposition of the gap between the SCP projections and the COM forecasts 
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differences in 2012 base levels are found for 
Cyprus (5.1% of GDP), Malta (4.7% of GDP) and 
Slovenia (3.5% of GDP) but these small Member 
States account for little in the weighted average. 
However, France and the United Kingdom also 
have sizeable differences of, respectively, 1.5% 
and 2.9% of GDP. As with the differences in the 
deficit projections, the fact that many Member 
States have significant policy changes penciled in 
is both a risk and a challenge, as consolidation 
measures must be implemented, to ensure that the 
outcomes are not weaker than the plans. 
3.3.2. Debt benchmark 
According to the debt reduction benchmark 
introduced by the reform of the Pact, Member 
States whose current debt-to-GDP ratio is above 
the 60% threshold have to reduce the distance to 
60% by an average rate of one twentieth per year 
as a benchmark, based on changes over the last 
three years for which the data is available. The 
debt reduction benchmark is also considered to be 
fulfilled if the budgetary forecasts of the 
Commission services indicate that the required 
reduction in the differential will occur over the 
three-year period encompassing the two years 
following the final year for which the data is 
 
Table I.3.3: Debt-stabilizing primary balance for Member States whose debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to exceed the 60% threshold in 
2015 
 Member State 2015 Debt-to-GDP 
2015 Interest- growth 
differential (%)
2015 structural primary 
balance (% GDP)
Debt-stabilizing primary 
balance (% GDP)
BE 92.3 0.2 3.5 0.2
DE 76 0.8 2.6 0.6
ES 80.8 -0.4 2.9 -0.3
FR 86.4 -0.6 2.2 -0.5
IE 117.4 1.5 2.1 1.7
IT 114.4 1.6 6.1 1.7
CY 65.4 0.4 3.6 0.3
HU 72.7 2.7 2.8 1.9
MT 65.3 1.8 3 1.1
AT 72.8 0.5 2 0.4
PT 109.5 0.2 4.5 0.2
UK 91.4 -0.8 0.9 -0.7  
Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
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available, based on unchanged policies. However, 
Member States subject to an excessive deficit 
procedure at the time of the entry into force of this 
new provision are granted a three-year period 
following the correction of the excessive deficit 
during which Member States should make progress 
towards compliance with the debt benchmark. A 
negative assessment of the progress made towards 
compliance with the debt benchmark should lead 
to the preparation of a report under Art. 126(3). 
"Sufficient progress towards compliance" is 
defined as a continuous and realistic adjustment 
needed to ensure meeting the debt benchmark at 
the end of the transitional period. Specifically, to 
ensure continuous and realistic progress during the 
transition period Member States should respect 
simultaneously two conditions as laid down in the 
Code of Conduct: 
 1) the annual structural adjustment should not 
deviate by more than 0.25% of GDP from the 
minimum linear structural adjustment ensuring 
that the debt rule is met by the end of the 
transitional period.  
 2) At any time during the transitional period, 
the remaining annual structural adjustment 
should not exceed ¾ % of GDP.  
This ensures that the path of deficit reduction is 
sustained over the three years of the transitional 
period (first condition) and realistic (second 
condition), while allowing some room for 
manoeuvre during the transition period.  
For each Member State concerned by the transition 
period, Table I.3.4 compares the minimum 
required adjustments to the structural balances set 
out in the SCPs. (
29
) It shows that, based on plans, 
all Member States would implement structural 
adjustments large enough to meet the debt 
reduction benchmark by the end of their 
transitional period. All Member States also plan 
sufficient progress according to the two criteria 
mentioned above.  
 
 
                                                          
(29) The minimum required adjustment is the minimum 
structural adjustment that ensures that, if followed, the debt 
reduction benchmark will be met at the end of the 
transition period. 
 
Table I.3.4: Minimum adjustments over the transition period for Member States whose debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the 60% threshold in 
2011 
SCPs/COM Forecasts[2] SCP Plans[3]
IT 120.1 2012 0 0 0.8
PT 107.8 2013 0 0 0.7
BE 98 2012 1 0.9 2.4
FR 85.8 2013 0.2 0.1 2
UK 85.7 2014 1.5 1.2 2.5
DE[4] 81.2 2013/2011 0 0 0.9
HU 80.6 2012 0.7 0 1
AT 72.2 2013 0 0 1.4
MT 72 2011 1.7 0.7 2
CY 71.6 2012 0.1 0.2 2.6
ES 68.5 2013 0.4 0.1 2
NL 65.2 2013 0 0 n.a[5]
Member States Debt Ratio in 2011
Deadline for EDP 
correction
Minimum cumulative required structural 
adjustment over the transition period[1]
Cumulative planned 
adjustment in the 
SCPs
 
[1] In both cases (SCPs/COM forecasts and SCPs plans), fiscal plans are assumed to follow SCPs projections until the EDP deadline. Differences 
between both scenarios then only stem from growth assumptions. 
[2] Growth projections between 2012 and 2020 are the following: in 2012 and 2013, they rely on the 2012 COM Spring forecasts, then from 2014 to 
2016, the real GDP growth is assumed to linearly close the output gap by 2016, finally from 2016 onwards, projections are assumed to converge 
towards the AWG projections. 
[3] Growth projections between 2012 and 2020 are the following: they rely on the SCPs as long as data are available and then, assuming constant 
potential growth, real GDP growth is assumed to close the output gap by 2016 and equal to potential thereafter. 
[4] In case of Germany, the calculations are made for a 2011 EDP abrogation and thus the transition period is assumed to start in 2012. 
[5] Not available since the Netherlands have not reported structural balance beyond 2013. 
Source:  SCPs, Commission services. 
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Box I.3.2: Overview of Council recommendations relating to fiscal policy
1.     AT 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is cautious for the 
years 2012 and 2013. For 2014-2016 the scenario becomes more optimistic, projecting average GDP growth of 2.1%, consistently above 
the current estimates of potential growth. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to correct the excessive 
deficit by 2013 and reach the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) by 2016. The programme has changed the MTO from the target of 
a balanced budget over the business cycle to a structural deficit of 0.45% of GDP, adequately reflecting the requirements of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. The foreseen correction of the excessive deficit is in line with the deadline set by the Council recommendat ion issued in 
the context of the Excessive Deficit Procedure in December 2009. However, based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance*, the 
average annual fiscal effort planned at 0.5% of GDP for the period 2011-2013 is lower than the 0.75% of GDP recommended by the 
Council. The envisaged structural progress towards the MTO is sufficient in 2015, but lower than 0.5% of GDP per year benchmark of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in 2014 and 2016. However, in 2014-2015 the projected growth rate of government expenditure, taking into 
account discretionary revenue measures, respects the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. Nevertheless, there are risks 
accompanying the fiscal targets both on the revenue and on the expenditure side. For example, the budgetary effect of some measures is 
difficult to quantify because of dependence on individual uptake. Since the legislation has not yet been decided the details of the financial 
transaction tax are not yet known. The envisaged expenditure cuts at the sub-national level are not defined. The programme foresees that 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, which amounted to 72.2% at the end of 2011, is going to peak at 75.3% in 2013 before gradually falling to 70.6% in 
2016. In terms of the debt reduction benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact, Austria will be in a transition period in the years 2014-
2016 and the plans presented in the programme would ensure sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt reduction benchmark. 
However, there are risks attached to this projection because of the growing debt of state-owned companies classified outside the general 
government sector and potential further burden due to the banking sector government support. 
Recommendation: 
 Implement the 2012 budget as envisaged and reinforce and rigorously implement the budgetary strategy for the year 2013 and beyond; 
sufficiently specify measures (in particular at the sub-national level), to ensure a timely correction of the excessive deficit and the 
achievement of the average annual structural adjustment effort specified in the Council Recommendations under the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure . Thereafter, ensure an adequate structural adjustment effort to make sufficient progress towards the medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO), including meeting the expenditure benchmark. 
 Take further steps to strengthen the national budgetary framework by aligning responsibilities across the federal, regional and local 
levels of government, in particular by implementing concrete reforms aimed at improving the organisation, financing and efficiency of 
healthcare and education. 
2.  BE 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible for 
the years 2012 and 2013 and optimistic for the years 2014 and 2015 as it foresees GDP growth to be substantially higher than the latest 
estimates of potential growth emerging from the Commission's 2012 spring forecast. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the 
programme is to bring the deficit below 3% of GDP in 2012 (to 2.8% of GDP, down from 3.7% of GDP in 2011) and to zero in 2015. The 
programme confirms the previous medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) of a surplus of 0.5% of GDP in structural terms, which 
adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact The planned 2012 headline deficit complies with the deadline set by 
the Council for the correction of the excessive deficit and the planned fiscal effort complies with the EDP recommendation of a minimal 
average annual effort of ¾% of GDP in structural terms. The planned growth rate of government expenditure, taking into account 
discretionary revenue measures, complies with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2013 to 2015, but not in 
2012. Based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance*, the programme projects the structural balance to improve by 1.1 percentage 
point of GDP in 2012 and by about 0.8% of GDP on average over the period 2013-2015. However, there are risks stemming from the fact 
that the additional measures to be taken from 2013 onwards are not yet specified and that the macroeconomic scenario from 2014 onwards 
is too optimistic. The government debt, which at 98.0% of GDP in 2011 is well above the 60% threshold, is planned by the programme to 
stabilise and then to decline to 92.3% in 2015, which would imply sufficient progress towards meeting the debt reduction benchmark of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, implicit liabilities stemming from the guarantees given to the financial sector are part icularly large. 
The rules-based, multi-annual framework for general government, particularly with regard to expenditure would benefit from enforcement 
mechanisms and/or commitments from the regions and communities, as well as from the local level, in order to meet their allocated deficit 
targets. 
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Graph I.3.13: General government debt for 2013: decomposition of the gap between the SCP projections and the COM forecasts 
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Recommendation: 
 Implement the budget for the year 2012 to make sure the excessive deficit is corrected by 2012. Additionally, specify the measures 
necessary to ensure implementation of the budgetary strategy for the year 2013 and beyond, thereby ensuring that the excessive deficit is 
corrected in a durable manner and that sufficient progress is made towards the mediumterm budgetary objective (MTO), including 
meeting the expenditure benchmark, and ensure progress towards compliance with the debt reduction benchmark. Adjust the fiscal 
framework to ensure that the budgetary targets are binding at federal and sub-federal levels, and increase transparency of burden-sharing 
and accountability across layers of government. 
3.  BG 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that compared with the Commission´s 2012 spring forecast the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the 
budgetary projections in the programme is optimistic for the 2012-13 period, when annual growth is expected to reach 1.4% in 2012 and 
2.5% in 2013. The Commission's 2012 spring forecast foresees a GDP growth of 0.5% in 2012 and 1.9% in 2013. After the correction of 
the excessive deficit in 2011, the objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to achieve a budgetary position which is 
close to balance, both in terms of the structual and headline budget balances, by the end of the programme period. The medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO), defined in structural terms, has been marginally revised from a deficit of 0.6% of GDP to a deficit of 0.5% of 
GDP. The new MTO adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Based on the (recalculated) structural deficit*, 
Bulgaria plans to achieve its MTO over the programme period. In 2012-2014, the growth rate of government expenditure, taking into 
account discretionary revenue measures, would respect the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact, yet breach it in 2015. 
Planned fiscal consolidation faces a number of risks stemming from (i) lower revenue given the optimistic macroeconomic scenario as well 
as less tax-rich underlying growth structure of the economy and (ii) inefficiencies in the public sector, particularly with respect to arrears in 
healthcare, which may lead to considerable expenditure pressures. The debt ratio is below 60% of GDP and, according to the programme, it 
is expected to peak at close to 20% of GDP in 2012 and then to decrease over the programme period. There is  considerable scope for 
improvement in tax compliance and advancing in this area would allow Bulgaria to support higher growth enhancing expenditures. A 
requirement to keep the budget deficit below 2 % and limiting government expenditure to 40 % of GDP was adopted as an amendment to 
the Organic Budget Law, thus strengthening the binding nature of the fiscal framework and improving the predictability of budgetary 
planning. However, challenges remain with respect to further improving the contents of the medium-term budgetary framework and 
strengthening the reporting on accrual basis including through improving the quality and timeliness of reporting by State Owned 
Enterprises and sub-national governments. 
Recommendation: 
 Continue with sound fiscal policies to achieve the medium-term budgetary objective by 2012. To this end, implement the budgetary 
strategy as envisaged, ensuring compliance with the expenditure benchmark, and stand ready to take additional measures in case risks to 
the budgetary scenario materialise. Strengthen efforts to enhance the quality of public spending, particularly in the education and health 
sectors and implement a comprehensive tax-compliance strategy to further improve tax revenue and address the shadow economy. 
Further improve the contents of the medium-term budgetary framework and the quality of the reporting system.  
4.  CY 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme appears  
optimistic in 2012-2014. Although incorporating a major downward revision of the growth outlook, the macroeconomic scenario 
underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme remains subject to downside risks, relating in particular to the evolution of 
domestic demand in 2012-2013. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to correct the excessive deficit by 
2012 and to reach the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) by 2014, and to stay at MTO in 2015. The programme confirms the 
previous MTO of a balanced budget in structural terms, which adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. The 
planned correction of the excessive deficit is in line with the deadline set by the Council recommendation issued in the context of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure on 13 July 2010. Based on the (recalculated) structural deficit,* the average annual fiscal effort planned at 
1.5% of GDP for the period 2011-2012 is equal to the effort recommended by the Council. The envisaged progress towards the MTO in 
2013 is sufficient as it is higher than the 0.5% of GDP benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact both according to the Commission's 
2012 spring forecast and the programme. The growth rate of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, 
is in line with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2013-2014, but not in 2015. There are risks accompanying the 
budgetary targets of the programme linked to the macroeconomic scenario appearing optimistic in 2012-2014 and the planned consolidation 
effort in 2013, party relying on not fully specified measures. According to the programme, the debt-to-GDP ratio, which amounted to  
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ensure sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt reduction benchmark. However, there are risks attached to this projection 
linked to the possible rescue operations of financial corporations. 
Recommendation: 
 Take additional measures to achieve a durable correction of the excessive deficit in 2012. Rigorously implement the budgetary 
strategy, supported by sufficiently specified measures, for the year 2013 and beyond to ensure the achievement of the medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO) by 2014 and compliance with the expenditure benchmark and ensure sufficient progress with the debt 
reduction benchmark. Accelerate the phasing-in of an enforceable multiannual budgetary framework with a binding statutory basis and 
corrective mechanism. Take measures to keep tight control over expenditure and implement programme and performance budgeting as 
soon as possible. Improve tax compliance and fight against tax evasion. 
5.  CZ 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible. 
According to the convergence programme, GDP growth is expected to reach 0.2% and 1.3% in 2012 and 2013 respectively, compared to 
0% and 1.5% in 2012 and 2013 respectively in the Commission's 2012 spring forecast. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in 
the programme is to reach a balanced budget in 2016. The general government deficit target of 2.9% of GDP in 2013 is in line with the 
deadline for correcting the excessive deficit set out in the Council recommendations of 2 December 2009. The average annual fiscal effort 
of 0.9% of GDP over the period 2010-2013, based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance*, is slightly below the effort of 1% of 
GDP recommended by the Council. The programme confirms the previous medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) of a deficit of 1% of 
GDP, which adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, to be reached in 2015. The progress towards the MTO is 
0.8% and 0.7% of GDP in 2014 and 2015 respectively, based on the (recalculated) structural balance and the rate of growth of government 
expenditure complies with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. The budgetary projections of the programme are 
subject to several risks. The law on financial compensation to churches, currently discussed in Parliament, would increase the general 
government deficit by 1.5% of GDP in the year of entry into force. More generally, the nature and extent of the envisaged consolidation 
measures on both the revenue and the expenditure side entails a considerable risk for the sustainability of the fiscal adjustment beyond the 
programme period. Budgetary adjustment has so far relied mostly on across-the-board cuts, which affect also growth-enhancing 
expenditure. Additional savings in public administration expenditures amounting to almost 1% of GDP are planned for 2013 - 2015, but 
details are not sufficiently specified in the programme. Finally, most of the planned revenue measures are of a temporary nature and should 
expire in 2015. According to the programme, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to peak at 45.1% of GDP in 2013 and decline thereafter, 
mainly on account of the projected continuous improvement of the primary balance. 
Recommendation: 
 Ensure planned progress towards the timely correction of the excessive deficit. To this end, fully implement the 2012 budget and 
specify measures of a durable nature necessary for the year 2013 so as to achieve the annual average structural adjustment specified in 
the Council recommendation under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Thereafter, ensure an adequate structural adjustment effort to 
make sufficient progress towards the medium-term objective, including meeting the expenditure benchmark. In this context, avoid 
across-the-board cuts, safeguard growth-enhancing expenditure and step up efforts to improve the efficiency of public spending. 
Exploit the available space for increases in taxes least detrimental to growth. Shift the high level of taxation on labour to housing and 
environmental taxation. Reduce the discrepancies in the tax treatment of employees and the self-employed. Take measures to improve 
tax collection, reduce tax evasion and improve tax compliance, including by implementing the Single Collection Point for all taxes.  
6.  DE 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible. The 
programme's projections for 2012-13 are broadly in line with the Commission's 2012 spring forecast as regards the pace and pattern of 
economic growth as well as labour market developments. The programme's projections for economic growth in the outer years are broadly 
in line with the Commission's estimate of Germany's medium-term potential growth rate. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined 
in the programme is to meet the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) already in 2012 and to reach virtually balanced nominal budgets 
as from 2014, starting from a nominal deficit of 1.0% of GDP in 2011, thus below the 3% of GDP reference value of the Treaty 
significantly ahead of the 2013 deadline. The programme specifies the previous MTO of a structural deficit of ½% of GDP, (interpreted as 
a narrow range around 0.5% of GDP), which adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, to imply a deficit not 
exceeding 0.5% of GDP. Risks to the deficit and debt targets may arise notably if additional measures to stabilise the financial sector turned 
out to be required. Based on the (recalculated) structural deficit*, Germany plans to respect its MTO throughout the programme period, 
which should also be the case taking into account the risk assessment. According to the information provided in the programme and also  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
Part I 
Current developments and prospects 
 
51 
 
Box (continued) 
 
increase by 0.8 pp. to 82.0% of GDP in 2012, before falling to 80% of GDP in 2013 and remaining on a downward path thereafter. 
Following the correction of the excessive deficit, Germany is in a transition period and, according to plans, is making sufficient progress 
towards compliance with the debt reduction benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Recommendation: 
 Continue with sound fiscal policies to achieve the medium-term budgetary objective by 2012. To this end, implement the budgetary 
strategy as envisaged, ensuring compliance with the expenditure benchmark as well as sufficient progress towards compliance with the 
debt reduction benchmark. Continue the growth-friendly consolidation course through additional efforts to enhance the efficiency of 
public spending on health care and long-term care, and by using untapped potential to improve the efficiency of the tax system; use 
available scope for increased and more efficient growth-enhancing spending on education and research at all levels of government. 
Complete the implementation of the debt brake in a consistent manner across all LÄNDER, ensuring timely and relevant monitoring 
procedures and correction mechanisms. 
7.  DK 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible. The 
scenario projecting GDP growth at 1.2 and 1.5% in 2012 and 2013 is broadly in line with the Commission's 2012 spring forecast of 1.1 and 
1.4%. Accordingly, the government deficits are slightly smaller in the convergence programme (4.0 and 1.8% of GDP in 2012 and 2013 
respectively, compared with 4.1 and 2.0% of GDP in the Commission's 2012 spring forecast). The objective of the budgetary strategy 
outlined in the programme is to correct the excessive deficit by 2013 and achieving the medium term budgetary objective (MTO) of a 
structural deficit of no more than 0.5 percent of GDP. The government's objective is also to reach at least a structurally balanced budget in 
2020. The programme thereby confirms the previous MTO, which adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The planned headline deficit in 2013 is consistent with a timely correction of the excessive government deficit and, based on the 
(recalculated) structural budget balance*, the planned fiscal effort in that year complies with the Council recommendation issued under the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure in July 2010. Net discretionary measures as presented in the programme are estimated to yield a consolidation 
broadly in line with the EDP recommendation. The consolidation path has become more back-loaded than previously planned and a 
sizeable effort is needed in 2013 to ensure the required structural adjustment. Risks of falling short of the 3% of GDP reference value in 
2013 are limited; the Commission's 2012 spring forecast sees the government deficit at 2.0% of GDP. Denmark is expected to reach its 
MTO in 2013. However, based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance, this is not the case from 2013 onwards, and the estimated 
budgetary improvement in the structural budget balance falls short of the 0.5% of GDP required by the Stability and Growth Pact. At the 
same time, the growth rate of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, is expected to be in line with 
the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. Part of the budget deficits will be financed by reducing the government's 
account with Denmark's Nationalbank. Denmark's gross public debt is projected to fall from 46.5% of GDP in 2011 to  42.1% in 2015, well 
below 60% of GDP. 
Recommendation: 
 Implement the budgetary strategy as envisaged, to ensure a correction of the excessive deficit by 2013 and achieve the annual average 
structural adjustment effort specified in the Council recommendations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Thereafter, ensure an 
adequate structural adjustment effort to make sufficient progress towards the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO), including 
meeting the expenditure benchmark. 
8.  EE 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible in 
2012-13, when GDP growth is expected to average around 2.4%. The Commission's 2012 spring forecast foresees GDP growth of 3.8% in 
2013. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to ensure sustainable fiscal policy that supports balanced 
growth, by achieving a structural surplus while ensuring sufficient fiscal buffers and reducing the tax burden on labour. The strategy also 
aims at fulfilling the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. The programme aims at overachieving the medium-term budgetary 
objective (MTO) of a structural surplus as of 2013. The MTO adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Based 
on the (recalculated) structural budget balance,*, the rate of growth of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue 
measures, will meet the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact by 2015. In parallel, the programme aims at reaching 
headline surpluses as of 2014. The debt ratio is well below 60% of GDP and, according to the programme, is likely to decrease after 2013 
to about 10% in 2015.  
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more binding multi-annual expenditure rules within the medium-term budgetary framework, continue enhancing the efficiency of public 
spending and implementing measures to improve tax compliance. 
9.  EL 
Recommendation: Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding. 
10.  ES 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme is broadly plausible for 2012 and optimistic 
thereafter. The Commission's 2012 spring forecast projected GDP growth to reach -1.8% in 2012 and -0.3% in 2013, against -1.7% and 
0.2%, respectively, in the programme. In compliance with the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the objective of the budgetary strategy outlined 
in the programme is to bring the general government deficit below 3% of the GDP reference value by 2013, based mainly on expenditure 
restraint, but also on some revenue-increasing measures. Based on the (recalculated) structural balance*, the annual average improvement of 
the structural balance planned in the programme is 2.6 % of GDP for 2011-13, above the fiscal effort of over 1.5 % of GDP on average over 
the period 2010-13 recommended under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Following the correction of the excessive deficit, the programme 
confirms the medium-term objective (MTO) of a balanced budgetary position in structural terms, which would be almost reached by 2015 
with a structural budget deficit of 0.2 % of GDP. The MTO adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. The 
envisaged pace of adjustment in structural terms in 2012-13, represents sufficient progress towards the MTO and the growth rate of 
government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, is in line with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. The programme projects the government debt ratio to peak in 2013 and to start declining thereafter. In 2014 and 2015 Spain 
will be in transition period and plans presented in the programme would ensure sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt 
reduction benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. The deficit and debt adjustment paths are subject to important downside risks. 
Macroeconomic developments could turn out less favourable than expected. Moreover, measures are not sufficiently specified from 2013 
onwards. Budgetary compliance by regional governments, given their recent poor track record, a greater sensitivity of revenues to the 
ongoing structural adjustment, the uncertain revenue impact of the fiscal amnesty and potential further financial rescue operations also pose 
risks to the budgetary strategy. Any impact of these financial rescue operations on the deficit would be of a one-off nature. Strict 
enforcement of the Budget Stability Law and the adoption of strong fiscal measures at regional level would mitigate the risks of a slippage 
at regional level. Given the decentralised nature of Spain’s public finances, a strong fiscal and institutional framework is essential. The 
Council welcomes the intention of the Commission to present a thorough assessment of the implementation of the Council recommendation 
on correcting the excessive deficit, also taking into consideration the announced multi-annual budget plan for 2013-14 in the coming weeks. 
Recommendation: 
 Deliver an annual average structural fiscal effort of above 1.5% of GDP over the period 2010-13 as required by the EDP 
recommendation by implementing the measures adopted in the 2012 budget and adopting the announced multi-annual budget plan for 
2013-14 by end July. Adopt and implement measures at regional level in line with the approved rebalancing plans and strictly apply 
the new provisions of the Budgetary Stability Law regarding transparency and control of budget execution and continue improving the 
timeliness and accuracy of budgetary reporting at all levels of government. Establish an independent fiscal institution to provide 
analysis, advice and monitor fiscal policy. Implement reforms in the public sector to improve the efficiency and quality of public 
expenditure at all government levels.  
11.  FI 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible for 
the 2012-13 period, GDP growth expected in the programme is in line with the Commission's 2012 spring forecast. Projections are also 
realistic for the years 2014 and 2015 as they foresee GDP growth to be substantially lower than encountered before the crises and lower 
than in the recovery years 2010-11. The main budgetary goal of Finland's 2012 stability programme is to reduce the central government 
deficit by limiting expenditures and increasing revenues. As the central government budget is the main source of the general government 
deficit, improving its position will contribute to balancing of the general government budget. The medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) 
of a surplus of 0.5% of GDP in structural terms reflects adequately the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Based on the 
(recalculated) structural budget balance*, Finland has met the MTO in 2011 but would marginally deviate from it over 2012-15. The rate of 
growth of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, complies with the expenditure benchmark of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in all years except 2015. The programme aims at balancing the general government budget by 2015 and reaching 
surpluses as from 2016. The debt ratio is well below 60% of GDP and according to the programme, the debt level will peak in 2014 at close 
to 52% of GDP and then start declining. A notable sustainability gap still exists in Finland’s public finances, mainly stemming from a 
rapidly deteriorating dependency ratio caused by population ageing. The sustainability gap in public finances needs to be continuously  
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monitored and measures adjusted accordingly. Finland’s fiscal framework is anchored to multi-annual expenditure ceilings, but these do 
currently not apply for the municipal sector. 
Recommendation: 
 Preserve a sound fiscal position in 2012 and beyond by correcting any departure from the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) 
that ensures the long-term sustainability of public finances. To this end, reinforce and rigorously implement the budgetary strategy, 
supported by sufficiently specified measures, for the year 2013 and beyond including meeting the expenditure benchmark. Continue to 
carry out annual assessments of the size of the ageing-related sustainability gap and adjust public revenue and expenditure in 
accordance with the long-term objectives and needs. Integrate the local government sector better in the system of multi-annual fiscal 
framework including through measures to control expenditure.  
12.  FR 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is optimistic. The 
Commission's 2012 spring forecast projected GDP growth to reach 0.5% in 2012 and 1.3% in 2013, against 0.7% and 1.75%, respectively, 
according to the programme. After the deficit came out better than expected at 5.2% of GDP in 2011, the programme plans to bring it down 
to 3% of GDP in 2013, which is the deadline set by the Council for correcting the excessive deficit, and to continue consolidation 
thereafter, with a balanced budget to be achieved by 2016. The medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) of a balanced budget in structural 
terms is expected to be reached within the programme period. The MTO adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. Based on the (recalculated) structural balance*, the planned average annual fiscal effort in 2010-2013 is in line with the Council 
recommendation of 2 December 2009. Annual progress in structural terms equivalent to a further 0.7% of GDP towards achieving the MTO 
is projected to be made in 2014–16. According to the programme, the growth rate of government expenditure, taking into account 
discretionary revenue measures, is in line with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. The adjustment path presented 
in the programme is subject to risks. The macroeconomic scenario could turn out to be less favourable as indicated by the Commission's 
2012 spring forecast. Measures are not sufficiently specified to reach the targets from 2013 onwards and to achieve the recommended 
average annual fiscal effort. Furthermore, France's track record when it comes to meeting expenditure targets is mixed. Therefore, it cannot 
be ensured that the excessive deficit will be corrected by 2013 unless the planned measures are sufficiently specified and additional ones 
implemented as needed. Starting from 85.8% of GDP in 2011, the debt ratio is expected to reach 89.2% in 2013 and to drop to 83.2% in 
2016. According to the programme, the debt reduction benchmark will be met at the end of the transition period (2016). 
Recommendation: 
 Reinforce and implement the budgetary strategy, supported by sufficiently specified measures, notably on the expenditure side, for the 
year 2012 and beyond to ensure a correction of the excessive deficit by 2013 and the achievement of the structural adjustment effort 
specified in the Council recommendations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Thereafter, ensure an adequate structural adjustment 
effort to make sufficient progress towards the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO), including meeting the expenditure 
benchmark, and ensure sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt reduction benchmark. Continue to review the 
sustainability and adequacy of the pension system and take additional measures if needed. 
13.  HU 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is somewhat 
optimistic. The Hungarian authorities’ growth projections for 2012 and 2013 are higher by around half a percentage point compared to the 
Commission's 2012 spring forecast on the account of the more optimistic official assumptions regarding domestic demand, particularly in 
2013. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to ensure the sustainable correction of the excess ive deficit by 
the 2012 deadline set by the Council in line with the Council Recommendation of March 2012. The official deficit targets and the planned 
fiscal efforts comply with the March 2012 Council recommendations based on Article 126(7). The programme confirms the previous 
medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) of 1.5% of GDP, which it plans to achieve by 2013. The MTO adequately reflects the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance*, progress towards the MTO does not 
appear to be adequate in 2013 against the assessment of the Commission's 2012 spring forecast, which takes into account the 
implementation risks related to selected saving measures and a less optimistic macroeconomic scenario. The growth rate of government 
expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, is in line with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact 
in 2013, but not in 2014 and in 2015. According to government plans, the public debt is continuously reduced throughout the programme 
period to below 73% of GDP in 2015, but will remain above the 60% of GDP reference value. Regarding the debt reduction benchmark, 
Hungary will be in transition period in 2013-2014 and the programme would ensure sufficient progress towards compliance with the 
benchmark. According to the programme, the debt reduction benchmark would be met at the end of the transition period, in 2015, and 
thereby should help to reduce the accumulated external and internal indebtedness.  
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Recommendation: 
 Correct the excessive deficit by 2012 in a durable manner, by implementing the 2012 budget and the subsequently approved 
consolidation measures, while reducing the reliance on one-off measures. Thereafter, specify all structural measures necessary to 
ensure a durable correction of the excessive deficit and to make sufficient progress towards the medium-term budgetary objective 
(MTO), including meeting the expenditure benchmark, and ensure sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt reduction 
benchmark. Also to help mitigate the accumulated macroeconomic imbalances, put the public debt ratio on a firm downward path. 
 Revise the cardinal law on economic stability by putting the new numerical rules into a binding medium-term budgetary framework. 
Continue to broaden the analytical remit of the Fiscal Council, with a view to increasing the transparency of public finances. 
14.  IE 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections of the programme is plausible. 
Economic growth projections in the programme are similar to the Commission's spring 2012 forecast. The objective of the budgetary 
strategy of the programme is to reduce the general government deficit below the 3% of GDP threshold by end 2015, which is in line with 
the deadline set by the Council for correcting the excessive deficit. The programme currently projects a deficit of 8.3% of GDP (below the 
programme target of 8.6% of GDP) in 2012, 7.5% of GDP in 2013, 4.8% of GDP in 2014 and 2.8% of GDP by the end of the programme 
period in 2015. This path is underpinned by consolidation measures of 2.7% of GDP implemented in the budget for 2012, and broad 
consolidation measures of 3.9 % of GDP in 2013-2014 and a further partly specified consolidation effort of 1.1% of GDP in 2015. The 
programme restates the medium-term objective (MTO) of a structural general government deficit of 0.5 % of GDP, which is not reached 
within the programme period. The MTO adequately reflects the requirement of the Stability and Growth Pact. General government debt is 
above 60% of GDP and is projected to increase from 108% of GDP in 2011 to 120% in 2013 before starting to decline. For the duration of 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure until 2015 and in the following three years, Ireland will be in transition period and the budgetary plans 
would ensure sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt reduction benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Recommendation: Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding. 
15.  IT 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme is plausible, under the assumption of no further 
worsening in financial market conditions. In line with the Commission's spring 2012 forecast, it expects real GDP to contract sharply this 
year and recover gradually in 2013. In compliance with the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), the objective of the budgetary strategy 
outlined in the programme is to bring the general government deficit below the 3% of GDP reference value by 2012, based on further 
expenditure restraint and additional revenues. Following the correction of the excessive deficit, the programme confirms the medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO) of a balanced budgetary position in structural terms, which adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. It plans to achieve it in 2013, i.e. one year earlier than targeted in the previous stability programme, through the measures 
already adopeted in 2010 - 2011. Based on the (recalculated) structural deficit*, the planned average annual fiscal effort over the period 
2010-2012 is well above the 0.5% of GDP recommended by the Council under EDP. The envisaged pace of adjustment in structural terms  
in 2013 allows achieving the MTO in that year and the planned rate of growth of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary 
revenue measures would comply with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. The programme projects the 
government debt ratio to peak in 2012 and to start declining at an increasing pace thereafter, as the primary surplus increases. In 2013-14 
Italy will be in transition period and its budgetary plans would ensure sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt reduction 
benchmark, as also confirmed in the Commission's 2012 spring forecast. According to plans, the debt reduction benchmark will be met at 
the end of the transition period (2015). Reaching the above deficit and debt outcomes will require strict and full budgetary implementation 
of the corrective measures adopted in 2010-11. 
Recommendation: 
 Implement the budgetary strategy as planned, and ensure that the excessive deficit is corrected in 2012. Ensure the planned structural 
primary surpluses so as to put the debt-to-GDP ratio on a declining path by 2013. Ensure adequate progress towards the medium-term 
budgetary objective, while meeting the expenditure benchmark and making sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt 
reduction benchmark. 
 Ensure that the specification of the key features of the Constitutional balanced budget rule in the implementing legislation, including 
appropriate coordination across levels of government, is consistent with the EU framework. Pursue a durable improvement of the 
efficiency and quality of public expenditure through the planned spending review and the implementation of the 2011 Cohesion 
Action Plan leading to improving the absorption and management of EU funds, in particular in the South of Italy.  
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16.  LT  
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible. It is 
broadly in line with the Commission's 2012 spring forecast for 2012 and 2013. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the 
programme is to correct the excessive deficit by 2012 as recommended by the Council and progressing towards the medium-term budgetary 
objective (MTO) thereafter. The programme confirms the previous MTO, i.e. a structural general government surplus of 0.5 % of GDP, 
which adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, and outlines a consolidation of at least 1 percentage point per 
year, planning a balanced budget by 2015. While the budgetary plans are in line with a timely correction of the excessive deficit, the 
average annual fiscal effort in 2010-2012, based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance*, is expected to be lower than 2.25% of 
GDP required by the Council in its recommendation of 16 February 2010. The planned annual progress towards the MTO in the years 
following the correction of the excessive deficit is slightly higher than 0.5% of GDP in structural terms, that is, the benchmark of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The planned rate of growth of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, 
complies with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2013 and 2014, but not in 2015. General government debt is 
projected to remain below 60% of GDP over the programme period, increasing to nearly 41% of GDP in 2013, according to the 
Commission's 2012 spring forecast, while the convergence programme targets the debt to decrease to around 35% by 2015. The re form of 
budget planning and execution is progressing but the government has still to approve the proposed laws. These laws would improve 
accountability within the fiscal framework, by establishing an independent body, and to tighten rules on treasury reserves. 
Recommendation: 
 Ensure planned progress towards the timely correction of the excessive deficit. To this end, fully implement the budget for the year 
2012 and achieve the structural adjustment effort specified in the Council recommendation under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Thereafter, specify the measures necessary to ensure implementation of the budgetary strategy for the year 2013 and beyond as 
envisaged, ensuring an adequate structural adjustment effort to make sufficient progress towards the medium-term budgetary 
objective, including meeting the expenditure benchmark, while minimising cuts in growth-enhancing expenditure. In that respect, 
review and consider increasing taxes least detrimental to growth, such as housing and environmental taxation, including introducing 
car taxation, while reinforcing tax compliance. Strengthen the fiscal framework, in particular by introducing enforceable and binding 
expenditure ceilings in the medium-term budgetary framework. 
17.  LU 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible. In 
particular, the programme scenario for 2012 and 2013 is very close to the Commission's 2012 spring forecast. Medium-term deficit 
projections are made under a slightly optimistic growth scenario, above potential growth although still well below average historic rates. 
The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to bring the deficit from 1.5% in 2012 to 0.9% in 2014 with a package 
of consolidation measures of around 1.2% of GDP and provide a wider room for manoeuvre in case of negative shocks. The programme 
confirms the previous medium term objective (MTO) of a structural surplus of 0.5%. However, this MTO cannot be regarded as appropriate 
under the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact because, based on current policies and projections, this MTO does not appear to take 
sufficiently into account the implicit liabilities related to ageing, despite the debt being below the Treaty reference value. Moreover, based 
on both the Commission's 2012 spring forecast as well as on the (recalculated) structural budget balance in the programme, Luxembourg 
would significantly depart from its own MTO starting from 2012. The growth rate of government expenditure, net of discretionary revenue 
measures, is expected to significantly exceed the expenditure benchmark as defined in the Stability and Growth Pact. At 20 % of GDP, 
gross government debt is below the reference value of the Treaty. 
Recommendation: 
 Preserve a sound fiscal position by correcting any departure from a medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) that ensures the long-
term sustainability of public finances, in particular taking into account implicit liabilities related to ageing. To this end, reinforce and 
rigorously implement the budgetary strategy, supported by sufficiently specified measures, for the year 2013 and beyond, including 
meeting the expenditure benchmark.  
18.  LV 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is cautious in 2012, taking into 
account the latest available information, and plausible in 2013. While macroeconomic projections for 2012 in the programme scenario are 
very close to those in the Commission's spring 2012 forecast (with GDP growth projections respectively at 2.0% and 2.2%), recent  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
56 
 
Box (continued) 
 
convergence programme has changed the medium-term objective from -1.0% to -0.5% of GDP; the new MTO adequately reflects the 
requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. The planned headline deficit in 2012 complies with the deadline for correction of the 
excessive deficit established in Council Recommendation of 7 July 2009. For 2013, the programme targets a headline deficit of 1.4% of 
GDP, although the planned expenditure reduction is not yet fully supported by measures. Based on the (recalculated) structural budget 
balance*, Latvia will approach its MTO by the end of the programme period in 2015. While the recalculated information suggests that 
progress towards the MTO is less than 0.5% of GDP in structural terms in outer years of the programme, planned expenditure restraint 
would ensure that the growth rate of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, would be in line with the 
expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. At the same time, tax changes from the second half of 2012 as adopted by 
Parliament on the 24th of May, which are not yet reflected in the programme scenario but acknowledged in the letter accompanying the 
submission of the 2012 convergence programme represent a risk to the attainment of targets in 2013 and beyond. The general government 
debt ratio is below 60% of GDP, increasing from 42.6% of GDP in 2011 to 46.7% of GDP in 2014, as the authorities pre-fund large 
repayments related to the international financial assistance programme that are due in 2014-2015, and falling to 38.9% in 2015 as these 
repayments are made. 
Recommendation: 
 Ensure planned progress towards the timely correction of the excessive deficit. To this end, implement the budget for the year 2012 as 
envisaged and achieve the fiscal effort specified in the Council recommendation under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Thereafter, 
implement a budgetary strategy, supported by sufficiently specified structural measures, for the year 2013 and beyond, to make 
sufficient progress towards the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO), and to respect the expenditure benchmark. Use better than 
expected cyclical revenue to reduce government debt. 
 Implement measures to shift taxation away from labour to consumption, property, and use of natural and other resources while 
improving the structural balance; ensure adoption of the Fiscal Discipline Law and develop a medium term budgetary framework law to 
support the long-term sustainability of public finances; restore contributions to the mandatory funded private pension scheme at 6% of 
gross wages from 2013. 
19.  MT 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections is optimistic, especially in the outer 
years of the stability programme period when compared with potential growth as estimated by the Commission. The objective of the 
budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to gradually reduce the deficit, to 0.3% of GDP in 2015, after the planned correction of the 
excessive deficit in 2011. The programme confirms the previous medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) of a balanced position in 
structural terms, which is to be achieved beyond the programme period. The MTO adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. There are risks that the deficit outcomes could be worse than targeted, stemming from (i) lower revenue given the slightly 
optimistic macroeconomic scenario; (ii) possible overruns in current primary expenditure; and (iii) the ongoing restructuring of the national 
airline (Air Malta) and financial situation of the energy provider (Enemalta). Based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance*, annual 
progress towards the MTO is planned to be in line with the 0.5% of GDP benchmark in the Stability and Growth Pact. Using the 
Commission’s identification of the one-offs included in the budgetary targets, average progress towards the MTO is slightly higher (¾% of 
GDP) but spread very unevenly, with no progress in 2012 followed by an effort of 1¼% in 2013. According to the information provided in 
the programme, the growth rate of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, would be in line with the 
expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact throughout the programme period. The risks to the budgetary targets imply, 
however, that the average adjustment towards the MTO could be slower than appropriate. After peaking at 72% of GDP in 2011, the 
general government gross debt ratio is planned in the programme to start decreasing and to reach 65.3% of GDP in 2015 (still above the 
60% of GDP reference value). According to the plans in the programme, Malta is making sufficient progress towards meeting the debt 
reduction benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact at the end of the transition period (2015) but this assessment is subject to risks as the 
debt ratio could turn out higher than planned given the possibility of higher deficits and stock-flow adjustments. Malta's medium-term 
budgetary framework remains non-binding, implying a relatively short fiscal planning horizon. The programme announces that the Maltese 
government is considering reforms to the annual budgetary procedure, including timelines, and introducing a fiscal rule embedded in the 
Constitution, including monitoring and corrective mechanisms, in line with recent changes to the euro area governance framework. 
Recommendation: 
 Reinforce the budgetary strategy in 2012 with additional permanent measures so as to ensure adequate progress towards the medium-
term budgetary objective (MTO) and keep the deficit below 3% of GDP without recourse to one-offs. Continue fiscal consolidation at 
an appropriate pace thereafter, so as to make sufficient progress towards the MTO, including meeting the expenditure benchmark, and 
towards compliance with the debt reduction benchmark, by specifying the concrete measures to back up the deficit targets from 2013, 
while standing ready to take additional measures in case of slippages. Implement, by end-2012 at the latest, a binding, rule-based  
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multi-annual fiscal framework. Increase tax compliance and fight tax evasion, and reduce incentives towards indebtedness in corporate 
taxation.  
20.  NL 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is optimist ic. For 
2013, the stability programme projects economic growth of 1¼% without taking into account the negative impact of the additional 
consolidation measures on growth, whilst, on the basis of the same no-policy change scenario, the Commission's forecast a lower growth 
rate of 0.7%. The stated objective of the programme is to meet the Council recommendations on correcting the excessive deficit and to 
strive to further improve the budgetary position towards the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) by targeting a structural effort of at 
least 0.5% per year. The programme targets a headline general government deficit of 3% of GDP in 2013 and confirms the previous MTO 
of a structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP, which adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. The average annual 
fiscal effort of 0.75% of GDP over the period 2010-2013, based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance*, is in line with the 
structural effort of ¾% of GDP recommended by the Council. As the programme does not provide budgetary targets beyond 2013, the 
sustainability of the budgetary correction in 2013 and progress towards the MTO in the outer years, including compliance with the 
expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact, cannot be assessed. The budgetary projections over the programme period are 
subject to implementation risks. These are not solely restricted to the newly announced consolidation measures, but also to the 
implementation of some of the measures agreed upon earlier by the outgoing government. The additional measures proposed by the 
government in April 2012 for 2013 and their budgetary impact have been further specified and quantified on 25 May after the cut-off date 
for assessment. Budgetary adjustment has so far relied mostly on expenditure cuts, which also affect growth-enhancing expenditure. 
According to the 2012 stability programme, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to further rise relatively markedly in 2012, to 70.2% of GDP 
and to increase slightly further to 70.7% of GDP in 2013, taking into account the impact of the additional consolidation measures. The debt 
ratio is thus projected to remain well above the 60% reference value. For 2014 and 2015, the programme does not specify debt targets and 
therefore an assessment of compliance with the debt reduction benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact beyond 2013 cannot be given. 
Recommendation: 
 Ensure timely and durable correction of the excessive deficit. To this end, fully implement the budgetary strategy for 2012 as 
envisaged. Specify the measures necessary to ensure implementation of the 2013 budget with a view to ensuring the structural 
adjustment effort specified in the Council recommendations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Thereafter, ensure an adequate 
structural adjustment effort to make sufficient progress towards the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO), including meeting the 
expenditure benchmark, and ensure sufficient progress towards compliance with the debt reduction benchmark whilst protecting 
expenditure in areas directly relevant for growth such as research and innovation, education and training. To this end, after the 
formation of a new government, submit an update of the 2012 stability programme with substantiated targets and measures for the 
period beyond 2013.  
21.  PL 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible and is 
in line with the Commission's 2012 spring forecast. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to correct the 
excessive deficit by 2012 and reach medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) by 2015. The programme confirms the MTO of a deficit of 
1% of GDP, which adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. The planned correction of the deficit is in line 
with the deadline set by the Council and the planned fiscal effort complies with the recommendation under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Based on the (recalculated) structural deficit*, the planned annual progress towards the MTO is higher than 0.5% of GDP (in structural 
terms). The growth rate of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, is in line with the benchmark of 
the Stability and Growth Pact over entire programme period, but exceeds the expenditure benchmark by a small margin in 2013, according 
to the Commission's 2012 spring forecast. Sufficient progress towards the MTO may require additional efforts as it predominantly relies on 
sizeable cuts in public investment expenditure and is not sufficiently supported by detailed measures in the outer years of the programme. 
General government debt is projected to remain below 60 % of GDP in Poland over the programme period. The national authorities forecast 
it to decrease gradually from 56.3% of GDP in 2011 to 49.7% of GDP in 2015, whereas the Commission, taking account of possible risks 
to the consolidation plans, expects the improvement to be slower. 
Recommendation: 
Ensure planned progress towards the correction of the excessive deficit. To this end, fully implement the budget for the year 2012 and 
achieve the structural adjustment effort specified in the Council recommendations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Thereafter, 
specify the measures necessary to ensure implementation of the budgetary strategy for the year 2013 and beyond as envisaged,  
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 Speed up the reform of the fiscal framework by enacting legislation with a view to introducing a permanent expenditure rule by 2013. 
This rule should be consistent with the European system of accounts. Take measures to strengthen the mechanisms of coordination 
among the different levels of government in the medium-term and annual budgetary processes. 
22.  PT 
Recommendation: Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding. 
23.  RO 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible. The 
objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to reach a budget deficit below 3% of GDP in 2012, in line with the 
Council recommendations given to Romania under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Thereafter, it aims at achieving a medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO) defined as a deficit of 0.7% of GDP in structural terms. The MTO adequately reflects the requirements of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Following the planned correction of the excessive deficit in 2012, the deficit is expected to decrease further to 
2.2% of GDP in 2013, to 1.2% of GDP in 2014 and 0.9% of GDP in 2015. Based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance*, this 
implies an improvement in the deficit by 1.5% in 2012, 0.5% in 2013 and 0.7% in 2014, in line with the 0.5% of GDP benchmark of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The growth rate of government expenditure is in line with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and 
Growth Pact over the 2012-2015 period. The programme foresees the achievement of the MTO in 2014. The main risks to the budgetary 
targets are the arrears of state owned enterprises, as well as potential re-accumulation of arrears at local government level and in the health 
sector, even if some measures have been taken in the health sector. As regards public debt, it was below 34% of GDP by end 2011 thus 
remaining substantially below 60% of GDP. 
Recommendation: Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding. 
24.  SE 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible for 
2012 and optimistic in 2013-15, when GDP growth is expected to average around 3.5%. The Commission's 2012 spring forecast foresees 
GDP growth of 2.1% in 2013. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to ensure long-term sustainability by 
respecting the rules of the Swedish fiscal framework, including the target of having a surplus in general government net lending of 1% of 
GDP over the cycle. The strategy also aims at fulfilling the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact, notably respecting the 3% of 
GDP reference value. The programme has changed the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) from a general government surplus of 
1.0% of GDP to a deficit of 1.0% of GDP. The new MTO adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Due to the 
change, the MTO is, based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance, likely to be met over the programme period, even taking into 
account the likelihood of further expansionary discretionary measures in 2013 or 2014, . Certain downside risks to budgetary projections 
from 2013 onwards are linked to the optimistic macroeconomic assumptions. The planned growth rate of government expenditure, taking 
into account discretionary revenue measures, would comply with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact. The debt 
ratio is below 60% of GDP and, according to the programme, is projected to continue to decrease over the programme period. 
Recommendation: Detailed recommendations are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding. 
25.  SI 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is optimistic 
when compared with the Commission’s 2012 spring forecast. The objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to bring 
the general government deficit below 3% of GDP in 2013, the deadline set by the Council, and to pursue further deficit reduction thereafter 
so as to broadly achieve Slovenia’s medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) by 2015. The MTO is defined as a balanced position in 
structural terms, unchanged from the previous programme, but cannot be regarded as appropriate under the provisions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact because, based on current policies and projections, it does not ensure sufficiently rapid progress towards long-term 
sustainability. There are risks that the deficit outcomes could be worse than targeted, due to (i) a lack of specification of the measures 
foreseen, in particular for the period 2014-15; (ii) a track record of primary current expenditure overruns; (iii) lower revenue given the 
relatively optimistic macroeconomic scenario and uncertainty about the impact of the recently decided tax measures; and (iv) possible 
additional capital support operations and calling of guarantees. Based on the (recalculated) structural balance*, the average annual fiscal 
effort over the period 2010-2013, is planned to be almost 1% of GDP, slighty above the one recommended by the Council. However, the 
Commission's 2012 spring forecast implies that an additional effort will have to be made in 2013 to respect the recommendation over the  
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growth of government expenditure, taking into account discretionary revenue measures, is in line with the expenditure benchmark of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in both years, so overall the programme plans a broadly appropriate adjustment path towards the MTO. Taking 
account of the risks mentioned above, the progress towards the MTO could be slower than appropriate in both years. From around 48% of 
GDP in 2011, general government gross debt is projected in the programme to peak by 2013 at 53% (thus remaining below the 60% of 
GDP reference value) before falling slightly by the end of the programme period. The debt projections are subject to upward risks from the 
possibility of higher deficits mentioned above and higher stock-flow adjustments. Slovenia’s medium-term budgetary framework and 
expenditure rule remain insufficiently binding and insufficiently focussed on achieving the MTO and securing long-term sustainability. 
Recommendation: 
 Implement the 2012 budget, and reinforce the budgetary strategy for 2013 with sufficiently specified structural measures, standing 
ready to take additional measures so as to ensure a correction of the excessive deficit in a sustainable manner by 2013 and the 
achievement of the structural adjustment effort specified in the Council recommendations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Thereafter, ensure an adequate structural adjustment effort to make sufficient progress towards an appropriate medium-term objective 
for the budgetary position, including meeting the expenditure benchmark. Strengthen the medium-term budgetary framework, 
including the expenditure rule, by making it more binding and transparent. 
26.  SK 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible. It is 
broadly in line with the Commission's 2012 spring forecast, although the latter assumes somewhat higher real GDP growth in 2012. The 
stated objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances. The 
intermediary steps defined to reach this are a rigorous implementation of the 2012 budget and a reduction of the headline deficit below 3% 
of GDP in 2013, the deadline for correction of the excessive deficit set by the Council. The achievement of the headline deficit target in 
2013, however, may fall short of plans. The programme has changed the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) from a close-to-
balanced budget to a structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP, which is not foreseen to be achieved within the programme period. The new MTO 
adequately reflects the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. Based on the (recalculated) structural budget balance*, the average 
annual fiscal effort in 2010-2013 amounts to 1.3% of GDP, well above the required value recommended by the Council, whereby the 
residual fiscal effort is somewhat back loaded to 2013. The target for 2013 is subject to risks, as suggested revenue measures may fall short 
of the objective; simultaneous implementation of all small-scale measures can be difficult to implement, and in light of upwards revisions 
of the deficit targets that took place in the past. In addition, further across-board expenditure cuts may prove unsustainable in the medium 
term. In 2014 and 2015, the average fiscal effort stands at 0.3% of GDP annually, which is below the required adjustment of 0.5% of GDP 
for countries which have not yet reached the MTO. Nevertheless, according to the programme the growth rate of government expenditure, 
taking into account discretionary revenue measures, is in line with the expenditure benchmark of the Stability and Growth Pact in the outer 
years of the programme. Government debt would remain well below 60% of GDP. While Slovakia passed legislation establishing the Fiscal 
Council, so far it has not been set up and the legislation on expenditure ceilings has not yet been adopted.  
Recommendation: 
 Take additional measures in 2012 and specify the necessary measures in 2013, to correct the excessive deficit in a sustainable manner 
and ensure the structural adjustment effort specified in the Council recommendations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Implement targeted spending cuts, while safeguarding growth-enhancing expenditure, and step up efforts to improve the efficiency of 
public spending. Thereafter, ensure an adequate structural adjustment effort to make sufficient progress towards the medium-term 
objective, including meeting the expenditure benchmark. Accelerate the setting up of the Fiscal Council and adopt rules on 
expenditure ceilings. 
 Increase tax compliance, in particular by improving the efficiency of VAT collection; reduce distortions in taxation of labour across 
different employment types, also by limiting tax deductions; link real estate taxation to the market value of property; make greater use 
of environmental taxation 
27.  UK 
Summary assessment: 
The Council is of the opinion that the macroeconomic scenario underpinning the budgetary projections in the programme is plausible. The 
objective of the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is to implement the necessary fiscal consolidation to achieve the 
government's fiscal targets on net debt and cyclically-adjusted current balance. The convergence programme does not include a medium-
term objective (MTO) as foreseen by the Stability and Growth Pact. According to programme projections, the deadline to correct the 
excessive deficit set by the Council in its recommendation of 2 December 2009 is expected to be missed by one year. The government 
  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
60 
 
 
 
Box (continued) 
 
deficit in 2014-15, the deadline set by the Council, is estimated at 4.4% of GDP, implying, based on the (recalculated) structural deficit*, an 
average fiscal effort of 1.25% of GDP between 2010-11 and 2014-15 which is below the 1¾% effort set out in the Council recommendation 
under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. Although the government has not deviated from its fiscal consolidation strategy which initially, 
based on previous macroeconomic projections, appeared sufficient to comply with EDP targets, the fiscal performance and outlook have 
been affected by a deterioration of economic growth prospects. Revenue measures have been significantly front-loaded in the adjustment 
path of the fiscal consolidation. Almost 40% of the total annual fiscal consolidation planned for the 2010-11 to 2014-15 period has been 
achieved by the end of 2011-12, including 30% of the spending cuts and two-thirds of the net tax increases. The potential revenue 
contribution from an increased efficiency of the tax system, stemming from a review of the VAT rate structure, remains relatively 
underexploited. According to the convergence programme, the general government deficit is expected to be 8.3% of GDP in 2011-12, 5.9% 
in 2012-13, 6.0% of GDP in 2013-14, 4.4% of GDP in 2014-15, 2.9% of GDP in 2015-16 and 1.2% of GDP in 2016-17. These estimates 
are somewhat lower than those by Commission services, who in its 2012 spring forecast expect a deficit of 6.1% of GDP in 2012-13 (which 
would be 7.9% without an upcoming one-off pension fund transfer) and 6.5% of GDP in 2013-14. The differences stem from a lower 
growth forecast and amendments made by Eurostat to UK data. Some adjustments were made to the government’s fiscal plans in the 2011 
Autumn Statement to prioritise growth-enhancing expenditure, but public sector investment is still set to fall sharply by 2014-15. 
Government debt, forecast at 94.7% in 2013-14, is expected to peak in 2014-15. 
Recommendation: 
 Fully implement the budgetary strategy for the financial year 2012-13 and beyond, supported by sufficiently specified measures, to 
ensure a timely correction of the excessive deficit in a sustainable manner and the achievement of the structural adjustment effort 
specified in the Council recommendations under the Excessive Deficit Procedure and to set the high public debt ratio on a sustained 
downward path. Subject to reinforcing the budgetary strategy for the financial year 2013-14 and beyond, prioritise growth-enhancing 
expenditure to avoid the risk that a further weakening of the medium-term outlook for growth will negatively impact on the long-term 
sustainability of public finances 
                                                          
* Cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, recalculated by the Commission services on the basis of the 
information provided in the programme, using the commonly agreed methodology.  
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The deepening of the sovereign debt crisis in 2011 
and 2012 marked a turning point in the debate on 
the EU economy and its governance framework, in 
particular in relation to the euro area. The move to 
stricter budgetary and economic surveillance 
intensified, building on the recently adopted 
reforms. 
Despite the preceding period of sustained 
economic growth, many Member States entered 
the recession in 2009 with little or no room for 
fiscal manoeuvre to reduce its impact on the 
economy. In some Member States, the apparent 
fiscal space vanished as macroeconomic 
imbalances and strains in financial markets 
unwound. The dramatic social implications of 
shrinking economic output and rising government 
deficits and debt in those Member States that were 
most strongly affected, along with the first signs of 
spillovers to other euro area countries, triggered a 
consensus on the need to change the EU 
governance framework. As a result the economic 
and fiscal surveillance framework in the EU as a 
whole was reformed, and a crisis resolution 
mechanism for the euro area was introduced.  
The supervisory and regulatory framework of the 
banking system also underwent significant 
reforms. A new EU financial supervisory 
framework became operational in January 2011. In 
response to G20 commitments, the EU continues 
its financial regulation programme. The latest 
Commission's legislative proposal on credit rating 
agencies (CRA3) is meant to tackle the 
overreliance of financial markets on ratings, 
concentration in the credit rating sector, CRAs 
civil liability and remuneration models. Other 
major on-going projects include revisions of the 
capital requirements for banks (CRD4 directive) 
and the markets in financial instruments directive 
(MIFID), both currently being discussed in the 
European Parliament and the Council. Most 
recently, on 6 June 2012, the Commission adopted 
a legislative proposal for bank recovery and 
resolution. The proposed framework sets out the 
necessary steps and powers to ensure that bank 
failures across the EU are managed in a way which 
avoids financial instability and minimises costs for 
taxpayers. The May 2012 informal European 
Council summit resolved that Economic and 
Monetary Union needed to be deepened and a 
potential 'banking union' could be established with 
more integrated banking supervision and 
resolution, and a common deposit insurance 
scheme. The June 2012 Euro Area summit 
confirmed that the Commission would present 
plans for a European single supervisory 
mechanism along with a framework for the 
potential direct recapitalisation of euro area banks 
through the ESM, paving the way for a banking 
union.   
With a number of euro area members facing 
insolvency/illiquidity, backstops of last resort were 
set up as early as May 2010 (see Box I.2) to 
guarantee the stability of the euro area. The 
temporary firewalls were developed gradually. In 
February 2012, Member States signed a Treaty 
establishing the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). The strict conditionality attached to the 
financial support provided by all the different 
backstops implied a significant strengthening of 
economic and fiscal surveillance on the Member 
States concerned.   
The lack of fiscal space for some countries to 
support their economies during the early days of 
the crisis, and the more recent evolution of the 
crisis from a banking crisis to a sovereign debt 
one, highlighted the extent of the implications of 
inadequate national economic and budgetary 
policy during the boom years. With the risks to 
spillovers to other Member States also becoming 
evident, an overall strengthening of EU 
surveillance has been undertaken. A major 
overhaul of the EU economic governance 
framework was proposed by the Commission in 
September 2010 and adopted by European 
Parliament and Council in the second half of 2011 
(the so-called 'Six Pack'). With its entry into force 
in December 2011, the EU has now thus much 
stronger rules than before the start of the economic 
and financial crisis. 
The Six Pack legislation has strengthened a wide 
range of existing aspects of economic governance 
and introduced new ones. A new Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure has been set up to prevent or 
correct macroeconomic imbalances. Early 
detection of such imbalances will reduce the risks 
of their unwinding resulting in sudden rises of 
government deficits and debt in Member States 
with apparently sound public finances. 
A move towards a more integrated framework for 
assessing economic reforms and public finance 
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plans had already started in Spring 2011, when, in 
the context of the Europe 2020 strategy, the 
European Semester was implemented for the first 
time. The European Semester coordinates and 
aligns the submission of the Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (SCPs), which contain 
Member States' budgetary plans, with that of 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs), which 
contain the elements necessary for monitoring 
progress towards the Europe 2020 national targets 
for sustainable and inclusive growth. Both these 
documents are now submitted by mid-April so that 
they can be analysed and country-specific 
recommendations under Article 121(2) – on the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines –  and 148(4) – 
on Employment Guidelines – can be issued before 
the summer – in time to feed into the preparation 
of the national policies for the following year. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) sets out the 
provisions according to which the Treaty 
requirements to ensure fiscal discipline are 
implemented. In light of the heated debate on the 
need to adapt the fiscal policy reaction to a 
deteriorating economic environment, Chapter II.2 
explains the SGP provisions that apply to 
Excessive Deficit Procedures (EDPs) in the case of 
worsening economic conditions as well as the 
methods used to assess whether an extension of the 
timeline for correcting an excessive deficit can be 
granted.  
Chapter II.2 also presents the main new features 
introduced in the SGP by three of the regulations 
contained in the Six Pack. The adjustment towards 
the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) 
which is the core of the preventive arm of the SGP 
will now be assessed on the basis of a new 
expenditure benchmark, which allows early 
detection and correction of unsustainable 
expenditure developments, as well as on the 
structural balance. As for the corrective arm, in 
line with the Treaty envisaging both a deficit and a 
debt criterion to examine compliance with 
budgetary discipline, a debt-reduction benchmark 
has been established to allow the opening of an 
EDP on the basis of an insufficiently diminishing 
debt-to-GDP ratio. For the euro area, enforcement 
is now ensured by a gradual system of financial 
sanctions, which can already be invoked in the 
preventive arm, in the case of inadequate measures 
to correct a significant deviation from the 
appropriate adjustment towards the MTO.  
Compliance with the SGP will also be promoted 
by the minimum standards introduced for Member 
States' fiscal frameworks. Chapter II.3 presents the 
main elements of the Directive on national 
budgetary frameworks which was also part of the 
Six Pack. As is the case for most other national 
institutions, national budgetary frameworks are far 
from homogeneous within the EU. Such diversity 
is documented by a database created as a result of 
the Ecofin Council's 2006 decision to ask the 
Commission to conduct a comprehensive analysis 
of the existing national fiscal rules and institutions 
in the EU Member States. Based on a recent 
update of this database, Chapter II.3 outlines the 
main changes in national fiscal frameworks that 
took place in 2010. 
The variety across national fiscal frameworks 
reflects different political and economic 
environments and traditions. Different frameworks 
can be compatible with EU budgetary framework, 
as long as their quality and the consistency of their 
rules is conducive to the achievement of the EU 
obligations. For this reason, the Directive requires 
only minimum standards, in particular with regard 
to accounting and statistics, forecasting, numerical 
fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary frameworks 
and transparency. However, best practices going 
beyond these minimum requirements are also 
discussed amongst Member States, in peer review 
exercises, in order to help countries achieve the 
best outcomes they can. Chapter II.3 briefly 
outlines the outcome of the November 2011 
session of this exercise. 
With the sovereign debt crisis intensifying over the 
course of 2011, it has become widely 
acknowledged that the postponement of the 
adoption of even deeper reforms, both at national 
and EU level, could put the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) at serious risk, with 
dramatic implications for all Member States. 
The most recent initiatives of reforms to the 
budgetary surveillance framework have focussed 
on the euro area, where spillovers are particularly 
high. Chapter II.4 presents the two regulations 
proposed by the Commission on 23 November 
2011, focussing in particular on the main features 
of the draft regulation aimed at enhancing 
monitoring of budgetary policies on euro area 
Member States. The same regulation includes 
provisions specific to euro area Member States 
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subject to EDP, to which stricter monitoring 
requirements apply. The second regulation 
concerns only euro area Member States 
experiencing severe difficulties with regard to their 
financial stability or receiving financial assistance 
on a precautionary basis.  
National governments have also spurred a further 
strengthening of the adopted reforms for the 
national level. Chapter II.5 presents the content of 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG) that was signed by 25 
Member States (
30
) on 2 March 2012 and that is 
currently undergoing the process of ratification. In 
particular, the Fiscal Compact which is part of the 
TSCG reinforces the obligation to reach the MTO 
already envisaged by the preventive arm of the 
SGP through national rules and automatic 
corrective mechanisms. 
Finally, a vision for the future of a more deep and 
integrated EMU has been presented on 26 June 
2012 in the Report "Towards a Genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union" prepared by the President of 
the European Council, in cooperation with the 
Presidents of the Commission, of the Eurogroup 
and of the European Central Bank. 
31
 The Report 
sets out four building blocks for the future EMU: 
an integrated financial framework, an integrated 
budgetary framework, an integrated economic 
policy framework and strengthened democratic 
legitimacy and accountability. In its June 2012 
meeting, the European Council invited its 
President, again in cooperation with the Presidents 
of the Commission, of the Eurogroup and of the 
ECB, to develop a specific and time-bound road 
map for the achievement of a genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union.   
                                                          
(30) The United Kingdom and the Czech Republic did not sign 
the TSCG. 
(31) See European Council (2012). 
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Budgetary frameworks are set up to guide policy 
making over time. In order to be effective, they 
need to be stable enough to facilitate planning over 
the years, but they must also be flexible enough to 
adapt as any weaknesses become apparent and as 
the environment in which they operate changes. 
The need for stability is a key reason why changes 
are not usually introduced as a result of small 
weaknesses being identified. However, lack of 
timely adaptations of frameworks to the emerging 
policy challenges is also explained by institutional 
inertia. Consensus on improvements proves 
particularly difficult to achieve when they concern 
introducing more binding rules. Major changes are 
thus often adopted only as a result of dramatic 
events, which disclose the unsustainability of the 
status quo.  
Although there has been an increase in research 
into budgetary institutions and rules in recent 
years, the available empirical work is still limited 
(see for instance Fabrizio, 2008). The existing 
work does seem to confirm, though, that one 
determinant that typically brings about change to 
budgetary institutions and rules are negative 
economic shocks. Sufficiently large economic 
shocks not accommodated by markets help build a 
constituency for improving budget institutions. 
The fiscal framework of the European Union has 
proven to be no exception to these findings. 
The overall favourable macroeconomic conditions 
that characterised the first decade of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) had masked the 
extent of the potential consequences of the pitfalls 
of the EU governance framework. A first reform to 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (
32
) – the 
framework for budgetary surveillance at EU level 
– was carried out in 2005. This reform was also 
linked to the effects of a – more moderate – 
negative shock. Deficits rising above the 3% of 
GDP threshold during an economic downturn 
clearly showed that government balances that had 
not improved in structural terms in the late 1990s 
                                                          
(32) Member States are required by the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to avoid excessive 
deficits (Article 126) and to ensure coordination of their 
economic policies and sustained convergence of their 
economic performance (Article 121). The Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) provides the secondary legislation that 
defines these obligations in greater detail and thus sets out 
the framework within which fiscal policy making is to be 
set and monitored at European level. 
and early 2000s (Buti, 2006). However, the reform 
was essentially triggered by the difficult debate 
between EU institutions and Member States that 
ensued from the November 2003 decision by the 
Council not to follow the Commission 
recommendations concerning the excessive deficit 
procedures for France and Germany.  
The reform that followed in 2005 was a positive 
step forward, as it enhanced the economic rationale 
of the SGP. It introduced provisions on how to 
deal with special circumstances and country-
specific problems, above all linked to 
macroeconomic downturns. In particular, 
following the 2005 reform, the adjustment required 
to correct the excessive deficit was formulated in 
structural terms to allow the automatic stabilisers 
to operate freely around the fiscal consolidation 
path, unless there are specific risks to financial 
stability. This provision remains particularly 
relevant in the current economic situation (Chapter 
II.2 includes an explanation of how effective 
action to correct an excessive deficit is assessed).  
However, several problematic aspects of the SGP 
that had already been identified at that time were 
not effectively addressed by that reform, including 
the definition of the satisfactory pace of debt 
reduction, the poor enforcement mechanisms and 
the often too optimistic macroeconomic and 
budgetary forecasts prepared by national 
authorities. The experience of the 2005 reform  
brought forward the importance of seizing the 
window of opportunity given by the call for 
reforms in bad economic times to also address 
imprudent fiscal policies in good times. Changes to 
budgetary frameworks should not just focus on 
contingent situations that are likely to be 
exceptional, but should carefully consider the 
incentives inherent in the emerging framework for 
the medium and longer term.  
While a number of weaknesses had already been 
identified before the start of the current economic 
and financial crisis in 2008 (see European 
Commission, 2008b), the momentum for reforms 
to the EU governance framework only really 
gained pace when the possibility of the illiquidity 
or insolvency of both EU and euro area Member 
States arose for the first time since the launch of 
the euro. 
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The impact of financial crises on the public 
finances is typically very large and long lasting 
(see the analysis of the fiscal cost of financial 
crises in European Commission, 2009a). The 
consequences of a crisis are, however, even worse 
in countries where they come on top of underlying 
public finances fragilities, which, in some 
instances, are revealed by the crisis itself. This has 
been the case for a number of EU Member States.  
Lack of room for budgetary manoeuvre with the 
onset of the crisis and the subsequent risks to 
financial stability spurred acknowledgement that 
the SGP had not provided sufficient incentive to 
pursue prudent fiscal policies in good times. Also, 
the SGP's effectiveness in correcting government 
deficits below 3% of GDP was not enough to curb 
unsustainable developments of government 
expenditure and debt ratios (European 
Commission, 2010a). 
On 12 May (
33
) and 30 June 2010 (
34
), the 
Commission issued two communications outlining 
a comprehensive set of measures that were 
considered urgent to reinforce economic 
governance in the EU, drawing on the lessons of 
the first ten years of EMU. (
35
) Since then, a 
number of initiatives have followed. 
A first package of legislative proposals reforming 
economic governance – the so-called Six Pack –
was presented by the Commission on 29 
September 2010. This package is addressed to all 
Member States although certain aspects of it apply 
only to the euro area. Thanks to changes in 
legislative procedures introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty (
36
), the European Parliament was, for the 
first time, deeply involved in the design of the EU 
fiscal framework. Rapid but intense negotiations 
                                                          
(33) COM(2010) 250 final 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/docume
nts/2010-05-12-com(2010)250_final.pdf 
(34) COM(2010) 367/2 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/docume
nts/com_2010_367_en.pdf  
(35) The Report EMU@10 (European Commission, 2008b) 
taking stock of the experience of the first ten years of EMU 
had already highlighted some of the challenges ahead.  
(36) According to the Lisbon Treaty, legislation on the 
coordination of economic policy has to be adopted by both 
European Parliament and Council, through ordinary 
legislative procedure. A special legislative procedure 
envisaging only Council adoption remains for legislation 
that concerns the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and 
the related EDP protocol.  
between the European Parliament and the Council 
led to the adoption of all six proposed pieces of 
legislation at the first reading. Parliament gave its 
position in September 2011 and the Council 
decided on the legislation in November, 
confirming the same texts agreed by the 
Parliament. While the legislative process entailed a 
number of changes with respect to the proposals 
presented by the Commission, in particular with 
regard to the formulation of the principle of 
prudent fiscal policy making, the thrust of the 
Commission's proposals was broadly retained. The 
legislation entered into force on 13 December 
2011.  
These six pieces of legislations include a major 
reform of the SGP, but also new legislation, with a 
wider scope. First, the boundaries of EU 
surveillance have been extended to include 
macroeconomic surveillance. Previously, 
macroeconomic surveillance came under the 
recommendations stemming from the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines – the Six Pact 
sharpens the definition of macroeconomic 
surveillance and adds enforcement mechanisms. 
Second, the legislation revamps fiscal frameworks 
not only at EU level, but also at national level. 
The new regulation on the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances also has 
important implications with regard to fiscal 
surveillance. (
37
) It addresses cases like those of 
Ireland and Spain, where government deficit and 
debt figures were not a source of concern ahead of 
the crisis. In these Member States, government 
deficits and debt, however, increased suddenly and 
dramatically once the crisis hit, as a result of the 
unravelling of imbalances that were not essentially 
of a fiscal nature, although they contributed to 
mask unsustainable expenditure trends. The new 
regulation aims to ensure the timely assessment 
and correction of risks as they emerge.  
The new directive on national budgetary 
frameworks addresses the need to ensure 
consistency between national fiscal governance 
and the EU budgetary discipline provisions. It also 
promotes stronger frameworks to support national 
economic policy-making in those Member States 
                                                          
(37) Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention 
and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 
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that have still to make progress in this respect. In 
line with subsidiarity concerns and a history of 
very different budgetary frameworks across 
Member States, the directive sets only minimum 
requirements. However, with a view to exceeding 
these minimum requirements, best practice is 
discussed between Member States through a peer 
review process. The directive and the peer review 
process are presented in Chapter II.3. 
The reformed SGP is presented in Chapter II.2. 
The reform included two regulations amending the 
existing legislation on: (i)  the preventive arm of 
the SGP (
38
) – the part of the SGP which aims to 
ensure that Member States are at their Medium-
Term budgetary Objective (MTO) – and (ii) the 
corrective arm of the SGP – the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) (
39
). The main revisions 
concerned the introduction of benchmarks for 
expenditure (net of discretionary revenue 
measures) and debt developments, in the 
preventive and corrective arm, respectively. 
Further provisions have also been added, in 
particular as regards severe economic downturns 
for the EU or the euro area as a whole, as well as 
for the launch of EDPs for Member States with 
government debt-to-GDP ratios below 60% of 
GDP.  
The pieces of legislation mentioned above apply to 
all Member States. (
40
) The only specific euro area 
aspect of the legislation on economic governance 
that entered into force in December 2011 are the 
two regulations on enforcement mechanisms (one 
regulation related to the SGP and one regulation on 
macroeconomic imbalances) which do not concern 
Member States outside the euro area. In particular, 
the regulation on enforcement mechanisms for the 
SGP envisages a gradual system of financial 
sanctions for euro area Member States that can 
already be invoked in the preventive arm – this is 
well before the sanctions envisaged by the Treaty 
(Article 126) in the case where a euro area 
Member State does not comply with 
recommendations by the Council to correct its 
                                                          
(38) Council regulation (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions 
and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies. 
(39) Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on 
speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure. 
(40) Only provisions on national numerical fiscal rules do not 
apply to the UK, in view of its specific Protocol annexed to 
the Treaties.  
excessive deficit repeatedly. Unlike the sanctions 
foreseen by the Treaty, enforcement mechanisms 
foreseen by the new regulation are deemed 
adopted, on the basis of a Commission 
recommendation, unless a majority of euro area 
Member States in the Council rejects this 
recommendation (the so-called "reversed qualified 
majority").    
A distinction between provisions for euro area and 
non-euro area Member States is warranted by the 
different implications of fiscal misbehaviour by 
euro area or non-euro area countries on other 
Member States. As demonstrated by the sovereign 
debt crisis – and in particular by the need to put in 
place common financial backstops – spillovers 
from fiscal policies are high within a currency 
union. More integrated economic and financial 
systems mean that other countries bear a higher 
share of the cost of one country's profligacy than 
would otherwise be the case. The increased 
awareness of the cost of not preventing these 
negative spillovers has led the Commission to 
present two further legislative proposals, known as 
the Two Pack, for regulations specific to the euro 
area on 23 November 2011. On the same day, the 
Commission also presented a Green Paper on the 
feasibility of common euro area debt issuance, in 
particular on Stability Bonds that could over the 
medium term contribute to completing the 
institutional setup of EMU (see Box II.4.1). One of 
the legislative proposal is linked to the 
aforementioned financial backstops. It seeks to 
strengthen the economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States experiencing or 
threatened with severe difficulties with regard to 
their financial stability or receiving a financial 
assistance on a precautionary basis. (
41
)  
The other legislative proposal, on enhanced 
budgetary monitoring, is more directly linked to 
the SGP and will become part of it, when 
adopted. (
42
) It aims to reinforce the coordination, 
surveillance and discipline of euro area Member 
                                                          
(41) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability in the euro area (COM/2011/0819 final). 
(42) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on common provisions for monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction 
of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area 
(COM/2011/0821 final). 
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States' public finances. It sets common budgetary 
rules and a timeline for all euro area Member 
States. Above all, it envisages an assessment of 
governments' draft budgetary plans each autumn 
by the Commission, so as to feed into national 
Parliaments' examination of the draft budget. 
Stricter provisions should apply to Member States 
in EDP, for which the proposed regulation 
envisages a closer monitoring. 
On 21 February 2012, the Council reached 
agreement on a general approach to the proposed 
Regulation for negotiations with Parliament. The 
European Parliament's negotiation position was 
adopted in plenary meeting on 13 June 2012.  
At the date of publication of this report, the 
negotiations between the co-legislators have just 
started. Accordingly, Chapter II.4 presents the 
Commission proposals of 23 November 2011. 
These Commission proposals were followed by 
another important initiative aimed at enhancing 
economic governance, including fiscal surveillance 
and budgetary frameworks. On 9 December 2011, 
the Heads of State and Government of the euro 
area as well as almost all non-euro area Member 
States put forward proposed changes to economic 
governance of the euro area by way of a 'fiscal 
compact' based on stricter budgetary rules, 
completed by closer economic policy coordination, 
and a strengthening of stabilisation instruments.  
On 30 January 2012, the Heads of State and 
Government of 25 Member States (the only non-
signatories were the United Kingdom and the 
Czech Republic) agreed on the draft of an 
intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (TSCG), which they signed on 2 
March 2012. The content of the TSCG, including 
provisions going beyond the fiscal compact, is 
described in Chapter II.5. 
Participating Member States essentially undertake 
intensified commitments through the TSCG, in 
particular to reflect the SGP rules in their national 
legislation. The Article on the fiscal compact 
contains a provision to enshrine a balanced budget 
rule at national level through binding, permanent 
and preferably constitutional provisions. The 
TSCG explicitly refers to the respect of the MTOs 
of the SGP. The rule should also contain an 
automatic correction mechanism that shall be 
triggered in the event of significant deviation from 
the MTO or the adjustment path towards it, and be 
monitored at the national level by independent 
institutions. 
The TSCG tasks the Commission to propose: (i) 
common principles concerning the national 
automatic correction mechanisms and the role and 
independence of the institutions responsible at 
national level for monitoring compliance with the 
rules; (ii) a time frame for convergence towards 
the country-specific MTOs.  
The TSCG will enter into force following 
ratification by at least twelve euro area countries 
(
43
). Along with the transposition into national 
legislation of the directive on national budgetary 
frameworks, to be completed by December 2013, 
the TSCG entail the adoption of important reforms 
of national fiscal governance in many Member 
States. 
In its Communication of 20 June 2012, the 
Commission has already put forward seven 
common principles for designing the national 
correction mechanisms. The principles cover the 
legal status of a national correction mechanism, its 
consistency with the EU framework, activation, 
nature of the correction in terms of size and 
timeline, operational instruments, escape clauses, 
and the role and independence of monitoring 
institutions. (
44
) 
                                                          
(43) At the cut-off date of this document Greece, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Latvia have deposited their instrument of 
ratification of the TSCG. 
(44) COM(2012) 342 final 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:
0342:FIN:EN:PDF 
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2011 reform of the SGP 
As part of the EU response to the crisis, a reform 
of the European common fiscal framework – the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – entered into 
force on 13 December 2011. The new framework 
has two main components: 
Stronger preventive action and deeper fiscal 
coordination: A new expenditure benchmark will 
now be used alongside the change in the structural 
budget balance (
45
) to assess adjustments towards 
the country specific medium-term budgetary 
objective (MTO). Inadequate action to correct 
significant deviations from the appropriate 
adjustment path towards the MTO can lead to an 
interest-bearing deposit (of 0.2% of GDP as a rule) 
to be lodged by non-compliant euro area countries. 
Stronger corrective action through a reinforced 
SGP: The launch of an Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) can now result from government 
debt developments as well as from government 
deficit. Member States with debt in excess of 60% 
of GDP should reduce it in line with a numerical 
benchmark. Furthermore, regardless of whether an 
EDP is launched on the basis of deficit or debt 
developments, progressive financial sanctions on 
euro area Member States kick in at an earlier stage 
of the EDP. In cases of particularly serious non-
compliance, including those evidenced by the 
existence of an interest bearing deposit, a non-
interest bearing deposit (of 0.2% of GDP as a rule) 
will be requested from a euro area country when it 
is placed in EDP. Failure by a euro area country to 
comply with a Council recommendation under 
Article 126(7) to correct its excessive deficit will 
result in a fine (of 0.2% of GDP as a rule). The 
fine imposed can rise up to 0.5% of GDP per year 
in the case of non-compliance with a notice to take 
measures for the deficit reduction in accordance 
with Article 126(9). 
2.1. THE REFORM OF THE PREVENTIVE ARM OF 
THE SGP 
The provisions of the preventive arm of the SGP 
should provide the main guidelines for budget 
                                                          
(45) The structural balance is defined as the cyclically adjusted 
balance net of one-off and temporary measures 
planning and execution of the Member States 
when they are not subject to the more stringent 
requirements of an EDP. Countries currently in 
this situation are Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, 
Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden. The preventive 
arm is implemented through Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of 
economic policies. 
The expenditure benchmark 
Under the preventive arm of the SGP, Member 
States aim at a specific fiscal target – the so-called 
medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) – to 
ensure the sustainability of their public finances. 
The new rules define an "expenditure benchmark" 
for judging progress towards the MTO, to 
complement the assessment based on the structural 
balance. The aim is to improve the planning and 
the fiscal record of the Member States by 
guaranteeing the financing of expenditure 
programmes by permanent revenues of an 
equivalent level. This should help avoid the 
repetition of mistakes made ahead of the crisis, 
when unsustainable expenditure trends were 
temporarily funded through windfall revenues or 
additional borrowing. The expenditure benchmark 
does not constrain governments in terms of their 
level of government expenditure – it simply 
requires that all changes to expenditure are 
financed through additional revenues. The actual 
size of the spending to GDP ratio is not 
constrained.  
For Member States that have achieved their MTO, 
the expenditure benchmark is complied with when 
the annual growth of government expenditure, net 
of discretionary measures taken on the revenue 
side, does not exceed a reference medium-term 
rate of potential GDP growth.  
For Member States that have not yet reached their 
MTO, the expenditure benchmark is complied with 
when the annual growth of government 
expenditure, net of discretionary measures taken 
on the revenue side, does not exceed a rate below 
reference medium-term rate of potential GDP 
growth.  
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Table II.2.1: Expenditure benchmark in relation to MTO achievement 
Member State at its MTO Member State not at its MTO
Net expenditure growth in line with the reference rate
Net expenditure growth in line with a rate below the 
reference rate
% government expenditure in GDP constant % government expenditure in GDP decreases
Structural balance constant over time Structural balance strengthens
Remains at MTO Gap with the MTO closes over time
 
Source: Commission services. 
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The difference between the reference rate and the 
rate below the reference rate – referred to as "the 
convergence margin" – is country-specific, 
depending on the size of government spending in 
the economy(
46
), in order to ensure that complying 
with this lower rate yields an annual improvement 
of the government balance. Applying a lower 
reference rate for Member States not at their MTO 
means letting revenues grow more rapidly than 
spending: this should help the Member State to 
meet the required structural adjustment of 0.5pp of 
GDP. Table II.2.1 summarises the different 
requirements and their effects for Member States 
both at and not yet at their MTOs. 
The reference medium-term rate of potential GDP 
growth is based on regularly updated forward-
looking projections and backward-looking 
estimates, taking into account the relevant 
calculation method provided by the Economic 
Policy Committee (EPC). The reference medium-
term rate of potential GDP growth will be the 
average of the estimates of the previous 5 years, 
the estimate for the current year and the 
projections for the following 4 years. The aim is to 
have a measure which is sufficiently stable over 
time to provide a reference, but is also regularly 
updated so as to avoid that the reference provided 
to guide policy is out of touch with the economic 
situation.  
The government expenditure aggregate to be 
assessed excludes interest expenditure, since it is 
                                                          
(46) The convergence margin is set so that the lower increase in 
net expenditure relative to GDP is consistent with a 
tightening of the budget balance of 0.5pp of GDP, when 
GDP grows at its potential rate. It is calculated based on 
the assumption that any decrease in the share of public 
expenditure in the economy (which would occur if 
expenditure grows slower than potential GDP) would be 
translated into an exactly proportional improvement of the 
structural balance (the coefficient being equal to the base 
value of the share of public expenditure in GDP times the 
convergence margin of expenditure growth). 
to a large extent not under the control of the 
government, and non-discretionary changes in 
unemployment benefit expenditure, so as to allow 
for these to vary counter-cyclically. It also 
excludes expenditure on EU programmes fully 
matched by EU fund revenue and increases in 
revenue mandated by law. Due to the potentially 
very high variability of investment expenditure, 
especially in the case of small Member States, the 
government expenditure aggregate is to be 
adjusted by averaging investment expenditure over 
4 years. 
The notion of “significant deviation” and the 
enforcement provisions 
In the preventive arm, the enhanced Stability and 
Growth Pact allows a stronger action in the event 
of “significant deviation” of a Member State from 
the MTO or from the appropriate adjustment path 
towards it.  
To enforce this rule, the concept of “significant 
deviation” has been defined in the amended 
Regulation 1466/97 and has been detailed in the 
Code of Conduct 
 
(
47
). The identification of a 
significant deviation from the MTO or the 
appropriate adjustment path towards it is to be 
based on outcomes (i.e., ex-post data) as opposed 
to plans. In substance, the analysis of the 
'significant deviation' consists of an assessment of 
both the deviation of the structural balance from 
the appropriate adjustment path towards the MTO 
and of the impact of an excess of expenditure 
growth over the expenditure benchmark.  
                                                          
(47) Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and content of 
Stability and Convergence Programmes: 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governanc
e/sgp/pdf/coc/code_of_conduct_en.pdf 
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For a Member State that has not reached the MTO, 
the deviation will be considered significant if both: 
(i) the deviation of the structural balance from the 
appropriate adjustment path corresponds to at least 
0.5% of GDP in one single year or at least 0.25% 
of GDP on average per year in two consecutive 
years ; and (ii) an excess of expenditure growth 
has had a negative impact on the government 
balance of at least or 0.5% of GDP in one single 
year or cumulatively over two years. In case only 
one of the two conditions above is verified, the 
deviation will be considered significant if the 
overall assessment evidence limited compliance 
also with respect to the other condition.  
In the event of a significant observed deviation a 
warning under Article 121(4) is issued by the 
Commission. Within one month from the date of 
adoption of this warning, the Council will examine 
the situation and, on the basis of a Commission 
recommendation, adopt a recommendation under 
Article 121(4) for the necessary policy measures 
within the established deadline, normally of five 
months (
48
). The recommendation under Article 
121(4) is adopted by the Council by qualified 
majority.  
The Member State concerned has to report to the 
Council on action taken in response to the 
recommendation within the deadline established 
by the Council. It the Member State fails to take 
appropriate action in response to the Council 
recommendation under Article 121(4), the 
Commission recommends immediately to adopt a 
decision establishing that no effective action has 
been taken. Also this decision is adopted by the 
Council by qualified majority. At the same time, 
the Commission may recommend to the Council to 
adopt a revised recommendation under Article 
121(4) on necessary policy measures. 
However, if the Council does not take the decision 
that no effective action has been taken and failure 
to comply with the recommendation under Article 
121(4) persists, after one month from its previous 
recommendation, the Commission adopts a new 
recommendation to the Council to take a decision 
that no effective action has been taken. In this 
case, the decision is adopted by the Council by 
                                                          
(48) The deadline is reduced to three months if the Commission, 
in its warning, considered the situation to be particularly 
serious and warranting urgent action.  
“reversed simple majority”(49). Also in this case, at 
the same time the Commission may recommend to 
the Council to adopt a revised recommendation 
under Article 121(4) on necessary policy 
measures. 
In the case of euro area Member States, a financial 
sanction (an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of 
GDP as a rule) may be imposed if the Council 
decides that no action has been taken to address 
the Council recommendation under Article 121(4). 
This sanction is recommended by the Commission 
and adopted by the Council according to the 
“reversed qualified majority” vote (50). 
In order to deal with exceptional circumstances, an 
escape clause has been inserted. This foresees that 
the deviation may be left out of consideration 
when it results from an unusual event outside of 
the control of the Member State concerned which 
has a major impact on the financial position of the 
general government or in case of severe economic 
downturn for the euro area or the EU as a whole, 
provided that this does not endanger fiscal 
sustainability in the medium-term. 
The operational entry into force 
The new provisions of the preventive arm are 
immediately operational, in particular with regard 
to the content of the Stability or Convergence 
Programmes (SCP). If a Member State submits an 
SCP which presents plans that do not comply ex-
ante with the provisions of the preventive arm, the 
Council should invite the Member State to submit 
a new programme.  
Programmes of Member States which are still 
subject to an EDP need to demonstrate that they 
meet the obligations deriving from the preventive 
arm after correcting their excessive deficit. 
   
 
                                                          
(49) This means that the Commission’s recommendation is 
adopted unless a simple majority within the Council 
decides to reject it, within ten days or its adoption by the 
Commission. 
(50) This means that the Commission’s recommendation is 
adopted unless a qualified majority within the Council 
decides to reject it. 
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Graph II.2.1: Legal steps under the preventive arm of the SGP as of 13 December 2011 
 
Member States concerned:  Member States not already bound by the more stringent requirements of the corrective arm. 
For all Council decisions: no account of the vote of the MS concerned.  
Qualified majority voting (QMV) rules (Lisbon Treaty): 55% of MS participating in the decisions (i.e., in the context of the SGP, 16 countries if EA, 
26 otherwise, as the concerned country does not vote), comprising at least 65% of population of these States.  
Until the end of the Lisbon Treaty transitional period (as defined by the Protocol 36 to the Treaty): 2/3 of EA MS (excepted concerned country), with 
weights computed according to that Protocol, are needed to reach a QM. 
Reversed voting rules (RQMV/RSMV): the qualified/simple majority rules need to be fulfilled to reject the Council decision. 
Source: Commission services. 
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While the ex-ante compliance with the expenditure 
benchmark in the SCPs has already been examined 
in Spring 2012 (see Section I.3), the ex-post 
compliance with the expenditure benchmark and 
possible existence of a significant deviation will be 
evaluated for the first time in Spring 2013, when 
the outturn of 2012 budget formulated under the 
new rules will be assessed. 
2.2. THE REFORM OF THE CORRECTIVE ARM OF 
THE SGP 
The corrective arm of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) is concerned with the procedure to be 
followed if a country's public finances fall outside 
the requirements of the Treaty. It is based on 
Article 126 of the Treaty which specifies that 
Member States shall avoid excessive government 
deficits. It defines the criteria according to which 
compliance with budgetary discipline should be 
examined in terms of whether the general 
government deficit exceeds 3% of GDP or the 
debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 60% and is not 
sufficiently diminishing towards this reference 
ratio. Hence, an Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) can be launched not only on the basis of the 
deficit criterion but also on the basis of the debt 
criterion. The corrective arm is implemented 
through Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 
July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the EDP.  
The debt reduction benchmark 
Following the amendments to the corrective arm 
that entered into force on 13 December 2011, 
Member States with debt in excess of 60% of GDP 
should reduce their debt in line with a numerical 
benchmark.  
In particular, according to Article 2 (1a) of 
Regulation 1467/97, a government debt ratio 
above 60% of GDP should be considered in 
compliance with the debt criterion if its excess 
over 60% "has decreased over the previous three 
years at an average rate of one twentieth per year 
as a benchmark, based on changes over the last 
three years for which the data is available. The 
requirement under the debt criterion should also be 
considered fulfilled if the budgetary forecasts of 
the Commission indicates that the required 
reduction in the differential will occur over the 
three years period encompassing the two years 
following the final year for which the data is 
available." 
The compliance with the debt criterion will then be 
checked in three steps and an excessive deficit 
procedure could be launched when: 
 First step: the government debt ratio is above 
the reference value of 60% of GDP  
and  
 Second step:  
bt > bbt = 60% + 0.95/3 (bt-1 - 60%) + 0.95
2
/3 
(bt-2 - 60%) + 0.95
3
/3 (bt-3 - 60%) 
where  
bt stands for the debt-to-GDP ratio in year t;  
bbt stands for the backward-looking benchmark 
debt ratio in year t;  
and 
 Third step: 
 (a) bt+2 > bbt+2 = 60% + 0.95/3 (bt+1 - 60%) 
+ 0.95
2
/3 (bt - 60%) + 0.95
3
/3 (bt-1 - 60%) 
where 
bbt+2 stands for the forward-looking 
benchmark debt ratio; 
bt+1 and bt+2 stand for the debt forecast in year 
t+1 and t+2 as estimated by the Commission 
under the 'no-policy-change' assumption on the 
basis of the fiscal outcome of year t;and, in 
parallel  
 (b) the breach of the benchmark cannot be 
attributed to the influence of the cycle. 
The proposed formula for the benchmark debt 
level and the long time horizon over which it is 
computed is meant to avoid the pitfalls of a simple 
benchmark requiring a 1/20
th
 annual reduction of 
the excess of the debt ratio over 60% of GDP, 
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specifically the volatility of the benchmark and its 
vulnerability to manipulation (
51
).  
Graph II.2.2 illustrates the procedure for judging 
whether a country's debt trajectory is in 
compliance with the debt benchmark. 
Member States subject to excessive deficit 
procedures opened before the adoption of the debt 
reduction benchmark have to comply with 
recommendations and notices focussing on the 
only requirement to bring their deficit below 3% of 
GDP in a durable manner.  
However, a deficit of 3% of GDP does not, 
however, ensure that debt-to-GDP ratios diminish 
sufficiently toward 60% of GDP. In fact, this was 
the reason why a debt-reduction benchmark had to 
be introduced. Compliance with the existing 
recommendation to correct the excessive deficit 
does not thus ensure that the debt benchmark will 
be also complied with in the year following the 
correction. On the contrary, lacking a sizeable 
additional correction, a breach would be likely. In 
order to avoid having to launch an excessive 
deficit procedure on the basis of the debt criterion 
at the same time of the abrogation of the procedure 
based on the deficit criterion, a three-year 
transitional period has been envisaged. In 
particular, as specified by the same Article 2 (1a) 
of Regulation 1467/97, "For a Member State that 
is subject to an excessive deficit procedure on 8 
November 2011 and for a period of three years 
from the correction of the excessive deficit, the 
requirement under the debt criterion shall be 
considered fulfilled if the Member State concerned 
makes sufficient progress towards compliance as 
assessed in the opinion adopted by the Council on 
its stability or convergence programme." 
Extension of the list of the other relevant factors 
Before establishing that an excessive deficit exists, 
the Commission prepares a report under Article 
126(3) TFEU if a Member State does not fulfil the 
requirements specified under either the deficit or 
debt criteria. The Commission report should take 
into account the other relevant factors whose list 
                                                          
(51) The properties of the formula were presented in last year 
edition of the Report (European Commission, 2011).  
has been enlarged by the amendments to regulation 
1467/97 (
52
).  
However, as regards relevant factors, the deficit 
criterion and the debt criterion are not on an equal 
footing. Before establishing that an excessive 
deficit exists on the basis of the debt criterion, the 
whole range of relevant factors covered by the 
Commission report should be taken into account, 
which is not always the case for the launch of 
excessive deficit procedures based on the deficit 
criterion. 
 
                                                          
(52) According to Article 2(3) of regulation 1467/97, "The 
report shall reflect, as appropriate: 
(a) the developments in the medium-term economic position, in 
particular potential growth, including the various 
contributions provided by labour, capital accumulation and 
total factor productivity, cyclical developments, and the 
private sector net savings position; 
(b) the developments in the medium-term budgetary positions, 
including, in particular, the record of adjustment towards 
the medium-term budgetary objective, the level of the 
primary balance and developments in primary expenditure, 
both current and capital, the implementation of policies in 
the context of the prevention and correction of excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances, the implementation of policies 
in the context of the common growth strategy of the Union, 
and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the 
effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks; 
(c) the developments in the medium-term government debt 
position, its dynamics and sustainability, including, in 
particular, risk factors including the maturity structure and 
currency denomination of the debt, stock-flow adjustment 
and its composition, accumulated reserves and other 
financial assets, guarantees, in particular those linked to the 
financial sector, and any implicit liabilities related to 
ageing and private debt, to the extent that it may represent 
a contingent implicit liability for the government. 
 
The Commission shall give due and express consideration to 
any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State 
concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess 
compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the 
Member State has put forward to the Council and the 
Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall 
be given to financial contributions to fostering international 
solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union, the 
debt incurred in the form of bilateral and multilateral 
support between Member States in the context of 
safeguarding financial stability, and the debt related to 
financial stabilisation operations during major financial 
disturbances." 
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In particular, with regard to the deficit criterion, 
the 2011 reform introduced a distinction between 
Member States with the debt-to-GDP ratio above 
or below 60% of GDP. The whole range of other 
relevant factors has to the taken into account when 
evaluating the existence of an excessive deficit on 
the basis of the deficit criterion in Member States 
with debt-to-GDP ratios below 60% of GDP. 
Moreover, where the excess of the deficit over 3% 
of GDP reflects the implementation of a pension 
reform introducing a multi-pillar system that 
includes a mandatory fully funded pillar, the 
Commission and the Council will also consider the 
net cost of the reform to the publicly managed 
pillar when assessing developments in EDP deficit 
figures for Member States, as long as the general 
government deficit does not significantly exceed a 
level that can be considered close to 3% of GDP 
and the a debt-to-GDP ratio remains below 60% of 
GDP, on condition that overall fiscal sustainability 
is maintained (
53
). 
However, if the Member State's debt ratio exceeds 
60% of GDP, when evaluating compliance with 
the deficit criterion, the relevant factors assessed in 
the Commission report will be taken into account 
in the steps leading to the decision on the existence 
of an excessive deficit only if the general 
government deficit remains close to the reference 
value and its excess over the reference value is 
temporary (this is the so-called "double condition 
of the overarching principle").  
                                                          
(53) The net cost of the pension reform is measured as its direct 
impact on the general government deficit (as defined in 
Article 1 of Regulation 479/2009). 
Graph II.2.2: Steps preceding the preparation of a Report under Article 126(3) assessing a possible breach of the debt criterion 
 
Source: Commission services. 
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Enforcement provisions 
Beyond improvement of the corrective arm of the 
SGP, a new Regulation on the enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance in the euro area also 
entered into force on 13 December 2011. This 
Regulation sets progressive financial sanctions 
which kick in at an earlier stage of the EDP than 
was previously the case. A non-interest bearing 
deposit of 0.2% of GDP may be requested from a 
euro area country already when it is placed in EDP 
(either on the basis of its government deficit or 
debt). Failure of a euro area country to comply 
with recommendations for corrective action will 
result in a fine. 
Assessment of effective action: which 
implications? 
The 2005 reform of the SGP introduced rules to 
take into account the fact that, in spite of an 
adequate response to the recommendations, the 
deadline for correction might not be achieved 
because of unexpected unfavourable economic 
developments. In case an unexpected economic 
event occurs with major unfavourable 
consequences for the Member State concerned by 
the excessive deficit procedure,  the possibility 
extending the deadline for correction without 
stepping up the procedure is, however, considered 
only if the Member State has taken "effective 
action" to comply with the recommendation or 
notice addressed to it by the Council.  
The 2011 reform of the SGP did not change 
dramatically the provisions on assessment of 
effective action, but provided some important 
elements of clarity. First, the recommendations 
issued after the entry into force of the amendments 
will include annual nominal targets, which should 
be consistent with a minimum annual fiscal effort 
 
 
Box II.2.1: The transition period
In order to assess the debt path during the transition period, a definition of "sufficient 
progress towards compliance" is necessary. It is defined as the minimum linear structural 
adjustment ensuring that – if followed – Member States will comply with the debt rule by 
the end of the transition period. This minimum linear structural adjustment path will be 
built taking into account both the influence of the cycle and the forward-looking nature of 
the debt benchmark. Also, in order to ensure continuous and realistic progress towards 
compliance during the transition period, Member States should simultaneously respect 
the following two conditions: 
 First, the annual structural adjustment should not deviate by more than ¼% of 
GDP from the minimum linear structural adjustment ensuring that the debt rule is 
met by the end of the transitional period; 
 Second, at any time during the transition period, the remaining annual structural 
adjustment should not exceed ¾ % of GDP. 
This should ensure that the path of deficit reduction chosen by the Member State is 
sustained over the three years of the transitional period (first condition) and realistic 
(second condition), while allowing some room for manoeuvre during the transition 
period.  
A negative assessment of the progress made towards compliance with the debt 
benchmark during the transition period should lead to the preparation of a report of the 
Commission, based on Article 126(3). 
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of at least 0.5pp. of GDP as a benchmark (
54
). This 
novelty just aims at transparency; it does not imply 
a repeal of the important changes introduced by the 
2005 reform to return to an obligation of delivering 
a nominal adjustment. Second, Member State 
under an EDP will have to prepare a report on the 
action taken in response to the Council’s 
recommendation under Article 126(7) or a notice 
under Article 126(9) (
55
). The report shall include 
the targets for government expenditure and 
revenue and for the discretionary measures on both 
the expenditure and the revenue side consistent 
with the Council’s recommendation, as well as 
information on the measures taken and the nature 
of those envisaged to achieve the targets. Reports 
of Member States subject to a notice under Article 
126(9) should also include the information on the 
actions being taken in response to the specific 
Council recommendations (
56
). 
These provisions did not apply to 
recommendations that were issued before 13 
December 2011, which is the case for almost the 
totality of recommendations that characterise 
ongoing EDPs. Their implementation will however 
not entail major changes to the methodology 
developed to assess effective action for existing 
EDPs, which is described below. 
The initial assessment of effective action 
The Council recommendations under Article 
126(7) establish a maximum deadline of six 
months for effective action to be taken. The 2011 
reform has explicitly envisaged that, when 
warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the 
deadline may be three months (
57
).  
The Code of Conduct of the SGP specifies the 
modalities of the initial assessment of effective 
action. Following the expiry of the deadline, the 
Commission assesses whether the Member State 
concerned has acted in compliance with the 
recommendation (
58
). This assessment should 
                                                          
(54) Articles 3(4) and 5(1) of Regulation 1467/97. 
(55) Articles 4(2) and 6(1) of Regulations 1467/97. 
(56) The reporting requirements of Member States in EDP will 
increase with the entry into force of the two-pack, which 
foresees bi-annual and quarterly reporting for 126(7) 
recommendations and 126(9) notice respectively (see 
Section II.4). 
(57) Articles 3(4) of Regulation 1467/97. 
(58) As indicated in the Code of Conduct, in the case of a notice 
under Article 126(9), the initial assessment of effective 
consider whether the Member State concerned has 
publicly announced or taken measures that seem 
sufficient to ensure adequate progress towards the 
correction of the excessive deficit within the time 
limits set by the Council. 
This is a preliminary assessment in most cases and 
particularly so in cases of a multi-annual 
correction framework. In the specific case of 
recommendations or notices which have set a 
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit 
more than one year after its identification, the 
assessment should mainly focus on the measures 
taken for the year following the identification of 
the excessive deficit. 
The assessment of effective action when the 
procedure is held in abeyance 
If the Commission considers that the Member 
State has acted in compliance with the 
recommendation or notice, it informs the Council 
accordingly and the procedure is held in abeyance.  
After the first and only systematic assessment of 
effective action required by the SGP, Member 
States' compliance with the recommendation is 
subject to a continuous monitoring which does not 
embed fixed/defined occasions to take stock of the 
situation.  
According to the Code of Conduct, during the 
period of abeyance the Commission should assess 
whether the measures already announced or taken 
are being adequately implemented and whether 
additional measures are announced and 
implemented in order to ensure adequate progress 
toward the correction of the excessive deficit 
within the time limits set by the Council. 
Lack of effective action: case for stepping up 
the EDP and imposing sanctions  
The Code of Conduct also specifies what should be 
done in case it appears that the Member States 
concerned has not acted in compliance with the 
recommendation or notice. Specifically, it requires 
the following step of the EDP procedure to be 
activated. 
                                                                                   
action takes place after the four month period following the 
notice. 
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This means that the Commission has to 
recommend to the Council to adopt a decision 
under Article 126(8) in case the Member State was 
subject to a recommendation under Article 126(7). 
For euro area Member States, the decision under 
Article 126(8) is followed by a notice under 
Article 126(9). In case the Member State does not 
even comply with the notice, the Treaty envisages 
enforcement measures under Article 126(11).  
The 2011 reform introduced additional 
enforcement mechanisms of euro area Member 
States, all already entered into force (
59
).  
The imposition of a non-interest bearing deposit is 
now possible already when the excessive deficit 
procedure is launched. In particular, the 
Commission will recommend to the Council to 
require a non-interest bearing deposit: (i) in case 
the Member State was already subject to an 
interest-bearing deposit for inadequate action to 
correct a significant deviation from the adjustment 
path towards the MTO; or (ii) in case of 
particularly serious non-compliance with the 
obligations laid down in the SGP.  
A Council decision on non-effective action under 
Article 126(8) addressed to a euro area Member 
State is now followed by a Commission 
recommendation to the Council to impose a fine 
corresponding to 0.2% of GDP as a rule. In the 
case of Cohesion Fund beneficiaries, the 
possibility to suspend a part of the commitments 
under the Cohesion Fund in view of a Council 
decision 126(8) exists both for euro area and for 
non-euro area Member States(
60
).  
A decision under Article 126(11) includes, as a 
rule, fines up to 0.5% of GDP per year (a fixed 
component of 0.2% of GDP plus a variable 
component linked to the size of the deficit).  
                                                          
(59) Enforcement mechanisms for euro area Member States are 
included both in Regulation 1173/11 on the effective 
enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area and 
in Regulation 1697/97 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.  
. 
(60) Council Regulation (EC) No 1084/2006 of 11 July 2006, 
establishing a Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1164/94. 
The case for postponing the deadline 
According to Article 3(5) of Regulation 1467/97 
(and analogous Article 5(2) in case of notices): "If 
effective action has been taken in compliance with 
a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU and 
unexpected adverse economic events with major 
unfavourable consequences for government 
finances occur after the adoption of that 
recommendation, the Council may decide, on a 
recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a 
revised recommendation under Article 126(7) 
TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into 
account the relevant factors referred to in Article 
2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend 
the deadline for the correction of the excessive 
deficit by one year as a rule. The Council shall 
assess the existence of unexpected adverse 
economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances against the 
economic forecasts in its recommendation. In the 
case of a severe economic downturn in the euro 
area or in the Union as a whole, the Council may 
also decide, on a recommendation from the 
Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation 
under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does 
not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium 
term." 
Therefore, the Regulation allows for the possibility 
of postponing the deadline for correction when a 
Member State has taken effective action but cannot 
meet the deadline for correction because 
unexpected events occurred with major 
unfavourable consequences for government 
finances. While this provision was already part of 
the SGP since the 2005 reform, the 2011 
introduced the possibility of considering the 
postponement of the deadline not only on the basis 
of unexpected adverse economic events for the 
Member State concerned but also in case of a 
severe economic downturn in the euro area as a 
whole or in the Union as a whole, provided that the 
revision does not endanger fiscal sustainability in 
the medium term(
61
). In this latter event, the 
postponement is not conditional on action taken.  
                                                          
(61) Regulation 1467/97 does not provide a specific definition 
of severe economic downturn for the Union or the euro 
area as a whole that could lead to a postponement of the 
deadline for correction. Only indicatively, a reference is 
provided by the provision specifying whether an excess of 
the deficit over the reference value resulting from an 
economic downturn could be considered as exceptional.  
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Abrogation of the procedure in case of a 
durable correction  
Some important clarifications on conditions for 
abrogating the excessive deficit procedure have 
been included in the latest version of the Code of 
Conduct. In particular, the Code of Conduct 
foresees that a decision on abrogation should be 
based on notified (i.e. observed) data and that 
abrogation should only occur if the Commission 
services' forecast indicates that the deficit will not 
exceed the 3% of GDP reference value over the 
forecast horizon (
62
). 
Irrespective of the structural effort implemented, a 
"durable correction" is deemed achieved if: 
 (i)  the notified data for the previous year 
show a deficit below 3% of GDP or a deficit 
close to 3% of GDP that has declined 
substantially and continuously and where the 
excess over the 3% threshold is fully explained 
by the net cost of the implementation of a 
multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, 
fully funded pillar;  
and 
 (ii) the Commission services' forecast indicates 
that the deficit will not exceed the 3% of GDP 
reference value over the forecast horizon or 
where the excess over the 3% threshold is fully 
explained by the net cost of the implementation 
of a multi-pillar system that includes a 
mandatory, fully funded pillar. 
If the deadline has expired but one or both of the 
above conditions are not respected, the procedure 
should be stepped up. 
                                                                                   
According to article 2(2), this would be the case "if the 
excess over the reference value results from a negative 
annual GDP volume growth rate or from an accumulated 
loss of output during a protracted period of very low annual 
GDP volume growth relative to its potential".  
 
(62) Reflecting the operationalization of the debt criterion in the 
EDP allowed by the 2011 reform, the Code of Conduct also 
specifies that the abrogation requires the debt ratio to 
comply with the forward-looking element of the debt 
benchmark. However, the envisaged transitional period for 
the debt benchmark implies that this provision does not 
apply for current EDPs.  
How to assess effective action?  
According to the Code of Conduct, a Member 
State should be considered to have taken effective 
action if it has acted in compliance with the 
recommendation or notice, regarding both the 
implementation of the measures required therein 
and budgetary execution. The assessment should in 
particular take into account whether the Member 
State concerned has achieved the annual budgetary 
targets initially recommended by the Council (
63
) 
and the underlying improvement in the cyclically 
adjusted balance net of one off and other 
temporary measures. In case the observed budget 
balance proves to be lower than recommended or if 
the improvement of the cyclically adjusted balance 
net of one off and other temporary measures falls 
significantly short of the adjustment underlying the 
target, a careful analysis of the reasons for the 
shortfall would be made. In particular, the analysis 
should take into account whether expenditure 
targets have been met and the planned 
discretionary measures on the revenue side have 
been implemented. 
 Based on Regulation 1467/97 and the 
specifications provided in the Code of Conduct, 
the Commission assessment of effective action 
reflects the comparison of three different 
variables: 
 The recommended effort (R);  
 The apparent fiscal effort (S) measured by the 
change in the structural balance computed 
according to the commonly agreed 
methodology; 
 The "adjusted structural balance" (S*), where 
the adjustment takes into account:  
 the impact of revisions of potential output 
growth compared to that assumed at the time of 
the recommendations (α) (See Box II.2.1),  
 the impact of the composition of economic 
growth or of other windfalls/shortfalls on 
revenue, the whole effect being measured by 
the impact of the divergence in the apparent 
elasticity of revenue to GDP (net of 
                                                          
(63) The provision on the annual budgetary targets is fully 
relevant only for recommendations and notices adopted 
after the entry into force of the 2011 reform. 
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discretionary revenue measures) from its long-
term norm, or, if different, from the value 
retained in the macroeconomic scenario 
underlying the recommendation (
64
) (β),  
 the impact of other unexpected events on the 
general government balance (γ).   
The comparison of R with S*, to assess the extent 
of the effort taken with respect to the 
recommended one, is compounded by a 
comparison of S and S*, which provides an 
approximation of unexpected events with an 
impact on public finances.   
For current EDP recommendations entailing a 
multi-annual correction defined in terms of 
average structural effort, the comparison should 
focus on the period since the start of the correction 
period until the year for which the budget should 
normally already have been adopted. Admittedly, 
the formulation of recommendations in terms of 
average structural effort suggests that lower effort 
in initial years compared to that recommended 
should be taken into account as an aggravating 
factor in case correcting by the deadline is at risk 
in the later years even if due to a deteriorated 
macroeconomic scenario in those years.  
How to interpret the results? 
 If the implemented effort, as measured both by 
S and S*, is in line with that recommended, 
then the conclusion is that effective action has 
been taken; 
                                                          
(64) The idea is to compute a short-term tax 
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 If S* indicates a lower effort than that 
recommended it can be concluded that no 
effective action has been taken. With the 
current recommendation requiring an annual 
average fiscal effort, consideration should be 
given to the existence of a margin for 
manoeuvre for reaching the deadline through a 
higher effort in the later years. This margin for 
manoeuvre is subject to some constraints. In 
particular, it should be such that the effort 
postponed to later years remains realistic, 
especially given the possibility of a less 
favourable macroeconomic scenario. However, 
no effective action could still be concluded in 
specific cases such as a strong backloading in 
the early years of the consolidation period 
despite a supportive business cycle;  
 If S is below the recommended effort but S* 
indicates an effort in line with that 
recommended, then there is evidence that some 
economic events with an impact on public 
finances have materialised. However, a small 
difference would mean that the unfavourable 
consequences for government finances of the 
unexpected adverse economic events where not 
major.  
How to proceed with the careful analysis?  
The Code of Conduct requires a careful analysis of 
why the fiscal effort fell short of that underlying 
the recommended targets. In particular, since the 
2011 reform of the SGP, the Code of Conduct 
specifies that the careful analysis should take into 
account whether: 
 the expenditure plans have been achieved,  
 the discretionary revenue measures planned 
have been implemented.  
The composition of growth and its effect on the tax 
base have already been taken into account in the 
computation of S* and in particular of β. However, 
a more detailed analysis should be carried out, 
including highlighting possible reasons for 
divergences between the fiscal effort measured by 
the change in the structural balance and the 
budgetary impact of the measures effectively 
implemented by the Member State concerned, i.e. 
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divergences between the top-down and the bottom-
up approach.  
When is extending the deadline permissible?  
In the case of effective action and an unexpected 
adverse economic event with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances, the 
deadline may be extended, by one year as a rule. 
However, there is no obligation to postpone the 
deadline. Such a decision should include 
supplementary considerations on:  
 the size of the gap to the 3% of GDP threshold,  
 the macro-financial vulnerability, 
 the overall fiscal stance, 
 and any other relevant country-specific factors.  
 A large amount of uncertainty surrounding the 
forecast might also require caution in proceeding 
with an immediate postponement of the deadline. 
For example, this could be the case if such a 
decision is to be considered in the early years of a 
multi-annual correction. In case of non-effective 
action, which implies a stepping up of the 
procedure, a decision to extend the deadline in the 
new recommendation or the notice can also be 
taken. This decision should essentially rest on an 
assessment of the plausibility of meeting the old 
deadline. If the size of the gap to the 3% of GDP is 
too large, then an extension of the deadline could 
be considered.  
To summarize, following consideration whether 
the general government deficit be durably below 
the 3% of GDP reference value by the 
recommended deadline, the assessment of effective 
action should address the following sequence 
which is set out in the decision tree in Graph II.2.3:  
 (1) Has the recommended fiscal effort been 
achieved once all possible unexpected 
economic events with major consequences for 
government finances are taken into account?  
 and  
 (2) What does a careful analysis reveal about 
the expenditure and revenue developments 
compared to original plans in case of doubts?  
As mentioned above, the application of this 
framework needs particular caution when effective 
action is assessed in response to recommendations 
envisaging an average structural effort to be 
carried over a multi-annual correction period, 
given the existence of a margin for manoeuvre for 
delivering the required effort in future budgets. 
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Graph II.2.3: The legal steps of the corrective arm of the SGP as of 13 December 2011 
 
Definitions 
Required fiscal effort = R 
Change in the structural budget balance = S 
Change in the adjusted structural budget balance = S* 
S=S*-(α+ß+γ) 
Effect of revision of potential output growth on S = α 
 Overall tax elasticity effect on S = ß 
Other effects on S (e.g. natural disaster) = γ 
Careful analysis: analysis of expenditure and revenue developments compared to national plans in line with recommendation, bottom-up approach. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph II.2.4: The legal steps of the corrective arm of the SGP as of 13 December 2011 
 
Source: Commission services. 
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In the context of the recent overhaul of European 
economic governance undertaken in response to 
the crisis in 2010-2011, the role of national fiscal 
frameworks has been given new prominence: most 
visibly, through the adoption of a binding legal 
text on minimum requirements; but also through 
the sharing of best practices between Member 
States through a peer review process. The 
monitoring of progress at the EU level is also 
supported by an extensive, robust dataset 
maintained by the Commission (Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs – DG 
ECFIN). 
3.1. A BINDING INSTRUMENT: THE DIRECTIVE 
ON NATIONAL BUDGETARY FRAMEWORKS 
The Directive on requirements for budgetary 
frameworks of the Member States (
65
) was 
adopted as part of the Six-Pack economic 
governance package and will be transposed by end 
of December 2013. It sets out minimum 
requirements for Member States' fiscal frameworks 
in five key areas outlined below, with a view to 
ensuring consistency between national fiscal 
governance and budgetary discipline provisions 
from the EU Treaties and the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP). The legal instrument chosen was a 
Directive, to ensure the most appropriate 
association of uniform EU-level requirements with 
the variety of Member States' budgetary structures. 
Contrary to voluntary standards, a Directive is 
binding, but unlike a Regulation – through which 
most of the SGP rules are established – it leaves 
Member States the flexibility to choose the means 
they will use to comply with its requirements. In 
particular, the Directive on budgetary frameworks 
allows Member States to adapt their existing 
frameworks to the new EU rules, and leaves open 
the possibility of enacting – or maintaining – more 
stringent provisions than its minimum 
requirements. This is crucial not only to respect 
existing institutional settings, but also to anchor 
national ownership of EU rules. 
                                                          
(65) Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member 
States which entered into force on 13 December 2011. 
Key requirements in five areas of budgetary 
policy-making 
 1) Accounting and statistics: Sound fiscal 
statistics are not only necessary to support 
national budgetary processes from budget 
preparation to execution, they are also crucial 
for a proper functioning of the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework. Building on the 
proven methodological framework provided by 
the European System of Accounts, the 
Directive requires accruals-based data 
compliant with ESA95 covering all the general 
government subsectors, and also regular audits, 
both internal and external, of public accounts. 
Member States are required to publish cash-
based fiscal data, at a monthly frequency for 
each of the central and regional government 
and social security subsectors, while local 
governments are required to report on a 
quarterly basis. Reconciliation tables 
explaining how ESA95 data is derived from 
primary sources should also be made publicly 
available. 
 2) Forecasting: Macroeconomic and budgetary 
forecasts are an essential component of the 
budget process, as fiscal planning based on 
biased or unrealistic forecasts may hamper 
budgetary discipline in a significant manner. 
The Directive mandates the public availability 
of official macroeconomic and budgetary 
forecasts prepared for fiscal planning, and also 
of the methodologies, assumptions and 
parameters on which these forecasts are based; 
alternative scenarios (e.g. lower-than-expected 
growth) shall also be considered. Furthermore, 
the reliability of the forecasts can be improved 
through comparisons with forecasts from other 
institutions – such as the Commission – and 
independent economic institutes; other relevant 
stakeholders should contribute to strengthening 
the robustness of forecasts. 
 3) Numerical fiscal rules: Well-designed 
national rules-based frameworks are known to 
significantly enhance budgetary discipline; 
numerical fiscal rules can therefore provide 
effective domestic leverage for the SGP (itself 
a rule-based system defined on quantitative 
fiscal targets) through increased domestic 
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ownership of fiscal goals. While discretion is 
left in the definition of the numerical fiscal 
rules – which may target not just the debt or 
deficit but also expenditure and/or revenues – 
basic features are mandated in the Directive. 
These features include the requirements that 
the targets and scope of the rules be well 
defined, that effective and timely independent 
monitoring be put in place, that strict 
compliance mechanisms must exist and that 
well-circumscribed escape clauses should be 
defined. This can be relevant not only at the 
general government level, but also at the sub-
national level, as shown in Part IV. 
 4) Medium-term budgetary frameworks 
(MTBFs): Although the annual budget law is 
the pivotal element of fiscal policy in all 
Member States, most fiscal measures have 
budgetary implications beyond the yearly 
cycle; a multiannual perspective can greatly 
improve fiscal planning. While Stability and 
Convergence Programmes are already 
presented from a multi-annual perspective, they 
could have a greater impact on domestic 
budgetary debates, notably given that annual 
budgets are supposed to be in line with SCP 
commitments. The Directive therefore sets out 
minimum requirements for domestic MTBFs 
which include a fiscal planning horizon of at 
least three years, the embedding the MTBF into 
the EU fiscal framework (including reference 
to the achievement of  the medium-term 
objective), revenue and expenditure projections 
on the basis of unchanged policy and an 
explicit link to annual budgets.   
 5) Transparency: Increasing fiscal 
decentralisation in most Member States 
strengthens the need for coordination between 
central government (which, according to 
Protocol 12 of the Treaty, is the level at which 
compliance with Treaty provisions on fiscal 
matters is judged), and regional and local 
governments, which manage an increasing 
share of public expenditure. The Directive 
promotes accountability by calling for national 
fiscal frameworks to appropriately cover all 
general government tiers and requires that 
Member States establish coordination 
mechanisms across subsectors, including 
numerical fiscal rules. The Directive also 
requires more clarity on specific items which 
may have an impact on budgets, namely extra-
budgetary funds, tax expenditures and 
contingent liabilities. 
Recent progress on adoption and monitoring 
All Member States must fulfil the requirements of 
the Directive within the given transposition 
deadline, that is the end of 2013. By then, Member 
States must have taken all the necessary legal, 
institutional and procedural measures to ensure full 
compliance. 
Euro Plus Pact partners aim for an early 
implementation. If they so wish, Member States 
can choose to exceed the requirements imposed by 
the Directive. They can also ensure that these are 
transposed into national legislation in advance of 
the deadline. This is the case for participants to the 
Euro Plus Pact (members of the euro area plus 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania), who pledged in mid-2011 to transpose 
the Directive by the end of 2012. 
Sweeping reforms are underway in most 
European countries. Spurred on by the 
impending deadline for the transposition of the 
Directive, and supported in parallel by the sharing 
of best practice at European level through the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) Peer Review 
process which is described below, most Member 
States have recently committed to a strengthening 
of their national fiscal framework. In spite of 
different national traditions in the conduct of fiscal 
policy, and of different starting positions, 
significant reforms were undertaken in a majority 
of Member States in 2011 in the pursuit of better 
fiscal governance.   
Taking stock of this progress, the Commission 
will prepare an Interim Progress Report for the 
Directive by the end of 2012. As provided for by 
the adopted Directive, the Commission will 
prepare a report on the measures in place across 
countries implementing the main provisions of the 
Directive by mid-December, on the basis of 
information to be provided by the Member States 
in the second half of 2012. 
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3.2. THE PEER REVIEW OF NATIONAL FISCAL 
FRAMEWORKS 
The Directive on budgetary frameworks (
66
) 
constitutes one of two pillars of the Commission's 
strategy to reinforce fiscal-structural settings in the 
European Union. The second pillar has been 
developed as a forum for discussion among 
Member States which should lead to tangible 
developments in the area. Together with legislative 
initiatives, this two-pronged approach was 
approved in the final report of the Van Rompuy 
task force on economic governance. It foresaw the 
organisation of a regular assessment and peer 
review of domestic fiscal frameworks, alongside 
the requirements set in the Directive. Its purpose 
was to seek policy advice and evaluate other 
desirable but non-binding features of domestic 
fiscal frameworks which support good policy 
making. The Van Rompuy Task force concurred 
with the earlier Council conclusions of 18 May 
2010, which invited the Commission and the EPC 
to promote the exchange of best practices, in 
particular in view of the elements that have proven 
to be most successful in underpinning fiscal 
consolidation efforts and in contributing to 
building up sustainable public finances. 
Consequently, the peer review was carried out in 
2011 under the aegis of the Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC) in two sessions. The first session 
in May 2011 reviewed the frameworks of 14 
Member States (Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Italy, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and the 
United Kingdom). The second session covered the 
remaining 13 Member States in November 2011 
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and 
Sweden). 
The output of the peer review took the form of 
EPC policy advice to the reviewed Member States. 
This non-binding guidance consisted of elements 
that were deemed to improve each country's fiscal 
framework, while taking account of national 
specificities and respecting the wide spectrum of 
institutional and administrative traditions in the 
                                                          
(66) Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member 
States which entered into force on 13 December 2011. 
EU. The Commission services contributed to the 
peer review by preparing country factsheets. (
67
) 
While the country-specific elements usually 
prevailed over common factors, the 2011 peer 
review revealed a number of general trends. It 
confirmed that there was strong momentum for 
fiscal framework reform in most Member States. 
This is particularly the case in those with 
previously weak frameworks, including a lack of 
any independent fiscal institution supporting the 
preparation, execution and assessment of annual 
budgets, as well as limited numerical fiscal rules 
and poor medium-term planning. The peer review 
identified important gaps in these areas and 
provided policy advice to specify the relevant key 
building blocks that would need to be put in place. 
Particular attention has also been paid to the need 
for comprehensive and timely fiscal statistics. 
Pressing ahead the implementation of the agreed 
commitments will prove critical for these countries 
which are often undertaking major macroeconomic 
reforms in parallel, as structural improvements in 
fiscal policymaking should support and go hand-
in-hand with fiscal consolidation efforts. 
Another feature emerging from the peer review is 
that reforms are not only taking place in Member 
States with the weakest frameworks. Member 
States with relatively stronger frameworks are also 
taking steps to refine existing structures and add 
new building blocks. While some of the best fiscal 
performers in the EU have been able to rely on a 
relatively light fiscal framework, based on a 
combination of mutual trust, strong political 
commitment and popular support, those Member 
States have recently felt the need to cement the 
informal arrangements they were used to into 
legislation, further reinforcing the link between 
political commitment and policy deliverables. 
Some Member States took further steps to enshrine 
key fiscal principles into their national 
constitution, with the intention of providing a 
stronger legal base to enforce the reforms. 
From a thematic point of view, cross-cutting issues 
identified in the 2011 peer review included: 
(i) fiscal rules; (ii) fiscal councils; (iii) medium-
term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs) and (iv) sub-
national governments slippages (on the relevance 
of it, see Part IV). 
                                                          
(67) See European Commission (2012b).  
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As part of the advice delivered in the course of the 
peer review, the introduction of fiscal rules was 
suggested for a number of countries, especially on 
the expenditure side. While these rules share the 
same general objectives and features (as target and 
scope definition, enforcement and compliance 
mechanisms, and escape clauses), different 
approaches were discussed, including the treatment 
of cyclical expenditure, tax expenditure and/or 
expenditure not considered to be directly under the 
control of public authorities. 
The introduction or the strengthening of fiscal 
councils has also been advocated for several 
countries, though some differences among EPC 
Members remained in the assessment of their 
performance and suitability. In smaller countries, 
resource constraints are more often considered to 
be a hindrance to their establishment and 
development. An alternative could be to facilitate 
cooperation between resources scattered across 
existing institutions. 
The introduction or strengthening of MTBFs was 
recommended for some Member States, mostly 
through the insertion of more binding features. The 
discussion of specific design features addressed 
several items, for example the proper mix of fixed 
and flexible elements or methodologies to account 
for multi-year price and cost developments. 
Another promising topic concerned sub-national 
governments and their place in budgetary 
frameworks. While the construction of a fiscal 
framework usually begins with the resolution of 
issues at the central government level, it should 
also encompass sub-national governments as they 
may be an important source of fiscal slippages, 
especially if expenditures at sub-national level are 
not matched with the adequate level of funding 
responsibilities as indicated in Part IV. A number 
of Member States received policy advice in this 
field, especially countries with a federal or a 
heavily-decentralised administrative structure. The 
peer review also highlighted the need for further 
work to better assess how expenditure in sub-
national governments could be effectively 
monitored and controlled. Avenues for further 
research include stricter internal funding and 
borrowing arrangements, tasking fiscal councils 
with the monitoring of sub-national governments 
(in countries with stronger fiscal decentralisation) 
or enhancing reputational sanctions through 
increased transparency. 
Overall, the 2011 peer review process provided a 
unique opportunity for Member States to brief 
each other and the Commission on progress made. 
It gave impetus to these reforms by providing 
examples of ‘good/best practices’ amongst 
Member States. Where appropriate, elements of 
the resulting policy advice were incorporated into 
the country-specific recommendations in the 2011 
European semester exercise. A monitoring process 
has been agreed upon by the EPC, whereby 
Member States' progress towards the measures 
advised would be discussed in 2012 and 2013. 
Leaving aside common features, the following 
section presents country-specific information about 
the most visible recent reforms introduced in the 
Member States examined in the November 2011 
session of the peer review. (
68
) 
In Austria, the fiscal framework consists of the 
Fiscal Equalisation Law and the Austrian Stability 
Pact encompassing all levels of government as 
well as the medium-term expenditure framework 
(MTEF), which concerns only the federal 
government. On 15 November 2011, the Austrian 
federal government adopted a proposal for a ‘debt 
brake’, with the transition to a structural general 
government deficit of 0.35% of GDP by 2017. The 
reform package foresees the extension of the 
MTEF to the Länder level. Subsequently, 
following negotiations on the debt brake with sub-
national authorities, the proposed deficit limit was 
raised from 0.35% to 0.45% of GDP. 
In Belgium, the budget process has gradually 
taken the form of a series of agreements or 
conventions not only between the political parties 
of the governing coalition but also between the 
different government layers. The framework relies 
on the two existing independent bodies (the 
Federal Planning Bureau and the High Council of 
Finance), which continue to positively influence 
public finance developments. By contrast, 
numerical fiscal rules and medium-term budgetary 
frameworks appear to be less developed, which has 
contributed to frequent slippages in the past. It is 
expected that the framework will undergo 
                                                          
(68) For Member States examined in May 2011, see European 
Commission (2011a), pp.107-108. 
Part II 
Evolving budgetary surveillance 
 
89 
significant changes as a result of the new 
agreement on institutional reforms which was 
concluded in October 2011. This calls for adequate 
measures to reinforce the domestic fiscal 
framework with a view to tackling the rising debt 
challenge. 
In the Czech Republic, the government has 
launched a review of the existing fiscal framework 
(dating from 2004) with the aim of improving its 
functioning. As a first step, an internal expert 
group at the Ministry of Finance is identifying 
weaknesses in the current framework. In the 
second phase, the government will propose draft 
legislation which will also aim at complying with 
the new requirements on fiscal frameworks 
stemming from EU legislation. Proposals currently 
under consideration include: possible ways of 
improving coordination between different levels of 
government, a new fiscal rule for local and 
regional governments, stronger enforcement 
mechanisms for the existing fiscal rules, better 
monitoring and ex post evaluation of budgetary 
performance, and the introduction sustainability 
considerations in the fiscal targeting. Furthermore, 
the possibility of establishing an advisory body on 
fiscal and budgetary matters is also under 
discussion. 
In Germany a wide political debate on the 
sustainability of public finances led to an 
amendment of the Constitution in 2009, replacing 
the golden rule by the debt brake stipulating 
balanced budgets for federal and Länder 
governments. For the federal budget, the debt 
brake has been in effect from 2011 and applies to 
the cyclically adjusted budget. It sets a ceiling for 
the federal structural deficit in normal times of 
0.35 % of GDP which will apply from 2016 with a 
transition period starting in 2011. The 
implementation of the debt brake for the federal 
budget includes a (virtual) control account 
registering deviations in budget execution from the 
defined level of authorised new borrowing, with 
overruns entering as debits, and savings as credits. 
Debits on the control account need to be reduced 
once they exceed 1 % of GDP, but only in an 
economic upswing and by no more than 0.35% of 
GDP per annum. Länder budgets must be balanced 
as of 2020. The constitutional amendment also 
included the establishment of a Stability Council 
with a view to enhancing the monitoring of 
budgetary developments at the federal and Länder 
level and introducing a federation-wide early 
warning system. In 2010, it replaced the former 
Financial Planning Council and consists of the 
federal ministers of finance and economic affairs 
as well as the state ministers of finance. 
In Denmark, given the important role of regional 
and local authorities in administrating public 
expenditure, the government put forward a 
proposal for multi-annual expenditure ceilings 
covering all levels of government to tighten 
spending control and to prepare for the effects of 
demographic ageing in spring 2011. The ceilings 
are to be underpinned by sanctions, including 
reductions in appropriations and grants, and to be 
controlled by the Danish Economic Councils 
(DORS), which are currently monitoring the 
implementation of the general government’s 
budget plans and quantifying short-term and long-
term budgetary effects of envisaged policy 
measures and reforms. 
In Spain, in response to perceived weaknesses, the 
fiscal framework was strengthened in 2010 with 
the obligation for autonomous regions to publish 
standardised economic and budgetary execution 
data on a quarterly basis. In addition, in July 2011, 
the government introduced an expenditure rule, 
according to which central government and 
municipalities cannot set an expenditure growth 
rate greater than the medium-term nominal GDP 
growth rate in the setting of their budgetary 
stability objectives. In September 2011, the 
parliament approved a constitutional balanced 
budget amendment, which should prohibit 
structural deficits in excess of targets set at the EU 
level and limit the size of the aggregate debt of all 
levels of administration to the reference value set 
in the Treaty on European Union; it also enshrines 
the expenditure rule and prioritises debt 
repayments over other expenditure. Crucial 
parameters of the constitutional rule have been 
defined in an organic act on budgetary stability 
specifying, in particular,  the definition of the 
structural deficit and the deficit ceilings at the 
general government level (which is 0 as a general 
rule but can reach 0.4% of GDP in case it 
accompanies structural reforms),  the distribution 
of deficit and debt limits between the different 
levels of administration and the responsibility of 
each government in case of breach, the exceptional 
circumstances that can justify exceeding the limits, 
and the corrective mechanisms for non-compliant 
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administrations. The act entered into force on 1 
May 2012, but the main binding provisions will 
only take effect from 2020 onwards. 
In France, in line with the constitutional reform of 
July 2008, a second multi-annual public finance 
planning act was passed for the 2011–14 period in 
December 2010. On the expenditure side, the 
target now covers the whole general government 
sector, including local authorities. A maximum 
increase in expenditure compared to that of 2010 
has been set and central government expenditure 
excluding interest payments and civil servants’ 
pensions is now to remain unchanged in nominal 
terms. An annual ceiling exists for healthcare 
spending and for the main mandatory funds of 
social security. Transfers to local governments 
have been frozen in nominal terms.  
In the Netherlands, the September 2010 Coalition 
Agreement endorsed new rules, following the 
advice of the Budgeting Framework Commission. 
These include (i) the adoption of a signalling 
margin: a downward deviation of one percentage 
point relative to the path for the general 
government deficit would trigger additional 
consolidation measures; (ii) expenditures sensitive 
to cyclical trends (unemployment benefits, social 
assistance benefits and movements in the terms of 
trade) and interest expenditure have been 
reintroduced within the expenditure ceiling 
frameworks; (iii) the rule that spending overruns 
should be compensated in a ‘specific’ manner was 
broadened; (iv) a windfall formula for tax relief 
was introduced, but subject to strict eligibility 
conditions. 
In Slovenia, the budget for 2010/11 was prepared 
using performance-based budgeting, whereby the 
budgetary lines are translated into 16 policy areas 
for the first time. A new expenditure rule for the 
general government (in cash terms) was applied 
for the 2011–14 period. It lays down expenditure 
ceilings on a rolling basis by limiting expenditure 
growth to potential GDP growth (both in nominal 
terms) and restraining it further as long as the 
primary deficit and the general government debt 
(as % of GDP) exceed their target values. Ceilings 
are fixed for the first two years and indicative 
ceilings for the following two years. 
3.3. EVIDENCE FROM THE FISCAL 
GOVERNANCE DATABASE 
With a view to supporting the EU reflection and 
decision-making process, the Fiscal Governance 
database maintained by DG ECFIN collects 
information on the main elements of national 
budgetary frameworks that underlie the conduct of 
budgetary policies of general government at all 
stages
 
(
69
), such as national fiscal rules, medium-
term budgetary frameworks, and independent 
fiscal institutions. 
The fiscal governance database was created as a 
result of the Ecofin Council's January 2006 
decision to ask the Commission to conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the existing national 
fiscal rules and institutions in the EU Member 
States. In April 2009, the Ecofin Council invited 
Member States to annually update the 
Commission's questionnaire on changes to their 
fiscal governance.  
The most recent update of the fiscal governance 
database focused on changes in fiscal frameworks 
that took place in 2010.  
Numerical fiscal rules 
The Commission services have defined a 
composite index measuring the strength of 
numerical fiscal rules based on five dimensions, on 
which information has been collected through the 
annual survey. These are the rules' statutory base, 
the room for setting or revising objectives, the 
nature of the bodies monitoring compliance and 
fostering enforcement of the rule, their 
enforcement mechanisms, and media visibility. 
The index also takes into account the coverage of 
general government finances by the numerical 
fiscal rules.  
In 2010, the number of numerical fiscal rules in 
force increased by two compared to 2009. Thus 24 
Member States were operating a total of 70 
numerical rules in 2010 (Cyprus, Malta and Greece 
did not have any numerical fiscal rules, as in 
previous years). This increase is a result of new  
                                                          
(69) The fiscal governance dataset is accessible on DG ECFIN's 
website at  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_
governance/index_en.htm.  
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rules introduced in 2010, of which two were 
implemented in the United Kingdom, one in 
Slovenia and one in Estonia, while at the same 
time, Slovenia and Germany abolished one 
existing rule each.  
By type, budget balance rules continued to be the 
most widely used, making up around 40 per cent of 
the rules. Debt rules and expenditure rules 
correspond to 27 and 24 per cent of the rules, 
respectively. About 25 per cent applied to both 
central and general government while the majority 
– over 30 per cent – applied to local governments.  
The fiscal rule index (FRI) summarising the 
average strength of numerical fiscal rules in force 
in the EU27 countries along five dimensions has 
recovered from its first ever drop in 2009. (
70
) This 
                                                          
(70) Note that the fiscal rule index calculated from the 
2009 data is obtained from slightly modified 
calculations as compared with earlier releases of the 
Graph II.3.1: The fiscal rule index (FRI) in the EU27 and selected groups of Member States, 1990 to 2010 
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Graph II.3.3: The MTBF index in the EU27, 2009 and 2010 
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results mainly from the two new rules 
implemented in the United Kingdom that replaced 
previously suspended rules. Graph II.3.1 shows the 
FRI over time, for the EU27 and for the pre-2004 
members (EU15) and more recent entrants (EU12). 
It shows that the average strength of numerical 
fiscal rules has increased more significantly in the 
EU15 than it has amongst the EU12. In terms of 
individual Member States Graph II.3.2 shows the 
value for the FRI by Member State for 2009 and 
2010. It highlights the significant improvement of 
the United Kingdom and minor changes taking 
place in other countries.  
Medium-term budgetary frameworks 
Medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs) are 
defined as institutional policy instruments that 
allow the extension of the horizon for fiscal policy 
making beyond the annual budgetary calendar. (
71
) 
Similarly to fiscal rule index, the MTBF index 
captures the quality of these devices based on five 
dimensions: (1) the existence of a domestic MTBF, 
(2) the connectedness between the multi-annual 
                                                                                   
index. Still, figure 3 is based on a recalculated series 
of the fiscal rule index for the whole period covered 
by the dataset, therefore comparability in time is not 
impaired by the change in methodology.  
(71) See European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (2007) for this definition 
and details.  
budgetary targets and the preparation of the annual 
budget, (3) the involvement of national 
parliaments in the preparation of the medium-term 
budgetary plans, (4) the existence of coordination 
mechanisms between subsectors of general 
government prior to setting the medium-term 
budgetary targets, and (5) the monitoring of 
enforcement mechanisms of multi-annual 
budgetary targets.  
2010 saw several changes to MTBFs in the EU 
Member States. A major novelty was the new 
budgetary framework in Greece which aims to 
include fiscal targets for the general government 
and its sectors as well as measures to achieve these 
targets, as a minimum. In Poland, a Multi-Year 
Financial Plan of the State is prepared as of 2010. 
It comprises a statement of the government 
medium-term fiscal policy, medium-term 
projections of expenditure and revenue and 
aggregate fiscal projections together with 
macroeconomic assumptions.  
Graph II.3.3 shows the MTBF index for all 
Member States for 2009 and 2010. It shows that in 
2010 the quality of medium-term budgetary 
frameworks as measured by the MTBF index 
experienced an improvement compared to 2009. 
This results from the considerably higher score of 
Greece that had no MTBF before, as well as minor 
improvements in several other countries including 
Poland, Italy and Slovenia. 
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Independent fiscal institutions 
Independent fiscal institutions are a further 
institutional mechanism to improve budgetary 
performance and help foster a medium-term 
orientation for budgetary policy. Their role is to 
provide independent input, analysis, assessment 
and/or recommendations in the area of fiscal 
policy. In a number of EU Member States these 
institutions (also called fiscal councils) have 
proved to be instrumental in improving fiscal 
policy making by providing positive and/or 
normative analysis, assessments, and 
recommendations. 
In 2009, there were 29 independent fiscal 
institutions located in 17 EU Member States. Such 
institutions were far more common in the former 
EU15, often having a long history. In new Member 
States some tasks of independent fiscal institutions 
are often assumed by central banks that are not 
covered under the definition used in the survey.  
In 2010 three new independent fiscal institutions 
were established (Greece, Romania and the United 
Kingdom), two were reformed (Sweden and the 
United Kingdom) and one closed (Italy). The new 
Greek fiscal council, the Parliament (State) Budget 
Office, is responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the state budget, the analysis 
and evaluation of the state budget's data and 
forecasts, and of the sustainability of long term 
fiscal figures. The Romanian Fiscal Council is 
composed of five members who will support the 
work of government and parliament in the process 
of elaboration and development of fiscal and 
budgetary policies. Finally, the Office for Budget 
Responsibility, new fiscal institution in the United 
Kingdom, is responsible for examining and 
reporting on the sustainability of the public 
finances and for assessing the extent to which the 
fiscal mandate has been, or is likely to be 
achieved. 
In Italy, on the other hand, the Italian Institute for 
Studies and Economic Analyses (ISAE) ceased to 
exist at the end of 2010. The closure of the 
Institute was part of a general rationalisation of 
public bodies. The new Constitutional law on a 
balanced budget rule envisages the creation of a 
fiscal council within the Italian Parliament. 
Even with the increase in the number of fiscal 
councils, among the new EU Members only 5 have 
such institutions (Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Slovenia and Romania). This might be due to the 
fact that independent fiscal institutions require a 
certain investment in terms of adequate financing 
and skilled human resources, in contrast to other 
areas of fiscal governance where changes can be 
achieved by legal instruments. Some of the new 
EU members may therefore have preferred to 
concentrate their human resources for monitoring 
fiscal policy making in the central bank, ministries 
of finance, and academia. 
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A clear need for an enhanced monitoring of 
budgetary policies in the euro area 
Member States experience strong interlinkages 
between both their economic situations and 
their budgetary policies. The management of the 
public finances in each of the euro area Member 
States becomes a matter of common concern given 
that it may affect all other participant countries. In 
good times, this interdependence brings increased 
prosperity. But it also means that the sharing of 
risk should be accompanied by a sharing of 
responsibility and a seamless procedure covering 
all eventualities, including the use of financial 
backstops, is needed. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) contained 
stronger provisions for the euro area Member 
States since its inception and the Six Pack 
enhanced and added to these. In this way, the 
imposition of financial sanctions in case euro area 
Member States do not comply with the rules of the 
SGP has been intensified. In addition, it was 
necessary to adapt the surveillance framework to 
the exceptional situations of euro area Member 
States under financial assistance, and for those 
experiencing financial difficulties.  
The increasing awareness of the interlinkages of 
the euro area economies has led to an 
acknowledgement of the need to further reinforce 
the framework for budgetary coordination and 
governance for euro area Member States. In the 
light of this, the Commission put forward two 
additional proposals for legislation and a Green 
Paper on Stability Bonds on 23 November 2011 
(the Green Paper is described in Box II.4.I).  
Both proposals are based on Article 136 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFUE), which allows specific legislation aimed at 
reinforcing budgetary coordination and 
surveillance in the euro are to go beyond the legal 
framework applicable to the Union as a whole 
(corresponding to Regulations No 1466/97 and 
1467/97 in the context of fiscal surveillance). This 
so-called Two Pack comprises:  
1) A proposal for a Regulation on common 
provisions for monitoring and assessing draft 
budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of 
excessive deficits of the Member States in the euro 
area.  
2) A proposal for a Regulation on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to 
their financial stability in the euro area.  
This second proposed Regulation sets out explicit 
rules for enhanced surveillance for those euro area 
Member States facing severe difficulties with 
regard to their financial stability; those in receipt 
of financial assistance on either a precautionary 
basis or as part of a full-scale assistance 
programme; and those in the process of exiting 
such assistance. For the first time, there will be a 
common and graduated framework that will set out 
the surveillance requirements made in such cases. 
Taken together, these proposals puts in place an 
enhanced monitoring procedure that builds on and 
complements the SGP for the euro area Member 
States, ensuring a seamless continuity of policy 
monitoring in all budgetary situations. 
Following the usual process for the adoption of 
legislative proposals, both texts have since been 
discussed in the Council and the European 
Parliament. The Council reached agreement on a 
general approach to the proposed Regulations, 
which was endorsed by the 21 February ECOFIN. 
The European Parliament's negotiation position 
was adopted in plenary meeting on 13 June 2012.  
At the date of publication, the negotiations 
between the co-legislators have just started. 
Accordingly, this Chapter presents the 
Commission proposals of 23 November 2011.  
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Box II.4.1: Stability Bonds
The recent discussion about possible common euro area debt issuance ignited again in particular after the 
Report of the President of the European Council of 26 June 2012 (see European Council (2012)) which 
presents a vision for the consolidation of the Economic and Monetary Union. The report states that "In a 
medium term perspective, the issuance of common debt could be explored as an element of.a fiscal union". 
A large number of proposals for Eurobonds have been put forward, including the issuance of mutualised 
bonds combined with a debt redemption fund as suggested by the German Council of Economic Advisers(1), 
different options of Stability Bonds as outlined in the Commission's Green Paper or the common issuance of 
short-term debt securities (E-Bills). These various Eurobond schemes differ remarkably related to the aims, 
the structure and the time pattern of the new instrument. To further frame the intensified public debate on 
common debt issuance in the euro area, the European Commission published a Green Paper on the 
feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds on 23 November 2011. It identified significant potential benefits of 
introducing Stability Bonds. Creating a new sovereign bond market segment would accommodate the 
shortage of stable, deep and liquid assets in the euro area. Although common issuance of government bonds 
is unlikely to play any decisive role in overcoming the current sovereign debt crisis, Stability Bonds could 
over the medium term contribute to completing the institutional setup of EMU. Stability Bonds would 
thereby (i) facilitate the transmission of monetary policy, (ii) deepen the internal market and render capital 
markets more efficient, (iii) increase the stability and shock resilience of the financial sector, (iv) raise the 
attractiveness of euro-area financial markets and the euro at global level, and (v) reduce the impact of 
excessive market fluctuations on sovereign borrowing costs and hereby strengthen the stability and 
robustness of government financing. The European Commission considers that the main feature of common 
issuance should be overall enhanced financial stability. To emphasize this aim the term "Stability Bonds" is 
used instead of "Eurobonds".  
The Green Paper outlines three generic options for common issuance, by combining two main features: the 
guarantee structure (joint and several vs. several) and the degree of substitution of national by joint issuance 
(partial vs. complete): 
– Option 1, based on joint and several guarantees, full substitution of national bonds; 
– Option 2, based on joint and several guarantees, partial substitution of national bonds; 
– Option 3, based on several guarantees, partial substitution of national bonds. 
The three options are characterized by different trade-offs between expected benefits on the one hand and 
the fulfilment of preconditions as well as the difficulty of implementation on the other hand. Option 1 seems 
to be the most likely to provide a high credit quality of commonly issued bonds, as well as major positive 
effects on financial integration, on financial stability and on the global attractiveness of EU financial 
markets. At the same time, this approach would however imply the greatest risk of moral hazard, as it would 
completely suppress financial markets and market interest rates as signals and incentives for individual 
Member States' fiscal policy. The third approach addresses this latter concern, while, at least in the absence 
of further credit enhancement, it does not provide the best credit quality or not the best rating. Consequently, 
the expected level of liquidity of the Stability Bonds would be more limited. The impact on financial 
integration, on financial stability and on the global attractiveness of EU financial markets would overall be 
rather medium to low. The second option is commonly referred to as the "blue-red approach"2 and balances 
the different previous arguments. It implies a relatively high credit quality for common bonds ("blue bonds") 
and addresses at the same time the risk of moral hazard through the remaining national-guaranteed bonds (or 
"red bonds"). Member States with higher debt would not be able to refinance them through common bonds, 
but beyond a threshold rely on financing all additional debt through national bonds. As they would be 
obliged to serve the common bonds first (seniority principle), the national bonds would be issued at higher 
costs. The three approaches also differ in terms of required adjustment of the regulatory framework. As 
                                                          
1  See German Council of Economic Experts (2011).  
2  See Delpa et al.(2010).  
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Box (continued) 
option 3 would not call for changes of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), it 
could be used as short-term immediate crisis management tool. In contrast to this, options 1 and 2 would 
need Treaty changes and are therefore more suitable as medium to long-term instruments. Hereby Stability 
Bonds option 2 could be launched as medium-term tool to repair financial markets after the crisis, while 
option 1 would rather be an instrument to complete the EMU architecture in the long run by contributing to 
a more advanced economic and financial architecture. 
While Stability Bonds would provide substantial benefits in terms of financial stability and economic 
efficiency, it is essential to meet important economic, legal and technical preconditions. The positive net 
effects of common issuance of bonds depend on managing the potential disincentives for financial discipline 
and the therefrom resulting consequences. Budgetary discipline must be guaranteed in order to limit moral 
hazard. While the EU's governance framework has been considerably reinforced over recent years, it 
remains to be seen whether such a framework would provide sufficient safeguards also in a framework of 
more advanced or ambitious forms of common issuance.  In such a case, additional criteria or conditions for 
the participation in common issuance might be warranted.  Second, Stability Bonds would need to have high 
credit quality to be accepted by investors. The successful implementation of the new economic governance 
framework already in force and in the process of being put in place may be a significant step towards 
fulfilling the preconditions for common issuances. Furthermore, consistency with the EU Treaty would be 
essential to ensure the successful introduction of Stability Bonds. Common bonds must not be in breach with 
the Treaty prohibition on the "bailing out" of Member States (Art. 125 TFEU). This would be particularly 
relevant within Bond issuance under joint and several guarantees. While some options would require Treaty 
changes, others would not. Issuance under several but not joint guarantee would be possible within the 
existing Treaty provisions. Overall, the technical design of Stability Bonds impacts all above mentioned 
issues. It is therefore most important to consider various design options and to analyse the resulting 
consequences. The Commission's Green Paper elaborated on the various parameters and options and 
provided a first tentative analysis of their advantages and disadvantages.  
In winter 2011/2012 the Commission invited all citizens and organisations to contribute to the public 
consultation on its Green Paper on the Feasibility of introducing Stability Bonds. The results of the public 
consultation, published in May 2012, showed significant differences in views between supporters of and 
opponents to Stability Bonds. However, the majority of respondents were in favour of implementing a 
common debt issuance instrument. Most of the supporters expressed a preference for Stability Bonds option 
2. Overall, several issues were raised: Respondents voiced their concerns about moral hazard and 
emphasised on the fact that sufficient fiscal discipline should be ensured before implementing Stability 
Bonds. Therefore a stable legal and governance framework should be put in place. Furthermore participants 
stressed that Stability Bonds under joint and several guarantees should involve a tight control on national 
budgets possibly including a restriction of sovereignty. Especially market stakeholders called for a stable 
and definite instrument, rather than a transitory one and emphasized simplicity and transparency. They 
objected to hybrid or over-collateralised structures, with or without credit enhancement, and favoured a 
simple issuance structure, ideally via a central debt management office. Fears of an unjustified burden on 
citizens and an increase of financing costs for sub-national entities have also been put forward. Finally, legal 
concerns were addressed as well.  
Even if the number of replies is relatively low and cannot be interpreted as representative, they offer a useful 
snapshot of relevant concerns and preconditions of political and technical nature. The public consultation 
was a useful process for further reflection on Stability Bonds, as it revealed several additional issues not 
addressed in the Green Paper. The issues raised in the responses are being studied by the Commission 
services and further reflection is taking place on possible implementation schemes of Stability Bonds. 
Due to the existence of trade-offs between the political scope of a new instrument and the legal, political and 
technical feasibility of introducing such an instrument in the short term, more limited options for common 
issuance are under discussion. Especially if the main objective was to design common issuance as a crisis 
management took, an instrument that differs in design and phasing compared to the Green Paper approaches  
(Continued on the next page) 
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MAIN FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED REGULATION 
ON ENHANCED MONITORING 
The proposal for a Regulation on monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the 
correction of excessive deficits of the Member 
States in the euro area sets out graduated steps and 
conditions that reinforce the monitoring of national 
budgetary policies. The main features of the 
Commission proposal are set out in this 
Subsection.  
A Common Budgetary Timeline for the euro 
area 
All Member States of the euro area will follow a 
common timeline, as well as common rules, 
regarding their budgetary procedures. These new 
requirements aim to complement the European 
Semester so as to ensure a good integration of the 
European Union policy guidance in the national 
budgetary process and to allow taking a view of 
the euro area as a whole (see Graph II.4.1). 
Experience has shown that effective planning plays 
a key role in ensuring sound public finances, in 
particular when it allows the ex ante identification 
of any risk of gross errors and thus prevents them 
from occurring. 
In addition, euro area Member States need to take 
into account the fact that their budgetary plans may 
potentially trigger spillover effects on the other 
countries sharing the same currency. Therefore, a 
first step in reinforcing the preventive aspect of 
Box (continued) 
time and/or maturity of such common issuance. Main examples of such more limited approaches include (1) 
common issuance based on several guarantee only; (2) time-limited common issuance based on joint and 
several guarantees in the form of a debt redemption fund as proposed by the German Council of Economic 
Experts, or (3) common issuance only of short-term debt with a maturity of up to 1 to 2 years, so-
called"Eurobills" / "E-bills". 
The latter proposal has attracted the most significant attention.  As all other proposed instruments, E-bills 
involve specific advantages and disadvantages. However, while aiming for a crisis management tool the 
benefits of common issuance of short-term debt seem to exceed the negative consequences. E-bills would 
contribute to financial market completion by providing a larger supply of short-term securities markets of 
sufficiently high credit quality. Until now markets for T-bills, commercial paper and certificates of deposit 
are relatively underdeveloped in most Member States. Eurobills could moreover strengthen financial 
stability insofar as they would assure a ready supply of short-term liquidity for all euro area Member States. 
Compared to long-term bonds, the potential exposure of Member States to E-bills under joint and several 
guarantees would be reduced in volume and time. This is mainly due to the smaller size of the government 
bill markets and the lower average maturity of bills. The common issuance of short-term securities would 
also seem beneficial for the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area, as the transmission channels would 
be strengthened and harmonised. Finally, some of the more technical issues to be solved for commonly 
issuing long-term bonds (i.e. trading venues or maturity profiles), would be smaller for issuing short-term 
paper only. Nevertheless the limits of Eurobills need to be considered. Unlike for long-term bonds, 
collective gains in liquidity premia would be extremely limited, as bills are typically not traded, but purely 
bought and held. Effects on market integration and efficiency would equally be restrained. Furthermore, 
euro area Member States' current reliance on T-bills in overall issuance differs widely. This would 
complicate the introduction of Eurobills, including an agreement on aggregate limits. In addition, it should 
be avoided that, by creating a particularly attractive short-term instrument, a bias towards short-term 
issuance appears, particularly in vulnerable Member States. This could lead to very serious rollover risks 
over the medium term. As is the case for the issuance of common bonds, care would also need to be taken to 
ensure that an introduction of Eurobills does not breach the no bailout condition enshrined in the TFEU 
under Article 125. 
Still, E-bills should be considered as a possible crisis management tool, as they are more flexible and more 
easily manageable. As they are of short-term nature their issuance can relatively easily been phased out in 
the event they lead to unwarranted consequences. While, when successful they could become a stepping 
stone for other forms of common issuance. 
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European surveillance is to ensure a better 
synchronisation of the key steps of the budgetary 
procedure. Sharing a common budgetary timeline 
should help Member States exchange relevant 
information and follow the budgetary procedures 
of their counterparts in a transparent manner, and 
so facilitate synergies. This will reinforce the 
effectiveness of the European Semester, organised 
for the first time in 2011, and which is premised on 
the same rationale which is that the EU Member 
States need to coordinate better their budgetary 
and economic processes in line with common 
objectives, building on Commission and Council 
recommendations.  
This common budgetary timeline is organised 
around three milestones: 
By 15April: the fiscal plans in accordance with the 
national medium-term budgetary frameworks are 
made public.  
Each Member State must prepare a national 
medium-term budgetary framework and publish it 
alongside its Stability Programme that is submitted 
to the Commission and the Council, in accordance 
with the preventive arm of the SGP.  
As a starting point, the information to be presented 
in the national medium-term budgetary framework 
should encompass all the data required in the 
Stability Programme; however, the Member State 
may decide that this national document might go 
further either in the horizon or in the coverage of 
the medium-term budgetary strategy that it sets 
out. 
By 15 October: The draft budget is made public, 
together with the macroeconomic forecasts on 
which it is based; 
The draft budgetary plans for the general 
governments are made public and submitted to the 
Commission and the Eurogroup.  
The submission of draft budgetary plans is 
intended to mirror the procedure of the Stability 
Programmes, but with focus on the following year. 
This new milestone will be specific to the euro 
area, acknowledging the need for an enhanced 
synchronisation of the budgetary policies of 
Member States sharing the same currency. 
By 31 December: Budget Laws are adopted and 
made public. 
Finalising all countries' budgetary processes in a 
synchronised manner should eliminate any 
uncertainty possibly linked to the forthcoming 
budgetary plans of the euro are Member States and 
enhance the transparency both across countries and 
towards external observers. 
Common Budgetary Rules for euro area 
Member States 
Building on the same rationale as the Directive on 
national budgetary frameworks adopted in 2011 
presented in Section II.3, the proposal for a 
Regulation on enhanced budgetary monitoring sets 
out more precise requirements for euro area 
Member States. The new rules are therefore 
additional to the provisions of the Directive on 
national budgetary frameworks which should be 
transposed in all Member States by end-2013.  
There is strong evidence showing the effectiveness 
of rules-based fiscal frameworks in supporting 
sound and sustainable fiscal policies. The 
introduction of national fiscal rules which are 
consistent with the European framework is 
important to ensure that Member States are 
equipped to abide by their obligations under the 
SGP.  
While the directive on national budgetary 
frameworks requires EU Member States to have 
numerical fiscal rules in place to promote 
compliance with EU obligations(
72
), the proposed 
regulation proposed more explicitly requires euro-
area Member States to enshrine the medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO) in their national 
budgetary process. At least for euro area Member 
States, the approval of this provision would allow 
transposing in secondary legislation the core 
commitment of the Contracting Parties of the 
intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (TSCG), signed on 2 March 2012 
(see Chapter II.5). The binding nature of such 
national rules would demonstrate the strongest 
commitment of national authorities to meet their 
                                                          
(72) The UK is exempted from this provision, in view of its 
special Protocol annexed to the Treaties. 
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obligations deriving from the preventive arm of the 
SGP, too often neglected in the past. 
Ensuring that all Member States of the euro area 
have high-quality budgetary processes is another 
safeguard to help them meet the strengthened 
requirements and ensure a sound management of 
their public finances. The first area concerned by 
these new common budgetary rules is the 
reliability of the forecasts on which Member States 
base their budgetary plans, be they the national 
medium-term fiscal plan or the draft budget for the 
forthcoming year. Indeed, in the absence of 
realistic and unbiased forecasts, the link between 
budgetary planning and execution is weakened and 
Member States are likely to miss the targets 
foreseen in the plans. In particular, as the revenue 
projections are based on the level and composition 
of economic growth, overly optimistic GDP 
forecasts will leave the government unable to 
respect its budgetary targets for revenues and 
hence, for the overall budget balance. The 
directive asks the macroeconomic and budgetary 
forecasts to be realistic and subject to a regular 
evaluation. The proposed regulation requires fiscal 
plans of euro area Member States to be based on 
independent macroeconomic forecasts. 
In addition, according to the Commission proposal 
euro area Member States should rely on 
independent fiscal bodies for the monitoring and 
implementation of national rules, in particular, of 
rules ensuring compliance with the MTO. The 
directive does not strictly require national 
independent bodies to monitor fiscal rules. 
However, it envisages that monitoring of 
numerical rules should be based on analysis 
carried out by independent bodies 
New reporting requirements in order to 
improve the monitoring of Member States' 
budgetary policies 
An enhanced monitoring of budgetary policies in 
the euro area exerted at the European level and 
based on a reinforcement of existing processes for 
budgetary and economic surveillance, has been 
deemed necessary to take account of the fact that 
national economic policies of Member States are a 
matter of common concern – particularly in the 
case of countries sharing a single currency. This 
implies greater awareness and interest by national 
parliaments and stakeholders in the EU-level 
perspective. 
The new Regulation, builds upon the European 
Semester by introducing a new exercise to be 
conducted in the autumn, when the budgetary 
plans of Member States of the euro area will be 
assessed. This new exercise would involve only 
the forthcoming budgetary year, as opposed to the 
European Semester, which considers budgetary 
plans and policies over the medium run. By taking 
into account one budgetary year only, just ahead of 
the adoption of the Budget by the National 
Parliament, this new milestone should allow a 
more targeted and more relevant intervention into 
national budgetary processes, thus reinforcing 
substantially the preventive function of the SGP. 
By requiring the submission by Member States of 
their draft budgetary plans by 15 October, the 
Regulation enables the Council and the 
Commission to examine the national draft budgets 
of all euro area Member States, both individually 
and with an overall view on the forthcoming fiscal 
stance in the euro area.  
In addition, the Eurogroup will hold a discussion 
on the fiscal prospects for the euro area for the 
forthcoming year, on the basis of the assessment of 
the draft budgetary plans undertaken by the 
Commission. 
The Regulation lays down the required information 
which is expected to be provided by Member 
States in their draft budgetary plan (see Box 
II.3.2). This information, provided following the 
common European accounting standards (ESA 95), 
in order to be fully comparable across Member 
States, will ensure horizontal consistency in the 
assessment and to allow the framing of a euro 
area-wide picture of fiscal positions. Indeed, the 
information required has been selected in order to 
provide a comprehensive overview of the fiscal 
position of each Member State over the 
forthcoming year. The proposal presented on 23 
November envisages that the specific content and 
the format of the draft budgetary plans is to be 
established by the Commission.  
There are two potential steps that the Commission 
might decide to undertake on the basis of the draft 
budgetary plans. First, in exceptional cases of 
serious non-compliance of the budgetary plan with 
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the obligations of the Member States deriving from 
the SGP, the Commission will be able, within two 
weeks from the date the Member State submitted 
its programme, to request a revised draft budgetary 
plan. In particular, this would be the case where 
the implementation of the initial budgetary plan 
would put at risk the financial stability of the 
Member State concerned or would risk 
jeopardising the good functioning of the EMU, or 
where the implementation of the initial budgetary 
plan would entail an obvious significant violation 
of the recommendations formulated by the Council 
under the SGP.  
In addition, the Commission may adopt an opinion 
on a Member State's draft budgetary plan, after 
having properly assessed it. This opinion will be 
given as soon as possible, with a maximum 
deadline established in the Commission proposal at 
30 November. The objective is to transmit this 
information to the Member State concerned before 
the plan is adopted by the National Parliament, 
inviting the budgetary authorities to take it into 
account in the process of the budget law adoption. 
The Commission would then stand ready to 
present its opinion to the national Parliament at its 
request. 
This new role of the Commission is one of 
information and monitoring, and there is no 
transfer of sovereignty away from the Member 
States, which remain fully competent on deciding 
on their budgets. The final budget Law is adopted 
by the National Parliament in full respect of its 
prerogatives. It is clear that countries will need to 
respect European requirements on their public 
finances when setting their budgetary plans if they 
want to avoid that the Commission requests a new 
budgetary plan; but these requirements are already 
set in the Treaty and the SGP and this new exercise 
is only meant to enhance the dialogue between the 
Member States and the European institutions and 
among themselves. The Regulation on enhanced 
monitoring therefore adds to the national rules and 
scrutiny of Member States' policy making but does 
not place additional requirements on the policies 
themselves that should have anyway been in 
compliance of the requirements recalled in Chapter 
II.2. 
In addition, any Commission Opinion issued on 
the draft budgetary plan of a Member State may 
help inform any subsequent decisions about 
whether this Member State should be placed in an 
Excessive Deficit Procedure; the Opinion will be 
formally taken into account in the steps leading the 
opening of the procedure. More precisely, the 
extent to which this opinion has influenced the 
final budget should be part of the assessment, 
where no follow-up to the early guidance from the 
Commission should be considered as an 
aggravating factor. 
Finally, The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG) described in Chapter II.5 acknowledges 
the necessity to enhance coordination on the 
budgetary side by also increasing the exchange of 
information concerning debt management. The 
objective is to ensure that each national debt 
manager benefits from useful information about 
broad parameters of debt issuance by other debt 
managers in the euro area. The Commission 
proposal for this Regulation could be amended 
accordingly to foresee a regular reporting by 
Member States on their ex ante debt issuance 
plans.  
Of course, possible gains, deriving from increased 
transparency and predictability of funding plans to 
all sovereign debt issuers in the euro area, have to 
be weighed against the imperative and justified 
needs of flexibility and confidentiality of issuing 
policies and procedures. 
This reporting could be built on existing 
mechanisms and frameworks for information 
sharing across Member States on their debt 
issuance. For instance, the Economic and Financial 
Committee's Sub-Committee on EU sovereign debt 
markets (ESDM), primarily composed of 
representatives of Member States' debt 
management offices, could constitute an 
appropriate forum for such consultation and 
cooperation. The ESDM has been established for a 
number of years and has started to implement ad-
hoc codes on monthly reporting of national debt 
issuance. Existing processes could therefore allow 
Member States to comply with what is now set as a 
legislative requirement. 
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A closer monitoring of progress by euro area 
Member States under the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) 
While the enhancement of the monitoring of 
national budgetary policies for all Member States 
of the euro area reinforces the preventive aspect of 
European surveillance, the new proposed 
Regulation also includes provisions to increase the 
effectiveness of its corrective part. The corrective 
arm only concerns Member States which have 
already breached the rules governing either the 
deficit level or the pace for debt reduction, and 
which, as a consequence, are subject to an 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The fiscal 
position of such Member States being particularly 
fragile, it becomes a matter of common concern 
for the euro area as a whole. It is therefore the 
responsibility of the EU to put in place tighter 
requirements to ring-fence the budgetary fragilities 
and ensure an effective and durable correction of 
budgetary slippages. 
Enhancing the effectiveness of the monitoring 
exerted at the EU level in the framework of the 
EDP means ensuring that Member States 
concerned take sufficient and effective action, so 
that their excessive deficit is corrected within the 
specific deadline set by the Council. The SGP 
already foresees that concerned Member States 
would submit a progress report to the Commission 
and the Council. This report presents the action 
taken by the Member State to correct the excessive 
deficit (Article 3(4a) of Regulation 1467/97) 
within the six months (at the latest) following 
Council recommendations issued in accordance 
with Article 126(7) TFUE (see Table II.4.1). It is 
on the basis of the information provided in that 
report that the Council decides, on a 
recommendation by the Commission, whether 
effective action has been taken.   
However, experience has shown that a closer 
monitoring of budgetary developments and of the 
corrective action undertaken, over and above this 
existing report, would be instrumental in ensuring 
 
 
Box II.4.2: Extract from Article 5 of the proposed Regulation on enhanced monitoring: 
Information to be presented by Member States in their draft budgetary plan
The draft budgetary plan shall contain the following information for the forthcoming year: 
(a) the targeted budget balance for the general government as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), broken down by sub-sector of general government; 
(b) the projections at unchanged policies for expenditure and revenue as a percentage of GDP for the general 
government and their main components; 
(c) the targeted expenditure and revenue as a percentage of GDP for the general government and their main 
components, taking into account the conditions and criteria to establish the growth path of government 
expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures under Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97; 
(d) a detailed description and a well-documented quantification of the measures to be included in the budget 
for the year to come in order to bridge the gap between the targets referred to in point (c) and the projections 
at unchanged policies provided in accordance with point (b). The description may be less detailed for 
measures with a budgetary impact estimated to be lower than 0.1% of GDP. Particular attention shall be paid 
to major fiscal policy reform plans with potential spillover effects for other Member States whose currency 
is the euro; 
(e) the main assumptions about expected economic developments and important economic variables which 
are relevant to the achievement of the budgetary targets. These assumptions shall be based on independent 
macroeconomic growth forecast; 
(f) where applicable, additional indications on how the current recommendations addressed to the Member 
State concerned in accordance with Article 121 of the Treaty in the budgetary area will be met. 
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an early correction of any deviations from the 
Council recommendations on the correction of the 
excessive deficit. Building on this rationale, this 
proposed Regulation increases both the 
requirements placed on euro area Member States 
in terms of the scope of the information to be 
shared and the frequency of the reports to be 
submitted to the Commission and to the Council. 
This will allow an early identification of risks to 
the compliance with the Member State's deadline 
to correct its excessive deficit.   
When an EDP is opened, the Member State has to 
present a comprehensive overview of its budgetary 
situations and of the actions it plans to take to 
correct the excessive deficit. In this way the 
proposed Regulation complements the initial 
report on action taken with a comprehensive 
assessment of in-year budgetary execution for the 
general government and its sub-sectors, including 
financial risks associated to contingent liabilities 
with potentially large impacts on public budgets, to 
the extent that they may contribute to the existence 
of an excessive deficit. 
Second, besides this initial overview of situation 
and the elaboration of the plans drawn up by the 
Member State after entering the excessive deficit 
procedure, the proposed Regulation foresees a 
regular exchange of information, following the 
initial report, until the excessive deficit is actually 
corrected. Accordingly, euro area Member States 
in EDP are required to report regularly to the 
Commission and to the Economic and Financial 
Committee, providing these bodies with 
information on the in-year budgetary execution, 
the budgetary impact of discretionary measures 
taken on both the expenditure and the revenue 
side, targets for the government expenditure and 
revenues, as well as information on the measures 
adopted and the nature of those envisaged to 
achieve the targets for the general government and 
its sub-sectors. The report shall be made public. 
As provided for in Article 126 of the Treaty, the 
modalities of such closer monitoring have to be 
graduated depending on the stage of the procedure 
the Member State is subject to. Therefore, after the 
initial report on action taken to be submitted in 
accordance with Regulation 1467/97, the new 
regular reporting introduced by the proposed 
Regulation on enhanced monitoring is to be 
submitted every six months, but the frequency is 
heightened to every three months if the Member 
State is subject to a Council notice (in accordance 
with Article 126(9) TFUE). Indeed, such Council 
notice is issued after the Council has decided that 
the Member State has not taken effective action to 
correct its excessive deficit; this more critical 
situation deserves a closer and more frequent 
monitoring of budgetary developments for the 
Member State concerned. 
In this way, more frequent information sharing will 
be the basis for the identification of the risks that a 
Member State might not correct its excessive 
deficit within its deadline. In the event of such 
risks being identified, the Commission will issue a 
recommendation to the Member State for measures 
to be taken within a given timeframe. This 
recommendation will be presented to the 
Parliament of the Member State concerned at its 
request. Compliance with this recommendation 
should allow for a rapid correction of any 
developments putting at risk the correction of the 
excessive deficit within the established deadline.  
Assessment of compliance with such a 
Commission recommendation should be part of the 
continuous assessment made by the Commission, 
of the effective action to correct the excessive 
deficit, in particular when deciding whether 
effective action to correct the excessive deficit has 
been taken. 
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As described in Chapter II.5, the TSCG introduces 
the concept of 'economic partnership programme' 
for countries in EDP, i.e., a programme including 
structural reforms to ensure a durable correction of 
the excessive deficit. Also progress with the 
implementation of the economic partnership 
programme could be included in the closer 
monitoring envisaged by this proposed regulation.  
Attention has been paid to avoid over-burdening 
national administrations: reports and monitoring 
already envisaged throughout the excessive deficit 
procedure, as described in the corresponding 
Regulation of the SGP, are included and combined 
with the requirements set out in the new proposed 
text (see Table II.4.I). In addition, countries which 
are subject to a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme are also exempt from the reporting 
requirements of this proposed Regulation on 
monitoring and assessment. 
Finally, in order to enhance the dialogue between 
the Union institutions – in particular between the 
European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission –and to ensure greater transparency 
and accountability, the competent committee of the 
European Parliament may offer the opportunity to 
the Member State concerned by a Commission 
recommendation issued in the context of the closer 
monitoring to participate in an exchange of views. 
 
 
Graph II.4.1: The new fiscal governance framework in the euro area 
 
Source: Commission services. 
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Box II.4.3: The proposed Regulation on enhanced surveillance for Member States 
experiencing severe difficulties with regard to their financial stability or for those in receipt 
of financial assistance
The second proposal for a Regulation of the so-called Two-Pack makes Member States experiencing severe 
difficulties with regard to their financial stability or receiving a financial assistance on a precautionary basis 
subject to enhanced surveillance. The proposal dovetails the financial assistance granted outside the 
framework of the Union with the Treaty, by setting out a clear procedure for preparing and adopting macro-
economic adjustment programmes. It also sets out the procedure for post-programme surveillance for 
countries which have received loans or have drawn a precautionary assistance. 
The main components of the proposed regulation are: 
(a) enhanced surveillance 
The Commission can, in close cooperation with the EFC, decide to make a Member State subject to 
enhanced surveillance, with such a decision being automatic for countries receiving precautionary financial 
assistance. This surveillance involves (a) an obligation on the Member State to adopt measures to address 
the sources of instability, (b) regular review missions, and (c) quarterly reporting by the Commission to the 
Eurogroup Working Group (EWG). This will give the Commission significant powers: beyond full access to 
fiscal data, the Commission would have the capacity to force a stress test exercise or to access disaggregated 
data of financial institutions.  
If monitoring shows that further measures are needed and the financial situation of the Member State 
concerned has a significant impact on the financial stability of the euro area, the Commission can propose to 
the Council to recommend that this Member State take precautionary measures or prepare a macroeconomic 
adjustment programme (de facto, seek financial assistance).  
(b) procedure for deciding and monitoring a macroeconomic adjustment programme  
The programme is prepared by the country and the Commission (in liaison with the ECB) and is submitted 
for approval to the Council via a Commission proposal.   The Commission, in liaison with the ECB, will 
ensure the monitoring of the programme. The two main novelties are (a) an obligation on the MS facing 
insufficient administrative capacities to seek technical assistance from the Commission and (b) the 
possibility for the Council to decide that a beneficiary is not complying with the policy requirements 
contained in the adjustment programme. The latter decision would have very significant effects; it would de 
facto trigger the interruption of the disbursements of the financial assistance of the European Financial 
Stability Fund (EFSF)/European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and a suspension of payments or commitments 
under the structural funds.  
(c) simplification of the monitoring of programme countries 
Macroeconomic adjustment programmes go beyond fiscal issues and have a wide scope, covering all policy 
areas that could improve the economic and financial situation. All attention naturally focuses on the 
monitoring of the programme, if only because it conditions the disbursements.  For this reason, it is 
proposed to avoid duplication and overburdening by suspending the monitoring under the SGP and the 
implementation of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP), European Semester and the proposed 
Regulation on enhanced budgetary monitoring.  
(d) post-programme surveillance 
Post-programme surveillance inadvertently offers lenders extra protection by ensuring that the beneficiary 
remains on the right fiscal track, thus protecting its capacity to repay its debt. Under the proposed 
Regulation, a country would be subject to the post-programme surveillance conditions as long as it has not 
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Box (continued) 
 
repaid 75% of its debt. This could lead to a very long surveillance period, which explains why post-
programme surveillance is not described in detail. The Commission would have monitoring powers and 
report twice a year. Where appropriate, it can propose to the Council to recommend to the MS concerned to 
adopt corrective measures. The wording allows enough flexibility to fine tune the level of surveillance 
according to specific needs; it can be either intrusive or very light, depending on the economic and financial 
situation of the Member State concerned.  
It should be noted that the Commission will implement post-programme surveillance only if the financial 
support is financed by the EU (EFSM) or its Member States (ESM, EFSF), but not if it comes from the IMF 
or third countries. 
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The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG), an intergovernmental 
initiative, is the latest stage of the European 
economic governance reform. As part of the 
multidimensional response to the economic and 
financial crisis, it is a reflection of Member States' 
willingness to further strengthen and fully 
implement the provisions of the revised Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP). Indeed, Contracting 
Parties have decided to incorporate key concepts 
of the SGP within their national legislation, and to 
go beyond in some cases. Even if the preference 
would have been the adoption of similar provision 
within the framework of EU law, the TSCG 
nevertheless runs alongside and complements the 
new legislation on fiscal and macroeconomic 
surveillance – the so-called "six-pack" – which 
entered into force on 13 December 2011.  
5.1. THE TREATY ON STABILITY, 
COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE : 
AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVE TO 
STRENGTHEN BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE 
AND ECONOMIC POLICY 
COORDINATION  
5.1.1. An intergovernmental initiative  
At the European Council of 8-9 December 2011, 
most EU Member States decided to open the way 
to an intergovernmental treaty designed to ensure 
greater fiscal surveillance and economic 
coordination within the European Union. 
Following a period of negotiations which involved 
all 27 Member States, as well as consultations with 
the European Parliament, the Commission and the 
European Central Bank, the Treaty was signed on 
2 March 2012 by 25 Heads of State or 
Government(
73
). 
The option of an international treaty allowed those 
Member States willing to proceed with 
commitments going beyond what is currently 
envisaged by the European Treaties, to do so 
despite other States wishing to remain outside the 
process. While not being part of EU law as such, 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
                                                          
(73) The TSCG was signed by all euro area Member States,  
and by Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and Sweden. The United Kingdom and 
the Czech Republic did not sign the TSGC. 
Governance is however consistent with EU law 
and shall be applied in conformity therewith. The 
Treaty therefore appears as a demonstration of 
Member States' willingness to go for a closer 
economic union.  
The 25 signatories of the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance (TSCG), 
concentrated their commitments to achieve greater 
budgetary and economic coordination on three 
main dimensions: (i) fiscal discipline, (ii) 
economic policy convergence and (iii) enhanced 
governance of the euro area. 
5.1.2. Building on the Stability and Growth 
Pact, a fiscal compact to improve 
Member States' budgetary discipline 
On the budgetary side, the fiscal compact (Articles 
3 to 8 of the TSCG), which covers the fiscal rules 
of the TSCG, gathers elements of a reinforced 
coordination for all stages of budgetary 
surveillance, which is governed at the level of the 
Union by the SGP – with some reinforced 
provisions specific to the euro area.  
The fiscal compact follows the two-fold approach 
of the SGP, where a preventive arm is designed to 
maintain or guide Member States towards medium 
and long-term fiscal sustainability; coming at a 
later stage, in cases that the preventive arm is 
supposed to avoid, corrective mechanisms, namely 
the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), ensure the 
correction of gross policy errors. 
The fiscal compact intends to complement both 
stages of fiscal surveillance, through: 
 at a preventive stage: implementation of a 
balanced-budget rule into national law; ex-ante 
reporting on debt issuance plans;  
 ensuring the correction of gross policy errors: 
greater deterrence of the corrective procedure; 
new focus on structural reform necessary to 
accompany correction of fiscal imbalances.  
 As main commitments consist in enshrining in 
national law, and with the support of national 
mechanisms, core principles of the SGP, the 
fiscal compact demonstrates an increased 
ownership of European rules. This can only 
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reinforce adherence and compliance with a 
common commitment towards sounder fiscal 
policy-making in Europe.  
Accordingly, and building directly on the concepts 
of the European Stability and Growth Pact, the 
fiscal compact sets the following rules: 
 Contracting Parties commit to translate at the 
national level the core concept of the 
'preventive arm' of the SGP: their budget will 
have to reach a 'balanced or in surplus' 
position, deemed respected if the annual 
structural balance of the general government is 
at the country-specific medium-term objective 
(MTO). In most cases, this MTO will have a 
lower limit amounting to a structural deficit of 
-0.5% of GDP (see section 5.2.2 below). 
Following the same rules as in the SGP, a 
temporary deviation from the medium-term 
objective or the adjustment path towards it will 
only be possible in exceptional circumstances. 
In case of significant observed deviations from 
the MTO or the adjustment path towards it, 
also assessed in accordance with SGP concepts, 
correction mechanisms will be triggered 
automatically at the national level.  
 To ensure compliance, the Contracting Parties 
will have to enshrine those rules in their 
national law through provisions of binding 
force and permanent character. Failure to do so 
may result in the CJEU imposing a financial 
sanction of up to 0.1% of the Member State's 
GDP. In addition, independent bodies will be in 
charge, at the national level, of monitoring 
compliance with the balanced-budget rule. 
 If deficits need to be contained, the crisis 
showed that debt also requires to be monitored 
closely. A major innovation of the six-pack 
was to give to the government debt as much 
importance as to the deficit, by allowing the 
opening of an EDP if any of the two criteria is 
not respected. Recalling their commitment to 
comply with what has been translated into a 
new debt reduction benchmark (see Chapter 
II.2), the Contracting Parties re-state in the 
TSCG that, in case their general government 
debt exceeds 60% of GDP, they will have to 
reduce the difference between their debt-to-
GDP ratio and the 60% threshold at an average 
rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark. 
 Confirming the greater focus on debt and with 
a view to better coordinate the planning of their 
national debt issuance, the Contracting Parties 
will report ex ante on their issuance plans to the 
Council of the EU and to the European 
Commission. 
 Enforcement of the rules of the SGP was one of 
the challenges to be addressed by the reform of 
the SGP. In that vein, the six-pack reinforced 
disincentives for non-compliant Member States 
of the euro area, through the creation of quasi-
automatic financial sanctions attached to the 
different steps under the preventive arm and 
under the EDP. Indeed, sanctions are triggered 
under a recommendation of the Commission, 
unless a qualified majority of Member States 
opposes them: this is the so-called reversed 
qualified majority voting. If such voting rules 
were possible for these new sanctions 
introduced by secondary law, the steps of the 
EDP itself are set by the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
together with the corresponding voting rules in 
the Council of the EU: they could not be 
modified by one of the Regulations of the six-
pack. As a consequence, to strengthen the 
deterrence of the procedure by introducing 
more automaticity in the different steps of the 
EDP, the only alternative to a Treaty change 
was an intergovernmental agreement. Hence 
the "behavioural commitment" of the 
Contracting Parties of the TSCG to support 
Commission recommendations in the context 
of the EDP unless a qualified majority of 
Member States is against – mimicking the so-
called reversed qualified majority voting. Even 
though this provision is restricted to cases 
when the procedure is opened on the basis of 
an excessive deficit, leaving aside debt-based 
EDPs, this provision, coming on top of the new 
financial sanctions of the six-pack, will 
enhance the dissuasive dimension of the EDP 
for euro area Member States.  
 To support the correction of excessive deficits, 
and ensure its effectiveness and durability, 
Contracting Parties add a complement to 
existing requirements under the excessive 
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deficit procedure. Contracting Parties subject to 
an EDP will have to present an economic 
partnership programme detailing the structural 
reforms that are deemed necessary to support 
an effective and durable correction of the 
excessive deficit. 
5.1.3. An agreement aimed at reinforcing 
economic coordination and 
governance of the euro area. 
Economic policies are a matter of common 
concern for all Member States of the Union, as 
stated by Article 121 of the TFUE. Commitments 
are made in that direction in the framework of the 
TSCG, to deepen economic policy coordination 
and convergence (Title IV of the TSCG). These 
include increased recourse to enhanced 
cooperation on matters essential for the smooth 
functioning of the euro area, as well as greater ex-
ante coordination of the major economic policy 
reforms planned by the signatories. Such 
coordination will involve the institutions of the 
European Union. 
Provisions were also introduced in order to 
reinforce the governance of the euro area (title V 
of the TSCG). The Treaty makes provision for 
regular informal meetings to take place between 
the Heads of State or Government of euro area 
Member States, together with the President of the 
European Commission. The objective of those 
Euro Summit meetings, which shall take place at 
least twice a year, will be to discuss issues 
concerning the governance of the Economic and 
Monetary Union, as well as strategic orientations 
to increase economic convergence among euro-
area Member States. A President of the Euro 
Summit, appointed by the euro-area Heads of State 
or Government will ensure the preparation and 
continuity of the meetings in close cooperation 
with the President of the European Commission. 
Herman Van Rompuy was designated to embody 
this function, with the same term of office as for 
the presidency of the European Council that he 
holds in parallel until 30 November 2014. The 
President of the Euro Summit, will keep non-euro 
area Member States informed of the preparation 
and outcome of those meetings and will present a 
report to the European Parliament after each of 
them. 
5.2. OPERATIONALISING THE TREATY - 
RATIFICATION PROCESS AND 
ANCHORING INTO EU LAW 
5.2.1. The ratification process of the TSCG 
Before it becomes operational, the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance will have 
to go first through a ratification process by the 
Member States’ national parliaments.  
The Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 
2013, provided that twelve euro-area signatories 
have ratified it. The national parliaments of several 
euro area Member States have already approved it: 
Greece was the first signatory to notify the 
ratification the TSCG on 10 May 2012, followed 
by Slovenia, Portugal and Latvia.  
While euro-area Member States are bound by the 
Treaty from the first day of the month following 
the deposit of their instrument of ratification, other 
Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro 
may decide to be bound by certain provisions 
related to the fiscal compact and economic policy 
coordination, on a voluntary basis. 
In parallel, the European institutions are working 
towards the integration of some provisions of the 
Treaty into EU law. 
5.2.2. Anchoring provisions into EU law: 
possible Commission initiatives and 
connection with the Two-Pack 
Contracting Parties of the TSCG pledged to 
incorporate the provisions of the 
intergovernmental treaty into the EU legal 
framework within five years of its entry into force. 
The European Commission has indicated its 
intention to operationalize relevant parts of the 
treaty, such as key elements of the fiscal compact, 
through secondary legislation. The objective of the 
European Commission is to ensure that novelties, 
and elements needed for their operationalization, 
are entrenched into law via the Community 
method, in full compatibility with the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Relying on EU law, when 
appropriate, will ensure a quick and smooth 
implementation. 
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5.2.2.1. Calendar for convergence towards 
the MTO 
While Member States commit in the fiscal 
compact to set up a constraining framework at the 
national level to ensure that their budgetary 
position is maintained at the medium-term 
budgetary objective, most of the Contracting 
Parties are currently not yet at their MTO. 
Therefore, a horizon needs to be set for their 
adjustment towards the objective. Accordingly, the 
Commission will define a timeframe for the 
convergence towards Member States' respective 
MTOs. 
This calendar will be presented by the Commission 
following the imminent revision of the MTOs, 
which occurs every three years and is due this 
year. It will be based on common principles, and in 
full accordance with the spirit and the principles of 
the SGP.  
According to the fiscal compact, MTOs in the euro 
area, which are country-specific values, could not 
go below a structural deficit of 0.5% of GDP: this 
is slightly more stringent than what exists in the 
current legislation, i.e. -1% for Member States 
participating in the Economic and Monetary Union 
or in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II. 
The fiscal compact however maintains this limit of 
-1% of GDP for Member States with a debt-to-
GDP ratio significantly below 60% and low risks 
for the sustainability of public finances. 
5.2.2.2. Common principles for the national 
set-ups ensuring compliance with the 
balanced-budget rule 
In order to ensure compliance with the new rules 
implementing MTOs at the national level, the 
fiscal compact foresees that a correction 
mechanism will be triggered automatically in the 
event of a significant deviation from the medium-
term objective or the adjustment path towards it.  
According to the TSCG, this national mechanism 
is to be put in place on the basis of common 
principles to be proposed by the Commission on 
the nature, size and timeframe of the corrective 
action to be undertaken, as well as on the role and 
independence of the national institutions 
responsible for monitoring compliance with the 
rule. A Communication putting forward common 
principles underlying the national correction 
mechanisms was issued by the Commission on 20 
June 2012. (see Box II.5.1). 
5.2.2.3. Strengthening ex ante economic 
coordination 
The TSCG envisages a reinforced economic 
coordination, stipulating that the Contracting 
Parties should ensure that all major economic 
reforms that they plan to undertake will be 
discussed ex ante, and where appropriate, 
coordinated among themselves.  
According to these provisions, Contracting Parties 
will have to present information on those 
economic reform plans - which could have spill 
over effects on other Member States - ahead of 
their adoption, so that they may be discussed at the 
level of the Eurogroup. Countries that do not 
participate in the Economic and Monetary Union 
may also opt in the process and present their own 
economic reform plans to other Member States. 
This mechanism will allow identifying best 
practice and benchmarking future reforms. This 
will also be an occasion to look systematically at 
likely cross-border spill over effects as well as 
implications for the euro area's overall macro-
economic policy stance. 
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Box II.5.1: Common principles for national fiscal correction
The common principles for national fiscal correction mechanisms as expressed in the Communication form 
the Commission COM(2012) 342 of 20 June 2012 are the following. 
(1) [Legal status] The correction mechanism shall be enshrined in national law through provisions of 
binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully 
respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes. The mechanism shall fully respect the 
prerogatives of national Parliaments.  
(2) [Consistency with EU framework] National correction mechanisms shall rely closely on the concepts and 
rules of the European fiscal framework. This applies in particular to the notion of a 'significant deviation' 
and the definition of possible escape clauses. The correction, in terms of size and timeline, shall be made 
consistent with possible recommendations addressed to the concerned Member State under the Stability and 
Growth Pact.  
(3) [Activation] The activation of the correction mechanism shall occur in well-defined circumstances 
characterising a significant deviation from the medium-term objective (MTO) or the adjustment path 
towards it. The activation triggers may comprise EU-driven or country-specific criteria, to the extent that 
they meet the above condition. Subject to the same condition, both ex ante mechanisms that set budgetary 
objectives preventing the materialisation of deviations and ex post mechanisms that trigger corrections in 
reaction to prior deviations, may fulfil the requirements.  
(4) [Nature of the correction] The size and timeline of the correction shall be framed by pre-determined 
rules. Larger deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it shall lead to 
larger corrections. Restoring the structural balance at or above the MTO within the planned deadline, and 
maintaining it there afterwards, shall provide the reference point for the correction mechanism. The 
correction mechanism shall ensure adherence to critical fiscal targets as set before the occurrence of the 
significant deviation, thereby preventing any lasting departure from overall fiscal objectives as planned 
before the occurrence of the significant deviation. At the onset of the correction Member States shall adopt a 
corrective plan that shall be binding over the budgets covered by the correction period.  
(5) [Operational instruments] The correction mechanism may give a prominent operational role to rules on 
public expenditure and discretionary tax measures, including in activating the mechanism and implementing 
the correction, to the extent that these rules are consistent with attainment of the MTO and the adjustment 
path towards it. The design of the correction mechanism shall consider provisions as regards, in the event of 
activation, the coordination of fiscal adjustments across some or all sub-sectors of general government.  
(6) [Escape clauses] The definition of possible escape clauses shall adhere to the notion of 'exceptional 
circumstances' as agreed in the Stability and Growth Pact. This would include an unusual event outside the 
control of the concerned Member State with a major impact on the financial position of the general 
government, or periods of severe economic downturn as defined in the Stability and Growth Pact, including 
at the level of the euro area. The suspension of the correction mechanism in the event of an escape clause 
shall be on a temporary basis. The correction mechanism shall foresee a minimum pace of structural 
adjustment once out of the escape clause, with the requirement from the Stability and Growth Pact a lower 
limit. When exiting the escape clause, Member States shall adopt a corrective plan that shall be binding over 
the budgets covered by the correction period. 
(7) [Role and independence of monitoring institutions] Independent bodies or bodies with functional 
autonomy acting as monitoring institutions shall support the credibility and transparency of the correction 
mechanism. These institutions would provide public assessments over: the occurrence of circumstances 
warranting the activation of the correction mechanism; of whether the correction is proceeding in 
accordance with national rules and plans; and over the occurrence of circumstances for triggering, extending 
and exiting escape clauses. The concerned Member State shall be obliged to comply with, or alternatively  
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5.2.2.4. Connections with the Two-Pack 
Regulation on enhanced monitoring  
The rationale of the TSCG shares some traits with 
that of the proposals of the Two-Pack Regulations 
(see Part II.4). In particular, with the proposed 
Regulation on common provisions for monitoring 
and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring 
the correction of excessive deficit of the Member 
States in the euro area.  
Both initiatives have the same objective to secure 
sound fiscal policy-making in the euro area, by 
provisions complementing at the same time the 
preventive and the corrective arms of the SGP. 
Both intend to articulate better budgetary practices 
at Member State level with strengthened 
provisions for euro area fiscal surveillance. 
This is why the current inter-institutional 
negotiations on the Two-Pack offer an appropriate 
context to reflect on how to enshrine into EU law 
some of the provisions of the intergovernmental 
treaty. The proposed Regulation on enhanced 
monitoring could provide a suitable legal space to 
enshrine into EU law some of the key elements 
operationalising the TSCG, and more specifically 
the fiscal compact. 
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explain publicly why they are not following the assessments of these bodies. The design of the above bodies 
shall take into account the already existing institutional setting and the country-specific administrative 
structure. National legal provisions ensuring a high degree of functional autonomy shall underpin the above 
bodies, including: i) a statutory regime grounded in law; ii) freedom from interference, whereby the above 
bodies shall not take instructions, and shall be in a capacity to communicate publicly in a timely manner; iii) 
nomination procedures based on experience and competence; iv) adequacy of resources and appropriate 
access to information to carry out the given mandate. 
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One of the main consequences of the economic 
and financial crisis has been sharp increases in 
government debt. As a result, the EU Member 
States started the necessary process of 
consolidating their government finances in 2010.  
In the face of growing signs of a weakening 
economy, a public debate is taking place on the 
effectiveness of consolidating government 
finances. The tone of the debate has mounted in 
the claim that "austerity can be self-defeating". 
The aim of this Chapter is to provide simulations 
on the short- and long-term effects of fiscal 
consolidations under various scenarios.  
The main factor driving the impact of a 
consolidation on the debt-to-GDP ratio is the size 
of the fiscal multiplier, i.e. the impact of 
consolidation on growth, and the reaction of 
sovereign yields to such a consolidation.  While 
there is a large body of research concerning the 
former (with an equally large variance in the 
results), less evidence is currently available 
concerning the latter.  
The size of the fiscal multipliers depends on many 
factors, the most relevant of which are i) the 
composition of the adjustment and whether it is 
perceived to be permanent or temporary, ii) the 
absence or presence of financial constraints for 
economic agents, iii) the size of automatic 
stabilizers, iv) the initial level of public debt, v) the 
stance of monetary policy and vi) the international 
economic environment. Moreover the size of the 
fiscal multipliers evolves with time. The size of 
first-year multipliers is larger if the fiscal 
consolidation is based on government expenditures 
– and government investment in particular – if the 
measures taken are not credible and temporay, if 
agents are financially constrained and if the 
monetary policy is unable or unwilling to 
accommodate the effect on real interest rates along 
with the fiscal shock. The negative output effects 
of consolidations in one country are reinforced if 
consolidations are implemented at the same time 
by all its trade partners. The composition has an 
impact on long-term output, as tax-based 
consolidations have a long-term negative impact 
on output which is not present in expenditure-
based consolidations unless these are based on 
government investment. 
In addition, there is a growing understanding that 
fiscal multipliers are non-linear and become larger 
in crisis periods because of the increase in 
aggregate uncertainty about aggregate demand and 
credit conditions, which therefore cannot be 
insured by any economic agent, of the presence of 
slack in the economy, of the larger share of 
consumers that are liquidity constrained, and of the 
more accommodative stance of monetary policy. 
Recent empirical works on US, Italy Germany and 
France confirm this finding. It is thus reasonable to 
assume that in the present juncture, with most of 
the developed economies undergoing 
consolidations, and in the presence of tensions in 
the financial markets and high uncertainty, the 
multipliers for composition-balanced permanent 
consolidations are higher than normal.  
For the counter-intuitive dynamics to happen 
multipliers should be large, either due to 
significant slack in the economy or lack of 
credibility of the consolidation programme, very 
persistent and financial markets very short-sighted.  
However, even when these factors come together, 
the analysis also shows that even for high but 
plausible values of the first-year fiscal multipliers 
such counterintuitive scenario would be short-lived 
unless the effects of consolidation on GDP 
remained large for two-three years or if deficit 
reduction induces a rapid and large increase on 
average effective interest rates - contrary to what is 
normally expected and estimated in consolidations 
- and the increase in risk premia induced by a 
higher observed debt ratio are ten times the 
average estimates. In the latter and improbable 
case only, somewhat longer-lasting counter-
intuitive dynamics could not be excluded. Once 
again, a high degree of financial market myopia is 
further required for these effects to happen: if, to 
the contrary, after consolidation measures have 
been implemented financial markets do not only 
look at the debt ratio of the first year (and attach 
implausibly high risk premia to the observed short-
term change in the debt ratio, while ignoring any 
longer-term debt-reducing effect) but instead 
consider those three or four years ahead, the debt 
dynamics would evolve as one would expect: 
consolidation reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus, 
under reasonable assumptions, counter-intuitive 
debt dynamics become practically impossible. 
Finally, some calculations are performed taking as 
a baseline current economic projections for EU 
Member States. They first show that the reverse 
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effect of consolidations would end within three 
years or less even if the impact of consolidation on 
GDP growth is long lasting, provided that financial 
markets do not require substantially higher risk 
premia when the country consolidates – even 
though the required interest rates increase with 
debt levels. High debt countries would experience 
a scenario in which the debt ratio increased 
following fiscal tightening only if financial 
markets were myopic and induced a very high 
increase of average effective interest rates when 
the country consolidates. Second, it is also shown 
– in line with the analysis provided in Chapter I.3 - 
that in view of the debt dynamics in a number of 
EU Member States, sizeable fiscal efforts of some 
points of GDP would be needed to bring debt 
ratios back to current levels within the next 
decade. Given the high level of debt reached in 
many of these countries, consolidation is a 
necessity. The analysis shows that, in these cases, 
high multipliers do not play a decisive role in debt 
dynamics, but may, under adverse scenarios delay 
the fall in the debt ratio by one year at most. 
The simulation-based analysis in this Section 
assumes that the relation between the risk premia 
paid on sovereign debt and the fiscal multipliers is 
relatively small. However, fiscal consolidations in 
the presence of large multipliers could lead to 
increases in the debt ratio, thereby entailing rises 
in the government real interest rates. This would 
imply that a consolidation would take a long time 
to bring debt below baseline. The case for interest 
rates increasing with a consolidation can reflect 
factors affecting financial markets that cannot be 
modelled, for example if financial markets come to 
believe that consolidation will be reversed based 
on political economy reasons. This could entail an 
increase in risk premia offsetting the action of 
monetary policy. This simplifying assumption is a 
useful first approximation. In any case it is to be 
noted that, in presence of a myopic reaction of 
financial markets to consolidations, such an 
assumption is could more easily generate a 
scenario displaying the counter-intuitive dynamics. 
So by making such an assumption the results found 
here constitute a limit to the possibility of having 
unexpected debt dynamics. 
A final issue that is not included in the scenario 
analysis is the effect of consecutive consolidations. 
If consolidations are repeated, especially in periods 
where multipliers are large and persistent, the 
effects on the economy tend to cumulate along the 
line and can, in presence of continued myopic 
behaviour of financial markets, induce counter-
intuitive dynamics. This could be the case, for 
example, if the target of fiscal policy is exclusively 
set in terms of headline variables, like headline 
debt or deficit ratios and not in terms of cyclically 
adjusted or structural figures. In this situation it is 
possible that the scenario consolidation-debt 
increase-consolidation-further debt increase takes 
place as long as the current multiplier is high 
enough to induce further short-term debt-to-GDP 
increases in response to consolidation. The same 
spiral can happen with deficits, but for sensibly 
higher values of the multipliers. As a high degree 
of financial market myopia is necessary for this to 
happen, this underlines that the credibility of the 
adjustment is crucial in providing financial 
markets with a long-term view. It is therefore 
better if policy recommendations are formulated in 
terms of a (path of) structural balances so that, 
once sufficient measures are taken, time is left for 
the effects of the consolidation measures to deploy 
fully, in line with current EU legislation. 
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EU countries have seen large debt increases since 
the onset of the crisis. In most EU countries debt is 
now at an unprecedented level. In some cases, the 
increases since 2007 have exceeded 20 percentage 
points of GDP starting from an already high level. 
The impact of the crisis has, for a number of 
countries, compounded the dynamics of a 
structural deficit. As shown in Part I, the EU 
Member States have now started consolidating 
their government finances. The increased levels of 
debt have led to pressure being placed on a number 
of countries by the financial markets especially in 
absence of interventions from central banks. 
Moreover, the realisation that inadequate attention 
to debt levels during the "good" economic times 
that preceded the crisis led to amendment of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to put debt on an 
equal footing with the deficit. New provisions in 
the SGP foresee that EU members with a debt to 
GDP ratio higher than 60% have to act to put it on 
a downward path such that the excess of the debt 
ratio over this 60% value decreases by 1/20th per 
year on average over three years.   
A public debate is taking place both in the press 
and within the economics profession on the 
effectiveness of consolidation in government 
finances in the current situation, mounting in the 
question whether "austerity can be self-defeating". 
In this context, "self-defeating" would mean that "a 
reduction in government expenditure leads to such 
a strong fall in activity that fiscal performance 
indicators actually get worse" This formulation 
stems from Gros (2011), who refutes such a claim 
for the longer term.  (For further contributions, see 
for example the debate taking place on 
www.voxEU.org: among many Buti and Pench 
(2012), Cafiso and Cellini (2011), Corsetti (2011), 
Gros (2011), and Krugman (2012)). The debate is 
reflected also in more academic literature (see 
Section III.2 below) where there has been a large 
increase in the amount of new research on the 
effects of fiscal consolidations. 
Given the renewed relevance of the debt, both in 
the financial markets and in the context of the 
fiscal governance in the EU, the public discussion 
has centred on the debt-to-GDP ratio as the key 
fiscal policy indicator. The present Chapter aims to 
discuss the consolidation dynamics and to define 
precisely the conditions under which counter-
intuitive dynamics can happen. The main result in 
this respect is that such a possibility exists, but it is 
mainly short-lived and its occurrence depends on 
the effects on sovereign yields.   
The success of a consolidation in reducing the debt 
ratio depends crucially on the value of the 
multiplier, which measures the impact of 
consolidation on growth, and on the reaction of 
sovereign yields to such a consolidation. Even a 
cursory literature review shows that estimates or 
assessments of the value of the multipliers vary 
enormously depending on the type of model used, 
the econometric technique, the economic 
conditions assumed for the estimate, the conduct of 
monetary policy and other factors influencing the 
interest rates, the composition of the adjustment 
and various institutional factors (from the 
exchange rate to credit and labour market 
arrangements.) 
The present Part finds a general condition that 
describes the impact of the adoption of 
consolidation measures – compared to the situation 
without consolidation considered as the baseline –
on the final debt ratio as a function of starting debt 
ratio, cyclical budgetary semi-elasticities and fiscal 
multipliers. Quite intuitively the basic condition 
shows that in presence of a high starting debt ratio 
and of a high cyclical semi-elasticity, relatively 
high fiscal multipliers more likely to be observed 
in crisis times are needed to have undesired effects 
of consolidations in the short term. The Part then 
shows how such a conclusion changes when 
account is taken of the effect on yields, a 
particularly relevant condition in the current 
sovereign crisis.  
Chapter III.2 discusses the factors that influence 
multipliers according to theory and presents a vast 
review of the empirical literature assessing the 
value of multipliers. The review covers DSGE 
calibration-based estimates, model-based estimates 
of different nature, VAR-based estimates and other 
estimates based on different econometric 
techniques. It also provides a review of existing 
estimates of effects of government debt and deficit 
on government yields. 
Chapter III.2 also presents VAR-based estimates 
of multipliers for some large euro area countries 
and for the euro area as a whole. The analysis is 
conducted using quarterly data and using a 
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traditional structural VAR approach. The main 
novelty of the analysis is to take the effects of 
confidence directly into account which should help 
reduce the downward bias on the fiscal multiplier 
induced by the fact that the date at which measures 
are implemented does not correspond with the date 
at which measures are announced or become 
known to the economic actors (for the potential 
relevance of this point see Romer and Romer 
(2010), Ramey (2011) and Corsetti et al. (2011) 
The results of the exercise are in line with 
literature results, with fist-year multipliers between 
0.4 and 1.4 depending on the country, an increased 
second-year multiplier and values for third year 
multipliers still in line with first-year multipliers, 
before a relative quick decrease. 
If the consolidation measures taken by the 
government are of a permanent nature, such an 
effect can only be short term, since the 
improvement in the government balance is 
permanent – and cumulates its effects on debt 
compared to baseline – the effects on growth of 
such a consolidation vanish in time. Section III.3 
analyses the conditions influencing the number of 
years that, in case of a short-term consolidation-
induced debt-increase, are needed for a 
consolidation to show its effects on the debt ratio. 
It shows that the typical horizon for a 
consolidation to improve debt is relatively short – 
under the situation in which debt increases from 
the beginning. Intuitively, the main factors 
influencing the length of the reverse effect are the 
multipliers at the different years and the initial 
level of debt and deficit. 
Also in Chapter III.3 estimated cyclical elasticities 
and actual debt figures for EU countries are used 
to have a back-of-the-envelope representation of 
the situation of the various EU countries with 
respect to the values of multipliers estimated in the 
literature, given the current crisis situation and 
tight credit markets. 
Finally, Chapter III.4 presents a set of conclusions 
based on the analysis conducted along Part III. 
2. REVIEW OF EXISTING ESTIMATES OF FISCAL MULTIPLIERS 
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This Chapter aims at providing an overview of 
existing estimates of fiscal multipliers. It is now 
acknowledged that it is more correct to talk about 
the multipliers rather than about the multiplier, 
given that the value of fiscal multipliers, as it will 
be seen in more detail in the next Section, depends 
on many factors relative to the fiscal shock itself 
(its permanent or temporary nature and its 
composition), to the economic environment (the 
economic situation, the economic situation of the 
partner countries, the stress in the financial market) 
and to economic policy regime (monetary and 
exchange rate policy). It is therefore very difficult 
to compare correctly different estimates and every 
comparison has to be taken with care. For 
example, empirical estimates made using Vector 
Auto-Regression techniques (VAR) concern most 
of the times very specific fiscal shocks in terms of 
composition, and always consider temporary fiscal 
shocks – which are not purely temporary in that 
fiscal variables have an autoregressive component, 
while model-based evaluations like evaluations 
based on Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) models can vary in this respect from 
purely temporary measures to fully permanent so 
that comparisons are not always correct. 
Given the relevance of fiscal multipliers in the 
discussion concerning consolidation it is however 
useful to provide an overview of existing results, 
in particular in the two main areas of the literature 
which study effects of fiscal shocks. 
2.1. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON FISCAL 
MULTIPLIERS ESTIMATED BY NEW 
KEYNESIAN DSGE MODELS  
The concept of fiscal multiplier is due to 
traditional Keynesian macroeconomic analysis, 
where it indicates the reaction of output to a 
change in government spending. More precisely, 
the output multiplier is defined as the ratio 
between the change in the level of output and the 
exogenous change in the relevant fiscal variable. 
However, in practice fiscal shocks have some 
degree of persistence, which affects the response 
of output to such shocks. Therefore, the literature 
often refers to the concept of "cumulative 
multiplier", especially with VARs. (
74
)  
In this framework, consumption and investment 
depend on current income. In presence of nominal 
rigidities and a low rate of resource utilisation an 
increase in government spending increases 
aggregate demand and output. In basic Keynesian 
economics the key parameter in estimating the 
fiscal multiplier is the "marginal propensity to 
consume" which measures the fraction of current 
income that is consumed rather than saved. 
Subsequent developments in economic theory, 
from the Hicksian IS/LM version of the multipliers 
via its Mundell-Flemig extension to open 
economies, the re-discovery by Barro of the so-
called Ricardian effects and through to the most 
recent New Keynesian developments have shown 
that the marginal propensity to consume is only 
one of the relevant parameters affecting the value 
of the multipliers.  
According to modern theory – mainly modelled 
via DSGE models – there are different factors that 
affect the multipliers. These can be grouped as 
follows: i) factors that force consumers to base 
consumption choices on current revenues only, 
such as financial frictions; ii) factors concerning 
the nature of the fiscal shock, in particular the 
credibility of the shock and/or its permanent or 
temporary nature; iii) the composition of the fiscal 
shock; iv) structural features of the economy, like 
the presence of nominal or real rigidities; v) the 
size of automatic stabilizers; vi) the type of 
monetary policy, and vii) the exchange rate regime 
and the degree of openness of the economy. In 
most of these models responses to shocks are 
symmetric, for which the discussion of the effects 
of expensionaly fiscal shocks is equivalent to that 
of fiscal consolidations with the reverse sign. 
However, it is likely that responses to fiscal shocks 
are not symmetric depending on the economic 
situation or the state of public finances. In this 
connection, the size of fiscal multipliers could also 
be conditioned by the initial level of public debt. 
Thus, fiscal expansions with high public debt 
levels could have more limited effects (or even 
                                                          
(74) The cumulative multiplier is defined as the cumulative 
response of output at a given point in time relative to the 
cumulative fiscal shock at the same point.  
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negative) on output as agents might discount a 
fiscal tightening in the future.   
The first two factors in the list act on the fiscal 
multiplier with the same economic mechanism 
based on the influence that expectations of future 
income have on current consumption decisions.  If 
economic agents are forward-looking and make 
their decisions on the basis of permanent income, 
an increase in the government deficit induces a 
negative wealth effect on households, as 
households expect a corresponding future tax 
increases and thus future surpluses. This reduces 
consumption and increases labour supply, which 
tends to reduce real wages and consumption 
further. This decline in private demand offsets 
most of the increased public demand, causing 
output to increase by less than the increase in 
government consumption (see Hall (2009) and 
Woodford (2011)). In this framework, the 
consumption and investment multipliers are 
negative and the output spending multiplier is 
lower than one, even if its value depends on the 
relative increase in the labour supply relative to the 
fall in consumption.  
Baxter and King (1993) show that a model in 
which a large (permanent) stimulus causes a large 
wealth effect and a large increase in labour supply 
can have a spending multiplier near to one as the 
consequent boom in the marginal product of 
capital and investment compensates for the effect 
on consumption. However, in general, Real 
Business Cycle (RBC) models in which prices are 
flexible and competition is perfect indicate that the 
effects of fiscal policy on output pass mainly via 
supply effects and generate small spending 
multipliers which very often are below 0.5. 
The capacity of households to make consumption 
choices on the basis of their permanent income is 
the divider between Keynesian theory and modern 
theory. This idea, which was introduced in DSGE 
models in Galì et al. (2007) and dates back to 
Campbell and Mankiw (1998) and Mankiw (2000), 
is meant to reintroduce some Keynesian features in 
consumption behaviour, in line with observed 
empirical patterns of the relation between current 
income and current consumption and of (at least 
some) consumption increase in response to an 
increase in government spending. Consumers 
make choices on the basis of current income either 
because of less-than-perfect rationality or because 
they are financially constrained in the sense that 
they cannot get credit for their present 
consumption which would be reimbursed with 
future incomes. 
The introduction of this type of consumers along 
with perfectly rational consumers, together with 
other features which will be discussed below, 
constitute the basis for the current mainstream 
theory, a synthesis between RBC and Keynesian 
models defined as "New Keynesian" models. 
According to the meta-analysis of Leeper et al. 
(2011) the fraction of non-savers is the single most 
relevant parameter in influencing the size of the 
impact spending multipliers – except for the 
monetary policy regime. Such a fraction explains 
19% of the size of the multipliers on impact and 
13% of the first-year multiplier. To give an order 
of magnitude, the QUEST model shows increased 
impacts on multipliers for temporary fiscal shocks 
done with measures that concern consumers which 
are of this order of magnitude or larger. For 
example the multiplier of fiscal transfers and 
labour tax doubles from 0.2 to 0.4, while the first 
year multiplier of increases in government wages 
increases from 1.1 to 1.3 (see European 
Commission (2010b) and Roeger et al. (2010)). 
The second factor that influences the multiplier, 
concerns the temporary (or credible) nature of the 
fiscal shock. A permanent fiscal expansion has a 
much larger size than a temporary shock, and 
therefore a larger negative wealth effect on 
consumers that are Ricardian and/or base their 
consumption decisions on their permanent income. 
This depresses consumption more and, as a 
consequence, decreases the fiscal multiplier.  The 
same mechanism holds if fiscal measures are 
credible: in that case Ricardian agents know that 
the measures taken by the government have a 
permanent effect and therefore the multiplier is 
decreased via the mechanism just explained This 
factor has a very large impact on the value of 
multipliers: for example in QUEST the multiplier 
of a balanced (in terms of composition) permanent 
fiscal stimulus is 0.3/0.4 but can increase to 0.7/0.8  
if the measures taken are non-credible or 
temporary. 
The composition of the fiscal shock (be it 
consolidation or stimulus) is the major factor 
concerning the size of the fiscal multiplier, so that 
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many economists consider there to not be just one, 
but a many fiscal multipliers. In general, 
government spending multipliers are found to be 
different from tax ones. That is the reason why in 
spite of fiscal packages usually target both sides of 
the budget, they are assessed separately. 
Multipliers vary also when one takes into account 
the future ways of financing an expansion, which 
becomes less relevant in the case of a permanent 
consolidation. Coenen et al. (2012) compare 
results from the DSGE models used in six 
institutions and show that in general larger impact 
and first-year multipliers are found with spending 
measures (except for general transfers); this is 
particularly the case with government expenditure, 
which has a first-year multiplier above unity if 
measures are temporary. Tax and transfer 
multipliers have a smaller short-term impact, 
unless targeted at financially constrained 
households. Thus first-year multipliers for a 
permanent consolidation estimated from QUEST 
(European Commission (2010b) and Roeger et al. 
(2010) are 1 for government wages and 
government investments, 0.5 for government 
purchases and below 0.4 for transfers and taxes. 
Most analyses propose values for (temporary) 
government purchases first year or impact 
multipliers. The multipliers based on government 
purchases have the highest value. Thus the 
multiplier of 1.6 proposed by Romer and Bernstein 
(2009) and the multipliers analysed in the meta-
analysis by Leeper et al. quoted in this Subsection, 
- which consider environments in which monetary 
policy is accommodative (
75
) – all refer to 
multipliers for government purchases. This is the 
case for the values below 0.7 proposed by Cogan 
et al. (2010) and for the values oscillating between 
0.5 for Germany and 1.1 for the US in Barrel et al. 
(2012). Tax and transfer multipliers for EU 
countries are all below 0.4. The corresponding 
multiplier for temporary government expenditure 
shocks in QUEST is 0.8 which increases to 1.2 if 
monetary policy is at the zero lower bound. (
76
)   
It is worth noting, however, that taxes and 
expenditures imply also very different long-term 
                                                          
(75) Accommodative monetary policy is a monetary policy that 
decreases real interest rates.  
(76) This range can be compared to values for government 
investment multipliers presented in Coenen et al. (2012) 
which proposes a range of 0.9 and 1.3 or 1.1 to 2.2 
depending on the model discussed. 
multipliers, with a negative and increasing impact 
on output from cuts in government investment, an 
increase in corporate tax and long-term positive 
impact on GDP from cuts in government transfers 
and purchases, and increases in housing taxes 
(European Commission (2010b)). QUEST results 
(
77
) show that fiscal consolidations generally 
involve a fundamental trade-off between short-run 
pain and long-run gain. The pain arises from the 
negative multiplier effects of lower spending or 
higher taxes, while the gain stems from the lower 
world interest rates and lower distortionary taxes 
associated with lower debt levels. The results on 
both pain and gain are subject to important 
qualifications such as the design of a fiscal 
package; if the tightening is well designed with 
favourable long-run incentives for investment and 
labour supply, then the short-term pain only arises 
in the presence of an initial lack of credibility and 
only lasts for the non-credibility period. If, on the 
other hand, the fiscal tightening is badly designed 
– for example sharply raising taxes on income or 
cutting essential government investment – the long 
run gain could be much lower or even non-
existent, as higher distortions and/or productivity 
losses offset the gains from lower real interest 
rates.  
These effects also depend on monetary policy. 
However in general it is preferable to use all 
instruments: Forni, Gerali, Pisani (2010) simulate a 
monetary union DSGE model of the euro area and 
analyse the macroeconomic and welfare effects of 
alternative fiscal consolidation strategies. They 
show that a significant debt-to-GDP ratio reduction 
obtained by reducing both expenditure and taxes 
can be welfare improving.  
The presence of real frictions like the presence of 
investment adjustment costs and constraints to 
adapt capacity utilisation, which is common to 
RBC and new Keynesian models and was 
introduced by Burnside et al. (2004), reduce 
multipliers because the presence of those frictions 
slows the reaction of firms to changes in interest 
rates because of the costs they entail (see also 
(Monacelli and Perotti (2008)). According to 
Leeper et al. (2011) the quantitative impact of the 
presence of frictions is reduced.  
                                                          
(77) This is the case for most DSGE models see for example 
Clinton et al. (2010). 
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On the contrary the presence of nominal rigidities 
like price (
78
) or wage rigidities, characteristic of 
new Keynesian models, allows them to stress – 
together with the presence of financially 
constrained consumers – the relevance of 
aggregate demand. In a model with monopolistic 
competition, Woodford (2011) shows that the 
presence of either of these rigidities increases 
multipliers. Price rigidities increase multipliers 
because firms respond to increases in aggregate 
demand not by increasing prices but rather 
increasing output. Leeper et al. (2011) show that 
price rigidities increase first-year multipliers by six 
percentage points. This is not a very large amount, 
but the effect remains in the long-term multipliers. 
The presence of wage stickiness, which clearly 
refers to Keynes' traditional argument, has similar 
effects because the real wage may remain constant, 
or even fall, while average labour productivity 
increases. It is important to notice that if fiscal 
policy does not raise inflation expectations but 
lowers them, the sticky prices assumption worsens 
the impact on output and labour, because it 
prevents prices from falling and the mark-up from 
rising, lowering labour demand and output (see 
Linnenmann and Schabert (2003)).  
The role of monetary policy, via the impact on real 
interest rates is, in the context of the new 
Keynesian models, the most important factor 
determining the size of government spending 
multipliers. In the Hicksian IS/LM version of the 
Keynesian approach, spending multipliers are 
smaller the stronger the reaction of interest rates, 
as a strong increase in interest rates crowds out 
investments. Therefore situations in which interest 
rates do not increase with the increase in expected 
inflation generated by fiscal stimulus, like the 
liquidity trap characterising depressed economic 
environments show large spending multipliers. 
This feature is very relevant in new Keynesian 
DSGE models such as described in Woodford 
(2011), as the stance of monetary policy influences 
the size of the multipliers: the more 
accommodative monetary policy is, the smaller the 
real interest rates and as a consequence the larger 
the multipliers induced by the same fiscally-
generated increase in demand and inflation. Leeper 
et al. (2011) show that the parameter which 
represents the reaction of interest rates to expected 
                                                          
(78) This assumption goes together with the assumption of the 
existence of monopolistic power in the product market. 
inflation in the Taylor rule is particularly 
important, accounting for about 10 percent of 
impact multipliers. This effect is magnified in 
situations which can be described as near to the 
Keynesian liquidity trap, in which the nominal 
interest rate remains at zero (the so-called "zero 
lower bound" condition). Christiano, et al. (2011) 
show that in a fairly standard DSGE model, the 
multipliers are higher the larger the percentage of 
spending implemented under this condition, with 
peak multipliers that can be larger than two if 
fiscal action is taken in periods w the economy is 
in liquidity trap and such a liquidity trap condition 
holds for three years, with values much above one 
– the fairly standard multiplier for temporary 
increase in government expenditures in normal 
times. This result is consistent with the meta- 
analysis in Leeper et al. (2011) which indicates 
that under the regime with passive monetary policy 
and active fiscal policy one-year spending 
multipliers can be high, at 1.5-1.6. (
79
) To give a 
further idea of the order of magnitude, Table 
III.6.1 in European Commission (2010a) shows 
that, depending on the composition of the fiscal 
stimulus, multipliers increase by 30 to 50% under 
monetary accommodation. All six DSGE models 
analyzed in Coenen et al. (2012) show effects of 
the same size. 
The final aspect to be considered concerns the 
external side of the economy. This has two 
aspects: first the degree of openness of the 
economy, and second the exchange rate regime 
coupled with freedom of capital movements. In the 
Mundell-Fleming extension to open economies, 
the fixed exchange rate regime magnifies the fiscal 
multiplier in presence of capital mobility because 
of the monetary accommodation necessary to keep 
the exchange rate at parity. Erceg and Lindé 
(2012a) study the relative efficiency of spending 
versus tax instruments in monetary unions and 
show that multipliers of spending-based 
consolidations are smaller than multipliers of tax-
based consolidations if monetary policy is at the 
zero lower bound. However, the reverse holds for a 
small member of a currency union, or if the other 
                                                          
(79) The values of 0.8 for QUEST given above and 1.6 are not 
directly comparable because of different assumptions on 
credibility and on the composition of the consolidation, but 
represent the relevant range of values that can be supported 
by existing models. The comparable QUEST multiplier is 
1.2. 
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members of the currency union are consolidating 
and monetary policy is in a liquidity trap.  
Finally, a high degree of openness of the economy 
reduces the multipliers in that a fiscal expansion's 
effect on aggregate demand is limited as part of the 
effects of the fiscal shock leaks abroad via 
increased imports and reduced exports. Thus an 
open economy has smaller multipliers. Corsetti 
and Mueller (2012a) stress the existence of cross-
border effects of national fiscal policy on foreign 
demand via an interest rate channel and show that 
in presence of large contagion effects on risk 
premia, multipliers can be sizably reduced. 
2.2. VAR-BASED FISCAL MULTIPLIERS IN THE 
LITERATURE 
An increasing number of empirical studies 
assessing the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
shocks was produced in the last decade. The 
studies are very different in nature, sample and 
techniques used, so that they cannot be compared. 
The main differences concern i) the choice to have 
panel or individual estimates and ii) the type of 
technique used. The first choice needs an 
assumption on whether (at least some of) the 
crucial parameter of interest are equal across 
countries composing the panel and trades off the 
disadvantages from this restriction again the 
advantages coming from the possibility of making 
more precise estimates thanks to the different 
experience of the different countries which can 
reduce the problems raising from the absence of 
long enough data series. The second choice is 
based on the evaluation of which methodology is 
preferable to solve the identification issue which 
bias the estimate of the multipliers and is raised by 
the contemporaneous reciprocal effects of fiscal 
policy on growth and of growth on fiscal policy 
outcomes. The choice of the technique relies upon 
the availability of data and of proper instrumental 
variables. The present Chapter presents separately 
estimates based on single country VAR 
techniques. 
The effects of government expenditure shocks 
in the VAR literature on individual countries  
The last decade has seen a large increase in the 
number of studies assessing the macroeconomic 
effects of fiscal shocks using VAR techniques. 
While the most prominent papers have focused on 
the U.S., there has also been a growing body of 
evidence on other countries, especially European 
Union ones. The literature typically finds short-
term (usually 1-year) multipliers to be somewhat 
below 1 in the case of the United States, whereas 
for European countries cumulative multipliers (
80
) 
over the same horizon are usually found to be 
above unity. (
81
)  
From a theoretical point of view, the sign and 
magnitude of the impact of discretionary fiscal 
policy on aggregate demand depends on many 
conflicting factors, as shown above, which can 
lead to opposite conclusions. 
Government spending multipliers are therefore not 
structural constants as they depend heavily on a 
number of structural features as well as on cyclical 
factors. Thus, as fiscal multipliers depend on the 
responses of endogenous economic variables to 
fiscal shocks, they are expected to vary over time.     
Empirically, estimated multipliers also depend on 
the methodology used to derive responses of 
economic activity to fiscal shocks. In general, 
VAR multipliers are usually found to be higher 
than RBC or even DSGE models. The response of 
private consumption is key. While private 
consumption is usually found to decrease in RBC 
models as a result of the negative wealth effect, 
empirical evidence in VAR studies usually shows 
positive responses of this variable in response to 
higher public spending.  
One criticism often levied at the VAR literature, is 
that VAR models cannot properly account for the 
fact that changes in government spending and 
taxes can be anticipated due to legislative and 
implementation lags (Leeper, et al. (2008)) 
because in this case the effects of the fiscal shock 
would appear in the economy as from the moment 
agents anticipate the government decisions. If 
agents are forward looking Structural VAR 
                                                          
(80) The cumulative multiplier at a given period is obtained as 
the ratio of the cumulative response of GDP and the 
cumulative response of government expenditure. They are 
especially accurate to correct for the persistence of fiscal 
shocks. 
(81) Other literature reviews come to the opposite conclusion, 
namely that fiscal multipliers in the US are somewhat more 
sizeable than in Europe due to automatic stabilizers playing 
a larger role in Europe. This conclusion is affected by 
studies used in the comparison. 
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(SVAR) models may fail to correctly estimate 
fiscal shocks, thereby leading to biased estimates 
of their effects and in particular of fiscal 
multipliers. This is the so-called "fiscal foresight 
problem". The debate on this issue is open in that 
if Ramey (2011) finds that fiscal foresight is a 
relevant issue inducing a bias on estimates of fiscal 
multipliers contrary to the previous findings of 
Perotti (2004,) Bouakez et al. (2010) show that 
Ramey's results are most likely driven by the data 
points relative to the Korean War episode only and 
should thus be not considered of a general 
relevance. (
82
) 
Four basic approaches to identify fiscal shocks in 
VARs can be distinguished (Perotti, (2004);) (1) 
the identification of fiscal policy shocks by using 
dummy variables that capture specific episodes 
(event approach) such as the military build-ups 
(Burnside et al., 2000; Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; 
Edelberg et al., (1999)); (2) the imposition of sign 
restrictions on the impulse response functions 
(Mountford and Uhlig, (2009)); (3) the 
identification of fiscal shocks based on a Cholesky 
ordering (Fatás and Mihov, (2001)); (4) and 
finally, the identification of fiscal policy shocks by 
exploiting decision lags in policy making and 
information about the elasticity of fiscal variables 
to economic activity (Blanchard and Perotti, 
(2002) and Perotti, (2004)). 
Table III.2.1 summarizes some of the available 
empirical evidence in the literature on fiscal 
multipliers to government expenditure shocks. 
Most of the available empirical estimates of fiscal 
multipliers refer to the United States, with the 
different estimates being far from conclusive in 
view of the marked differences across 
specifications and methodologies. Short-term 
multipliers, typically one-year, usually rank 
between 0.4 and 1; for longer horizons the 
dispersion is even larger. Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) find that expansionary fiscal shocks 
increase GDP. Their results imply a cumulative 
                                                          
(82) Technically, while Ramey (2011) provides evidence that 
SVAR-based innovations in the US as identified in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) can be anticipated and 
Granger-caused by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) war 
episodes. However, Perotti (2004) finds little evidence that 
SVAR-based innovations are predictable. In turn, Bouakez 
et al. (2010) show that, the fiscal foresight problem is not 
severe enough to preclude the use of SVAR innovations as 
correct measures of unanticipated fiscal shocks as Ramey's 
results are driven by the Korean War episode. 
multiplier to shocks to direct expenditure of 
around 0.5 at the 4th and 12th quarters.  
Building on this methodology Perotti (2004) also 
includes the GDP and the interest rate as 
endogenous variables and observes even lower 
multipliers for the sample between 1980 and 2001.   
By contrast the results in Galí et al. (2007) and 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) imply a significantly 
larger cumulative multiplier of government 
spending, which amounts to above one after one 
year. 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) use a different 
methodology that consists in imposing sign 
restrictions to impulse responses. In this case, their 
1-year multiplier also stands close to 0.5, although 
it decreases quickly thereafter and eventually 
becomes negative. 
In turn, Ramey (2011) criticizes standard VAR 
identification methods for not accounting for the 
timing of the news and consequently the 
anticipation effects of economic agents to fiscal 
news. She uses a narrative method to construct 
richer government spending news variables from 
1939 to 2008 and obtains short-term government 
spending multipliers ranging from 0.6 to 1.2, 
within range of previous estimates. 
Despite the evidence being scanter than in the case 
of the US, the last years have witnessed an 
increasing amount of empirical studies with further 
evidence of multipliers for different countries. For 
Germany, Perotti (2004), Heppke-Falk et al. 
(2006) and Baum and Koester (2011) estimate 1-
year cumulative multipliers ranging between and 
0.7. These multipliers are observed to increase 
somewhat during the second year after the shock, 
although showing somewhat larger discrepancies. 
However, the Threshold VAR estimates in Baum 
and Koester (2011) observe higher spending 
multipliers in low growth regimes, whereas in 
good times multipliers are lower and seem to 
behave more linearly. 
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Much higher multipliers are obtained by Biau and 
Girard (2005) in the case of France. Relying on the 
Blanchard-Perotti identifying methodology, they 
gauge cumulative multipliers of government 
spending close to 2 at the 4th quarter, dreceasing 
only gradually thereafter and amounting to around 
1.5 three years after the initial shock. (
83
) 
Significantly higher than one multipliers are also 
observed by Giordano et al. (2007) for Italy, 
although they focus only on purchases of goods 
and services.  
                                                          
(83) It is to be noted however that French quarterly data for 
fiscal policy variables only have been computed recently. 
Older data are thus constructed using interpolation 
techniques. The replication of the Biau and Girard exercise 
made by the Commission with data until 2010 (but notice 
that series used may be different) gives insignificant values 
of the multipliers. 
In the case of Spain, either with a Cholesky 
decomposition or with the Blanchard-Perotti 
identification strategy direct government 
expenditure short-term multipliers are estimated at 
around 1 or above  after one and two years, while 
after three years.they diminish and range between 
0.6 and 1 (see De Castro (2006), De Castro and 
Hernández de Cos (2008) or De Castro and 
Fernández (2011)).  
For Portugal the IMF (2005) also relies on the 
Blanchard-Perotti approach and also obtain, one-
year spending multipliers above unity, remaining 
above this level for almost three years. These 
estimates are close to those observed for Spain.  
The existing evidence for the United Kingdom 
contrasts however with that for other countries, 
 
Table III.2.1: Expenditure VAR-based multipliers 
Studies Sample Short-term multiplier[1] Medium-term Multiplier [2] Identification strategy[3]
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) US (1947:1-1997:4) -0.69 0.5[4]
Decision lags in policy 
making and imposition of 
contemporaneous GDP 
elasticities
US (1960:1-1979:4) 1.29 1.4
US (1980:1-2001:4) 0.36 0.28
Galí et al. (2007) US (1954:1-2003:4) 0.7 1.74 Cholesky decomposition
Ramey (2011) US (1939:1-2008:4) 0.6 to 1.2 No estimate Narrative approach
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) US (1955:1-2000:4) 0.65
[5]
; 0.46; 0.28
[6] -0.22
Sign restrictions on impulse 
responses
Fatas and Mihov (2001) US (1960:1 - 1996:4) Similar to Galí et al. (2007) Similar to Galí et al.(2007) Cholesky decomposition
Perotti (2004) Germany (1960:1-1974:4) 0.36 0.28 Blanchard-Perotti
Germany (1975:1-1989:4)
Heppke - Falk et al. (2006) Germany (1974:1-2004:4) 0.62 1.27 Blanchard-Perotti
Baum and Koester (2011) Germany (1976:1-2009:4) 0.7 0.69
Blanchard-Perotti and 
Threshold VAR
Benassy-Quere and Cimadomo 
(2006)
Germany (1971:1-2004:4) 0.23 -0.23
FVAR and Blanchard-
Perotti
Biau and Girard (2005) France (1978:1-2003:4) 1.9 1.5 Blanchard-Perotti
Giordano et al. (2007) Italy (1982:1-2004:4) 1.2 1.7 Blanchard-Perotti
De Castro (2006) Spain (1980:1-2001:2) 1.14-1.54 0.58-1.04 Cholesky decomposition
De Castro and Hernández de 
Cos (2008)
Spain (1980:1-2004:4) 1.3 1 Blanchard-Perotti
De Castro and Fernández 
(2011)
Spain (1981:1-2008:4) 0.94 0.55 Blanchard-Perotti
IMF (2005) Portugal (1995:3-2004:4) 1.32 1.07 Blanchard-Perotti
Perotti (2004) UK (1963:1-1979:4) 0.48 0.27 Blanchard-Perotti
UK (1980:1-2001:2) -0.27 -0.6
Benassy-Quere and Cimadomo 
(2006)
UK (1971:1-2004:4) 0.12 -0.3
FVAR and Blanchard-
Perotti
Burriel et al. (2010) Euro Area (1981:1-2007:4) 0.87 0.85 Blanchard-Perotti
Perotti (2004) Blanchard-Perotti
 
(1) We define "short-term" as a time gap ranging from simultaneous effects to one year distance from the fiscal shock.  
(2) By medium-run is broadly intended a period going from 1 to 3 years after the time fiscal shock took place.  
(3)  Perotti (2004) distinguished four basic approaches in the literature to identify fiscal shocks in VAR: 1. Setting a dummy variable accounting for 
specific episodes such as wars; 2. Imposing sign restrictions on IRFs (pioneered in an "agnostic" way by Uhlig 2005); 3. Exploiting Choleski ordering; 
4. Considering decision lags in policy making and fiscal variables' elasticity to economic activity (narrative). 
(4) Cumulative multiplier between the 4th and 8th quarter.  
(5) Impact multiplier. 
(6)  These two numbers are referred to expenditure multiplier respectively at the 4th and 8th quarters. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
126 
where spending multipliers are usually found to be 
very low, usually non-significant (see Bénassy-
Quéré and Cimadomo, (2006)) and sometimes 
even negative (Perotti (2004)). 
Also with the Blanchard-Perotti identification 
methodology, Burriel et al. (2010) for the euro area 
as a whole obtain multipliers below, although close 
to unity in the short term, while after 3 years it 
shrinks to some 0.6. These estimates fall within 
range of previous empirical evidence for other 
European countries as well as for the available 
evidence for the US. Burriel et al. (2010) also find 
that fiscal multipliers are higher for public 
investment shocks and in times of fiscal stress. 
The effects of tax shocks in the VAR literature 
on individual countries  
As in the case of government expenditure shocks, 
the bulk of the available empirical evidence on tax 
multipliers refers to the United States. Results are 
not conclusive as even differences in the sign of 
multipliers are observed. In any case, most of the 
empirical estimates reveal that tax shocks usually 
entail lower effects on GDP than public 
expenditure. Table III.2.2 summarizes some of the 
available empirical evidence. 
The results in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) imply 
tax multipliers ranging between -0.7 and -1.3 for 
the first two years and somewhat lower in absolute 
value for the third one. It is worth mentioning that 
these are not cumulative multipliers; they are 
estimated with respect to the size of the initial 
shock.  
Favero and Giavazzi (2007) allow for impose the 
fulfillment of the government borrowing constraint 
in the VAR specification and obtain positive (non-
cumulative) multipliers to an increase of taxes for 
the sample 1980-2006. The increase of output in 
response to a tax increase is rather counterintuitive, 
although this result is also observed in other 
studies and for other countries. 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), with their 
methodology consisting in imposing sign 
restrictions, obtain (non-cumulative) multipliers 
that amount to around 2 or even above after two 
years after a negative revenue shock.  
 
Table III.2.2: Tax VAR-based multipliers (To an increase in net taxes) 
Studies Sample Short-term multiplier Medium-term multiplier Identification strategy
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) US (1947:1-1997:4) Within range -0.7 and -1.3 Within range -0.4 and -1.3
Decision lags in policy 
making and imposition 
of contemporaneous 
GDP elasticities
US (1960:1-1979:4) -1.41 -23.87
US (1980:1-2001:4) 0.7 1.55
Favero and Giavazzi (2007) US (1980:1-2006:4) 0.29 0.65 Narrative approach
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) US (1955:1-2000:4) -0.16 -2.35
Sign restrictions on 
impulse responses
Romer and Romer (2010) US (1945:1-2007:4) -3 Narrative approach
Germany (1960:1-1974:4) 0.29 -0.05
Germany (1975:1-1989:4) -0.04 0.59
Baum and Koester (2011) Germany (1976:1-2009:4) -0.66 -0.53
Blanchard-Perotti and 
TVAR
Benassy-Quere and Cimadomo 
(2006)
Germany (1971:1-2004:4) -1.17 -1.08
FVAR and Blanchard-
Perotti
Biau and Girard (2005) France (1978:1-2003:4) -0.5 -0.8 Blanchard-Perotti
Giordano et al. (2007) Italy (1982:1-2004:4) 0.16 Blanchard-Perotti
De Castro (2006) Spain (1980:1-2001:2) 0.05 0.39 Cholesky decomposition
Afonso and Sousa (2009) Portugal (1979:1-2007:4) + + Blanchard-Perotti
UK (1963:1-1979:4) -0.23 -0.21
UK (1980:1-2001:2) 0.43 0.7
Benassy-Quere and Cimadomo 
(2006)
UK (1971:1-2004:4) -0.23 -0.07
FVAR and Blanchard-
Perotti
Cloyne (2011) UK (1945-2010) Between -0.5 and -1.0 -2.5 Narrative approach
Burriel et al. (2010) Euro Area (1981-2007) -0.63 -0.49 Blanchard-Perotti
Perotti (2004) Blanchard-Perotti
Perotti (2004) Blanchard-Perotti
Perotti (2004) Blanchard-Perotti
 
Source: Commission services. 
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Romer and Romer (2010) employ a narrative 
approach for the US post-World War II period and 
find very high negative tax multipliers, of almost -
3% over the next three years following the shock. 
This contrasts significantly with the lower 
multipliers calculated on the basis of tax shocks 
identified within VARs with the Blanchard-Perotti 
methodology. Favero and Giavazzi (2010) argue 
that such difference is not explained by a 
difference in the shocks (VAR versus narrative) 
but by the different models used to estimate their 
effects on macro variables. They show that when 
the effects of shocks identified by the narrative 
method are analysed in the context of a 
multivariate VAR (rather than using a limited 
information, single-equation approach), multipliers 
with both methodologies turn out to be rather 
similar and are estimated at about unity.  
For Germany, Perotti (2004) estimates cumulative 
multipliers to net tax cuts of around -0.6. As in 
other cases, the reduction of output in response to a 
tax cut after three years is rather counterintuitive. 
In turn, in Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) output is 
barely affected by net tax shocks. By contrast, 
Baum and Koester (2011), with their linear 
specification, estimate a multiplier of -0.66 after 
one year. In their TVAR estimates they do not 
obtain significant evidence of non-linearities.  
In the case of France (Biau and Girard (2005) very 
low, non-significant tax multipliers are found, 
whereas for Italy (Giordano et al. (2007)), Spain 
(De Castro (2006)) or Portugal (Afonso and Sousa 
(2009)(
84
) some counterintuitive results are 
observed, with higher net taxes yielding positive 
short-term output responses.  
Bénassy-Quéré and Cimadomo, (2006) for the 
United Kingdom also obtain very low one-year 
multipliers, of some 0.2, whereas  Perotti (2004) 
also estimates negative multipliers in response to 
tax cuts, as observed in other cases.  
                                                          
(84) They argue that increases in taxes can raise private 
consumption in the case of fiscal consolidations if it moves 
the economy from an unsustainable fiscal path to a 
sustainable one (Giavazzi et al., (2000)). In addition, the 
effect of a tax shock on output depends on whether it is 
motivated by the government's desire to stabilize the debt, 
or is unrelated to the stance of fiscal policy (Romer and 
Romer, (2007)). 
By contrast, Cloyne (2011) identifies fiscal shocks 
with a narrative approach à la Romer and Romer. 
He argues that the estimated output elasticities of 
net taxes in the Blanchard-Perotti method, in 
addition to automatic responses to output changes, 
would also be capturing any legislated changes in 
policy which are contemporaneously correlated 
with output. He finds impact multipliers to 
negative tax shocks between 0.5 and 1 per cent, 
depending on the model specification, which rise 
to around 2.5 per cent after 10-12 quarters.  
Regarding the euro area as a whole, Burriel et al. 
(2010) gauge net-tax multipliers between -0.6 and 
-0.5 for the first three years.  
2.3. VAR ESTIMATES OF OUTPUT MULTIPLIERS 
TO GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS 
In order to provide further evidence on the effects 
of government spending shocks and output 
multipliers thereof, VARs for Germany, Italy and 
Spain are estimated. The focus on these three euro 
area cases is motivated by the availability of 
quarterly fiscal data to carry out the estimations. In 
fact, quarterly datasets used in previous empirical 
studies are employed: in the case of Germany the 
quarterly dataset in Heppke-Falk et al. (2006); (
85
) 
for Italy the dataset in Giordano et al. (2007); (
86
) 
in the case of Spain the new dataset recently 
compiled by De Castro et al. (2012). (
87
) The VAR 
estimations cover the period from 1985Q1 to 
2010Q4 in the cases of Germany and Italy and 
from 1986Q1 onwards in the case of Spain. (
88
)
 
 
The euro area as a whole is also dealt with. To 
estimate the relevant VAR models we made use of 
                                                          
(85) We thank Bernhard Manzke and Joern Tenhofen for 
proving us with an updated version of this dataset. 
(86) We thank Sandro Momigliano for an updated version 
thereof 
(87) This quarterly fiscal database for Spain is compiled for the 
period 1986Q1-2010Q4 and it is solely based on intra-
annual information, on the basis of multivariate, state-space 
mixed-frequencies models. The models are estimated with 
annual and quarterly national accounts data and 
government monthly cash accounts data. 
(88) VAR models were also estimated for France and the UK. 
However, they are not presented as responses were either 
rather counterintuitive or non-significant. For France, this 
can be due to the fact that existing quarterly data for fiscal 
variables in national accounts are derived from 
interpolation until very recently. Negative fiscal multipliers 
for the UK are also found in Perotti (2004). 
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the quarterly fiscal database for the euro area 
compiled by Paredes et al. (2009) (
89
) and 
employed in Burriel et al. (2010) and in Kirchner 
et al. (2010) to assess the macroeconomic effects 
of fiscal shocks in the EMU. As in previous cases, 
the VAR estimations cover the period from 
1985Q1 to 2010Q4.   
The estimated models include a measure of direct 
government spending (g) as the relevant fiscal 
variable. In the cases of Germany, Spain (
90
) and 
the euro area as a whole this variable is the sum of 
government purchases of goods and services, 
personnel expenditure and public investment made 
by the general government; for Italy the 
government expenditure variable used in the 
estimations is the sum of the two first components 
only, which turns out to be close to government 
consumption in the quarterly national accounts.  
The economic sentiment indicator (ESI) estimated 
by the European Commission is included as 
endogenous variable too. Its inclusion aims to 
address, at least in part, the "fiscal foresight 
problem" of VAR estimates. The remaining 
endogenous variables are GDP (gdp), the GDP 
deflator (p) to allow for price changes and a long-
term interest rate (r) (10 years). (
91
) Government 
spending and GDP enter in real terms in logs. The 
GDP deflator is the price index used to obtain real 
government expenditure. In the case of Germany a 
dummy to capture the effect of the unification has 
been included as an exogenous variable, given that 
government expenditure data show an upward 
swift in 1991. This variable turns out to be highly 
significant. A dummy for the last crisis period, 
since 2008Q1, has also been included as an 
exogenous variable when it turned out to be 
significant, especially in the case of Spain but also 
in the euro area as a whole. The purpose for its 
inclusion is to correct for a number of elements 
linked to the financial crisis that are not properly 
                                                          
(89) This quarterly fiscal database for the euro area is compiled 
for the period 1980Q1-2010Q4. As in the case of Spain, it 
is solely based on intra-annual information, on the basis of 
multivariate, state-space mixed-frequencies models. 
(90) For the purpose of the analysis in this Section the only 
variable from the quarterly fiscal database by De Castro et 
al. (2012) is public investment, as government 
consumption has been taken from the quarterly national 
accounts. 
(91) Alternative models including public debt as endogenous 
variable have been estimated to test the robustness of the 
results. The results did not differ significantly from those 
presented here though. 
accounted for by the endogenous variables. These 
elements include the sharp correction in residential 
investments after a protracted period of buoyant 
housing markets in a number of countries, the 
credit crunch following the financial crisis and 
sovereign debt crisis as a result of a lack of 
markets confidence on the ability by some euro 
area Member States to meet the service of their 
public debt.     
Government spending shocks are identified by 
using the Cholesky decomposition with the 
ordering (g, esi, gdp, p, r). This ordering assumes 
that public expenditure decisions are 
predetermined within the quarter and affect 
contemporaneously the remaining variables in the 
system. Hence, the identified government spending 
shocks are equivalent to Blanchard-Perotti ones.  
Graph III.2.1 shows the impulse responses to a 
government spending shock of the main variables 
for the countries under consideration. Government 
spending shocks display little persistence in the 
case of Germany and Italy, whereas they turn out 
to be fairly persistent in Spain and in the whole 
euro area where it is still significant after 12 
quarters. Confidence increases in all cases, 
possibly in view of the positive reaction of GDP in 
the short term. However, confidence worsens 
around three years after the initial shock, when the 
initial improvement in economic activity has faded 
away. In turn, interest rates rise some quarters after 
the initial shock except in Germany, where their 
response is broadly non-significant.  
The responses for the whole euro area largely 
follow this pattern. However, in this case the 
increase in confidence in response to the fiscal 
shock is not significant. On the other hand, 
although the euro area interest rate also rises, this 
response is more muted than in the cases of 
individual countries. Hence, the interest response 
loses significance and turns out to be significant 
only for some quarters around the second year 
after the shock.  
The impulse responses of government spending 
and GDP are used to estimate the cumulative 
output multipliers shown in Table III.2.3. The left 
panel presents the multipliers obtained with the 
sample covering until 2010, whereas the right 
panel displays the multipliers for the pre-crisis 
period. Estimated output multipliers for Germany 
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and Spain are very similar and stand around 1.2 
after one year for the sample covering until 2010. 
These values are broadly in line with previous 
empirical evidence. The estimated impact 
multiplier for Germany is somewhat below the 
estimate of 0.62 in Heppke-Falk et al. (2006), 
whereas the estimated value after one year appears 
largely comparable with their peak estimate of 
1.27 after 6 quarters. By contrast, the multiplier 
after one year is larger than the short-term linear 
multiplier of 0.7 reported by Baum and Koester 
(2011). For Spain these estimates are broadly in 
line with output multipliers around 1.3 in De 
Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008). By contrast, 
medium-term multipliers for both Germany and 
Spain in Table III.2.3 are higher than those 
reported by the aforementioned studies. 
Estimated cumulative output multipliers in Italy 
are significantly lower, always below unity. The 
Graph III.2.1: VAR responses to a government spending shock 
 
Source: Commission services. 
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peak is observed in the second year after the shock, 
when the cumulative multiplier amounts to 0.75, to 
decrease rapidly thereafter. These values are well 
below cumulative multipliers reported in Giordano 
et al. (2007). However, they are not directly 
comparable as multipliers reported by Giordano et 
all focus only on purchases of goods and services 
in that expenditure on wages and salaries does not 
lead to significant responses. On the other hand, it 
is worth recalling that multipliers for Italy are not 
fully comparable with those for Germany or Spain, 
as for these two countries public investment is also 
embedded in the government expenditure variable 
in the respective VAR models. Public investment 
is deemed to entail positive spill-overs on private 
GDP, for which shocks to this variable would be 
expected to yield higher multipliers than other 
spending components.  
In the case of the euro area, output multipliers 
amount to around to 1.4 one year after the shock 
and remain comfortably well above unity even 
there years after the initial shock. These contrast 
significantly with values obtained in Burriel et al. 
(2010), where cumulative multipliers are lower 
than those reported in Table III.2.3 regardless of 
the sample used. The reason for such a different 
could be that the specification in Burriel et al. 
(2010) includes net taxes, which rise endogenously 
to government spending shocks, thereby 
contributing to assuage the GDP response. By 
contrast, the specification adopted here does not 
allow for endogenous net tax responses, which are 
replaced by the economic sentiment indicator.    
The comparison between the estimates with the 
whole sample and for the pre-crisis period yields 
interesting results. In the case of Spain medium 
term multipliers seem to have increased with the 
crisis. This evidence would, in principle, be 
consistent with the hypothesis that insofar as the 
crisis has implied a sizeable increase of 
financially-constrained agents and a reduction of 
the used productive capacity it may have 
contributed to raise fiscal multipliers. However, in 
the case of Germany the opposite seems true, 
whereas in Italy however, the crisis does not seem 
to have had a significant impact on government 
spending multipliers. In the case of Germany, 
despite the sizeable fall of GDP in 2009, the 
unemployment rate has stood at historical lows. 
Therefore, the share of constrained economic 
agents, rather than increasing, might even have 
decreased, thereby contributing to moderate fiscal 
multipliers. While the results here might appear in 
some contradiction with those in Baum and 
Koester (2011), it is worth noticing that the 
difference between the multipliers in the two  
panels in Table III.2.3 cannot be taken as an 
indication of how multipliers in Germany behave 
in crisis periods; the two panels only reflect the 
influence of the last three years, where no especial 
liquidity constraints seem to have been present in 
Germany. 
The multipliers for the euro area as a whole are 
also higher for the sample covering until 2010 than 
with the sample ending in 2007. Arguably, this 
result could be consistent with the hypothesis that 
multipliers tend to increase in times of subdued 
economic growth or even when GDP contracts due 
to the rise in financially-constrained agents and 
when the economy approached to the lower zero 
bound. This result is consistent with the findings in 
Afonso et al. (2011), who find that the size of 
fiscal multipliers is higher than average in the last 
crisis. However, this statement must be qualified 
as for government spending multipliers, given their 
standard errors, the differences between both sets 
of estimations are not significant.  
 Accordingly, the evidence presented in this 
Section suggests that output multipliers to 
government expenditure shocks may be sizeable in 
 
Table III.2.3: Cumulative output multipliers to spending shocks 
1 4 8 12 1 4 8 12
Germany 0.38 1.19 1.78 1.49 0.71 1.99 3.08 3.4
Italy 0.1 0.34 0.75 0.22 0.11 0.43 0.84 0.5
Spain 0.3 1.15 1.79 1.49 0.58 1.35 1.55 0.98
Euro area 0.63 1.38 1.67 1.27 0.79 1.23 1.57 1.06
Sample until 2007Q4
Quarters Quarters
Sample until 2010Q4
 
Source: Commission services. 
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the three country cases examined, especially in 
Germany and Spain, as well as for the euro area as 
a whole where they stand above 1 in the short and 
medium term. This evidence appears broadly 
consistent with previous empirical evidence 
reported in Section III.2.2. 
The range of VAR-based short and medium term 
output multipliers to fiscal shocks is quite wide, 
with estimates depending on the sample period, 
country under scrutiny and the econometric 
specification employed. Notwithstanding this, 
some general conclusions can be drawn from both 
the estimates presented here and from the 
empirical literature. Despite their wide range, 
output multipliers to government expenditure 
shocks are sizeable, in many cases estimated at 
above one. In turn, net taxes appear to imply lower 
multipliers than public spending, although their 
effects in the medium term are deemed to be non-
negligible.  
While a proper assessment of fiscal multipliers is 
of high importance when adopting discretionary 
fiscal measures, this issue gains especial relevance 
in the coentex of the current crisis where most 
EU27 Member States are implementing sizeable 
fiscal consolidation packages simultaneously. 
According to the evidence on fiscal multipliers 
presented in this chapter, fiscal contractions are 
expected to weigh heavily on economic activity in 
the short term, with some of these effects 
displaying somewhat high degrees of persistence. 
These effects must be factored in, especially when 
designing the consolidation strategies with a view 
to minimise these negative effects.  
2.4. FISCAL MULTIPLIERS IN CRISIS PERIODS 
One of the main issues discussed within the 
context of the "self-defeating consolidations" 
debate is the non-linearity of the multipliers (see, 
among many, Parker (2012)), and specifically the 
fact that multipliers are expected to be larger in 
crisis periods.  
This argument is enshrined in the Keynesian 
tradition which proposes fiscal policy as an 
effective instrument to manage aggregate demand 
in periods in which there are underutilized 
production factors: high unemployment is 
expected to avoid wage upward pressure and, in 
these conditions, the increased demand for output 
would bring an increase in employment and 
consumption. The Keynesian tradition is thus 
inherently non-linear in that the effects of fiscal 
policy are different depending on the status of the 
economy. 
Modern theory in general does not give this 
channel a large weight, with the exception of 
Thomas (1995), which shows that, in situations in 
which firms have to invest under profits' 
uncertainty which they cannot hedge risks in the 
financial markets, employment level is sub-optimal 
and fiscal policy can be used to increase 
employment and welfare. The economy in a 
financial crisis, which is characterized by 
aggregate non-insurable uncertainty about 
expected aggregate demand and credit conditions, 
fits such a model characterized by incomplete 
markets. (
92
)  
However DSGE models - also of the new 
Keynesian type – follow a different line of 
argument and provide in general linear multipliers, 
which are functions of the various parameters 
discussed above. Assessing the value of multipliers 
in crisis situations, can mostly be done in an 
heuristic way, by assessing the value that 
reasonably can be taken by the crucial parameters 
in crisis times as opposed to the values that those 
parameters can take under normal circumstances.  
Three factors influencing the value of the 
multipliers in DSGE models can in principle be 
related to crisis. First channel is the traditional 
Keynesian presence of slack in the economy. This 
channel however, in presence of agents that take 
consumption decisions on the basis of their 
permanent income – and not only their present 
income as in the Keynesian tradition – has a very 
limited effect on the multipliers. More relevant 
quantitative impact on the multiplier, as shown 
above, comes from the percentage of agents which 
are rationed on the financial markets and from the 
fact that monetary policy is at the so-called zero 
lower bound i.e. in a situation akin to the 
Keynesian liquidity trap. 
                                                          
(92) The relevance of uninsurable uncertainty in depressing 
investments is corroborated, among many, by the empirical 
studies of Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2007.) 
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Even if DSGE models do not make endogenous 
the share of consumers that are liquidity 
constrained, it is a reasonable assumption that 
during crisis, especially crisis originated in the 
financial sector as the present one, the fraction of 
consumers that are financially constrained 
increases. As indicated in the review of the 
literature above, QUEST,(
93
) in line with the 
literature, indicates an increase of the impact 
multiplier by 20% on average in presence of 
financially constrained consumers, with higher 
value for fiscal measures impacting directly 
current revenues – like transfers to households - 
and smaller for other type of measures. (
94
) 
A second key factor of key relevance is the stance 
of monetary policy: the more accommodative 
monetary policy, the larger the multipliers, via the 
impact on real interest rates. Moreover Christiano, 
et al. (2011) show that multipliers are higher the 
larger the percentage of spending implemented 
under a liquidity trap, with peak multipliers that 
can be larger than two while Leeper et al. (2011) 
find one-year spending multipliers at 1.5-1.6. Also 
Table III.6.1 of European Commission (2010a) 
shows that the presence of monetary 
accommodation increases multipliers by 25% to 
30%. 
The main exceptions to linear models are 
constituted by Erceg and Lindé (2010) which build 
a new-Keynesian DSGE model showing that the 
duration of a liquidity trap is endogenous and is 
shorter the larger the fiscal stimulus provided by 
an increase in government spending. Given that 
multipliers are larger the longer the period in 
which the economy remains in the liquidity tap, in 
Erceg and Lindé the size of the multiplier is 
inversely related to spending levels. The second 
exception is Canzoneri et al. (2012), which build 
on the previous reasoning and introduce costly 
financial intermediation allowing financial 
frictions to vary counter-cyclically. The model can 
thus generate impact spending multipliers which 
are between two and three in recessions and 0.9 in 
expansions. Yearly cumulative multipliers are 
almost 1 and roughly two thirds respectively. It 
                                                          
(93) See European Commission (2010b), pg. 186. 
(94) The relevance of financial frictions in crisis period is also 
indirectly confirmed by Kollmann et al. (2012) and in't 
Veld and Roeger (2012), where it is shown the relevance of 
state support to banks in reducing risk premia and real 
interest rates. 
should be noticed that these results are obtained 
with persistence of government shock of 0.97. 
Interestingly the model mimics two fully 
Keynesian features: first, the "theorem of 
multiplier in balance" holds in that multipliers 
during recessions remain greater than one even if 
higher spending is financed through taxes; second, 
debt-financed multipliers are even higher (in 
recessions). 
Recent empirical analysis tends to find that 
multipliers are larger in crisis periods. Auerbach 
and Gorodnichenko (2010) using a smooth 
transition structural VAR (STVAR) methodology 
find peak values for spending multipliers of 1 and 
for tax multipliers of -1 in the US. When a 
distinction is made between expansions and 
recessions spending multipliers are found 
respectively around 0.6 and up to 2.5, while tax 
multipliers become smaller but still differentiated 
at -0.5 and -0.1 in recessions and expansions, 
respectively. Values can become very large in 
recessions depending on the proxies used for fiscal 
variables' expectations but the difference between 
expansion and recession remains. Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2011) use a panel of semiannual 
yearly observations for OECD data since 1985 to 
find the same result – but much lower multipliers – 
with a linear multiplier estimated at around 0.2, a 
recession multiplier between 0.4 and 0.7 and an 
expansion multiplier which is never significantly 
different from 0. IMF (2012) presents similar 
results using a threshold VAR for the large EU 
countries. 
A similar exercise is made in Caprioli and 
Momigliano (2011) which use a STVAR technique 
on a sample of quarterly data for Italy in 1982-
2011. They show that in recession the responses of 
private GDP are much larger than in expansions, 
with peak responses after six quarters of 0.13 in 
the linear model, 0.16 in expansions and 0.61 in 
recessions. 
Afonso et al. (2011) use similar techniques on data 
from a quarterly dataset for the period 1980:4-
2009:4 for the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Italy 
to estimate the differences in multipliers in high 
financial stress versus low financial stress regimes. 
They find that the responses of economic growth 
to a fiscal shock, defined in terms of changes in the 
debt ratio. are mostly positive (though in some 
cases very small) in both financial stress regimes, 
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but that 3-year multipliers can be twice as large as 
in high stress regime (0.7 versus 0.3 in Italy, 0.24 
versus 0.2 in the US, 0.2 versus 0.15 in the UK and 
0.4 versus 0.2 for Germany) so that they conclude 
that the size of the fiscal multipliers is higher than 
average in the last crisis. 
As mentioned before, Baum and Koester (2011) 
with a Threshold VAR show that public 
expenditure multipliers vary depending on the size 
of the shock, its sign and the level of the output 
gap. Hence, in low regimes or crisis periods they 
observe that the higher the size of the shock, the 
higher the spending multiplier when government 
expenditure increases. Hence, a government 
expenditure increase of 5% may lead to a 
multiplier of around 1.3, whereas when the 
spending increase only amounts to 2% the 
multiplier diminishes to around 1. In good times 
though multipliers are lower and seem to behave 
more linearly. 
Bouthevillain and Dufrenot (2011) estimate a 
Markov switching model on quarterly data on 
France for the period 1970:1-2009:4. (
95
) 
Increasing government expenditures is effective in 
raising GDP in recessions but not in expansions in 
expansions, and similarly for a decrease in 
government revenues. 
2.5. EFFECTS OF DEBT AND DEFICIT ON 
GOVERNMENT YIELD 
The other relevant factor that shapes the dynamics 
of the debt ratio following a consolidation is the 
response of apparent interest rates on sovereigns. 
The predictions of economic theory on the effects 
of fiscal policy variables on interest rates are not 
univocal. The traditional Keynesian analysis well 
represented by the IS/LM model stresses the role 
of deficit: an increase in deficit tends to increase 
government yields and consequently interest rates 
via demand pressure: the consequent increased 
demand for money pushes up interest rates – 
unless monetary policy reacts by increasing money 
supply as it is the case if the country wants to keep 
its exchange rate unchanged following the change 
                                                          
(95) True fiscal policy data at quarterly frequency are computed 
in France only for recent years. Data used in Bouthevillain 
and Dufrenot, as those used in the present Section are 
based on yearly time series interpolation by the OECD. 
in deficit. A similar argument holds for New 
Keynesian DSGE models, that incorporate a 
Taylor rule by which interest rates react positively 
to future inflation generated by the increased 
demand due to a deficit increase or a 
devaluation/depreciation of the currency. These 
models however refer to short-term interest rates, 
while the relevant rate for the economy is probably 
the long-term interest rate, which better reflects 
marginal productivity of capital.  
On top of reacting to short term interest rates and 
inflation expectations, long-term interest rates are 
influenced by debt levels via different channels. 
First, as stressed in Engen and Hubbard (2004) and 
Gale and Orszag (2004) growth theory shows that 
the debt level rather than the government deficit is 
the relevant fiscal variable that impact on long-
term interest rates. A higher government debt 
crowds out investments thus resulting in a lower 
capital stock. This at equilibrium implies higher 
real interest rates given decreasing marginal 
productivity of capital. A second channel which 
relates higher debt to increased long-term interest 
rates goes via risk premia (see Eaton and 
Fernandez (1995). Increased debt levels imply a 
higher probability of default which in turn implies 
higher risk premia and thus sovereign yields – 
even though this is necessarily also related to the 
assumption of lower expected future government 
deficits as pointed out in Manasse, Roubini and 
Schimmelpfennig (2003). Thus the main question 
to be faced by empirical researches is which fiscal 
variables to use for the analysis, whether deficit or 
debt. 
The existing empirical literature on the effects of 
fiscal variables on sovereign yields can be 
categorized in two groups. A first group of papers 
estimates how fiscal policy variables influence the 
level of long-term interest rates taking into account 
the effects of future inflation and monetary policy 
variables. A second group of articles tries to 
explain the factors driving the behaviour of 
spreads, in general vis-a-vis Germany, among 
which fiscal variables play a role. Many times no 
choice is made and both variables are tested. 
The main technical problem facing the first group 
of papers is related to endogeneity: the level of 
interest rates that has to be explained by fiscal 
variables also influences the very same variables 
that are used to explain it, both directly via 
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increased expenditures and indirectly, via the 
impact on the economy. In order to solve this 
problem, Elmendorf (1993) uses deficit forecasts 
for the US and finds that an increase in deficit 
projections of 1% of GNP raises five-year bond 
yields by almost 50 basis points. The use of 
projected deficit to solve the endogeneity issue 
however is not without problems, given that the 
business cycle affects at the same time the fiscal 
policy variable and sovereign yields.  
Laubach (2009) and Engen and Hubbard (2004), 
uses therefore five-year-horizon deficit and debt 
projections by the Congressional Budget Office 
and finds somewhat lower effects of around 20 
basis points for the five-year-ahead ten-year 
forward rate for each point of GDP increase in 
deficit and some 3 basis points increase for the 
five-year-ahead ten-year forward rate for each 
point of GDP increase in debt. Thomas and Wu 
(2009) control also for risk indicators but find 
results in the same range. 
As Gale and Orszag (2004) show, this result 
indicates a roughly similar effect of debt and 
deficit over a ten year horizon, in that a permanent 
increase in deficit by one point of GDP would 
increase the debt to GDP ratio by the same amount 
and have thus a cumulative effect in interest rates 
of the same order of magnitude. Always for the 
US, Gale and Orszag test differences between 
predictions on real and nominal interest rates and 
find broadly similar results for deficit, in the range 
of 30 to 70 basis points increase for each point of 
deficit increase, and still small but slightly higher 
for debt up to 6 basis points.  None of these papers 
uses samples containing crisis data. 
Similar estimates are found in papers that study the 
impact of fiscal policy on the yield curve: Dai and 
Philippon (2005) show that in the US a one 
percentage point increase in government deficit to 
GDP ratio lasting for three years increases the 10-
year rate by 40-50 basis points and that this 
increase is due not only to higher expected spot 
rates – related to monetary policy – but also for 
one third to higher risk premia.  
Another group of paper uses evidence from other 
advanced economies and applies panel data 
estimators to assess the impact of fiscal variables 
on interest rates. Ardagna et al. (2006) finds lower 
effects of deficits, whereas for the debt no impact 
is found below the threshold of 63% of GDP and 
only a small effect is estimated for higher values. 
Similar effects are obtained in Ardagna (2004), 
which finds that the ten-years government bond 
interest rate increases by some 160 basis points in 
periods of worsening primary government balance 
and decreases by somewhat lower values in 
consolidation periods. 
For a panel of ten of the early members of the euro 
area Faini (2006) detects no significant effect from 
debt levels on ten-year real interest rates but a 
small effect (a few basis points) from government 
deficit. The article finds however that there are 
sizable spillover effects within the euro area: the 
aggregate euro area deficit and debt have an 
impact on ten-year real interest rates of some 40 
and 3 to 8 basis points, respectively. 
The second strand of the literature uses infra 
annual data at various frequencies to assess the 
behavior of spreads within the euro area, the main 
advantage of using high-frequency data being that 
the endogeneity problem is greatly reduced.  The 
general feature of such analysis is to show that an 
international risk factor explains the bulk of the 
spreads behavior, but that fiscal variables have 
some effect as well. Codogno et al. (2003), using 
as independent variable differences in debt-to-
GDP ratios with respect to Germany, find that 
fiscal policy variables have effect on relative ten-
year government bond swap spreads except for 
Austria, Italy and Spain when interacting with 
international risk variables. In turn, Bernoth et al. 
(2004), with a sample of emissions by thirteen EU 
countries, finds that each point of difference 
between the country's debt ratio and Germany's 
debt ratio entails an effect on the spread around 3 
basis points, jointly with some evidence of non-
linear effects for large debt levels. Barrios et al. 
(2009) and Schucknecht et al. (2010) find very 
alike results in similar contexts but with data from 
the current crisis considered in the sample. In the 
latter case, as in Codogno et al. (2003), the effects 
of government debt on spreads steeply after the 
bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers. Values of 12 to 
18 basis points are also found in European 
Commission (2011a) in a study which uses 
observations of ten founding euro area countries 
over 1999-2009. 
Summing up, despite some dispersion in the 
estimates, higher fiscal deficits and public debt 
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ratios seem to lead to higher interest rates too (see 
Table III.2.4.). On average, the available evidence 
suggest that increases in public deficits and debt 
ratios of around 1% of GDP may entail long-term 
interest rate rises of around 50 basis points and 
about 5 basis points, respectively. Both estimates 
are compatible as a permanent increase in deficits 
by one point of GDP would increase the debt to 
GDP ratio by the same amount and have thus a 
cumulative effect in interest rates of the same order 
of magnitude. However, these effects may be non-
linear. The effects on government yields are 
expected to rise with the stock of public debt, 
mainly via the risk premium linked with 
sustainability concerns. Accordingly, insofar as 
fiscal consolidations succeeded in reducing public 
debt, their associated short-term pain would be 
lower the larger the initial stock of public debt.     
2.6. CONCLUSION ON REVIEW OF VALUE OF 
MULTIPLIERS  
The review of the literature presented above allows 
drawing the following conclusions, despite the 
large variation in estimates and the difficulty in 
 
Table III.2.4: Resuming the strand of literature on fiscal consolidation and the cost of debt 
Studies Sample
Short term int. rates
(5 years)
Long term int. rates
(10 years)
Approach
Engen and Hubbard (2004) US (1976-2003) Debt  0.28 Debt  0.30 Vector auto regression (VAR)
Gale and Orszag (2004) US (1956-2000) Deficit  0.3/0.7 LS and ML estimates
Eaton and Fernandez (1995) Survey of literature
Increased debt levels raise the 
probability of default. Higher 
public debt increases risk premia
Literature review
Manasse, Roubini and 
Schimmelpfenning (2003)
47 economies with market 
access (1970-2002)
Increased debt levels raise the 
probability of default. Higher 
public debt increases risk premia
Logit and binary recursive tree 
analysis
Laubach (2010) US (1976:1-2006:2)
Deficit  : 0.23 
Debt : 0.032
for the 5-year-ahead 5-year 
forward rate
Deficit : 0.20-0.29; 
Debt : 0.022-0.044 
for the 5-year-ahead 10-year 
forward rate
LS and IV regression
Thomas and Wu (2009) US (1983-2005) Deficit : 0.48-0.60 Deficit : 0.30-0.46 LS regression 
Dai and Philippon (2005) US (1970:1-2003:3) Deficit : 0.4-0.5
VAR that incorporates a no-
arbitrage affine term-structure 
model with a set of structural 
restrictions to identify fiscal 
policy shocks 
Ardagna et al. (2004)
16 OECD countries (1960-
2002); (1975-2002)
1% of GDP increase in primary 
deficit:
+10 bp (static specification)
+150 bp (P-VAR)
Non-linear effects of public debt
Panel and
Panel VAR
Ardagna (2006)
16 OECD countries (1960-
2002) yearly data
Deficit : 0.24-0.42 
Debt:  0.04-0.06
interest rate increases by 162 basis 
points in periods of worsening 
primary government balance and 
decreases by 124 basis points on 
average in consolidation periods
Panel
Faini (2006) 10 EA members (1979-2002) Debt: 0.53 Panel
Codogno et al. (2003)
9 EMU founding members 
(1999-2002)
Debt: Lowest in Netherlands 0.05; 
highest in Portugal 0.08
Debt ratio of 50 points higher than 
Germany: +47.5 b.p.
Time series inspection and 
SURE estimates
Bernoth et al. (2004)
13 EMU countries (1999-
2002)
Debt ratio of 25 points higher than 
Germany: +30 b.p.; 
Panel
Barrios et al. (2009)
7 Euro area countries (2003-
2009)
Government surplus: -0.024 Debt : 
0.003
LS and IV regression
Schucknecht et al. (2010) 12 countries (1991-2002)
+marginal debt (benchmark 
country): 0.09 b.p. before 2008; 
1.18 b.p. after.
Panel
European Commission (2010)
10 founding members (1999-
2009)
Debt: 12-18 basis points Panel
 Iara and Wolf (2001) 11 EA countries (1999-2009) Debt: 0.93-1.40 Panel (GMM)
 
Source: Commission services. 
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comparing them. Assessing the current size of 
fiscal multipliers is complex, in that the value 
taken depends on its composition, its permanent 
nature, and on the economic environment at large.  
First, the large majority of estimates of first-year 
spending multipliers in normal times are located in 
the range of 0.4 to 1.2. The values are lower – 
quite often below 0.7 - for tax multipliers. 
Therefore, if the composition of observed 
consolidation is taken as a guide, multipliers are 
expected in general to be lower than the highest 
estimates: using observed changes in revenues and 
expenditures to GDP ratios as proxies for the 
composition of the adjustment shows that in 2012 
consolidation is equally shared in revenue and 
expenditure measures (see Chapter I.3). In the 
same direction also go the indications that comes 
from the mostly permanent nature of the 
consolidation in the EU. 
However, it is likely that in the current juncture 
impact multipliers are higher than normal because 
the literature stresses that in situations of crisis, 
and of financial crisis in particular, with many 
agents constrained in the financial markets, 
multipliers are larger than average. The specificity 
of the EU and of the euro area, with high trade 
integration fixed exchange rates and the necessity 
of consolidating at the same time and during a 
period in which the rest of the world is growing 
well below potential indicate add to the probability 
that first year fiscal multipliers are relatively high. 
The European Commission's QUEST model yields 
first-year multipliers of around 0.7 and 0.4 for the 
Euro Area for a balanced consolidation in normal 
economic times, which is perceived respectively as 
temporary/not credible or permanent/credible by 
consumers (European Commission (2010b)). 
These multipliers can become larger in a crisis 
period (by a factor of one half) and even larger in a 
crisis period in which trade partners consolidate 
when they can be multiplied roughly by a factor of 
5/3.  
The relevance of the fact that consolidation is 
pursued at the same time by many partner 
countries is stressed both in theoretical paper like 
Erceg and Lindé (2012) relatively to the effects via 
international interest rates, and in Perotti (2011) 
where it is shown that the so-called non-Ricardian 
effects – related to the effect of future government 
balances on permanent income - where most 
probably not the source of the short-run success in 
terms of GDP of the main four episodes of 
consolidation which were associated with an 
expansion, rather the main driver of growth was 
exports rather than internal demand. This is 
particularly relevant for euro area countries, which, 
despite being relatively open economies if taken 
individually and have as main trade partners the 
other countries of the union (in general). In that 
case there can be magnifying effect of an area-
wide consolidation on the multipliers.  
Multipliers in the current juncture as assessed by 
QUEST are around 0.7 and 1.2 respectively for 
permanent/credible and temporary/non credible 
balanced consolidation under an accommodative 
monetary policy.  
Multipliers will be quite different according to the 
composition of the consolidation, with government 
consumption multipliers lying between 0.5 and 
0.8; larger multipliers correspond to cuts in 
government wages and government investments 
(above 1) while smaller multipliers (of around 0 in 
normal times and 0.7 in times of crisis) correspond 
to VAT and labour tax increases. The meta-
analysis by Leeper, Traum and Walker proposes 
similar multipliers for partially permanent/credible 
government consumption based shocks which are 
in the order of magnitude of 0.6 to 0.9 for normal 
times but larger multipliers – around 1.6 – for 
periods in which monetary policy is 
accommodative and for relatively open 
economies. (
96
)  
The estimates of spending multipliers made by the 
Commission on three large euro area countries and 
aggregate euro area data (
97
) are in line with 
literature results, with fist-year multipliers between 
0.4 and 1.4, an increased second-year multiplier 
and values for third year multipliers still in line 
                                                          
(96) The values of 0.7 and 1.6 are not directly comparable 
because of different assumptions on credibility and on the 
composition of the consolidation, but represent the relevant 
range of values that can be supported by existing models. It 
is recalled that a comparable QUEST multiplier is slightly 
above one. See Chapter  III.2. 
(97) Estimates for France were made but resulting multipliers 
were found to be null. This can be related to the fact that 
the quarterly series which are used are derived 
interpolating annual data and therefore are not proper 
quarterly data and do not reflect the reality of fiscal shocks. 
Non-significant multipliers were found also for the UK, in 
line with Perotti (2004). 
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with first-year multipliers, before a relative quick 
decrease. This is even more the case if 
composition is taken into account, as spending 
VAR multipliers are estimated using a composite 
spending variable which is the sum of government 
consumption and government investments, which 
– according to New Keynesian DSGE models – are 
among the components with the highest 
multipliers. 
It should be noticed that, it is not possible to 
compare directly VAR-based assessments of fiscal 
multipliers to model-based ones. The main reason 
is that fiscal shocks in VAR models are typically 
temporary, while in models-based assessment the 
nature of the shock can be different. 
3. DEBT DYNAMICS AND EFFECTS FROM CONSOLIDATION 
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This Chapter looks at the effects that 
consolidations have on the debt ratio. It looks at 
the relationship between deficits and debts and 
estimates the values of key parameters that 
determine how government debt changes for 
different levels of deficits. (
98
) 
In the absence of any stock-flow adjustments, (
99
) 
the government debt to GDP ratio (b) evolves 
according to the following formula: (
100
) 
 
where bal represents the budget balance to GDP 
ratio, pbal the primary budget balance, r the 
average effective interest rate on government debt  
and g nominal GDP growth. The evolution of the 
debt ratio can therefore be understood as being 
driven by the primary balance and the snowball 
effect, which is the difference between the average 
effective interest rate and the growth rate of the 
economy. Over the medium-term, the snowball 
effect is of particular importance as it drives the 
magnitude of primary balances that are necessary 
in order to ensure that government debt remains 
sustainable. 
The effects of consolidation on the debt ratio can 
then be analyzed by looking at the direct effect that 
the consolidation has on balance and its impact on 
the snowball effect. The Chapter starts by looking 
at the short-term impact of consolidations, looking 
at how the fiscal multipliers translate magnitudes 
                                                          
(98) This Section Chapter is based on Boussard et al. (2012).  
(99) The stock-flow adjustment is the difference between the 
change in government debt and the government 
deficit/surplus for a given period. The main categories of 
stock-flow adjustments are net acquisitions of financial 
assets, items that do no directly affect the Maastricht 
definition of debt and effects of face valuation, comprising 
also effects of exchange rate variation. See 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/STO
CK_FLOW_2011/EN/STOCK_FLOW_2011-EN.PDF 
(100) This formula is derived from the 
identity , where B represents 
government debt in cash terms, Bal government balance 
and stock-flow adjustments are assumed to equal zero. The 
formula in the text is derived by expressing all variables as 
a ratio to GDP (Y)   and simply 
rewriting   and approximating 
with  gives the formula in the text. 
of deficits into changes in economic growth. It 
considers the impact of the fiscal multipliers and 
analyses the magnitude of the multipliers – known 
as critical multipliers – that might generate 
undesired effects, whereby consolidations lead to 
increases in the debt due to the impact that they 
have on the GDP growth. By estimating the value 
of these critical multipliers for the EU27 Member 
States and comparing them with the likely range of 
actual multipliers according to the economic 
literature, the Chapter considers whether any 
countries are likely to face short-term debt 
increases as a result of the current consolidations, 
due to the effect of consolidations on growth. (
101
) 
The Chapter then turns to the medium-term, where 
the impact of consolidations depends on how 
various parameters – mainly the impact multiplier 
and the persistence of consolidation on next years' 
growth but also the starting level of debt, the size 
of automatic stabilizers and the baseline balance 
and growth – drive debt dynamics. The effect of 
these parameters is analyzed by looking at the 
number of years required for debt to go below a 
baseline level following a consolidation. Finally, 
the role played by interest payments on debt 
dynamics is considered, and how market myopia 
influences the effect of consolidations.     
3.1. SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF FISCAL 
CONSOLIDATIONS 
This Section analyses the effect of a fiscal 
consolidation relative to a baseline where no 
consolidation takes place. The effect of a 
consolidation ("a " in the following) is given by 
the change induced by it on debt and a positive 
consolidation effect is found if the debt ratio under 
consolidation is smaller than the debt ratio in the 
baseline.  (
102
) As Box III.3.1 shows the change 
induced on debt by consolidation  
written in full is:  
                                                          
(101) For a similar analysis restricted to the effects of VAR-
based fiscal multipliers see also Eyraud and Weber (2012). 
(102) This is expressed as   
 
 
  
Part III 
Consolidation and dynamics of the multipliers. Are there counter-intuitive effects? 
 
 
139 
 
In the short-term, a consolidation affects the debt 
ratio both via its effect on the primary balance and 
via its effect on the rate of growth of GDP. These 
two effects are given in the formula above. First, 
the debt ratio is affected by the change in the 
primary balance, which, in turn is driven both 
directly and indirectly by the consolidation 
measures. The direct effect is given by the fact that 
consolidation measures reduce the deficit, while 
the indirect effect is again given via the effect on 
growth; the primary balance is also affected by the 
growth rate of the economy via the automatic 
stabilizers. (
103
) The government balance is 
therefore increased by the direct effect of 
consolidation measures but reduced by the impact 
that these measures have on the economic growth 
rate (indirect effect). Second, assuming that there 
is no significant impact of a consolidation on the 
interest rate, the debt ratio is increased because of 
the negative effect on economic growth in the 
short term. (
104
)  
The effect of consolidation measures on the 
government balance in the first year (
105
) is 
composed by three effects: i) the direct of effect of 
the consolidation measures on balance (which by 
definition is equal to one, because measures worth 
one euro reduce government deficit by the same 
amount for a given growth rate;) ii) the negative 
effect induced on balance via the automatic 
stabilizers (i.e. the product of the multiplier times 
the effect of balance to growth equal to the semi-
elasticity of the government balance to the cycle); 
and iii) the "denominator effect" on the debt ratio 
                                                          
(103) If the government takes consolidation measures for a total 
a, there will be a reduction in growth compared to baseline, 
leading to a lower reduction in final deficit - due to the 
operation of automatic stabilizers - than the one due to the 
direct effect of the measures taken. 
(104) The higher the growth rate of GDP, the smaller is the debt 
ratio – for any given deficit. This is usually referred to as 
the denominator effect: any change in GDP affects the debt 
ratio via the denominator. 
(105) If  m1 is the one-year multiplier and ε is the elasticity of 
budget balance to growth the precise formula is  
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The non-approximated calculations and formulas are 
presented in Box III.1. 
caused by the diminution in growth with respect to 
baseline engendered by consolidation.  
Putting these two equations together give the effect 
of consolidations on the debt level, as a function of 
existing debt level, the multiplier and the cyclical 
budget elasticity, ε: (106) 
 
This equation leads to the conclusions that i) a 
high starting level of debt tends to dampen the 
debt-reducing impact of consolidation all else 
equal. If the initial debt ratio is large enough, 
consolidations can even bring about increases in 
the short term. The same holds for the elasticity of 
the government balance to the cycle; and ii) the 
larger the short-term multiplier, the smaller the 
debt-reducing impact of consolidations. This effect 
is actually independent of the economic growth 
rate and of the interest rate prior to the fiscal 
consolidation..  
It is therefore possible to compute a critical value 
for the multiplier which is the largest value the 
multiplier can take before a consolidation leads to 
a negative rather than positive impact. This value 
 is computed as 
 
It diminishes with the level of debt – the higher the 
debt the larger the growth impact on the debt to 
GDP dynamic – and with the cyclical semi-
elasticity – the effect of consolidation measures on 
deficit are smaller the more the automatic 
stabilizers react to diminished growth. For any 
estimated value of the budget elasticity to growth it 
is possible to draw the relationship between the 
                                                          
(106) All the previous computations are done with respect of a 
baseline, i.e. they show the comparison between the debt 
ratio at time t after the consolidation and the debt ratio that 
would have prevailed at time t in the absence of 
consolidation.  Notice that for one period the result 
presented here well approximates the result of equation 
III.5 in Box III.1. As baseline debt does not differ much 
from the starting level of debt after just one period, this 
equation also applies approximately to difference between 
the debt ratios in the first period compared to the period in 
which consolidation is implemented. 
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debt level and the critical multiplier. For a debt 
ratio equal to 100% of GDP, a typical order of 
magnitude on the value of the critical multipliers 
can be computed to be 2/3 if it is assumed that the 
semi-elasticity of budget balance to growth is 1/2. 
Graph III.3.1: Debt ratio and critical multipliers 
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Source: Commission services. 
Graph III.3.1 shows the relationship between the 
resulting critical multiplier and the starting level of 
debt and semi-elasticities. The three curves show 
the debt ratio and multiplier values such that the 
effect of consolidation on the debt ratio is zero in 
the short term, for three different illustrative 
elasticities. For any given semi-elasticity points 
above the line – representing higher debt ratios 
and/or multipliers – are characterised by 
consolidations leading to a higher debt ratio in the 
first year. 
Country analysis 
The theoretical relationship obtained in the 
previous Subsection can shed light on the effects 
of the consolidation in the short term in the EU 
countries. The last column of Table III.3.1 shows 
the estimated critical multipliers for the EU27, for 
the 2011 levels of Maastricht debt and using 
estimated cyclical semi-elasticities of government 
balance to the output gap to measure the reaction 
of automatic stabilisers to the change in growth 
induced by consolidation. (
107
) 
                                                          
(107) These values are computed by the Commission in the 
context of the fiscal surveillance on the basis of a 
methodology developed by the OECD. 
The critical values shown in Table III.3.1 can be 
compared with the values emerging from the 
literature review presented in Section III.3.6. As 
explained in the literature review, the value of the 
multiplier depends on many factors, with the 
composition of the adjustment, the existence of a 
simultaneous adjustment in trade partners and the 
situation of the economy playing a prominent role. 
 
Table III.3.1: Critical first year multipliers in EU Member States 
at constant interest rates in 2011 
Semi-
elasticities
Debt (2011)
Critical 
Multiplier
BE 0.51 98.0 0.7
BG 0.33 16.3 2.0
CZ 0.36 41.2 1.3
DK 0.65 46.5 0.9
DE 0.54 81.2 0.7
EE 0.30 6.0 2.8
IE 0.44 108.2 0.7
EL 0.42 165.3 0.5
ES 0.43 68.5 0.9
FR 0.53 85.8 0.7
IT 0.49 120.1 0.6
CY 0.43 71.6 0.9
LV 0.30 42.6 1.4
LT 0.29 38.5 1.5
LU 0.44 18.2 1.6
HU 0.44 80.6 0.8
MT 0.38 72.0 0.9
NL 0.62 65.2 0.8
AT 0.47 72.2 0.8
PL 0.38 56.3 1.1
PT 0.45 107.8 0.7
RO 0.32 33.3 1.5
SI 0.45 47.6 1.1
SK 0.33 43.3 1.3
FI 0.58 48.6 0.9
SE 0.61 38.4 1.0
UK 0.46 85.7 0.8  
Source: Commission services' calculation 
 
These values can be compared to the values 
proposed in Section III.3.1 above, i.e. QUEST 
multipliers of around 0.4 to 0.7 for the euro area 
for a composition-balanced consolidation in 
normal economic times, depending on credibility 
and 0.7 to around 1.2 in crisis situations (up to 1.6 
if one considers the spending multipliers from the 
meta-analysis or cumulative first-year spending 
multipliers from VAR-based analysis).  
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Comparing the critical multipliers given in Table 
III.3.1 with the results of literature indicates that 
Greece is the only country where short run debt 
increases could be observed even in normal times 
and if consolidation is balanced in terms of its 
composition between expenditures and revenues. 
However, given the high debt levels now present 
in the EU and given that large government sectors 
induce large cyclical semi-elasticities, around one 
third of the EU countries are likely to see their debt 
ratio increasing compared to the baseline in the 
first year when a consolidation process is 
implemented depending on the composition of 
consolidation. This is especially true if 
consolidation is spending-based and is not 
completely credible so that figures from meta-
studies are used and considering the current crisis 
situation, in which case multipliers can be 
expected to be larger and a large part of EU 
countries would be likely to be in the undesired 
effect area in the short term. 
In any case, it is obvious that this analysis does not 
suggest that remaining at the baseline, i.e. doing 
nothing, is preferable to consolidation. In 
particular, the analysis does not suggest that high-
debt countries should consolidate less than low-
debt countries, only because they have high levels 
of debt. 
3.2. MEDIUM RUN EFFECTS OF 
CONSOLIDATION 
The previous Section looked at the critical 
multiplier and presented evidence about how the 
actual multipliers in EU Member States compare 
with the countries' corresponding critical 
multipliers showing that it is not impossible that in 
the current situation consolidation leads to higher 
debt ratios in the short run. This Subsection looks 
at how the multipliers affect the debt dynamics 
following a consolidation, before the next Section 
introduces possible effects of consolidations on 
interest rates and moves to look at debt dynamics 
from a more medium-term point of view.  
As will be shown in this Subsection, under most 
parameter configurations that are in line with the 
evidence obtained from the economic literature 
and the simulations presented here, the time period 
necessary for a consolidation to have a beneficial 
effect on the debt ratio is two or maximum three 
years unless multipliers are very high and 
persistent. The exception to this pattern occurs in 
the presence of a high degree of myopia 
concerning determinants of government 
yields, (
108
) and this will be examined in the next 
Section which will enrich the analysis by including 
the impact on government interest rates. 
As shown in more detail in Box III.3.1 the 
evolution of the debt ratio, in the absence of any 
effect on government yields, it is the sum of same 
three effects indicated in the previous Subsection: 
i) the cumulative effect of growth on debt, which is 
generated by the change that the consolidation has 
on growth developments. (
109
) This effect is larger 
if the initial debt stock is larger and if multipliers 
are larger, while simulations show that the impact 
of the other parameters of the baseline scenario do 
not have the same relevance. ii) The cumulative 
effect of growth on government balance which 
considers how the growth effect of the 
consolidation affects the budget balance via the 
operation of the automatic stabilisers on the budget 
balance. This component of the effect typically 
increases debt in a consolidation, because it 
worsens the government balance for a given 
consolidation and the effect is greater the larger the 
size of the multipliers and the size of automatic 
stabilisers. Finally,  iii) the cumulative effect from 
the adjustment of government balance which 
represents the cumulative savings effect of the 
consolidation i.e. the direct debt reduction of the 
adjustment in the absence of any effects on 
growth. This effect reduces the debt ratio. It 
increases with the number of years and with the 
size of the consolidation implemented. 
As the first two effects are act to increase the debt 
ratio, while the third acts to decrease it. One way 
to look at the medium-term effects of a 
consolidation, then, is to consider the number of 
years n
*
 (hereafter "the critical year") (
110
) 
                                                          
(108) Gros (2011) presents a similar argument in a qualitative 
and incomplete manner. 
(109) The computation takes into account the fact that the 
evolution of debt over time is influenced by the path of the 
government balance, so that a large government balance 
influences the debt ratio more than a smaller government 
balance.  
(110) Notice that n*represents the number of years starting from 
the year of consolidation. If consolidation is implemented 
in year 1, n* represents the critical year. Therefore n*=1 
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necessary for the consolidation to lead to a 
decrease in debt with respect to a baseline 
scenario. In terms of the equation presented in Box 
III.1 this is equivalent to the number of years 
necessary for  to equal zero (or be negative).  
The critical period n* is different from the number 
of years required for the debt to go below its 
starting value in year 0 unless the baseline is the 
steady state of constant debt ratio. Graph III.3.2 
shows illustrative paths for the debt under baseline 
and consolidation scenarios, for a constant baseline 
in the left-hand panel and an increasing one in the 
right-hand panel. It shows that, while in the case of 
a stable baseline scenario n* coincides with the 
year in which the debt level returns to its level in 
the consolidation year, this does not happen when 
the baseline scenario is increasing and the solid 
line representing the path of debt-to-GDP ratio 
following a consolidation returns to the starting 
level only after crossing the dotted line 
representing the baseline scenario (if ever). When 
looking at the effects of a consolidation on the 
debt, the relevant comparison depends on the aim 
of the exercise. The debt trajectory under a 
consolidation should be compared to the baseline 
debt if we are purely interested in the effect of the 
consolidation per se; however, if there is an overall 
                                                                                   
means that there is no self-defeating effect at all, while 
n*=2 indicates that the perverse effects lasts one year and 
so on. 
question of debt sustainability the debt after a 
consolidation will also need to be compared to the 
actual starting level of debt. 
In order to model debt dynamics and calculate the 
value of the critical year n* under different 
consolidation scenarios, to run debt simulations 
under different consolidation scenarios, a clear 
picture of the reaction of GDP to consolidation in 
future years (
111
) is necessary, bearing in mind that 
is likely to change over time. The higher the 
multipliers in the first year and the longer the 
change in GDP induced by the consolidation, the 
larger the value of n* and the longer it will take for 
a consolidation to be effective. There are three 
broad effects emerging from the literature review 
presented in Chapter III.2 that will be incorporated 
into the simulations presented later in this 
Subsection:  
i) the values of first year multipliers in normal 
economic conditions are typically estimated at 
between 0.3 to around 1 depending on the 
composition and nature of the policy changes and 
type of estimate; ii) the values of first year 
multipliers are larger in crisis years, usually within 
a range from 0.5 to 1.6; and iii) the impact on GDP 
in years following consolidation tends to decrease 
but does so to different degrees depending on the 
                                                          
(111) See Box III.1 that defines the adjusted multiplier   
which corresponds to the difference between GDP and 
baseline at year t in an impulse-response function. 
Graph III.3.2: Critical year and underlying debt trend 
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Source: Commission services. 
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model used, on the type of estimate and on all the 
factors affecting multipliers.  
The fiscal multipliers can be very persistent or can 
decay rapidly in the first years, following a 
convex, autoregressive path. Such an AR1-shaped 
curve is similar to the shape of GDP responses 
which can be found in New Keynesian DSGE-
based assessments of multipliers for various (but 
not all) types of consolidation. (
112
) Graph III.3.3 
shows two stylised GDP responses following a 
consolidation of 1% of GDP, under low and high 
persistence. (
113
) The main difference between the 
two paths thus concerns the persistence of the 
effects of the consolidation. 
Graph III.3.3: Stylised paths of GDP  impulse responses used in the 
simulations 
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Source: SCPs, Commission services. 
Simulations 
Graph III.3.4 shows the debt-to-GDP ratio 
dynamics for the low-persistence multipliers path 
under different assumptions about the impact 
multiplier. The baseline scenario is one of a 
constant debt ratio of 100% of GDP. The Graph 
shows debt dynamics for a persistence rate of 
0.5, (
114
) with first year multipliers of 0.5, 1 and 
                                                          
(112) See for example in Graphs III.6.1 and III.6.2 in European 
Commission (2010a). 
(113) The precise formula is shown in Box III.1 as equation III.6. 
It is considered that the multipliers decline according to a 
persistence parameter to reach a long-term value. The 
persistence parameter is the ratio between the responses of 
two consecutive years if the long-run impact of fiscal 
consolidation is null. 
(114) 0.6/0.7 is the ratio of second to first year GDP responses in 
the case of composition-balanced permanent consolidation 
1.5. All values for the first-year multiplier that lie 
below the 0.7 level will correspond to an improved 
debt ratio from the first year – this is so by 
construction as the 0.7 level corresponds to the 
critical value for the multiplier. It should be noted 
that a first year multiplier of 1.5 is on the high side 
of existing estimates as it is the estimate of a 
temporary consolidation based on government 
spending. 
Graph III.3.4: Debt dynamics (baseline steady state, b0 = 100%), 
no effect on interest   rates – with low persistence 
93%
94%
95%
96%
97%
98%
99%
100%
101%
102%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
year
m = 0.5
m = 1
m = 1,5
baseline
 
Source: Commission services. 
Graph III.3.5 shows the case for a high persistence 
parameter (0.8) of the GDP response.  The higher 
persistence of the effects of consolidation 
generates longer-lasting negative effects from 
fiscal consolidation. If the first-year multiplier is 
1.5 the consolidation-based debt increase lasts for 
one more year so that three years are needed – 
taking into account the fact that year 1 is the year 
in which the consolidation is implemented – before 
debt goes below baseline. 
                                                                                   
in European Commission (2010a). This is the basis for the 
choice of 0.5 as low persistence and 0.8 as high persistence 
parameters. Note that the persistence in the following years 
is however smaller. Values of the GDP responses broadly 
constant for the first three years are very commonly found 
in VAR estimates. This wold make raise an hump-shaped 
GDP response with the consequence that the debt increases 
following a consolidation would be reversed only after 
three years for values of the impact multiplier of 1.5. This 
being the only difference, the case is not developed here.  
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Graph III.3.5: Debt dynamics (baseline steady state, b0 = 100%), 
no effect on interest   rates – with high persistence 
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Source: Commission services. 
3.3. INTRODUCING CHANGES TO 
GOVERNMENT YIELDS INTO THE ANALYSIS  
Over the medium-term, changes to the average 
effective interest rate are as important a factor for 
the debt to GDP dynamics as the growth rate of 
GDP. This Section incorporates a reaction function 
of average effective interest rates into the analysis 
to create a more complete picture of the medium-
term dynamics of debt following a fiscal 
tightening.  
The impact of consolidation on average effective 
interest rates is more visible in the medium-term 
than in the short-term, with limited first-year 
impact on the debt level. (
115
) 
                                                          
(115) A more immediate impact can be seen on the yield of 
government debt, which may react more abruptly as 
borrowing goes up or down. The more muted effect on the 
interest rate is partly driven by the fact that only a share of 
overall debt needs to be reissued in any one year and so the 
effect on the average (or apparent) interest rate is more 
modest. An increase in interest rate of 50 basis points has a 
modest impact in the first year if 20% of the debt is rolled 
over every year: for example with debt ratio at 100% and a 
20% rollover, 50 basis points increase means an additional 
0.1% increase in deficit/debt.   Nevertheless, in difficult 
times, there have been sizeable increases in the apparent 
interest rate that can be observed in the data. For example, 
between 1974 and 1975 the apparent interest rate increased 
from 15.7 to 22.2 in Denmark, while it increased from 8.3 
to 15.2 in Portugal between 1980 and 1981. Conversely to 
these large sharp increases, decreases are often more 
gradual even when sustained, as was the case for the 
countries  with higher yields at the entry in the EMU. 
As shown in Box III.1, taking into account the 
effects of changes in apparent interest rates adds a 
fourth element to the drivers of debt dynamics. 
Aside from the impact of growth on the debt and 
deficit and of the deficit on debt, a new term 
captures the cumulative effect of average effective 
interest rates on debt evolution. The interest rate 
effect (and hence the new term in equation III.11 
in Box III.3.1) consists of the increased (or 
decreased if the interest rate diminishes) future 
debt burden related to the increased interest 
payments on the rollover of existing debt stock, 
and, second, the increased payments on the new 
debt related to future deficits. 
The sign of this effect however is not clear cut as it 
depends crucially on the way market expectations 
are generated. (
116
) The normal case, in line with 
the results of the literature presented in Section 
III.3.2 and used in the previous Section, is the case 
in which a consolidation improves the market's 
confidence in government bonds and reduces 
yields so that a consolidation leads to a lower 
average effective interest rate r. In this case, the 
effect of a consolidation on debt is reinforced and 
debt-to-GDP ratios are likely to decrease at a 
higher speed (or increase less) than with constant 
yields. If, on the contrary, the market reacts to 
consolidation by increasing yields and 
consequently average effective interest rates, the 
effect of this term is the opposite. Such an effect 
would be rather unusual, however. (
117
)  
In general real interest rates paid by governments 
are modelled as being composed of the sum of two 
elements: central bank real rates – the safe interest 
rate –and a risk-premium, which depends on a 
number of very diverse factors. The central bank 
real rate's reaction to a consolidation depends on 
the state of the economy, a Taylor rule in normal 
times and a more accommodative stance in the 
crisis. This is modelled as an integral part of the 
New Keynesian DSGE models as seen in Section 
III.2 above and thus is already integrated in the 
                                                          
(116) Of course, other variables such as the conduct of monetary 
policy also affect this term. 
(117) Eyraud and Weber (2012) provides evidence that given 
markets' concerns about short-term growth, high fiscal 
multipliers may imply that deficit reductions entail 
increases in sovereign CDS spreads. 
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multipliers' values. (
118
) The risk-premium's 
reaction to consolidation depends on many 
variables of different nature, from the degree of 
risk aversion to the long-term sustainability of 
public finances. These can be proxied by a 
combination of the cyclically adjusted balance and 
the debt to GDP ratio expected at a certain horizon 
h.  
In the present simulation it is assumed that the 
change on average effective interest rates is driven 
by the risk premium so that the change of the 
average effective interest rate  due to a 
consolidation a is expressed as  
 
where   can be interpreted as combining the yield 
sensitivity to the structural balance, growth 
perspectives, and expectation-driven factors in 
general while represents the yield sensitivity to 
the debt level and h refers to the horizon 
considered by the financial markets, where h=1 
indicates that markets look at the debt in the year 
of the consolidation. (
119
) Thus the change in 
                                                          
(118) Certain versions of QUEST also integrate risk premium 
based on debt levels. 
(119) It is to be remarked the assumption that financial markets 
are assumed not to take into account the consequences of 
their own behaviour on debt evolution. This is a 
simplifying assumption which has very reduced practical 
government yields from a consolidation is 
modelled as a function of the shock to interest 
rates that happens immediately, which can be 
function of the improvement in deficit and/or of 
market sentiments, and from the value of expected 
debt. A high sensitivity of interest rates to the debt 
ratio could lead to make consolidations self-
defeating and act as a driver for a divergent debt 
ratio. This could happen if a consolidation 
increases the debt ratio due to the denominator 
effect, which then leads to increase in interest rates 
which then further increase the debt ratio and so 
on. A positive   means that the decrease in the 
risk premium due to the decrease in structural 
deficit does not offset the increase in central bank's 
real rates due to deflationary pressures.  
The way  is expressed allows for the impact of 
quantitative effects of consolidation on interest 
rates to be easily factored into the analysis. Such 
effects can be very relevant in crisis situations and 
are not well modelled in linear models. The 
formula does, however, have the disadvantage that 
it does not take into account the spreading of the 
                                                                                   
impact if myopia is interpreted as backward-looking 
behaviour or if the horizon in question is as short as one or 
two years. Notice that the formula could apply to new 
emissions as well, without substantive 
Graph III.3.6: Confidence effects on debt dynamics - a) low persistence , b) high persistence - first-year m=1,5 
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Source: Commission services. 
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changes of government yields on the rest of the 
economy – or de facto it assumes that such effects 
are relatively small – because the path of the 
multiplier is independent from the reaction of 
interest rates. (
120
) Moreover, the linear form of the 
interest rate function prevents from taking into 
account thresholds effects, another characteristic 
which the literature shows being potentially 
relevant in crisis periods. 
Graphs III.3.6a and III.3.6b show the effects for 
the two cases of low and high persistence of 
changes in the interest rate on the critical number 
of years n* under the condition that the first-year 
multiplier is 1.5. It can be seen that the critical 
number of years before the debt is reduced to 
below its starting level in absence of effects on the 
interest rates remains the same as shown in Graph 
III.4.4, for the case without interest rates, for 
changes in the interest rates which are in line with 
empirical evidence.  
To estimate the importance of confidence effects 
on interest rates, it is possible to consider the size 
of the change in interest rates which leads to a 
reduction in the critical number of years before 
debt falls below baseline, based on the assumption 
that  is negative as market confidence reacts 
positively to a consolidation. Under an impact 
multiplier of two  (not shown), the value of   
that allows debt-to-GDP ratios to fall below 
baseline one year earlier in a high-persistence 
model is -0.4; this is equivalent to saying that 
following a structural adjustment of 1% of GDP, 
the average effective interest rate must fall by 40 
basis points. This is in the high part of the value 
range estimated in the literature, taking into 
account that the measured impact on yields of 50-
80 basis points refers to new debt, while the 40 
basis point figure given here refers to the overall 
average effective interest rate on debt.  
                                                          
(120) Notice that if interest rates decrease with consolidation, the 
formula for the change in r reinforces the possibility of 
undesired effects. In DSGE models multipliers decrease 
with interest rates. 
Myopic behaviour and debt ratio 
So far, the possibility of a dynamically undesired 
effect on debt ratios from consolidation does not 
emerge out of the models presented and the likely 
values of key parameters. However, the presence 
of financial market myopia can change this. This 
myopia can be seen in the contradictory 
requirements sometimes made by rating agencies 
when they refer to the need to consolidate public 
finances while also noting the adverse effect of 
negative short term growth prospects in their 
notation process, without apparently noticing the 
short term negative relation between the two 
variables at least in the short term. 
To analyse the case in which short-termism of 
market sentiment influences the debt dynamics, the 
second part of the equation for   in the previous 
Subsection (
121
) is brought into the picture. This 
part looks at how yields are affected by the 
expected level of debt at a certain horizon h 
assuming baseline rates. Myopia is measured by 
the numbers of years ahead that the markets looks 
at (h): if markets are very myopic the changes in 
interest rates consequent to a consolidation are 
solely driven by the debt of the year immediately 
following consolidation, while if markets are 
extremely rational the interest rates are solely 
driven by the expected debt ratio at the steady 
state. Expectations are adaptive in a sense that 
agents revise them if the actual level of debt differs 
from what was expected. (
122
)
 
 
In line with the literature it is assumed that γ>0; in 
the analysis it will be used a value of  
as found in Laubach (2009) and used in European 
Commission (2010a), and it is assumed that  lies 
between -0.3 and 0.3. Thus negative values reflect 
the normal reaction of yields to consolidation, 
while positive values represent the case in which 
interest rates increase with improvements in 
government balance for reasons that are not related 
to the debt level. 
If interest rate behaviour is modelled according to 
equation III.10, the variation of debt at the end of 
                                                          
(121) It is reported as equation III.10 in Box III.1. 
(122) Such an assumption seems more coherent with myopic 
behaviour rather than rational expectations. 
Part III 
Consolidation and dynamics of the multipliers. Are there counter-intuitive effects? 
 
 
147 
the period n is determined by the cumulative effect 
of the change in the deficit, market sentiment and 
other factors subsumed in the constant part, and a 
cumulative effect from change in expected debt. 
Graphs III.3.7 and III.3.8 show how debt dynamics 
would evolve under different degrees of myopia 
and different values for the multiplier, under a 
high-persistence and low-persistence specification 
respectively. They show that the presence of 
highly myopic financial markets can play a role in 
increasing the number of years after which the debt 
ratio remains above baseline but that only in very 
extreme cases would they really lead to a debt 
increase in the medium run.  
The panels of these graphs show various examples 
of debt ratio dynamics, depending on the impact 
multiplier, under the case in which i) there is a 
normal reaction of interest rate to consolidation  
(first row) in line with estimates with a reduction 
in sovereign yields following a consolidation and 
an annual increase in yields related to the increase 
in debt which can be normal (left) or very large 
(right column;) ii) there is no immediate reaction 
to consolidation  but an annual impact on 
sovereign risk premia as a function of the debt 
ratio expected in the first year which can be small, 
large (second row) or sufficient to lead to an 
undesired debt dynamics (third row, left column;) 
iii) there is an immediate shock on average 
effective interest rates equal to μ (last rows) which 
is lasting – μ is a constant – that can be interpreted 
as a negative confidence shock following 
consolidation. The impact multiplier is assumed to 
be large at 1.5. 
In low persistence models self-defeating 
consolidations reinforced by the behaviour of the 
markets can verify only if consolidation does not 
bring any benefit in terms of immediate yield 
reduction and each point of increase in the debt 
ratio entails an increase in the average effective 
interest rate of 100 basis points, a value more than 
30 times larger than average estimated values. 
In high-persistence model, n* increases by one or 
two years if the reaction of the financial markets to 
consolidation is non-standard. However, 
consolidations-led debt increases happen only if 
myopic market reactions are 20 times larger than 
average estimates, even when the first year 
multiplier is as high as 1.5. 
Under normal average conditions, interpretable as  
μ = -0.3 and  γ= 0.03, the results of the previous 
Subsection are confirmed even under extreme 
market myopia assumed in Graphs III.3.7 and 
III.3.8. 
The existence of undesired effects could in 
principle be driven by very high impact multipliers 
(above two) and high persistence in presence of 
more standard behaviour of the financial markets. 
Under values for  allowing for a consolidation-
led debt rise, short-termism in the financial 
markets can become critical and change the critical 
number of years before debt-to-GDP falls below 
baseline through an effect on average effective 
interest rates. This is shown in Graph III.3.9a and b 
and in Graph III.3.10. Graph III.3.9 shows that 
even with large undesired effects in the financial 
markets a high myopia can have relevant effects. 
Under a low persistence of the effects of 
consolidation, when no dynamically undesired 
effects are generated, n* diminishes from 4 to 2 
when the financial markets adopt a medium-term 
horizon. The horizon of the financial markets 
becomes more relevant when the persistence is 
high, because less myopia reduces n* to 3. (
123
) 
Graph III.3.10 takes an extreme case to show the 
relevance of financial-markets myopia: a case in 
which impact multipliers are very high (m=2), 
persistence is high and financial markets react 
contrary to expectations. In this case, h=4 is 
necessary to avoid a fully self-defeating dynamic.  
                                                          
(123) It should be noted that h=2 already would reduce sensibly 
n*. 
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Graph III.3.7: Debt evolution with myopic financial markets (h=1) – low persistence 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Graph III.3.8: Debt evolution with myopic financial markets (h=1) – high persistence 
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Source: Commission services. 
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The next Subsection provides a more complete 
analysis of the effects of myopia on debt dynamics 
and of the requirements needed to have undesired 
effects. 
Graph III.3.10: The effect of myopia on debt projections 
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Source: Commission services. 
Sensitivity to parameters of the year n* in which 
consolidation is effective  
A full assessment of the sensitivity of the critical 
year n* – the year in which the debt ratio decreases 
as a consequence of the consolidation – to each 
individual parameter which affects it cannot be 
conducted analytically because the effect of each 
single factor cannot be disentangled easily. A 
simple, unified view is thus reached by running a 
least square regression of n* on the value of the 
parameter within a chosen range. (
124
) The analysis 
is developed under the same conditions explained 
in the Box III.3.1 (
125
) The values taken by each 
parameter – GDP growth, interest rate, primary 
balance, output gap, initial debt, impact multiplier, 
multiplier persistence, long-term multiplier, the 
three parameters driving the reaction of interest 
rate to consolidation – are set out in Table III.3.2. 
These values reflect the values found in the 
literature or the experience of EU countries. 
                                                          
(124) It is to be noted that n* is an exact function of the 
parameter An analysis which takes into account the 
empirical correlation among the parameters – thus giving 
more weight to more likely combination does not bring 
very different results. 
(125) The baseline scenario is a steady state. Multipliers are a 
decreasing function of time and interest rates are a linear 
function of future debt. 
Graph III.3.9: Debt evolution as a function of market horizon-  a) low persistence , b) high persistence -  first year m=1,5 
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Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.3.3: Potential impact of parameter changes on n* 
Parameter Maximum Range size Coefficient
Order of magnitude of 
impact on n*
Baseline growth (g) 5% 0.58 – 0.59 3%
Baseline interest rate (r) 5% 0% 0%
Primary balance (pbal) 6% 0.48 – 0.49 3%
First year multiplier (m) 2 1.4 – 1.6 2.8 – 3.2
Multiplier persistence (α) 0.3 1.5 – 1.9 0.45 – 0.57
Long-term multiplier (β) 0.2 0.5 – 0.6 0.1 – 0.12
Initial debt ratio (b0) 100% 0.9 – 1.2 0.9 – 1.2
Cyclical elasticity (ε) 0.4 2 – 2.3 0.8 – 0.92
Impact of future debt on r (γ) 0.3 -0.2 – 1.3 -0.06 – 0.4
Impact of consolidation on interest rate  (μ) 0.6 1.6 – 1.8 1 – 1.1  
Source: Commission services. 
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Table III.3.2: Range of parameters used to assess the sensitivity of 
the critical year n* 
Parameter Minimum Maximum
Baseline growth (g) -2% 2%
Baseline interest rate (r) -1% 3%
Primary balance (pbal) -4% 1%
First year multiplier (m) 0.3 1.8
Multiplier persistence (α) 0.5 0.8
Long-term multiplier (β) -0.1 0.1
Initial debt ratio (b0) 80% 140%
Cyclical elasticity (ε) 0.4 0.5
Impact of future debt on r (γ) 0 0.3
Impact of consolidation on interest 
rate  (μ)
-0.3 0.3
Degree of myopia (h) 0 2  
Source: Commission services. 
 
The value of n* associated with each combination 
of these values is then computed and regressed on 
the variables that determine the result.  Separate 
estimates are run for different degrees of myopia h. 
The result of these regressions (
126
) (not reported) 
indicate that the parameters that most affect n* are 
– in decreasing order of magnitude - the impact 
multiplier, the multiplier persistence, the level of 
debt, the idiosyncratic shock and the sensitivity of 
average effective rates to expected solvability. The 
                                                          
(126) The regression is  
 
All parameters are very significant, except for the baseline 
interest rate. This depends on the fact that changes induced 
by consolidation are large and affect n* and it should not 
be interpreted as a claim that sovereign yields are 
irrelevant. Note however that this regression does not 
represent a true model of the underlying determinants of 
n*. Given that high number of parameters it is just intended 
to provide an indication of the average effect of the 
different parameters. 
relevance of the parameter that measures the 
reaction of interest rates to debt - γ - highly 
depends on the short-termism of the markets: with 
short-sighted markets (low h) the higher the 
sensitivity of rates to solvability, the less effective 
is consolidation in bringing down the debt ratio 
under the case in which multipliers are above the 
critical value. On the contrary with more rational 
markets the higher is the sensitivity to solvability 
the more efficient is consolidation. The non-
significance of baseline interest rate depends on 
the fact that changes induced by consolidation are 
large and affect n* and it should not be interpreted 
as a claim that sovereign yields are irrelevant. 
Table III.3.3 shows the numerical impact on the 
critical number of years of a change in the 
variables. The second column, which reports the 
coefficient of the regression, shows the average 
impact on n* of the increase of the relevant 
parameter by 1 unit. The last column is the product 
of the second and third columns and shows – in the 
range of the parameter chosen as relevant – the 
maximum potential impact on the critical year of 
each parameter in the simulations. 
The value of the baseline scenario does not 
substantially affect the critical year: n
*
 increases 
only modestly with baseline growth, average 
effective rates and output gap, and decreases 
moderately with the baseline primary balance. 
On the other hand, the multipliers are relevant. 
Impact multipliers have a significant impact on 
debt dynamics since an increase in multipliers by 
one point leads to a 6 quarters increase in n*. The 
European Commission 
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Table III.3.4: Potential impact of a 1% of baseline GDP consolidation on the critical year and return to 2011 debt levels - LP 
Low m, 
normal 
markets
Average 
m, normal 
markets
High m, 
normal 
markets
High m, 
only debt 
effect
High m, 
myopic 
markets
Baseline 
n0
Low m, 
normal 
markets
Average 
m, normal 
markets
High m, 
normal 
markets
High m, 
only debt 
effect
High m, 
myopic 
markets
BE 1 2 2 2 4 inf 2 2 2 3 5
BG 1 1 1 1 1 inf 3 3 4 4 4
CZ 1 1 2 2 2 inf 4 5 5 5 5
DK 1 1 2 2 3 inf 5 5 6 6 6
DE 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 2
EE 1 1 1 1 1 inf 4 4 4 5 5
IE 1 2 2 2 5 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
EL 1 2 2 2 ≥10 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
ES 1 1 2 2 3 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
FR 1 2 2 2 3 inf 4 5 5 6 7
IT 1 2 2 2 6 2 2 2 2 2 3
CY 1 1 2 2 3 inf 3 3 4 4 5
LV 1 1 1 2 2 5 1 1 2 2 2
LT 1 1 1 1 2 inf 2 3 3 3 3
LU 1 1 1 1 2 inf 6 7 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
HU 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 2
MT 1 1 2 2 3 inf 1 2 2 2 7
NL 1 1 2 2 3 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
AT 1 1 2 2 3 4 2 2 2 3 3
PL 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
PT 1 2 2 2 4 8 5 5 5 5 6
RO 1 1 1 1 2 5 2 2 2 3 3
SI 1 1 2 2 2 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
SK 1 1 1 2 2 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
FI 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
SE 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
UK 1 2 2 2 3 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
Member 
States
n* n0
Low Persistence
 
Source: Commission services. 
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long-term multiplier and the semi-elasticity of 
budget balance have a similar impact on n
*
. (
127
)  
Finally, a general picture of the previous results 
shows that: 
 i) for any given debt-to-GDP ratio, the value of n* 
increases with the impact multiplier when 
consolidation has no effect on yields. A three year 
horizon is reached only with very high debt (140% 
of GDP) and multiplier at around 1.4.  
3.4. COUNTRY ANALYSIS 2011-2020 
Sections III.3.2 has considered debt dynamics from 
a medium-term point of view after Section III.2.1 
presented evidence of the value of first-year 
critical multipliers for the various EU Member 
States in Table III.3.1. However, in order to 
                                                          
(127) Given these result in what follows it is assumed to set real 
growth, apparent rate, primary balance, output gap and 
long-term multiplier at zero and the budgetary semi-
elasticity at 0.5. Multiplier persistence is fixed at 0.7. 
extrapolate from the analysis presented and be able 
to draw conclusions about individual countries, the 
underlying situation in these countries must be 
taken into account. Countries with high and/or 
rapidly increasing debt are likely to be on a non-
sustainable path of fiscal policy and need to 
consolidate government finances – especially 
when they are under market pressure. Comparing 
countries on the basis of the critical year only 
could be very misleading, in that the underlying 
situation can be extremely different, especially in 
terms of debt dynamics. 
In order to gain a full picture, Tables III.3.4 and 
III.3.5 present five groups of results for low 
persistence and high persistence models 
respectively. Columns two to six show the critical 
number of years that allow debt ratios to be below 
baseline following a 1% of GDP consolidation in 
the 2011 primary structural balance. Second, 
columns eight to eleven – under the title "n0" – 
present the number of year that are necessary for 
the country's debt-to-GDP ratio to return to its 
2011 level following an adjustment by 1% of GDP 
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in the primary structural balance in 2011. Third, 
column seven gives an indication of the underlying 
debt dynamic of the EU countries. The projections 
of the baseline are based on the Commission 
services’ 2012 Spring forecasts (up to 2013), and 
the macro-economic scenario of the 2012 Ageing 
Report (see Annex III.1 for details). Column eight 
indicates the first year in which debt is projected to 
touch again the debt level of 2011. (
128
) 
Taking this baseline scenario, five possible 
parameter configurations are presented. The first 
three in which average effective interest rates 
follow a normal market reaction (i.e. they decrease 
by 30 basis points upon consolidation and increase 
by 3 basis points with debt), and multipliers are 
low, average or high (first-year multiplier of 0.5, 1 
and 1.5 respectively). The last two consider a high 
first year multiplier of 1.5 associated with a only 
debt effect (and no immediate impact from 
consolidation) and strongly myopic reaction to 
consolidation by financial markets (both effects 
induce undesired debt dynamics). 
                                                          
(128) "Inf" stays for infinity, i.e. the country's debt is diverging. 1  
means that the country's debt is converging. 
Using high-persistence models as a basis for 
analysis, it emerges that – if one believes that in 
this moment first year multipliers are high, for 
example between 1 and 1.5 – a 1% of GDP 
consolidation will take maximum three years to 
show its effects on the debt ratio unless there is  an 
immediate undesired effect of consolidation on 
interest rates. Countries for which n*=3 are in 
general high debt countries. This is in line with 
what was presented in the previous Subsection. 
However a myopic effect of the financial markets 
in case of high persistence of the effects of 
consolidation on GDP not only increase n* in 
(almost) all cases but can induce a fully reverse 
dynamic in high debt countries. 
These results can then be compared with the 
corresponding column under "n0", which provides 
the information relative to the number of years 
required to return to the 2011 debt ratio, following 
a 1% of GDP permanent consolidation with 
respect to the baseline. All countries showing a 
≥10 in the optimistic scenario have an underlying 
diverging debt dynamic: it indicates that even after 
consolidating the primary structural balance by one 
percentage point, and correspondingly decreasing 
 
Table III.3.5: Potential impact of a 1% of baseline GDP consolidation on the critical year and return to 2011 debt levels - DSGE HP 
Low m, 
normal 
markets
Average m, 
normal 
markets
High m, 
normal 
markets
High m, 
only debt 
effect
High m, 
myopic 
markets
Baseline n0
Low m, 
normal 
markets
Average m, 
normal 
markets
High m, 
normal 
markets
High m, 
only debt 
effect
High m, 
myopic 
markets
BE 1 2 2 3 ≥10 inf 2 2 3 4 ≥10
BG 1 1 1 1 1 inf 3 4 4 4 5
CZ 1 1 2 2 2 inf 5 5 6 7 7
DK 1 1 3 3 5 inf 5 6 7 8 9
DE 1 2 2 3 6 1 1 1 1 1 2
EE 1 1 1 1 1 inf 4 5 6 6 6
IE 1 2 2 3 ≥10 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
EL 1 2 2 3 ≥10 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
ES 1 1 2 2 4 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
FR 1 2 2 3 7 inf 5 5 6 9 ≥10
IT 1 2 2 3 ≥10 2 2 2 2 2 3
CY 1 1 2 2 4 inf 3 4 4 5 6
LV 1 1 1 2 2 5 1 1 2 2 2
LT 1 1 1 1 2 inf 2 3 3 4 4
LU 1 1 1 1 2 inf 6 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
HU 1 1 2 3 5 1 1 1 1 2 2
MT 1 1 2 2 4 inf 1 2 2 ≥10 ≥10
NL 1 1 2 3 5 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
AT 1 1 2 3 5 4 2 2 3 3 4
PL 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 3
PT 1 2 2 3 ≥10 8 5 5 5 6 ≥10
RO 1 1 1 1 2 5 2 2 3 3 3
SI 1 1 2 2 3 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
SK 1 1 1 2 2 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
FI 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
SE 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 2
UK 1 2 2 3 6 inf ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10 ≥10
Member 
States
n* n0
High Persistence
 
Source: Commission services. 
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debt, 10 years are not sufficient to bring the debt 
ratio at the 2011 level. The behaviour of more 
counter-intuitive cases like Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Slovenia and Slovakia are explained 
by the inner dynamic of ageing costs, which will 
start having an impact on government balances in 
the course of the next decade. It is important to 
note that comparing n0 with the baseline can be 
misleading: the fact that many countries decrease 
their n0 from infinity in baseline to two simply by 
improving their balance by one GDP point does 
not mean necessarily that these countries will have 
solved their sustainability (ageing-related) 
problems with such a small consolidation. In fact 
n0 is only the first year in which debt decreases 
back to the level of 2011 after a consolidation. If 
the dynamic of the ageing costs is increasing in the 
following years the debt will start increasing again, 
and this is not captured in the Table.  
Comparing Table III.3.4 and Table III.3.5 shows 
that higher persistence increases n* by one year in 
many all cases and magnifies the impact of the 
underlying debt dynamic in case of myopic market 
behaviour, but that his parameter has a smaller 
influence than the underlying debt dynamics.  
The required total improvement in the structural 
balance over the period in order for the debt level 
to return to its 2011 level within nine years (for the 
countries that present a diverging dynamic) is in 
general below three points.  
Table III.3.6 presents the parameter values 
assumed for the simulation.  
 
Table III.3.6: Parameter values assumed for the simulation 
Low m, 
normal 
markets
Avearge 
m, normal 
markets
High m, 
normal 
markets
High m, no 
confidence 
effect
High m, 
perverse 
markets
m 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5
alpha
beta
mu 0.0 0.3
gamma 0.03 0.3
h 3 13
0.5 or 0.8
0.1
-0.3
0.03
 
Source: Commission services. 
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Box III.3.1: Debt evolution as a function of consolidation
The present Box presents the derivation of debt dynamics underlying the formulas 
presented in the main text. In what follows, higher case letters are in level, lower 
case letters in ratios to GDP or growth rates. All variables are real and during 
period i,  is GDP,  is the cyclically-adjusted general government balance, 
 is the cyclically-adjusted primary balance,  is cyclical component of 
the balance,  is government debt at the end of year i,  is GDP growth in i and 
 is the apparent interest rate paid on the stock of government debt in year i. 
By definition the general government balance BAL is the sum of a structural 
component and a cyclical component. Taking ratios to GDP the balance, 
expressed as the sum of cyclically adjusted balance and cyclical balance is  
 
where the cyclical part of the budget varies proportionally to the percentage 
difference of GDP to baseline, with a coefficient equal to the semi-elasticity of 
budget balance . In fiscal policy analysis the tradition is to consider percentage 
difference from potential GDP. 
In what follows the annual structural effort is represented by a diminution in 
. A permanent consolidation is thus a change in  which is constant in 
terms of ratio of GDP, i.e.  where the notation means 
that the change in capb has been put in place at the first period so that the 
variation of the cyclically-adjusted primary balance remains constant with respect 
to baseline throughout all years from to onwards. 
In the literature, the fiscal multiplier of year i is defined as the variation of 
GDP over the decrease in structural primary balance i.e.  
For the purpose of notational simplicity it is also useful to define, first, the 
adjusted fiscal multiplier as the percentage variation of GDP over the decrease 
in structural primary balance-to-GDP ratio, i.e.  
 
and, second, the fiscal multiplier of the growth rate, , representing the variation 
of growth from baseline growth over the decrease in structural primary balance-
to-GDP ratio, i.e.  with the convention that 
 so that the fiscal multiplier growth rate in the period in which the 
consolidation measures are taken depends only on the first year fiscal multiplier. 
This will allow analysing the behaviour of the evolution of the debt ratio 
following a permanent adjustment in the structural primary balance. Notice that 
 corresponds to the impulse-response function used to analyse the effects of 
fiscal (or other) shocks in VAR or DSGE models. 
It should be noticed also that if the structural primary balance of the basic scenario 
is small, and given that the growth rate is usually small enough, this implies that 
 as well as  in the first period are well approximated by the fiscal multiplier  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Box (continued) 
 
as usually defined, and that  in the following periods can be approximated by 
the change in the multipliers.  
If stock-flow adjustments are null, debt-to-GDP ratio evolves with the following 
dynamics: 
 
To facilitate the readability of the formulas it is supposed that the year of 
consolidation is year 0. Debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of period n is thus: 
(Eq.III.1) 
 
It is thus possible to compute the variation of debt-to-GDP ratio in year n 
following a permanent consolidation made in year 1, where as a first 
approximation it has been assumed that interest rates do no not vary with 
consolidation. 
 
     (Eq. III.2) 
Notice that since  is constant and the derivative of the cyclical 
balance to the structural adjustment can be computed to be  if the 
baseline GDP is assumed to be close to potential GDP, the derivative of 
government primary balance-to-GDP ratio with respect to the annual structural 
adjustment is 
   
 
The derivative of debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of year n with respect to the annual 
structural adjustment is thus: 
 
  
   
Let's assume that the economy was at the steady-state before the adjustment was 
made, meaning that initial balance is constant, nominal growth is constant and 
equal to potential growth and the apparent interest rate is constant. The marginal 
impact of consolidation on the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of year n becomes: 
 
          (Eq. 
III.3) 
  
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Box (continued) 
 
With some algebraic manipulation Equation III.3.4 discussed in Section III.4 is 
obtained:  
 
 
 
The first term is the cumulative effect of the change in growth during n years to 
the debt ratio evolution. The second term is the cumulative effect of the change in 
balance on debt-to-GDP ratio. The third term is the cumulative effect of the 
consolidation.  
It is important to notice that this formula calculates the deviation of debt with 
respect to the baseline scenario – considered here as the steady-state scenario – 
due to the permanent variation in structural primary balance. It takes into account 
variations in growth rates, primary balance and GDP level that the permanent 
consolidation – or stimulus – entails.  
The short-term case corresponds to n = 1, in which case the formula becomes 
(Equation III.5): 
  
We deduct the condition on the impact multiplier for the ratio to decrease on 
impact: 
 
 
 for small g becomes the formula in the text. 
DSGE-type of models 
If one assumes that the shape of the impulse-response function follows the typical 
DSGE result, the path of the adjusted multiplier can be approximated by the 
following equation: 
        
 (Eq. III.6) 
With  and no assumption on the sign of  the long-run impulse 
response of GDP to fiscal consolidation. The formula allows representing the 
situation in which the effect of present consolidation decreases through time. No 
assumption is made on the sign of the long-run multiplier: a negative figure then  
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Box (continued) 
 
which hysteresis effects (see for example de Long and Summers (2012)) are 
present.  A positive one represents the situation in which consolidation is made 
via cuts in government consumption or increases in property taxes or a situation in 
which interest rate are lowered by consolidation. 
Substituting the function for  into the previous formula gives  
 
 
      (Eq. III.7) 
Interest rates 
It is often argued that consolidation or stimulus measures have an impact on 
yields, influencing the future path of debt. Indeed, if we assume that apparent 
interest rates paid on the stock of debt vary with the implementation of a variation 
of the structural primary balance the overall variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio at 
the end of period n becomes (Equation III.8):  
 
 
 
Where  is the variation of the apparent interest rate at period i and  is the 
debt-to-GDP variation calculated in the previous section with constant interest 
rates. A negative   indicates that consolidation effort improve market's 
confidence in government bonds and reduce yields. To describe the variation of 
yields, as a function of debt, deficit, market expectations and market short-
termism is expressed as 
  
yields vary by assuming that they depend on the expected solvability of the 
government given the level of rates. Yields depend on the expected level of debt 
at a certain horizon h assuming baseline rates: a small h means that financial 
markets are short-sighted and high h means that financial long-sighted. 
Expectations are adaptive in a sense that agents revise them if the actual level of 
debt differs from what was expected. We thus have:  
          
(Eq. III.9) 
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Box (continued) 
 
 is the yield sensitivity to structural primary balance, growth perspective and 
other external factors that affect confidence and  is the yield sensitivity to the 
debt level.
1
 
The variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio  at the end of the period n becomes 
(Equation III.10):  
 
                                                          
1
 It is to be remarked the assumption that financial markets are assumed not to take into 
account the consequences of their own behaviour on debt evolution. This seems 
coherent with the assumption of myopic behaviour.   
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The present Part has looked at the possibility of 
counter-intuitive effects of consolidations, 
whereby consolidations would lead to an increase 
rather than a decrease in the debt burden. It has 
shown that the risks of such effect to arise from 
consolidation in the present context are overstated 
under plausible assumptions, although over the 
short-term increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio may 
be observed, driven by the denominator effect. 
Such debt increases are in most cases short-lived 
and followed by a fall in the debt ratio below the 
baseline of unchanged policy. In other words, over 
the medium-term, consolidations are generally 
successful in reducing the debt-to-GDP-ratio. 
More specifically, a simulated simple empirical 
model was presented which showed that the 
presence or absence of counter-intuitive effects 
from consolidations on debt dynamics is primarily 
driven by the size of the GDP multiplier. Chapter 
III.2 presented the likely range of the multipliers 
and Chapter III.3 discussed the implications that 
these values might have on debt dynamics. The 
range was based on the existing economic 
literature; however it is likely that one-year 
multipliers are larger in the current crisis period 
than in normal times. This is borne out by both of 
the empirical evidence based on different 
econometric techniques and of a reasoned analysis 
of the factors that increase the value of the 
multipliers in model-based assessments. Chapter 
III.3 has shown that, for normal values of 
estimated cyclical elasticities and at the debt levels 
currently observed in most of the EU countries, 
with such large crisis multipliers, debt is likely to 
increase following consolidation in the short run. 
It is however shown that for high but plausible 
values of the multipliers, such counter-intuitive 
effects are short-lived unless the multipliers have a 
high persistence – which can happen only in cases 
where the fiscal adjustments are repeatedly non-
credible– or if effects on interest rates are high and 
contrary to what is normally expected in 
consolidations. A fully self-defeating dynamic 
would only be generated under very unlikely 
configurations, i.e. situations in which multipliers 
are very large and interest rates rise significantly 
(and counter-intuitively) due to the consolidation 
and debt developments. A high degree of financial 
market myopia is also required for these effects to 
exist.  
Finally, some calculations are performed taking as 
baseline current economic projections for EU 
countries. They first show that the consolidation-
induced debt increase would end within three years 
or less, with the high figures holding mainly for 
high-debt countries. Second, the Part also shows 
that a number of EU Member States have 
underlying diverging debt dynamics. This means 
that at according to the scenario used here there is 
no expectation that debt ratios will return to 
current levels within the next decade unless more 
consolidation is implemented. However, given the 
peak levels of debt ratios observed in the EU today 
and the development in fiscal governance (see Part 
II), a ten-year horizon for debt to revert to current 
levels is far too long and cannot be guidance for 
EU countries.  
The simulation-based analysis proposed in Chapter 
III.3 has a main drawback, in that it assumes that 
the relation between the risk premia paid on 
sovereign debt and fiscal multipliers is relatively 
small. Such an assumption can be problematic as 
multipliers tend to be large when real interest rates 
increase with consolidations. In the case in which 
real interest rates increase with consolidation, the 
negative impact on growth is larger which implies 
that a consolidation will take a long time to bring 
debt below baseline. The prime example for 
interest rates increasing with a consolidation is 
provided by the case in which factors affecting 
financial markets that cannot be modelled - for 
example if financial markets come to believe that 
consolidation will be reversed based on political 
economy reasons. This could entail an increase in 
risk premia offsetting the action of monetary 
policy.. This simplifying assumption is justified as 
a first approximation in the short run. Moreover it 
is to be noted that, in presence of a normal reaction 
of financial markets to consolidation. An initial 
improvement in sovereign yields followed by an 
increase of yields as a function of debt ratio would 
rather imply an initial diminution in real rates thus 
reducing the undesired effect on the debt 
dynamics. The assumption made in the text 
therefore is favourable to the self-defeating 
consolidation argument, because the transmission 
of lower interest rates would reduce the negative 
effects of consolidation. The results found here 
constitute therefore a bound to the possibility of 
having self-defeating consolidation strategies. 
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The present Part does not answer to the question of 
whether there is a case in favour of immediate 
consolidation. The answer would in substance rely 
on the belief concerning the reaction of interest 
rates to consolidation and at the same time on the 
beliefs concerning the underlying behaviour of 
interest rates. If there exist threshold levels of debt 
at which the market reacts with large and sudden 
increase in risk premia so that baseline interest 
rates increase quickly, then improvements in the 
primary structural balance bring down the risk-
premium for normal values of the parameters and 
markets do not display extreme myopic behaviour.  
A second argument relies on the behaviour of 
multipliers with time. Even where it is believed 
that the impact of consolidation on GDP is 
relatively persistent, the argument in favour of 
anticipating consolidation remains. This is because 
if multipliers are very resilient and the baseline 
scenario is one in which debt is increasing, the 
future critical multiplier can be lower as its value 
crucially depends on the debt level at the 
beginning of consolidation. Moreover, if there are 
threshold effects from the debt level, a larger 
consolidation would be required in the future. 
Although in the present Part the illustrative 
consolidation was standardised at 1% of baseline, 
the size of consolidation matters in influencing the 
negative impact on growth and debt ratios.   
A final issue that was not discussed in the Part is 
the effect of repeated consecutive consolidations. 
If consolidations are repeated, especially in periods 
where multipliers are large and persistent, the 
effects on the economy tend to cumulate along the 
line and can, in presence of myopic behaviour of 
financial markets, bring to debt increases. This 
could be the case, for example, if the target of 
fiscal policy was set in terms of headline variables, 
like headline debt or deficit ratios and not in terms 
of cyclically adjusted or structural figures. In this 
situation it is possible that the scenario 
consolidation-debt increase-consolidation-further 
debt increase takes place as far as the current 
multiplier is higher than the critical multiplier. The 
same spiral can happen with deficits, but for 
sensibly higher values of the multipliers. It is 
therefore relevant that policy recommendations are 
formulated in terms of a (path of) structural 
balances so that, once measures are taken, 
sufficient time is left for the effects of the 
consolidation measures to deploy fully. 
 
ANNEX 1 
Assumptions underlying the baseline scenario in section III.5 
 
162 
The projections below are based on the 
Commission services’ spring 2012 forecast (up to 
2013), and the macro-economic scenario of the 
2012 Ageing Report: Underlying assumptions and 
projection methodologies. The macroeconomic 
scenario has been brought into line with recent 
decisions in ECFIN on producing a unified set of 
medium-term to long-term projections. This 
decision entails that, as a general rule, the output 
gap is assumed to close in t+5, after which the 
potential growth rates converge linearly to the 
AWG baseline scenario by t+10. Hence, up to 
2021, the spring forecast was linked linearly to the 
baseline scenario in the 2012 Ageing Report 
(European Economy 2/2009). Beyond 2021, the 
scenarios discussed below assume a return of 
(potential) growth to the long-term projection in 
the 2012 Ageing Report.  
The following additional assumptions are also 
made:   
 the increase in age-related expenditure is taken 
from the so called 'AWG reference scenario' 
from the 2012 Ageing Report by the European 
Commission. Age related expenditure refers 
here to the "strictly" age-related expenditure 
i.e. excluding unemployment benefits 
expenditure. For Germany and France, the 
change for the long-term care expenditure 
component has been projected through a 
specific scenario in which the unit costs are 
assumed to be constant in real terms. 
 the primary balance is adjusted by using the 
budget sensitivities (OECD estimates) in the 
period until the output gap is assumed to be 
closed (by 2016 as a rule);  
 the inflation rate (GDP deflator) converges 
linearly to 2% in 2016 (or 2018), when the 
output gap is closed and remains constant 
thereafter, for all countries;  
 zero stock-flow adjustment after 2013; this 
means no further purchases of financial assets 
or recapitalisations of financial institutions, nor 
disposal of such assets.  
 Data (extracted from Bloomberg and 
elaborated by DG ECFIN staff) on maturing 
public debt (debt with residual maturity up to 1 
year) are used to have a differential treatment 
in terms of interest rates applied to different 
debt "vintages" (debt that is rolled over or 
newly issued in the current year, versus debt 
that has been issued in the past and is not 
maturing in the current year). 
 Two different assumptions are made on the 
long-run value to which the two interest rates 
(short-term and long-term) converge. Given the 
AWG agreed assumption of real interest rates 
linearly converging to 3%, we project 
representative long-term and short-term interest 
rates as converging respectively to a value 
above and a value below 3% (in real terms) by 
2016 in a way that the (real) implicit interest 
rate on maturing debt (new and rolled-over) is 
3%.  
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In recent years, EU policymakers have 
increasingly raised the concern that the behaviour 
of subnational governments may be one of the 
factors hindering the achievement of budgetary 
targets at general government level. This issue has 
captured increasing interest, in part because 
subnational governments' responsibilities with 
respect to the provision of public goods and 
services are expanding and they are being assigned 
additional revenues to finance their spending. 
Budgetary targets set within the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework apply to the whole of 
general government – which consists of central 
government, subnational governments and social 
security funds whereas the responsibility for their 
achievement rests solely on central government. 
This Part of the report aims at assessing the extent 
and main features of fiscal decentralisation across 
EU Member States as well as the relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and fiscal outcomes 
at general government level. It attempts to 
determine whether and under what conditions 
decentralisation can worsen overall fiscal balances. 
The Part is structured along three chapters. 
Chapter IV.1 provides a cross-country comparison 
of fiscal decentralisation according to a set of 
indicators that are constructed using Eurostat data. 
It characterises EU decentralisation arrangements 
according to the following aspects: (i) the size of 
expenditure decentralisation, (ii) the size of 
revenue decentralisation, (iii) the composition of 
expenditure decentralisation by government 
function (e.g. education, health care etc.) and by 
type or economic function of expenditures 
(transfers, investments etc.), (iv) the composition 
of subnational revenues, essentially distinguishing 
taxes and transfers from the central government, 
(v) the degree of subnational financial 
responsibility (the share of subnational 
expenditures covered by subnational taxes and 
fees, as opposed to transfers). 
The Chapter shows that there is a trend towards 
increasing fiscal decentralisation across most of 
the EU from both the expenditure and revenue 
sides, albeit with heterogeneity across countries. 
The statutory classification of countries as federal 
or unitary only imperfectly reflects the effective 
degree of decentralisation, as significant 
decentralisation can also exist in formally unitary 
countries (for instance, Nordic countries.) Across 
the EU, transfers slightly predominate over taxes 
as main revenue source of subnational 
governments. The rate of coverage of subnational 
expenditures by tax revenues is relatively low (less 
than 50% in most Member States) and has not 
increased on average since 1995 even if the trends 
are very diversified across Member States. The 
revenue composition is a key aspect as a greater 
reliance on own resources compared to transfers 
should strengthen the incentives of subnational 
governments to behave in a fiscally responsible 
way. Subnational deficits are not negligible in 
several Member States, with Spain having the 
highest deficits. Conversely, subnational debt 
levels are mostly low and generally correspond to 
less than 10% of GDP in most countries, although 
Belgium, Spain and Germany have higher levels. 
The actual size of subnational fiscal imbalances is 
to some extent masked by the tendency of central 
governments to provide additional transfers to 
cover the gap between expenditures and revenues 
of subnational governments. 
Chapter IV.2 enriches the assessment by 
comparing and contrasting key elements of 
national fiscal decentralisation arrangements 
across the EU based on country descriptions 
compiled by ECFIN services. This exercise 
provides significant added value by covering 
several aspects which cannot be captured through 
quantitative data, such as the number and legal 
status of the different subnational tiers, the 
effective degree of subnational tax autonomy (as 
opposed to simple assignment of receipts from 
national taxes), the different typologies of transfers 
and the criteria used to determine their amounts 
and the fiscal rules and budgetary procedures 
applying to subnational governments (including 
the monitoring, enforcement and possibilities of 
bailouts of subnational entities in fiscal distress).    
The Chapter highlights that EU Member States 
have generally increased their decentralisation in 
recent decades – and this is also true of 
traditionally centralised countries. Some common 
patterns emerge with respects to the functions that 
are more frequently devolved to subnational tiers. 
These include not only functions with a markedly 
local dimension (e.g. local networks and 
infrastructure, local economic development and 
territorial planning) but, in several cases, also 
education, social protection, environment 
protection, housing and health care, albeit often 
with shared competence with the central 
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government and/or with responsibilities restricted 
to the implementation of national regulations. 
Autonomous subnational taxes are quantitatively 
important in several EU Member States, mainly 
those which are more decentralised in general and 
property tax is the most widespread own revenue 
source of subnational governments.  
The weight of shared taxes (without subnational 
government having the freedom to change tax 
parameters) is large in most New Member States 
(but also in AT, PT, EL and BE) and mainly 
concern the sharing of the personal income tax. 
Transfers account for a significant share of 
subnational revenues in a majority of Member 
States. General transfers often coexist with those 
earmarked to specific expenditures such as 
investment spending. Funds are generally allocated 
on the basis of spending needs and to correct for 
differences in revenue-raising capacity across 
subnational entities (equalising transfers). This 
may weaken subnational governments' incentives 
for cost-effective provision of services and fiscal 
discipline. In terms of their overall budgetary 
discipline, subnational governments are in most 
cases subject to rules constraining their fiscal 
behaviour, such as 'golden' rules restricting deficits 
to capital expenditures or numerical borrowing 
limits. Budgetary coordination across government 
tiers exists in more decentralised countries, 
although its effectiveness in achieving national 
fiscal targets depends on its design and 
implementation. Generally, default of subnational 
entities in fiscal distress is de facto ruled out, 
although central government 'bailout' often comes 
at the price of much tighter central control on 
subnational policies. 
Chapter IV.3 analyses the relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and fiscal outcomes of 
general government. This is done by testing the 
impact of the main indicators of fiscal 
decentralisation introduced in Chapter IV.1 on the 
primary balance, expenditures and revenues of the 
general government in the EU through 
econometric regressions. Results show that (i) 
expenditure decentralisation leads to a higher 
primary balance, through lower expenditures and 
higher revenues; (ii) the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation largely depends on the way 
subnational governments are financed: if their 
revenues come predominantly from taxes and fees 
(and, among those, from autonomous taxes) the 
effect of decentralisation on the budget balance is 
improved, whereas if they mainly come from 
transfers decentralisation is more harmful for the 
fiscal balances; (iii) high coverage of subnational 
expenditures with taxes and fees (rather than with 
transfers) is associated with an improved budget 
balance, reflecting a negative effect on 
expenditures and a positive one on revenues; (iv) 
with respect to fiscal rules applying to subnational 
governments, borrowing rules appear to partly 
counteract the adverse effect of transfers on fiscal 
balances, whereas no significant effect is found for 
balanced budget rules. 
Overall, the analysis in this part suggests that fiscal 
decentralisation is not harmful for budgetary 
discipline at the general government level per se, 
although it is likely to have an adverse effect if 
predominantly financed by transfers from the 
central government and if not matched by 
subnational governments having the responsibility 
for financing the expenditures through their own 
taxes and fees. This is in line with theoretical 
predictions underlining the risk of a 'soft-budget 
constraint' associated with a high reliance on 
transfers, as subnational governments can justify 
their deficits by the lack of own revenue sources 
and so credibly threaten the central government to 
drastically cut their services if the centre does not 
provide them with additional transfers.  
Therefore, the policy concerns over possible 
adverse implications on budget balances should 
not focus on decentralisation as such but on a 'bad' 
design of decentralisation, i.e. one which is not 
accompanied by subnational financial 
responsibility. Finally, comparison of existing 
cross-country data with information in country 
descriptions underlines the complexity and multi-
dimensionality of national fiscal decentralisation 
arrangements in the EU and highlights the fact that 
the cross-country data are not sufficiently rich to 
provide a comprehensive overview of the different 
aspects of fiscal decentralisation and the 
implications that it can have for budgetary 
discipline and economic efficiency. 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
According to a large literature and several 
economic indicators, there is a widespread trend 
across advanced economies, including many EU 
Member States, to increasingly shift the 
responsibility for key public sector functions from 
the central government to subnational sectors of 
government. Although the extent and pace of this 
process varies across countries, it is no longer 
confined to federal countries and increasingly 
involves traditionally centralised ones.  
With respect to a specific government function, the 
transfer of competence can be either partial – 
where the central government retains the 
responsibility of the overall regulation while 
assigning the task of management and 
implementation to subnational governments – or 
total. Decentralisation can concern both 
expenditure and revenues, with subnational 
governments being increasingly assigned a number 
of revenue sources, mainly in the form of grants 
and taxes, in order to match, at least partially, 
growing expenditure responsibilities with 
corresponding means of financing. This Chapter 
aims at describing the extent of fiscal 
decentralisation across EU Member States based 
on Eurostat data. (
129
) It covers both the 
expenditure and revenue sides of decentralisation. 
For both sides it provides evidence on the 
aggregate extent of decentralisation (subnational 
governments' shares in total revenue and 
expenditure of general government), as well as a 
more detailed assessment based on available 
break-downs of aggregate data.  
With respect to expenditure, the relative weight of 
subnational governments across different 
government functions (health, social protection 
etc.) and types of expenditures (consumption, 
wages, capital expenditures etc.) is assessed. 
However, available data do not allow to assess 
whether the competence assigned to subnational 
governments on their share of expenditure is total 
or partial. With respect to subnational government 
revenues, the break-down between taxes and 
transfers from the central government is provided. 
                                                          
(129) Data cover until 2010 as this was the latest year available at 
the time of data extraction (February 2012) for the purpose 
of drafting the report.   
Unfortunately, Eurostat does not provide data on 
the share of "own-source" taxes of subnational 
governments, i.e. taxes which are set at subnational 
level, as opposed to tax revenues which are simply 
transferred from the central government, e.g. 
within tax sharing agreements. Similarly, no 
further breakdown of transfers, e.g. general vs. 
earmarked, is available. (
130
)  
Moreover expenditure and revenue data are 
compared to assess whether and to what extent the 
decentralisation of spending functions has been 
matched by provision of adequate means of 
financing to subnational governments. Finally, the 
developments of debt and deficits at subnational 
level are also described.  
1.2. DECENTRALISATION OF EXPENDITURES 
1.2.1. Overall degree of decentralisation  
The overall decentralisation of public expenditure 
can be measured by the share of subnational 
government spending in total general government 
expenditure. This is presented in Table IV.1.1, 
where subnational government expenditure is 
given in columns 2 to 6 as percentage of total 
general government expenditure and in columns 7 
to 11 as a percentage of GDP. The Table shows the 
levels of expenditure for the earliest and latest year 
available (1995 and 2010, respectively) and for 
2007, which was the last year before the sovereign 
debt crisis. It also presents the changes over the 
1995-2007 and 2007-10 periods. Graphs IV.3.1 
and IV.3.2 show the share of subnational spending 
in overall general government spending for 2010 
and in terms of the change over the 1995-2010 
period, respectively, in order to ease cross-country 
comparisons. 
The Table and Graphs present Eurostat data. In 
order to properly interpret the data presented, a 
qualification is needed. For most EU Member 
                                                          
(130) However, information on both of these aspects is to some 
extent provided by country fiches describing fiscal 
decentralisation arrangements in individual EU Member 
States. These have been compiled by ECFIN services based 
on a common template and questionnaire and are available 
in Annex 1. Chapter IV.2 below provides a summary of 
them. Furthermore, the OECD Secretariat produced 
indicators on effective tax autonomy which are used in the 
analysis of chapter IV.3 below.    
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States, Eurostat only provides a break-down of 
total public expenditure by three sectors; these are 
central government, subnational government and 
social security. This means that throughout this 
Part the 'subnational government' sector 
encompasses all subnational tiers of government 
(i.e. municipalities, provinces, counties, regions 
etc.) even though in most Member States 2 or even 
3 subnational government tiers exist. A further 
break-down between local and state government is 
only provided for four countries, three of which 
are federal by Constitution (DE, AT and BE) and 
one (ES) which is largely regionalised. In these 
cases 'state' is distinct from 'national' and captures 
the intermediate layer between central and local 
government, such as Länder in DE and 
Comunidades Autònomas in ES.   
According to this measure Member States differ 
largely in the extent of expenditure 
decentralisation. In 2010 DK ranked at the top 
with about 63% of total expenditure being carried 
out by subnational governments. ES and SE come 
next with 47-48%, followed by FI, DE, BE, NL, 
PL, AT and IT with figures ranging between 30 
and 40%. At the opposite end of the spectrum are 
MT with a share of only 1.6%, CY (4.8%) and EL 
(5.6%), as the least decentralised MS, and IE, LU, 
PT, SK and BG with shares ranging from 10 to 
20%. Clearly these figures suggest that the extent 
of expenditure decentralisation is not only affected 
by the institutional framework but also by the 
geographical and demographic size of the country. 
As for the institutional architecture of the country, 
it is interesting to observe that decentralisation is 
relatively larger not only in constitutionally federal 
countries but also in a few unitary ones such as the 
Nordic countries, NL, PL and IT. (
131
)  
As both Table IV.1.1 and Graph IV.1.2 show, a 
large majority of EU Member States have 
increased the share of public expenditure carried 
out by subnational governments since 1995. 
Exceptions to this are IE (
132
), NL, BG, EE and LU 
where decentralisation measured in this way  
decreased (
133
), and AT, MT and CY where it 
remained largely stable. 
                                                          
(131) IT should be considered a highly regionalised country in 
light of several reforms introduced over the past two 
decades. 
(132) In Graph IV.1.2 the figure for Ireland relates to 2008 to 
correct for the exceptional increase of total public 
expenditure in 2009-10 due to measures aimed at the 
recapitalisation of the banking sector.  
(133) See below subsection 1.2.2 for a discussion on the change 
in the share of subnational governments' expenditure by 
 
Table IV.1.1: Share of subnational government expenditure in the EU (in %) 
1995 2007 2010 Change 95-07 Change 07-10 1995 2007 2010 Change 95-07 Change 07-10
AT 31.4 30.6 34.5 -0.8 3.9 17.7 14.9 18.1 -2.8 3.2
BE 33.0 37.1 37.0 4.1 -0.1 17.2 18.0 19.7 0.8 1.7
BG 23.7 16.9 18.2 -6.9 1.3 10.8 6.7 6.9 -4.1 0.2
CY 4.2 4.6 4.8 0.4 0.2 1.4 1.9 2.2 0.5 0.3
CZ 19.2 26.1 27.0 6.9 0.9 10.2 10.7 11.9 0.5 1.2
DE 33.2 37.9 37.5 4.7 -0.4 18.2 16.6 18.0 -1.6 1.4
DK 53.7 63.3 63.4 9.6 0.1 31.8 32.1 36.9 0.3 4.8
EE 26.7 27.8 24.6 1.1 -3.2 11.0 9.5 10.0 -1.5 0.5
EL 4.2 5.5 5.6 1.3 0.1 1.9 2.6 2.8 0.7 0.2
ES 33.1 49.9 47.9 16.8 -1.9 14.7 19.6 22.0 4.9 2.4
FI 30.5 39.6 39.9 9.1 0.3 18.7 18.8 22.1 0.1 3.3
FR 17.6 20.7 20.5 3.1 -0.3 9.6 10.9 11.6 1.3 0.7
HU 23.5 23.2 25.4 -0.3 2.2 13.1 11.8 12.6 -1.3 0.8
IE 31.1 19.6 10.2 -11.4 -9.4 12.7 7.2 6.8 -5.5 -0.4
IT 24.1 31.3 30.7 7.2 -0.6 12.6 14.9 15.4 2.3 0.5
LT 24.1 24.0 27.6 -0.1 3.6 8.3 8.3 11.3 0.0 3.0
LU 13.4 12.2 11.5 -1.2 -0.6 5.3 4.4 4.9 -0.9 0.5
LV 19.2 31.0 26.6 11.8 -4.4 7.4 11.1 11.8 3.7 0.7
MT 1.5 1.4 1.6 -0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.1
NL 40.2 34.0 33.3 -6.3 -0.7 22.7 15.4 17.1 -7.3 1.7
PL 18.9 31.4 32.5 12.4 1.2 11.0 13.2 14.8 2.2 1.6
PT 11.6 15.1 13.8 3.5 -1.2 4.8 6.7 7.1 1.9 0.4
RO 12.0 25.5 23.9 13.5 -1.6 4.1 9.8 9.8 5.7 0.0
SE 37.8 46.9 47.5 9.0 0.7 24.6 23.8 25.1 -0.8 1.3
SI 14.5 19.8 20.4 5.3 0.5 7.6 8.4 10.2 0.8 1.8
SK 13.1 17.6 16.0 4.5 -1.6 6.4 6.0 6.4 -0.4 0.4
UK 25.8 28.5 27.4 2.7 -1.1 11.3 12.5 13.8 1.2 1.3
EU27 --- 29.2 28.9 --- -0.3 --- 13.3 14.6 --- 1.3
Share of subnational governments expenditure in general 
government expenditure
Subnational governments expenditure in % GDP
 
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph IV.1.2: Change in subnational government expenditure between 1995 and 2010 (percentage points of general government 
expenditure) 
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The increase in decentralisation has been 
particularly pronounced in ES, PL, RO, SE, DK 
and FI where the percentage of overall general 
                                                                                   
function. In IE the figure in Graph IV.1.2 is mainly driven 
by a sharp reduction of the subnational government's share 
in health care expenditure. Moreover, Graph IV.1.5 below 
shows that the largest reduction in the subnational 
governments' share in investment expenditure by the 
general government between 1995 and 2010 occurred in IE 
and NL.  
government expenditure undertaken at subnational 
level rose by about 10 percentage points or more. 
Graph IV.1.3 plots the aggregate level of 
government expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) 
against the percentage of subnational government 
in total expenditure in 2010. (
134
) It shows that 
there is a positive, albeit weak, correlation between 
these two variables, providing some prima facie 
                                                          
(134) Except for IE (2008), see footnote 131. 
Graph IV.1.1: Subnational government expenditure (% of general government expenditure in 2010) 
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evidence that decentralisation may be related to a 
larger overall weight of the public sector in the 
economy. 
1.2.2. Composition of subnational government 
expenditures  
Eurostat figures on public expenditure by sector of 
government can be further broken down by 
government function (cofog), although data 
availability does not go beyond 2009. (
135
) This 
allows an assessment of whether expenditure 
decentralisation is predominantly concentrated in 
specific functions. Graph IV.1.4 plots the 
percentage of subnational government expenditure 
over total expenditure by function in 2002 and 
2009 (
136
) (all government functions considered by 
Eurostat are shown). (
137
) For each function the 
average, minimum and maximum figures for EU 
Member States are shown. (
138
) Table IV.1.2 
presents the underlying data by Member State, 
                                                          
(135) At the time of writing.  
(136) 2002 and 2009 are, respectively, the earliest and most 
recent year for which a full breakdown in the underlying 
data is available for all Member States – including an EU 
average. 
(137) With the exception of defence, for which the share of 
subnational governments is basically zero.    
(138) E.g. in the EU on average about 40% of public expenditure 
on public order and safety is carried out by subnational 
governments and, across EU Member States, this share 
ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of more 
than 90% (see table IV.1.2 for details on country data).   
showing the subnational government percentage of 
expenditure in each of the 9 functions in 1999 (
139
) 
and 2009. 
As the Graph shows, the most decentralised 
functions are environment protection and housing, 
for which between 60 and 80% of total expenditure 
is undertaken by subnational governments on 
average, followed by recreation, culture and 
religion and education, with an average percentage 
higher than 40%. This pattern is to a certain extent 
in line with economic rationale, as several 
expenditure items included in these functions 
concern services to be organised on a fairly small 
(i.e. subnational) scale and where heterogeneity of 
subnational preferences is likely to be more 
pronounced, i.e. waste management, housing and 
community developments, water supply, street 
lightning, recreational and sporting services, 
nurseries etc. At the other end, the least 
decentralised functions are general public services 
(
140
), social protection (
141
) and public order and 
                                                          
(139) The earliest year available for all Member States except LT 
(2000), PL and RO (2002). 
(140) General public services cover administrative expenditure of 
public bodies, general services, debt service, basic research 
and foreign aid.   
(141) In principle, at least part of social expenditure falls within 
the 'social security funds' subsector included in the Eurostat 
breakdown alongside the subsectors of central and 
subnational governments. According to the definition in 
national accounts the subsector of social security funds 
includes central, state and local institutional units whose 
Graph IV.1.3: Subnational government expenditure as a percentage of general government expenditure and government expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP (2010) 
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safety where subnational governments are 
responsible for below 30% of all spending on 
average. Comparing the figures from 2009 with 
those from 2002 (
142
) shows that the relative 
average weight of subnational governments 
spending across functions has been reduced for 
housing, public order and safety, economic affairs, 
education, environment protection and general 
public services, whereas it increased for health and 
social protection and it remained stable for 
recreation, culture and religion. 
Across all functions, the EU average figures mask 
considerable variation across Member States. As 
can be seen in Graph IV.1.4, the minimum 
percentage of subnational governments in overall 
government spending is zero (across all functions), 
whereas the maximum one ranges from 50-60% 
(general public services, economic affairs and 
social protection) to 90-100% (all remaining 
functions). In more detail, the figures for 2009 (see 
Table IV.1.2) show that: 
                                                                                   
principal activity is to provide social benefits. Hence 
figures on subnational government expenditure for social 
protection may underestimate its actual size. However, the 
situation may differ by country due to their legal and 
administrative architecture.  
(142) The earliest year with available data for the EU average for 
the breakdown by function. 
 General public services: the percentage of 
subnational government spending range from 0 
in MT to 58.4% in DE. CY, LT, IE, DK and 
BG all have percentages below 10% of overall 
spending, whereas AT and FI have percentages 
over 30%.  
 Public order and safety:  subnational 
governments have the highest percentages in 
DE (88%), BE, ES and UK (41-43%), lowest in 
CY, EE, EL and MT (0). 
 Economic affairs: largest share in ES, BE, DE 
and IT (50-60%), lowest in CY, MT and EL. 
 Environment protection: largest share in BE, 
CY, CZ (100%), ES, FR, PL, PT and RO (85-
90%), lowest in MT, LV, FI and EE. 
 Housing: highest in BE, EE, ES and PT 
(100%), lowest in MT, CY and EL. 
 
Graph IV.1.4: Subnational government expenditure by function (% of general government expenditure by cofog) - EU average for 2002 and 
2009 and minimum and maximum for 2009 
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(Table IV.1.2 continued) 
1999 2009 Change in 
% points
1999 2009 Change in 
% points
1999 2009 Change in 
% points
1999 2009 Change in 
% points
AT 43.1 37.4 -5.7 63.6 72.7 9.1 45.7 47.1 1.4 13.5 12.8 -0.7
BE 4.8 4.4 -0.3 90.0 92.9 2.9 86.8 84.7 -2.1 17.2 20.0 2.8
BG 50.0 9.1 -40.9 14.3 37.5 23.2 60.5 55.6 -4.9 5.8 4.4 -1.4
CY 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.2 23.1 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CZ 1.4 3.9 2.5 60.0 64.3 4.3 48.3 49.3 1.0 7.9 9.7 1.8
DE 6.3 6.8 0.5 100.0 88.9 -11.1 97.9 95.8 -2.0 18.7 19.4 0.7
DK 95.7 97.7 2.1 56.2 52.9 -3.3 52.6 48.8 -3.8 47.1 52.6 5.5
EE 18.9 19.8 0.8 40.9 45.8 4.9 42.7 59.7 17.1 7.6 5.6 -1.9
EL 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 14.3 -35.7 3.4 2.4 -1.1 0.0 2.2 2.2
ES 60.4 92.8 32.4 71.4 82.4 10.9 79.5 96.1 16.5 7.5 11.0 3.5
FI 63.6 59.8 -3.8 64.3 64.3 0.0 50.6 50.0 -0.6 15.2 18.2 3.0
FR 1.4 1.2 -0.2 72.7 70.6 -2.1 26.2 31.2 5.1 5.5 8.1 2.6
HU 25.3 20.2 -5.1 37.5 37.5 0.0 50.0 47.2 -2.8 10.4 7.1 -3.3
IE 54.2 0.0 -54.2 50.0 50.0 0.0 20.4 17.6 -2.7 12.6 4.1 -8.5
IT 61.1 60.8 -0.3 44.4 55.6 11.1 28.6 26.0 -2.6 3.1 3.1 0.0
LT* 21.5 21.4 -0.2 33.3 46.2 12.8 68.3 63.8 -4.6 9.6 6.0 -3.6
LU 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.1 35.0 -7.1 22.0 22.2 0.2 1.3 0.7 -0.5
LV 22.5 27.8 5.3 50.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 53.3 3.3 5.1 6.3 1.2
MT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NL 5.3 4.3 -0.9 84.6 80.0 -4.6 48.1 50.0 1.9 14.0 10.3 -3.7
PL** 23.2 29.9 6.7 75.0 78.6 3.6 45.8 48.8 2.9 5.2 7.5 2.3
PT 5.0 5.6 0.6 46.2 63.6 17.5 7.8 10.4 2.6 1.7 2.3 0.6
RO** 23.2 29.9 6.7 75.0 78.6 3.6 45.8 48.8 2.9 5.2 7.5 2.3
SE 83.6 82.8 -0.8 78.9 75.0 -3.9 63.7 73.7 9.9 25.0 25.6 0.6
SI 13.1 10.3 -2.9 46.7 42.1 -4.6 38.4 38.7 0.3 2.9 4.1 1.3
SK 1.3 0.0 -1.3 20.0 45.5 25.5 21.4 47.5 26.0 1.9 3.6 1.8
UK 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 47.1 45.2 -1.9 19.6 20.5 0.9
EU27 --- 39.0 --- --- 66.7 --- --- 41.5 --- --- 25.0 ---
Health Recreation, culture and religion Education Social protection
 
* 1999 data is replaced by 2000; ** 1999 data is replaced by 2002 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table IV.1.2: Percentage of subnational government expenditure by function (% of total general government expenditure by cofog) - 2009 
1999 2009 Change 
in % 
points
1999 2009 Change 
in % 
points
1999 2009 Change 
in % 
points
1999 2009 Change 
in % 
points
1999 2009 Change 
in % 
points
AT 35.2 37.3 2.2 12.5 17.6 5.1 42.9 44.8 2.0 83.3 66.7 -16.7 53.3 75.0 21.7
BE 15.3 16.9 1.6 40.0 42.9 2.9 62.7 55.6 -7.2 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
BG 7.8 9.2 1.4 4.5 6.5 1.9 14.0 22.5 8.5 90.0 58.3 -31.7 50.0 85.7 35.7
CY 6.1 7.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 16.0 13.6 -2.4
CZ 32.6 28.8 -3.8 4.3 9.5 5.2 23.2 35.9 12.7 70.0 90.0 20.0 50.0 45.5 -4.5
DE 49.5 58.4 9.0 93.8 88.2 -5.5 51.0 54.0 3.0 100.0 62.5 -37.5 81.8 77.8 -4.0
DK 10.7 8.8 -1.9 10.0 8.3 -1.7 36.1 42.4 6.3 42.9 60.0 17.1 25.0 42.9 17.9
EE 18.0 15.8 -2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.3 37.7 14.5 50.0 36.4 -13.6 100.0 100.0 0.0
EL 8.9 12.1 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 3.5 0.8 80.0 83.3 3.3 50.0 25.0 -25.0
ES 17.4 21.9 4.5 42.1 42.9 0.8 50.0 60.0 10.0 88.9 90.0 1.1 100.0 100.0 0.0
FI 25.8 37.5 11.7 21.4 20.0 -1.4 20.7 27.5 6.8 33.3 33.3 0.0 50.0 60.0 10.0
FR 21.7 25.8 4.1 16.7 23.1 6.4 35.0 30.6 -4.4 85.7 88.9 3.2 75.0 81.8 6.8
HU 15.9 18.0 2.2 5.0 9.1 4.1 11.1 16.7 5.6 75.0 42.9 -32.1 90.9 92.3 1.4
IE 4.0 6.8 2.8 11.8 5.0 -6.8 32.6 23.8 -8.8 66.7 62.5 -4.2 80.0 82.6 2.6
IT 17.2 22.2 5.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 48.8 50.0 1.2 80.0 80.0 0.0 90.0 58.3 -31.7
LT* 8.1 7.5 -0.5 4.8 5.0 0.2 11.5 12.5 1.0 100.0 83.3 -16.7 100.0 80.0 -20.0
LU 14.7 18.5 3.8 11.1 10.0 -1.1 25.6 18.0 -7.6 50.0 58.3 8.3 55.6 45.5 -10.1
LV 30.2 24.1 -6.2 3.8 9.5 5.7 18.6 27.8 9.2 33.3 18.2 -15.2 92.9 66.7 -26.2
MT 9.9 0.0 -9.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NL 20.5 24.1 3.6 40.9 36.7 -4.2 50.0 45.3 -4.7 80.0 80.0 0.0 69.2 76.9 7.7
PL** 18.9 19.7 0.8 12.5 14.3 1.8 48.7 42.1 -6.6 83.3 85.7 2.4 76.5 83.3 6.9
PT 10.1 15.7 5.6 5.9 4.3 -1.5 31.9 34.2 2.3 71.4 85.7 14.3 90.0 100.0 10.0
RO** 18.9 19.7 0.8 12.5 14.3 1.8 48.7 42.1 -6.6 83.3 85.7 2.4 76.5 83.3 6.9
SE 23.1 27.4 4.3 15.4 14.3 -1.1 28.9 32.7 3.8 100.0 50.0 -50.0 53.8 87.5 33.7
SI 15.3 19.0 3.7 5.9 5.9 0.0 15.1 25.0 9.9 42.9 54.5 11.7 50.0 66.7 16.7
SK 7.4 22.8 15.4 3.7 4.2 0.5 6.5 18.2 11.7 18.2 57.1 39.0 36.4 66.7 30.3
UK 12.3 12.7 0.4 50.0 41.2 -8.8 28.6 26.0 -2.6 66.7 54.5 -12.1 62.5 31.0 -31.5
EU27 --- 19.4 --- --- 27.8 --- --- 33.3 --- --- 77.8 --- --- 64.3 ---
General public services Public order and safety Economic affairs Environment protection Housing and comm. 
 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table IV.1.3: Percentage of subnational government expenditure by economic function - 2010 
Intermediate 
consumption
Compensation 
of employees
Interest Subsidies
Social 
benefits
Other current 
expenditures
Capital 
transfers
Investment
AT 51,1 45,4 3,8 52,9 17,4 18,5 50,0 70,0
BE 69,2 77,0 8,3 20,0 12,7 16,0 57,1 88,2
BG 38,7 30,1 0,0 7,7 0,0 1,5 0,0 29,8
CY 8,8 5,0 7,1 0,0 0,0 2,7 0,0 18,4
CZ 51,6 47,4 0,0 63,2 4,1 5,9 14,3 71,9
DE 70,8 78,5 44,0 60,0 15,3 30,7 35,3 85,7
DK 65,7 71,7 10,5 53,8 71,1 3,6 14,3 61,9
EE 38,7 38,7 100,0 27,3 3,4 4,2 16,7 45,8
EL 14,5 10,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,9 0,0 20,7
ES 80,4 78,2 19,0 50,0 17,5 19,5 37,5 71,8
FI 64,6 73,6 7,1 13,3 9,6 3,6 0,0 68,0
FR 43,1 26,1 4,2 41,2 4,3 11,4 28,6 74,2
HU 43,0 50,5 2,4 18,2 3,3 2,9 12,5 66,7
IE 24,6 15,4 0,0 0,0 5,0 1,7 0,9 64,9
IT 69,5 42,3 4,5 63,6 13,6 3,4 27,3 71,4
LT 37,5 47,3 0,0 0,0 7,4 1,0 0,0 51,1
LU 32,4 21,3 0,0 11,8 0,5 3,6 0,0 39,0
LV 31,9 45,5 11,1 28,6 6,6 12,8 0,0 74,4
MT 6,6 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 4,5
NL 59,3 66,3 15,0 26,7 7,8 1,9 17,2 65,7
PL 58,1 57,4 3,8 16,7 7,1 3,9 18,2 58,9
PT 32,0 17,2 3,1 14,3 3,2 7,6 7,1 45,9
RO 33,8 34,7 12,5 16,7 7,3 2,3 33,3 37,9
SE 64,9 76,7 18,2 40,0 21,2 5,0 0,0 50,0
SI 31,9 33,9 0,0 13,6 2,6 3,3 7,1 57,1
SK 40,8 39,0 0,0 23,1 0,5 3,5 0,0 64,0
UK 37,4 46,1 6,5 33,3 11,9 0,0 9,1 50,0
EU27 54,3 52,3 14,3 46,2 12,4 11,1 24,0 65,4  
Source: Commission services. 
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 Health: highest share in DK, ES (more than 
90%), SE (83%), IT and FI (around 60%); zero 
(or close to) in CY, CZ, EL, IE, MT, SK, UK 
and FR. 
 Recreation: highest share in BE, DE, ES, NL, 
PL and RO (close to 80% or more), lowest in 
MT, EL, CY, BG, LU and HU (less than 40%). 
 Education: highest subnational share in ES, DE 
(96%), BE (85%), SE (74%), LT and EE (60-
64%), lowest in CY, MT, EL (0-3%), PT and 
IE (10-18%).  
 Social protection: highest share in DK (52%), 
SE, (25%), BE, DE, FI and UK (18-20%), 
lowest in CY, MT (0), BG, CZ, EE, EL, FR, 
HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, PL, PT, RO, SI and 
SK (less than 10%). 
As regards the change in shares of subnational 
expenditures by function between 1999 and 2009, 
taking as a threshold a 10 percentage point 
difference, the largest variation are observed for i) 
housing, with an increase in BG, SE, SK (30+pp), 
AT (20-30pp), DK, FI, PT and SI and a decrease in 
IT (32pp), LV, EL, LT (20-30pp) and LU; ii) 
environment, with an increase in SK (39pp), CZ 
(20), DK and PT and a reduction in SE (50pp), 
BG, DE, HU (30-40pp), AT, EE, LT and LV; iii) 
recreation, with an increase in SK, BG (20-30pp), 
PT, LT, IT and ES and a reduction in EL (36pp) 
and DE (11pp); iv) health, with an increase in ES 
(32pp) and large reductions in IE (54pp) and BG 
(41pp); and v) economic affairs, with an increase 
in CZ, EE, ES, SI and SK (never exceeding 15pp). 
Similarly to Table IV.1.2, Table IV.1.3 below 
provides figures for the share of subnational 
government expenditure by economic function (i.e. 
compensation of employees, transfers, capital 
expenditure etc.) in 2010. Amongst the categories 
included, the percentage of subnational 
governments in general government spending is 
highest for expenditure on intermediate 
consumption (it represents over 50% of the total in 
AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, IT, NL, PL and SE), 
compensation of employees (over 50% in BE, DE, 
DK, ES, FI, HU, NL, PL, SE and between 45 and 
50% in UK, LV, LT, CZ and AT) and investment 
European Commission 
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spending (at or over 50% in AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, 
ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, NL, PL, SE, SI, 
SK and UK). 
On the other hand, the percentage of subnational 
governments in overall spending is generally low 
for interest expenditure with most public debt 
being issued by the central government (exceptions 
to this include EE and DE where subnational 
governments undertake 100% and over 40% of this 
spending, respectively, followed by ES, SE, NL, 
RO, LV and DK, with a subnational percentage of 
10-20%), social benefits (in all cases except DK), 
other current expenditures (where the subnational 
government percentage is below 20% for all 
Member States except DE, where it is over 30%), 
and capital transfers, (with the exceptions of BE 
and AT at 50% or more and ES, DE, RO, FR and 
IT at between 25 and 40%). The subnational 
percentage in the expenditure for subsidies shows 
larger variation (it is 50% or more in IT, CZ, DE, 
AT, DK and ES).     
The above evidence on the average composition of 
subnational expenditures by economic function 
across the EU is to some extent consistent with 
recommendations from the "classical" fiscal 
federalism literature on the optimal assignment of 
main government functions across sectors of 
government (Oates, 1999). According to this 
literature, two out of the three economic functions 
of government identified by Musgrave's 
classification (Musgrave, 1959), i.e. income 
redistribution and stabilisation of macroeconomic 
shocks, should be assigned to the central 
government, leaving to subnational governments 
only the allocation of public goods with a 
subnational dimension. Such assignment is 
consistent with the "benefit principle" suggesting 
that a service should be provided by the level of 
government that most closely represents the 
community benefiting from it which implies that, 
for instance, public goods benefiting only people 
living in a city should be provided by the 
municipality, whereas national public goods such 
as redistribution and macroeconomic stabilisation 
(where risks of spillovers and free-riding are 
larger) should be assigned to the central level 
(McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 2000). The larger 
subnational weight in intermediate consumption 
and investments and the lower one in social 
benefits are by and large consistent with this 
recommendation. 
Table IV.1.3   shows that subnational government 
spending accounts for a large share of general 
government investment. To highlight this issue 
further, Graph IV.1.5 above provides evidence on 
the change in the subnational share of government 
capital expenditure (
143
) by plotting the sum of 
                                                          
(143) The figures in the graph are computed by summing up 
expenditures in capital transfers and investments (last two 
columns in table IV.1.3 above). 
Graph IV.1.5: Subnational government percentage of investment expenditure by the general government (1995 and 2010) 
 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table IV.1.4: Share of subnational government revenues in the EU 
1995 2007 2010 Change 95-07 Change 07-10 1995 2007 2010 Change 95-07 Change 07-10
AT 34.1 31.5 31.6 -2.6 0.1 17.2 15.0 15.2 -2.2 0.2
BE 34.9 37.9 38.5 3.0 0.6 16.6 18.2 18.8 1.6 0.6
BG 22.4 16.1 19.8 -6.3 3.6 8.4 6.6 6.9 -1.8 0.3
CY 3.7 4.2 5.4 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.9 2.2 0.7 0.3
CZ 30.3 27.5 29.0 -2.8 1.5 12.2 11.1 11.4 -1.1 0.3
DE 36.8 39.1 38.8 2.3 -0.4 16.7 17.1 16.9 0.4 -0.2
DK 57.8 57.2 66.3 -0.6 9.1 32.6 31.8 36.8 -0.8 5.0
EE 24.8 24.7 25.2 0.0 0.5 10.5 9.0 10.3 -1.5 1.3
EL 5.2 6.1 6.6 1.0 0.5 1.9 2.5 2.6 0.6 0.1
ES 37.6 46.5 49.0 8.8 2.6 14.0 19.1 17.8 5.1 -1.3
FI 36.1 35.3 41.7 -0.8 6.4 20.0 18.6 21.9 -1.4 3.3
FR 18.8 21.0 23.2 2.2 2.2 9.2 10.5 11.5 1.3 1.0
HU 28.2 25.7 25.9 -2.6 0.2 13.3 11.7 11.7 -1.6 0.0
IE 33.2 19.1 19.2 -14.1 0.1 12.9 7.0 6.8 -5.9 -0.2
IT 28.3 32.2 32.5 3.8 0.4 12.7 14.8 14.9 2.1 0.1
LT 24.3 23.8 33.7 -0.5 9.9 8.0 8.0 11.4 0.0 3.4
LU 13.5 11.8 11.8 -1.8 0.1 5.7 4.7 4.9 -1.0 0.2
LV 19.7 29.2 31.3 9.5 2.1 7.3 10.4 11.3 3.1 0.9
MT 1.7 1.5 1.8 -0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.1
NL 48.3 33.5 35.3 -14.8 1.8 22.8 15.2 16.3 -7.6 1.1
PL 23.1 33.0 36.3 9.9 3.3 10.0 13.3 13.6 3.3 0.3
PT 13.4 15.6 15.1 2.1 -0.4 4.9 6.4 6.3 1.5 -0.1
RO 13.1 26.9 28.5 13.8 1.6 4.2 9.5 9.7 5.3 0.2
SE 42.2 43.9 48.0 1.7 4.2 24.3 23.9 25.3 -0.4 1.4
SI 17.7 19.6 22.1 1.8 2.5 7.8 8.3 9.8 0.5 1.5
SK 6.9 18.5 17.0 11.7 -1.5 3.1 6.0 5.5 2.9 -0.5
UK 28.9 30.2 34.2 1.2 4.1 11.0 12.4 13.8 1.4 1.4
EU27 --- 32.3 33.9 --- 1.6 --- 15.5 16.2 --- 0.7
Share of subnational governments revenue in general 
government revenue
Subnational governments revenue in % GDP
 
Source: Commission services. 
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subnational government investment spending and 
capital transfers as a percentage of the sum of 
general government investment spending and 
capital transfers for 1995 on the horizontal axis 
and 2010 on the vertical axis. The figures shown in 
Graph IV.1.5 thus contain the sum of the last two 
columns in Table IV.1.3, as this total is a more 
appropriate way to capture the total contribution of 
the general government to capital formation (
144
). 
The Graph should be considered against a 
backdrop of decreasing overall government 
investment expenditure in most EU Member States 
during recent years.  
The share of subnational authorities in general 
government capital expenditure amounts to 50% or 
more in 11 Member States (BE, ES, FR, FI, DE, 
IT, AT, NL, HU, PL and DK) including all the 
most decentralised ones in terms of aggregate 
                                                          
(144) This mainly relates to the fact that capital transfers also 
include capital injections granted by the government to 
state-owned enterprises which invest in networks and 
infrastructures (e.g. railways). These enterprises may be 
classified out of the general government sector if they 
operate as market operators, hence the investments they 
undertake would not be accounted if only looking at figures 
on government expenditure on investments.      
expenditure. As the Graph shows, this share 
increased in a majority of Member States (16 out 
of 27 lie above the 45 degree line) between 1995 
and 2010, with the increase being particularly 
pronounced in FI, DE, HU, SI, CZ, LT and ES. On 
the other hand, subnational governments' 
contribution to public investments decreased 
significantly in IE, NL, BG and LU.          
1.3. DECENTRALISATION OF REVENUE 
SOURCES 
1.3.1. Overall degree of decentralisation  
This Section discusses fiscal decentralisation in the 
EU from the revenue side. First, it considers the 
overall degree of revenue decentralisation and the 
extent to which the broadening of subnational 
governments' competences (and corresponding 
expenditure responsibilities) are matched with 
corresponding financial means. Second, it 
discusses the composition of subnational 
governments' revenues, by focusing on the relative 
weight of two main sources, i.e. taxes and 
transfers.  
European Commission 
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The degree of government revenue 
decentralisation can be measured by the share of 
subnational government revenues in revenues of 
the general government. These are defined as 
revenues collected by or transferred to subnational 
governments. (
145
) Table IV.1.4 presents these 
figures for EU Member States. The format is the 
same as for Table IV.1.1, which presented the 
share of subnational government expenditures; in 
both cases the levels as a percentage of the overall 
general government total and GDP are given for 
1995, 2007 and 2010, alongside the percentage 
point changes between 1995 and 2007 and 
between 2007 and 2010 in order to single out the 
impact of the recent economic crisis. The figures 
for 2010 are also displayed in Graph IV.1.6 to ease 
cross-country comparisons. 
As shown in the Graph, in 2010 DK had the 
highest revenue decentralisation in the EU with 
around two thirds of total government revenues 
being raised by or assigned to subnational 
                                                          
(145) The Chapter differs here from a number of papers (e.g. 
Escolano et al., 2012 and Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2011) 
where revenue decentralisation is defined as the share of 
subnational own revenues (taxes and fees) in general 
government revenues, thereby excluding transfers. This is 
done as the current focus is on the whole set of subnational 
revenues and on their composition across different sources 
(taxes, transfers and fees), see below. In chapter IV.3 the 
indicator of own revenue decentralisation, distinct from the 
above indicator (i.e. excluding transfers), is introduced and 
used in the analysis.    
governments. ES and SE had subnational 
percentages close to 50%, whereas FI, BE, DE, 
PL, NL, UK, LT, IT, AT and LV had percentages 
in excess of 30%. On the other hand, subnational 
revenues make up less than 5% of total 
government revenues in MT, EL and CY and 
under 20% in LU, PT and SK. Subnational 
revenues account for 37% of GDP in DK, between 
20 and 25% in SE and FI, between 15 and 20% in 
BE, ES, DE, NL, AT and IT. The share of 
subnational governments in total public revenues 
has increased in the 1995-2010 period in the 
majority of Member States (17 out of 27). The 
increase has been particularly pronounced 
exceeding 10 percentage points in RO, PL, LV, ES 
and SK, whereas DK and LT have seen increases 
of just below that amount (fully concentrated in the 
crisis years). Conversely, reductions of over 10 
percentage points have occurred in IE and NL, in 
both cases concentrated in the pre-crisis period. 
1.3.2. Break-down of subnational 
governments' revenues: tax vs. transfers  
In terms of composition of revenues, subnational 
levels of government rely on two main sources – 
taxes (which can either be set at subnational level 
or assigned from the central government) and 
transfers from the central government. Other 
sources, which are much less important in 
quantitative terms, include fees paid by service 
Graph IV.1.6: Subnational government revenues (% of general government revenues - 2010) 
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Graph IV.1.8: Decomposition of tax revenues of subnational governments (2010) 
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users and property income. The use of borrowing 
by subnational governments is covered in Section 
1.5 below. Graph IV.1.7 above shows the break-
down of total revenues of subnational governments 
by four main sources; taxes, transfers, sales 
(essentially fees or charges on services provided) 
and other revenues (including property income, 
other subsidies etc.) in 2010. 
These figures suggest that on average subnational 
governments across the EU rely slightly more on 
transfers than on taxes as their main source of 
Graph IV.1.7: Sources of subnational government revenue (2010) 
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financing. Taxes account for 50% or more of total 
subnational government revenues in SE, DE, AT 
and LV, and for between 40 and 50% in FI, ES, 
EE, SK, CZ, SI and IT. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, subnational governments receive no 
income from taxes in MT, whereas they receive 
less than 10% of their income from taxes in EL, 
NL and BG and between 10 and 20% in RO, UK, 
IE, HU and BE. Transfers make up more than half 
of subnational government revenues in 14 
countries (PL, LT, CY, BE, HU, IE, UK, RO, BG, 
NL, EL, MT, DK and IT). Finally, fees and 
charges generally account for a much lower share 
than taxes and transfers, with subnational 
governments in LU, CY, FI and EL receiving the 
greatest percentage of their income from these 
sources amongst EU Member States at or over 
20%.          
Graph IV.1.8 above shows the break-down of tax 
revenues of subnational governments by type of 
tax (income tax, property tax, VAT etc.) in 2010 
for all EU Member States. It allows to highlight 
cross-country differences with respect to the 
predominant type of tax which is assigned to 
subnational governments. Taxes on income and 
wealth account for 70% or more of total tax 
revenues in 13 countries, including some of the 
more decentralised such as SE, FI, DK and DE, as 
well as the UK, LU, EE, LV, LT, SK, SI, PL and 
FR. Within this group of countries, this share is 
almost entirely accounted by income taxes alone 
(both personal and corporate) with the exception of 
UK and FR where wealth taxes (including property 
taxes) make up all or most tax revenues of 
subnational governments.  
Wealth and property taxes are an important source 
also in FI, NL, BG, CY and RO. On the other 
hand, taxes on production and imports are 
predominant in 11 MS (IE, EL, HU, AT, RO, PT, 
IT, CY, BE, BG and NL), albeit not including 
VAT, except in AT and PT. In CZ and ES the 
weight of production taxes and of income/wealth 
taxes is quantitatively similar, with a significant 
role for VAT. Taxes on capital are generally not 
assigned to subnational governments except in BG, 
ES and, to a lesser extent, BE and DE. 
1.4. EXPENDITURE VS. TAX 
DECENTRALISATION, VERTICAL FISCAL 
IMBALANCES 
The literature on fiscal decentralisation highlights 
that own-source revenues, i.e. subnational taxes, 
are a more efficient financing tool for subnational 
governments than transfers from the centre. The 
reason is that if the bulk of subnational expenditure 
is financed via own-source taxes, subnational 
public services are paid by the community which 
benefits from them and so their costs should be 
fully internalised by subnational policy-makers. 
Conversely if transfers are their predominant 
source of revenues, subnational governments are 
inclined to carry out looser expenditure policies 
because, firstly, the cost of subnational services is 
not fully internalised since it is partly borne by 
other subnational communities via the national 
budget and, secondly, because they anticipate that 
any financing gap will eventually be covered by 
the central government, leading to a 'soft-budget 
constraint' at subnational level (see Chapter IV.3 
below).   
However, it should be recalled that there are also a 
number of economic arguments militating against 
a full financing of subnational expenditures via 
taxes assigned to subnational governments, 
restoring some rationale for transfer schemes, as 
long as these are well designed. These include i) 
economies of scale and degree of complexity in tax 
collection and administration; ii) geographical 
mobility of tax bases (e.g. capital and investments) 
and the associated risk of tax competition among 
subnational governments to attract them; iii) tax 
exportation, i.e. risk that the subnational tax 
burden falls on non-residents (i.e. not benefiting 
from subnational services financed by those taxes); 
iv) reduced stability of subnational governments' 
revenues against business cycle fluctuations; v) 
need to carry out redistributive policies from richer 
to poorer regions and to ensure similar level of 
services throughout the country (if all subnational 
services were financed by subnational taxes poor 
regions would either be disproportionately taxed or 
receive worse services). 
Clearly, the weight of these arguments, especially 
as regards ii), varies by the type of tax. The 
normative literature on fiscal decentralisation is 
fairly consensual in recommending keeping 
personal income and corporate income taxation at 
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central level, while taxes on immovable bases such 
as property tax and fees on subnational services 
would be more suitable for subnational 
governments. VAT is often mentioned to be too 
complex to administer for subnational 
governments (Blöchliger and Petzold, 2009 and 
IMF, 2009).  
As mentioned above, existing data on subnational 
tax revenues do not allow the effective degree of 
subnational governments' autonomy in setting tax 
rates and bases to be captured, as they generally 
also include tax receipts which are transferred 
(totally or partly) from the central to the 
subnational government, with no leeway for the 
latter to adjust the main tax parameters. This 
means that a part of subnational governments' tax 
revenues may also be subject to the same adverse 
incentive effects as grants.  
Bearing in mind this data restriction, an indicator 
of vertical fiscal imbalance, capturing the share of 
subnational governments' expenditure which is 
covered by subnational taxes has been computed. 
The assumption is that the lower the gap between 
subnational taxes and subnational expenditures is, 
and so the lower the reliance on complementary 
transfers from the central government to finance 
these expenditures, the more efficient is the 
relationship between different levels of 
government in terms of the incentives for fiscal 
discipline and prudent expenditure behaviour 
(Rodden et al., 2003 and Eyraud and Lusinyan, 
2011). 
This indicator is presented in Table IV.1.5 and 
Graph IV.1.9 below. Table IV.1.5 presents the 
percentage of subnational expenditure covered by 
subnational taxes in 1995 and 2010 and the change 
between the two years in percentage points. 
The Graph plots the figures for 1995 and 2010 for 
EU Member States to ease cross-country 
comparisons. The key finding is that in 2010 tax 
decentralisation fell short of matching expenditure 
decentralisation across the EU. Subnational tax 
revenues covered more than half of subnational 
expenditures in only two countries, SE and DE. In 
AT, LV, EE, FI and CZ the percentage ranged 
between 40 and 50%, and in SI, IT, ES, FR, SK, 
DK, LU and PT, it ranged between 30% and 40%. 
 
 
Table IV.1.5: Coverage of subnational government expenditure by 
subnational tax revenues 
1995 2010
Change in the coverage 
(in points of %)
AT 42.2 48.6 6.4
BE 15.1 19.9 4.8
BG 32.4 8.7 -23.7
CY 28.6 22.7 -5.8
CZ 41.2 40.3 -0.8
DE 50.9 51.7 0.7
DK 48.6 34.1 -14.5
EE 43.6 46.0 2.4
EL 10.0 7.1 -2.9
ES 26.9 37.0 10.2
FI 49.8 45.8 -4.0
FR 45.5 36.4 -9.0
HU 20.6 18.9 -1.7
IE 6.3 13.0 6.8
IT 24.0 38.9 14.8
LT 61.4 28.3 -33.1
LU 39.0 30.2 -8.8
LV 75.6 47.5 -28.1
MT 0.0 0.0 0.0
NL 5.2 8.1 2.9
PL 42.7 26.7 -16.1
PT 33.3 30.6 -2.8
RO 59.5 11.2 -48.3
SE 57.5 62.5 5.0
SI 31.2 39.2 8.0
SK 25.0 37.0 12.0
UK 11.0 12.9 1.8
EU27 --- 28.0 ---  
Source: Commission services. 
 
Overall, there is no systematic pattern across the 
EU with respect to the change in tax coverage of 
subnational expenditures between 1995 and 2010, 
although reductions are slightly more numerous 
and tend to be larger than increases. Tax coverage 
decreased sharply in RO, LT, LV, BG (by more 
than 20pp) and more moderately in PL and DK,   
and increased in ES, IT, SK (by more than 10pp) 
and, to a lesser extent, in AT, IE, SI and SE (by 5 
to 10pp).  
European Commission 
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Table IV.1.6: Subnational government deficit vs. deficit of general government (% of GDP) 
State or local 
government deficit in 
% of GDP**
General 
government deficit 
in % of GDP**
State or local 
government deficit 
in % of GDP**
General government 
deficit in % of GDP**
State or local 
government***
General 
government***
Local government 0.0 -0.4 -0.4
State government 0.2 -0.8 -1.0
Local government 0.0 -0.3 -0.3
State government 0.4 -0.7 -1.1
BG -0.2 0.1 0.0 -3.1 0.2 -3.2
CY -0.2 -4.3 0.0 -5.3 0.2 -1.0
CZ 0.0 -3.6 -0.5 -4.8 -0.5 -1.2
Local government 0.2 -0.2 -0.4
State government -0.5 -0.9 -0.4
DK 0.4 1.3 -0.2 -2.6 -0.6 -3.9
EE -0.4 -3.5 0.2 0.2 0.6 3.7
EL* 0.0 -3.7 -0.2 -10.6 -0.2 -6.9
Local government 0.0 -0.6 -0.6
State government -0.2 -3.5 -3.3
FI -0.2 1.7 -0.3 -2.5 -0.1 -4.2
FR 0.3 -1.8 -0.1 -7.1 -0.4 -5.3
HU 0.0 -5.5 -0.8 -4.2 -0.8 1.3
IE 0.2 2.7 0.0 -31.3 -0.2 -34.0
IT -0.6 -1.9 -0.5 -4.6 0.1 -2.7
LT -0.6 -2.8 0.1 -7.0 0.7 -4.2
LU 0.2 3.4 0.0 -1.1 -0.2 -4.5
LV -0.6 -3.9 -0.5 -8.3 0.1 -4.4
MT 0.0 -7.7 0.0 -3.6 0.0 4.1
NL 0.1 0.4 -0.8 -5.1 -0.9 -5.5
PL -0.9 -2.3 -1.2 -7.8 -0.3 -5.5
PT 0.2 -2.7 -0.8 -9.8 -1.0 -7.1
RO 0.1 -4.4 -0.1 -6.9 -0.2 -2.5
SE -0.3 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.4 -0.7
SI 0.1 -3.0 -0.4 -5.8 -0.5 -2.8
SK -0.8 -7.4 -0.9 -7.7 -0.1 -0.3
UK -0.2 0.9 -0.1 -10.3 0.1 -11.2
Local government 0.0 -1.0 -0.3 -6.5 -0.3 -5.5
State government -0.1 -0.5 -0.4
DE
-4.4
ES -1.2 -9.3 -8.1
EU27
BE -0.6 -4.1 -3.5
-2.1
-1.6 -4.3 -2.7
1999 2010 Change  in points of %
AT -2.3
 
* 1999 value is replaced by 2000 
** (-) means a net borrowing 
*** (-) means a deterioration  
Source: Commission services. 
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Graph IV.1.9: Coverage of subnational governments' expenditure by subnational tax revenues (1995 and 2010) 
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1.5. DEFICIT AND DEBT OF SUBNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS IN THE EU 
This Section reviews the data on the deficits and 
debt of subnational governments across the EU in 
order to assess their contribution to the overall 
budget balance and borrowing of the general 
government. The economic rationale for some 
degree of borrowing by subnational governments 
may be implied by the need to finance investments 
in subnational capital endowments, given the 
generally significant share of public capital 
expenditure undertaken at subnational level across 
the EU (see above). Table IV.1.6 provides data on 
the subnational government deficits as a 
percentage of GDP. Figures are decomposed for 
local and state governments for DE, AT, BE and 
ES. (
146
) The figures are given for 1999 which is 
the earliest year for which data are available and 
2010, and the percentage point change between 
these two years is also given. In each case the 
Table also includes the corresponding figures for 
the deficit of the general government (
147
) to 
                                                          
(146) In this case figures for local and state governments are 
shown separately for the five countries for which this is 
possible as it is especially relevant to see which layer of 
government contributes more to the deficit of general 
government in federal countries.    
(147) ESA95 figures, Excessive Deficit Procedure.  
provide a context to the contribution of subnational 
governments to the general government’s 
budgetary position. The subnational government 
deficits in 1999 and 2010 for all EU Member 
States are also shown in Graph IV.1.10 above.   
In 2010 the largest subnational deficit, by far, is 
observed in ES, about 4% of GDP, 3.5 percentage 
points of which were generated by state 
governments. PL, AT, DE and BE follow with a 
subnational deficit of 1% of GDP or slightly more, 
with, again, a large share of this being run by state 
governments, i.e. from twice (AT) to more than 
four times (DE) that of local governments. Figures 
ranging from 0.5% to 1% of GDP are observed in 
SK, HU, NL, PT, CZ, IT and LV. On the other 
hand, a subnational government surplus was 
observed in SE and LT, whereas subnational 
budgets were balanced in LU, IE, CY and BG. In 
ES half of the general government deficit is 
generated by subnational governments, followed 
by DE, BE and AT where the share is around one 
quarter.  
Compared to 1999, the budget balance of 
subnational governments is generally worse in 
2010, with the exceptions of LT, SE, BG, CY, UK, 
IT and LV. The largest deterioration is observed in 
ES (almost 4 percentage points of GDP), followed 
Graph IV.1.10: Subnational government deficits (% of GDP), 1999 vs. 2010 
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Graph IV.1.12: Coverage of subnational government expenditures by transfers (1995, 2007 and 2010) 
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by AT, BE (1.4 percentage points), PT (1 
percentage point), NL (0.9 percentage points), HU 
and DE (0.8 percentage points).       
Graph IV.1.11 above presents data on the stock of 
debt of subnational governments as a percentage of 
GDP across the EU. (
148
) As the break-down of 
                                                          
(148) These data should be taken with caution as they refer to 
gross debt, i.e. unconsolidated, which implies that they do 
not correct for possible cross-sectoral debt holdings (e.g. 
state debt held by central government, local debt held by 
state governments etc.). This especially applies to the four 
countries (DE, AT, BE and ES) for which debts of the local 
and state subsectors are summed up.  
debt data by sector of government is only available 
from 2007, the Graph shows the debt levels for 
2007 and 2010. This allows an assessment of 
whether the recent recession has led to significant 
debt accumulation at subnational level. In 2010, 
the largest subnational debt is observed in DE, 
about 30% of GDP, followed by ES with 15%, BE 
with 12%, and AT, FR, IT and NL with around 
8%. At the opposite end, subnational debt 
corresponds to below 2% of GDP in MT, EL, BG, 
LT and SI. Some increase compared to 2007 is 
generally observed, although it is sizeable only in 
ES, DE, AT and LV. It should be underlined that 
Graph IV.1.11: Subnational government debt (% of GDP), 2007 vs. 2010 
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the size of subnational debt is also affected by the 
economic importance of the subnational sector, 
which is larger in more decentralised countries 
such as DE, ES etc.   
It is reasonable to expect that data on subnational 
deficits may underestimate the actual size of fiscal 
imbalances at subnational government level, since 
the central government may be moved to, at least 
partly, cover a rising gap between subnational 
expenditures and revenues with ex-post balancing 
transfers. This effect is often mentioned in the 
literature, and is linked to the fact that a large share 
of expenditure may be mandated by national 
legislation so that subnational policy-makers can 
claim to have limited control over it. This then 
leads to heightened pressures on the central 
government to provide additional resources.  
On the other hand, the opposite effect may also 
occur (Darby et al., 2005), i.e. the central 
government may reduce transfers to subnational 
governments, especially in times of crisis, in order 
to force them to cut expenditures and hence 
contribute to fiscal consolidations. In order to have 
prima facie evidence on which of these two effects  
prevailed in the EU during recent years, and 
especially during the economic crisis, Graph 
IV.1.12 plots figures for the coverage of 
subnational expenditures by transfers from higher 
levels of government (i.e. the size of transfers as 
percentage of subnational expenditures) in 1995, 
2007 and 2010.  
No general trend towards an increase in 
subnational governments' reliance on transfers 
during the sovereign debt crisis (i.e. between 2007 
and 2010) is found in the data, although such an 
increase is observed in CY, HU, FR, LT, SK and, 
to a lesser extent, LV, IT, EE and DK. This 
suggests that some pressure on central 
governments to provide additional resources to the 
subnational ones may have occurred in these 
countries. The reverse has occurred in AT, EL, IE 
and BE. Over the previous period (i.e. 1995 to 
2007) transfer dependence decreased in 13 
Member States, and particularly so in CZ, ES, IT 
and HU, and increased in 10, with the increase 
being most significant in RO, BG, LT, SK, AT and 
DK.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that none of the two 
above mentioned effects occurred in a systematic 
way across the EU, although one or the other 
probably occurred in different groups of Member 
States, during the recent crisis. The figures are also 
likely to be influenced by reforms introduced in a 
number of countries to increase the share of tax 
revenues assigned to subnational governments. 
However, further analysis (which is out of the 
scope of this Chapter) would be required to 
disentangle the different effects as figures in Graph 
IV.1.12 do not control for a number of factors, 
such as denominator effects (i.e. changes in the 
transfers' coverage driven by changes in 
subnational expenditures, rather than transfers), 
offsetting movements of the two above mentioned 
effects, or reforms which were not driven by 
subnational spending pressures or consolidation 
needs.    
1.6. CONCLUSIONS  
This Chapter has analysed evidence on the extent 
and key features of fiscal decentralisation in the 
EU. It covered expenditures and revenues (both on 
aggregate and in terms of composition) as well as 
borrowing of subnational governments. The data 
show that, on average across the EU, subnational 
governments have a large share of fiscal 
responsibilities within general government and that 
this share has been increasing in most Member 
States during the 1995-2010 period. This trend 
concerns both expenditures and revenues and is 
not confined to countries with a federal structure 
from the legal point of view. 
In terms of revenue composition, subnational 
governments still rely heavily on transfers from 
higher levels of government in most Member 
States, which may lead to adverse incentives in 
terms of fiscal discipline via 'soft-budget 
constraints'. On the other hand, the weight of tax 
revenues assigned to subnational governments has 
increased in a few countries in recent years. The 
subnational share of general government deficit 
has generally increased in recent years, including 
in some of the most decentralised such as ES, AT, 
DE and BE although there is no one-to-one link 
between subnational deficit and decentralisation as 
shown by the cases of DK and SE. 
In Chapter IV.2 below, aspects of decentralisation 
which cannot be assessed via Eurostat data will 
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also be to some extent covered based on country-
specific analysis providing descriptions of fiscal 
decentralisation arrangements across the EU. Such 
aspects mainly include the effective tax autonomy 
of subnational governments (e.g. distinguishing 
genuine subnational taxes from assignment of 
revenues of national ones), the type of transfers 
and fiscal rules and budgetary frameworks 
applying to subnational governments. Furthermore, 
a more precise analysis of the impact of the 
various aspects of decentralisation considered in 
this Chapter as well as others (e.g. effective tax 
autonomy and fiscal rules) on fiscal outcomes of 
the general government is carried out in Chapter 
IV.3 below. 
2. NATIONAL FISCAL DECENTRALISATION ARRANGEMENTS 
- A DESCRIPTION BASED ON COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
ANALYSIS 
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2.1. THE CONTENT OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
ANALYSIS ON FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Following the description of the extent and main 
aspects of fiscal decentralisation in the EU based 
on available data in Eurostat carried out in Chapter 
IV.1, this Chapter presents more in-depth 
description of national fiscal decentralisation 
arrangements, based on country-specific analysis 
for all 27 EU Member States. The Chapter 
highlights main commonalities and differences 
across the EU, whereas the full country-specific 
analysis is contained in country fiches which are 
available in Annex 1. 
Compared to information in the previous Chapter, 
those provided in the fiches are more qualitative 
and institutional. Fiches have been compiled based 
on a common template and questionnaire; 
information provided can be distinguished in four 
main building blocks: 
overall institutional description of the system, i.e. 
number of government tiers, indications of main 
laws and reforms which have shaped the current 
system, constitutional status of subnational 
government tiers etc. 
Areas of competence and size and composition of 
expenditures of subnational governments. This 
includes indications of the functions which are 
devolved to subnational tiers and, as far as 
possible, the extent of subnational autonomy in 
setting standards of services within the devolved 
functions.   
Financing of subnational governments. This 
includes a description of the composition of 
subnational revenues across own sources 
(essentially subnational taxes), shared taxes (i.e. 
national taxes the receipts of which are totally or 
partly allocated to subnational government tiers) 
and transfers.  
Budgetary frameworks and fiscal rules applying to 
subnational governments. 
Points 3 and 4 are those which enrich information 
provided in Chapter IV.1 to a larger extent. Point 3 
allows, firstly, to distinguish genuine subnational 
taxes, where subnational authorities are free to 
change, fully or partly, tax rates and/or bases, 
exemptions etc., from taxes which are simply 
shared between the central and subnational 
government sector. Secondly, it provides 
information on the allocation formulas of shared 
tax revenues and transfers from the central 
government, i.e. whether they are somehow based 
on costs of services to be provided by subnational 
governments or compensate for differences in 
fiscal capacity across them (horizontal 
equalisation). Thirdly, it distinguishes different 
types of transfers, e.g. general or earmarked.  
Point 4 briefly describes, among other things, the 
difficulties encountered with ensuring fiscal 
discipline at subnational level, by highlighting 
recent changes in the budgetary framework; it also 
refers to monitoring, sanctions and enforcement of 
subnational fiscal rules, the role of the ministry of 
finance or other public bodies in this area and the 
possibility of bailing-out subnational entities in 
financial distress. 
2.2. A SUMMARY OF MAIN PATTERNS OF 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN THE EU 
BASED ON COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS     
This Section summarises the main patterns of 
fiscal decentralisation arrangements across EU 
Member States based on the description contained 
in country fiches covering each Member State (see 
Annex 1). The focus is on the main commonalities 
and differences across the EU, or across groups or 
clusters of Member States as regards the four main 
elements listed above. 
The reader should be aware that an exhaustive 
comparison of country systems in this field would 
be an immense task, both for the sheer amount of 
information that need to be collected and analysed 
and for the novelty of this exercise at EU level, 
and hence is beyond the scope of this Chapter. The 
focus here is rather on providing a preliminary 
overview based on a first attempt to systematically 
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collect qualitative information for all Member 
States. A more established tradition for reviewing 
national systems in this field exists at the OECD 
Secretariat, which set up a Network on Fiscal 
Relations across Levels of Government which has 
been active already for a few years by now. 
2.2.1. General considerations on the role and 
weight of subnational governments 
across the EU 
As it could be easily expected, there is a large 
variation in the depth and main features of fiscal 
decentralisation across EU Member States, 
reflecting the different status recognised to 
subnational governments in the national 
Constitutions. A first demarcation can be drawn 
between federal or highly regionalised states such 
as DE, AT, ES, BE and IT, on the one hand, and 
unitary states, on the other. However, it is quite 
striking to see that the constitutional definition of a 
country as federal or unitary only imperfectly 
reflects the actual weight of subnational 
government tiers in the delivery of public services 
and their ability to raise revenues.  
Actually, all EU Member States, including the 
smallest ones such as MT, CY and LU, set up 
some form of subnational government (i.e. 
municipalities) with autonomous and 
democratically elected institutions, as opposed to 
decentralised articulations of central 
administration. Secondly, several Member States, 
albeit not being statutorily federal, assign a very 
large role in terms of public service delivery and 
revenue raising capacity to subnational 
governments, in some cases even larger than in 
constitutionally federal countries, see for instance 
Nordic Member States such as DK, SE and FI as 
opposed to AT. 
Thirdly, there appears to be a general trend 
towards increasing rather than decreasing 
decentralisation of state functions to subnational 
authorities and this move also concerns countries 
with a strong centralised tradition, such as FR, 
which has enacted several legislative reforms 
between the 1980s (Defferre laws) and the 2000s 
to create new layers of subnational governments 
and strengthen the existing ones, or the UK which 
has created devolved authorities in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland and is currently 
discussing an agenda for 'localism' to increase 
subnational authorities' leeway in taking decisions 
over their share of expenditure.  
Fourthly, across the EU it is very common to have 
more than one tier of subnational governments, 
with the exception of smaller countries such as 
CY, LU, EE, LV, SI, FI and BG, where 
municipalities are the only subnational level. Other 
countries have either two tiers of subnational 
governments(
149
) or three tiers(
150
) (DE, IT, ES, 
AT, PL, FR, BE, SE and UK(
151
)). In a few cases 
special entities exist for capital cities(
152
) and the 
division of tiers is not the same across the whole 
national territory, e.g. in UK and IE. (
153
) In BE the 
specific ethnic situation motivated the creation of 
two different types of upper subnational tier, i.e. 
regions (Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders) and 
communities, the latter reflecting the three 
language groups existing in the country (French, 
Flemish and German-speaking).   
An issue mentioned in a few fiches is the 
excessively small scale (in terms of population) of 
municipalities which prevents them from 
maximising efficiency in the provision of their 
services (e.g. HU, FR and AT). Attempts to 
overcome this problem are made by gradually 
increasing the average size of municipalities by 
cutting their number or encouraging mergers (FI, 
NL) or by setting-up inter-municipal associations 
to jointly provide certain services (FR, NL, IE). 
This suggests that insufficient exploitation of 
economies of scale in providing public services 
may constitute a serious challenge for setting up an 
effective decentralised system.    
2.2.2. Expenditures of subnational 
governments 
As far as the government functions that are 
devolved to subnational tiers are concerned, a 
number of common patterns can be highlighted. 
Services that are typically provided on a smaller 
                                                          
(149) I.e. municipalities and regions or counties 
(150) Including municipalities, provinces/counties and 
regions/states. 
(151) Including devolved authorities of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. 
(152) E.g. in UK, LT, LV, EE. 
(153) In UK 'unitary authorities' are the only subnational tier in 
certain areas whereas in others shire counties exist which 
are further subdivided into districts. Similarly, in IE two 
tiers exist in rural areas (town and county councils) and 
only one in urban areas (city councils). 
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geographical scale and need to be better tailored to 
subnational preferences, such as subnational 
infrastructures and utilities, including roads, 
subnational public transports, water and heating 
supply, waste management, housing, subnational 
economic development and territorial planning are 
generally attributed to municipalities, which is 
consistent with the normative literature on fiscal 
federalism. At the same time, in a majority of 
Member States subnational governments also have 
at least partial competence over education, social 
protection/social services and environment 
protection.   
Their involvement over education may concern, 
according to the country considered, pre-school 
services (i.e. nurseries) but also primary and 
secondary education and vocational training (DE, 
BE, ES, CZ, SK, AT, Baltics), whereas higher 
level education (i.e. universities) are normally 
excluded from subnational competence (except in 
DE and BE). In case a two or three-tier subnational 
structure exists, responsibilities can be further split 
between municipalities, often being in charge of 
nurseries and primary schools, and 
provinces/counties, managing secondary schools 
(e.g. SK). As regards social protection, subnational 
governments are often attributed fairly limited 
tasks such as providing social assistance services 
to vulnerable people such as elderly, homeless and 
disabled(
154
) (e.g. IT, LT, LV and EE). However, 
in a few countries their tasks also include actual 
payment of welfare benefits to individuals (DK, 
FI, SE, LT), which are in some other cases 
managed by autonomous social security agencies 
(DE, IT). 
As regards the management of health care systems, 
subnational governments have a relatively 
important role in IT(
155
), AT, ES, PL, DK(
156
), SE 
and FI, where they are in charge of the actual 
provision of medical services within hospitals. In 
some countries, e.g. LV, LT and EE, 
responsibilities of subnational governments in this 
area are more limited as, although the latter may 
have the ownership of hospitals, these are actually 
financed and run by specialised agencies (e.g. the 
Health Insurance Fund in Estonia) or by health 
                                                          
(154) E.g. organising shelters or structures for care of the elderly. 
(155) In IT health care is almost completely devolved to regions, 
and account for 80% of their expenditure. In turn regions 
account for 2/3rds of total subnational expenditure.   
(156) In DK it is the responsibility of regions. 
insurance companies. Still in these countries 
municipalities are responsible for organising some 
'ancillary' services, such as transport of patients to 
the health establishments, and may be liable to 
cover excess expenditures of establishments of 
their ownership. 
When discussing the attribution of specific 
functions to subnational governments it is 
important to distinguish cases where they have full 
competence, i.e. they are free in designing the 
corresponding policies subject to compliance to 
national laws, from cases where they are only in 
charge of implementing national guidelines and 
regulations. (
157
) Although information in the 
fiches on this aspect is very limited, the overall 
impression is that subnational governments tend to 
enjoy large autonomy in setting policies 
concerning subnational community services and 
utilities (e.g. road networks, subnational transports, 
waste disposal etc.). On the other hand, when they 
have responsibilities in the areas of health care, 
education and social protection (e.g. payment of 
social transfers) they are to a large extent bound by 
national rules and guidelines(
158
), including in 
highly decentralised countries such as, for 
instance, ES(
159
). In these cases national standards 
often aim at ensuring homogeneous level and 
quality of services throughout the country. 
In a few Eastern Member States (e.g. PL, BG, SI) 
an explicit distinction is made between 'own' 
competences of subnational governments, where 
the latter retain a larger degree of freedom (i.e. 
economic affairs, culture and recreation, 
subnational networks and utilities, nurseries), and 
competences 'delegated' or 'transferred' from the 
central government, on which the latter remains 
responsible for overall regulation (e.g. social 
protection, education, health care).      
A last observation on the expenditure side 
concerns the existence of shared competences 
between the central and subnational layers of 
government. This is especially relevant in DE, a 
federal country with a large role of Länder and 
                                                          
(157) Including those contained in ministerial decrees, circulars 
etc. 
(158) E.g. on the eligibility to benefits, teachers' qualifications, 
number of pupils per class, minimum services in health 
care etc. 
(159) Exceptions are Nordic countries where subnational 
autonomy is large even in these three domains. 
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where most legislation is passed as concurrent 
legislation of the federation and the Länder, except 
for social security where policies are shaped by the 
federation and education, which is Länder 
competence, and AT, where the competence on 
health care is essentially split between the social 
security system, which regulates the activity of 
family physicians, and states, which run hospitals 
with a large margin of autonomy. (
160
) 
2.2.3. Financing of subnational governments - 
own taxes, shared taxes and transfers 
Moving to subnational governments' revenue 
sources, an important distinction to be made is the 
one between Member States that grant to 
subnational governments the possibility to raise 
their own taxes, with at least partial freedom to 
change key tax parameters, and those that do not.  
Autonomous taxes are an important revenue source 
for subnational governments in SE, FI, DE, where 
there is concurrent legislative competence of 
Länder and federation on most tax matters, ES, 
BE, IT, FR (albeit more for municipalities than for 
departments and regions), BG, PL (only for 
municipalities), CZ (only for municipalities), CY, 
HU, DK (only for municipalities) and LU. 
Conversely, own taxes of subnational governments 
have a low weight in AT, LT, EE, IE, UK, NL, 
RO, SK and PT and, finally, there is basically no 
subnational tax autonomy in MT, SI, EL and LV.      
The tax which is more often assigned to 
subnational governments with autonomy in setting 
its rate and/or base is the property or real estate 
tax, which is levied on buildings and/or land and 
on domestic and/or business properties.  This is the 
case in all countries except in MT, EL and LV, 
although even in the latter two countries receipts of 
the property tax are at least partly assigned to 
subnational governments. This tax is commonly 
assigned to municipalities. In a few Member 
States, such as DE or BE, upper subnational tiers 
(Länder and regions, respectively) are also entitled 
to tax properties.  
                                                          
(160) In the case of AT, in particular, transferring workload from 
hospitals to family physicians, which would allow 
significant savings, has so far been hindered by this 
division of responsibilities. 
Subnational governments are also generally 
allowed to levy taxes on vehicles (or vehicle 
registration), on donations/inheritances, gambling 
and on subnational economic activities such as 
public markets, although such sources normally 
represent a small share of subnational revenues. In 
a few cases, subnational governments are also 
entitled to autonomously raise taxes on corporate 
income or subnational business taxes. This is the 
case in IT (with the regional tax on productive 
activities, the IRAP)(
161
), ES (for municipalities), 
DE, PL, CZ, HU, PT and LU. Finally, the tax on 
personal income largely remains a national tax 
(albeit quite often its revenues are shared with 
subnational governments, see below) across the 
EU with only some exceptions, i.e. DE, ES, SE, FI 
and DK. The VAT remains everywhere a national 
tax, except for a regional sur-tax in BE (see 
below).  
In some cases, subnational tax autonomy is granted 
via the possibility to raise surtaxes on national 
taxes. Regional and municipal surtaxes on personal 
income exist in IT and BE (with leeway to change 
the rate within a band in IT); BE also allows a 
regional surtax on VAT and municipal and 
provincial surtaxes on the regional real estate tax. 
A municipal surtax on corporate income exists in 
DE and a provincial surtax on car registration in 
NL.  
Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that 
despite large historical and institutional differences 
across the EU, general patterns in the assignment 
of own tax powers to subnational governments 
exist and they are by and large consistent with 
recommendations from normative fiscal federalism 
literature. This especially concerns the use of real 
estate tax as a subnational own revenue source 
almost everywhere in Europe, as real estates and 
properties constitute an a-cyclical and immobile 
tax base and hence are not associated with risk of 
tax competition among subnational governments 
and of large volatility of tax receipts (see Chapter 
IV.1). However, as shown by IMF staff estimates, 
the revenue potential of property taxes is not fully 
reaped in most advanced economies. (
162
) 
                                                          
(161) Italian regions have the power to increase or reduce by 1 pp 
the basic IRAP rate (see fiche of Italy in Annex 1).  
(162) According to IMF staff estimates, taking as a benchmark 
the average revenues ratios of the best performers among 
high income countries, the revenue potential from property 
taxes is about 2.5-3% of GDP, with most advanced 
Part IV 
Fiscal decentralisation in the EU - main characteristics and implications for fiscal outcomes 
 
189 
Similarly, the prevalent assignment of personal 
income tax and of VAT to the central government 
is in line with economic arguments related to 
cyclical volatility of revenues from those taxes, 
redistributive objectives of tax policy, tax spill-
overs beyond subnational boundaries and 
administrative complexity which all contribute to 
make these revenue sources less suitable for 
subnational governments. 
Additionally, it is important to underline that 
assignment of own taxes to subnational 
governments does not imply that the latter are 
responsible for collecting revenues from those 
taxes. Tax collection mostly remains a task of the 
central government, which eventually transfers to 
subnational governments the amount of tax 
revenue they are entitled to based on residence of 
tax-payers or other criteria (see below).   
Besides autonomous taxes, EU subnational 
governments and especially municipalities also 
collect other types of own revenues, such as user 
charges/fees on services. (
163
) These account for a 
normally minor share of subnational revenues, 
with some exceptions such as FI and IE (see also 
Chapter IV.1). From the reading of fiches it 
appears that it is sometimes difficult to draw a line 
between fees and autonomous taxes. A reasonable 
criterion should be that fees, unlike taxes, are 
prices to be paid in return to specific services. 
Further own revenues sources are those from 
subnational properties.    
The second category of subnational revenues is 
shared taxes. In order to avoid confusion with 
autonomous taxes, in this exercise shared taxes 
only include receipts of national taxes which are 
fully or partly assigned by the central government 
to subnational governments, with the latter having 
no autonomy in setting tax parameters. This 
implies that cases where central and subnational 
governments share receipts from a tax but 
subnational governments also have, at least partly, 
the power to set its rate or base, falls within the 
                                                                                   
economies being largely below this level, as average 
property tax receipts amount to less than 1% of GDP across 
OECD countries.   
(163) E.g. water supply, sewerage, heating supply, issuance of 
permits for certain professions/economic activities, 
construction activities or use of land 
category of autonomous taxes. This is to a large 
extent the case of DE and ES. (
164
)    
With this definition in mind, tax sharing is an 
important revenue source for subnational 
governments in BE (for the upper tier, i.e. regions 
and communities), AT, LV, LT, EE, RO, PL, CZ, 
SK, EL, HU, PT, SI and LU. On the other hand tax 
sharing without subnational autonomy in setting 
tax parameters has a relatively small weight in DE, 
ES(
165
) (except for municipalities in both 
countries)(
166
), IT, DK, FI, IE, UK, FR, whereas it 
is basically absent in MT, CY, SE, NL and BG. In 
several cases, the sharing of personal income tax 
receipts plays a significant role, i.e. in BE, LV, LT, 
EE, RO, PL, SK, EL, HU, PT, SI. Sharing of VAT 
is important in BE, ES, IT, CZ, EL, PT and LU, 
whereas corporate income tax is shared in DK, FI, 
AT, PL and PT. Property taxes (on either buildings 
or land) are shared in UK (on business properties), 
EE, LT, LV and EL. Other shared taxes are the 
vehicle tax (IE, LU), inheritance tax (LT), a 
gambling tax and natural resource tax (LV) and 
excise on alcohol-tobacco (ES, LU), electricity tax 
(ES). In AT the proportions in which tax revenues 
are shared between central government, states and 
municipalities are set every six years through 
negotiations between the three government tiers. 
The third and last main category of subnational 
revenues are transfers from the central 
government. They can be divided in two 
categories, (i) general transfers, i.e. those which 
finance subnational expenditures without 
obligation as regards the specific function/ item for 
which they have to be used; (ii) transfers 
earmarked to finance a specific function or item of 
subnational expenditures. 
                                                          
(164) In DE and ES tax sharing and subnational tax autonomy 
largely go together. In DE tax matters mostly fall within 
concurrent legislation of the Federation and the Länder and 
at the same time the main taxes (income tax, corporate tax 
and VAT) are shared between the two tiers in similar 
proportions. In ES personal income tax rates are composed 
of two parts, one set by the central government and the 
other set by autonomous communities. The same applies 
for allowances and exemptions. 
(165) See footnote 163.  
(166) In ES municipalities that are capitals of provinces or 
communities get a share of personal income tax, VAT and 
alcohol-tobacco excise. A small part of personal income 
tax and VAT is allocated by Länder to municipalities in 
DE, whereas the latter can autonomously raise a local 
business tax (Gewerbesteuer).  
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General and earmarked transfers, taken together, 
are the main revenue source for subnational 
governments (accounting for half of their revenues 
or more according to the fiches) in MT, UK, IE, 
NL, BG, IT, DK, BE (for municipalities and 
provinces), LT, CZ (for regions), PL. They are 
quantitatively important, albeit to a lower extent, 
also in CY, SK, RO, AT (for states, less for 
municipalities), LV, EE, FR, PT, HU, LU and CZ 
(for municipalities). The incidence of transfers 
compared to own taxes and shared taxes is instead 
quite low in ES, DE, BE (for regions and 
communities), AT (for municipalities), SE, FI, SI 
and EL. 
Normally, general and earmarked transfers coexist. 
This is the case in BE, SE, DK, FI, EE, IE, UK, 
NL, MT, CY, BG, FR(
167
), PL, CZ and HU 
although the distinction between the two types is 
not always straightforward based on information in 
the fiches. In some cases all transfers are by and 
large earmarked (RO, LU, PT, SK and LV). In 
several Member States earmarked transfers are 
devoted to subnational capital/infrastructure 
expenditure(
168
) (LU, SI, HU, CY, PL, BG, FR, 
UK, IE, EE, LV, DE for municipalities), education 
(LV, IE, UK, PL, CZ, SK, PT, LU for nurseries) or 
social expenditures (PT, CZ, NL, UK). In a few 
new Member States, own revenues mainly finance 
autonomous subnational functions whereas 
transfers are used to fund state-delegated 
functions(
169
) (CZ, BG, LT, SK).  
Quite frequently transfers are allocated to 
subnational governments based on equalisation 
criteria, i.e. aiming at ensuring uniform levels and 
quality of services across different subnational 
entities within the country. This is normally done 
in two ways: (i) via transfers from central to 
subnational governments providing the latter with 
sufficient resources to fulfil their expenditure 
obligations (vertical equalisation) and (ii) via 
transfers between subnational governments 
compensating for differences in revenue-raising 
                                                          
(167) Transfers are divided between current and capital 
expenditures, the former category being admittedly very 
broad to qualify as earmarked transfer. 
(168) The latter mainly including improvement of networks and 
infrastructures linked to government functions carried out 
by subnational governments, e.g. roads, school buildings 
etc. 
(169) Albeit with some subnational co-financing with own 
resources. 
capacity and cost of service provision across them 
(horizontal equalisation).    
Equalising transfers exist in DE, ES, SE, LV, FI, 
LT, EE, IE, UK, NL, RO, BG, PL, SI, PT, FR and 
HU. The amounts assigned to the different 
subnational governments are set via specific 
allocation formulas normally based on 
demographic variables (mainly population size(
170
) 
and age structure) and economic variables (e.g. 
unemployment rate), which allow to compute 
expenditure needs in the various subnational 
entities, as well as on measures of tax capacity. 
The formula can be more or less complex 
depending on the Member State; additional 
allocation criteria used are number of properties, 
geographical size of the subnational entity, 
remoteness of local areas, length of roads network 
etc. In DE(
171
) and ES(
172
) the equalisation system 
is articulated in different steps. 
However, the equalisation formula can be applied 
not only to the allocation of transfers, but also to 
that of shared tax revenues (these cases were 
included in the list of countries in the previous 
paragraph), making the distinction between these 
two categories of revenues not always clear cut. 
This is the case for the allocation of VAT revenues 
in DE, of the personal income tax in SI and HU, 
and of a joint pool of taxes, which are put together 
                                                          
(170) E.g. size of transfers being determined as a lump sum per 
inhabitant. 
(171) DE operates a strong system of fiscal equalisation among 
the Länder aimed at ensuring equivalent living standards 
across them. This is essentially achieved by a complex 
system of VAT receipts redistribution in three steps, (i) 
vertical redistribution (from centre to Länder) of part of 
VAT to Länder with below-average tax revenues, (ii) 
horizontal transfers from Länder with above average fiscal 
capacity to those with below-average fiscal capacity, (iii) 
supplementary federal transfers to Länder with lower fiscal 
capacity. This system allows to largely compress cross-
Länder differences in per capita revenues. Municipalities 
also receive vertical (from their Land) and horizontal (from 
richer municipalities) transfers to minimise differences 
between their fiscal capacity and their expenditure needs. 
(172) ES also has an elaborate system of transfers with multiple 
steps to ensure uniform access to social services across all 
Comunidades. Firstly, all Autonomous Communities 
contribute 75% of their tax revenues to a Guarantee Fund 
which is then redistributed among them based on their 
funding needs for 'essential public services'. Secondly, 
supplementary transfers are provided by the central 
government to those Autonomous Communities with 
residual financing needs through the Global Sufficiency 
Fund and through other funds aimed to further reduce 
differences in financing capacities.   
Part IV 
Fiscal decentralisation in the EU - main characteristics and implications for fiscal outcomes 
 
191 
in subnational funds and then redistributed to 
subnational governments, in ES, PT, EL and LU.  
Allocation of transfers based on expenditure needs 
and independent of the quality and efficiency of 
service provided tend to discourage the adoption of 
cost-saving or efficiency enhancing measures by 
subnational governments. Although this problem is 
pointed out in several fiches, no Member State, 
except DK (see 2.2.4 below), appears to have 
introduced mechanisms to correct this feature. 
However, this may be partly explained by the fact 
that performance-based transfers should be 
conditional on outputs, i.e. on the quantity and 
quality of public goods and services delivered and 
on access to them, rather than on outcomes, i.e. the 
short and long-run consequences of public service 
provision for consumers and taxpayers(
173
), as the 
latter can be affected by factors beyond the control 
of subnational authorities. Therefore, performance-
based transfers may be difficult to design as the 
distinction between outputs and outcomes is often 
not clear cut (Shah, 2007). This being said, it 
should be pointed out that formulas based on 
"presumed" costs, measured by demographic or 
socio-economic indicators, would still be 
preferable in terms of incentives than systems 
which simply cover the amount of expenditures 
claimed by subnational governments. This is 
illustrated by recent experience in IT(
174
), which 
plans to move from historical to 'standard' costs of 
services as main criterion for subnational 
financing, and NL, where reimbursement of 
subnational claims for social expenditures has been 
replaced by assignment of fixed (formula-based) 
amounts of resources.    
Another problematic feature of a transfer-based 
system is the tendency to largely reduce the 
amount of transfers to subnational governments 
during 'bad' economic times while keeping 
subnational obligations to provide services 
                                                          
(173) E.g. in the case of education, literacy rates and supply of 
skilled professionals.  
(174) In IT a far reaching reform to deepen the system of fiscal 
decentralisation is currently being implemented (starting 
from 2009), implying major changes also for the financing 
of subnational governments: (i) introducing the 'standard 
cost' principle, rather than the 'historical cost' one to 
determine subnational expenditure needs, so that 
subnational entities providing services at higher costs will 
have to raise additional resources to cover them; and (ii) 
the introduction of equalisation transfers across subnational 
governments to compensate for differences in fiscal 
capacities. 
unchanged. This may force the central government 
to eventually provide 'extraordinary' transfers 
aimed at covering widening subnational deficits or 
cope with special economic difficulties, hence 
further discouraging subnational governments to 
behave in a fiscally responsible way (by, for 
instance, raising own taxes to cover the gap 
created by reduced  transfers).   
2.2.4. Fiscal rules, budgetary arrangements 
and bail-out possibilities of subnational 
governments 
The remaining part of this Section summarises 
main facts with respect to fiscal rules applying to 
subnational governments across the EU, their 
monitoring and enforcement, the supervisory role 
of the central government, the possibility for 
subnational governments to borrow, the procedures 
to be followed in case a subnational government 
falls in financial distress, the budgetary 
coordination across different tiers of government. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn after 
looking at information in country fiches on all 
these aspects. 
Fiscal rules apply to subnational governments in 
most EU Member States. The most widespread 
type of rule is the golden rule, whereby 
subnational governments are entitled to borrow 
exclusively to finance investments, although it is in 
some cases extended to cover borrowing linked to 
temporary revenue shortfalls and repayment 
obligations of existing debt. Another type which is 
quite recurrent is a borrowing limit, often 
formulated as a threshold on the amount of 
liabilities which can be assumed by a subnational 
government in a year or as a threshold on annual 
debt service obligations, both generally expressed 
as percentage of subnational revenues. 
Limits to the total stock of subnational debt are 
less common, although in some cases borrowing is 
allowed only if the accumulated debt is below a 
specified threshold. Surprisingly, statutory limits 
on subnational expenditures are mostly non-
existent across the EU. However lack of control of 
growth of subnational expenditures is in some 
cases, e.g. ES, pointed out as adversely affecting 
the achievement of fiscal targets of general 
government, calling for the introduction of such 
ceilings. In DK binding expenditure limits for 
subnational governments were introduced in 2011 
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after a long trend of increase in subnational 
expenditures. 
As opposed to statutory thresholds on fiscal 
aggregates, across the EU it is quite common to 
have some form of budgetary coordination across 
different government tiers. This essentially 
consists in annual negotiations and adoption of 
targets for the budget balance and, in some cases, 
expenditures and revenues of both the central and 
subnational government tiers. These are more 
common in more fiscally decentralised countries. 
They are in some cases called Internal Stability 
Pacts (IT, AT) and in general imply monitoring of 
compliance to targets by the central government 
(typically the ministry of finance) and can imply a 
range of sanctions for non-compliance.  
The existence of a system of internal budgetary 
coordination appears to positively contribute to 
fiscal discipline at general government level; in 
some cases (PT, HU) it is precisely the insufficient 
coordination/exchange of information across levels 
of government which seems to be one of the 
causes of fiscal slippages at subnational levels. In 
the case of PT, this occurred via a systematic 
overestimation of revenues by subnational 
governments. However, internal stability pacts are 
not a panacea, as their effectiveness depends on a 
number of implementation details, such as the time 
horizon for fulfilment of fiscal targets (if multi-
annual, deficit in one year can be offset by surplus 
in another year), automaticity of sanctions, 
variability and degree of ambition of targets and 
their scope of application (the whole subnational 
sector vs. individual subnational entities, the latter 
clearly being stricter). 
As for monitoring and sanctions in case of breach 
of fiscal rules or negotiated targets by subnational 
governments, across the EU these alternatively 
include the prohibition to issue new debt, the need 
to ask authorisation for it, the need to introduce 
corrective measures within specified timeframes 
under enhanced supervision of the ministry of 
finance, cuts in revenue allocation from transfers 
or shared taxes. The most elaborate example of the 
latter is provided by DK, which has recently made 
its block grant to subnational governments partly 
conditional to fulfilment of expenditure targets and 
no increase of own taxes by municipalities. 
In any case, it is interesting to observe that there is 
no generalised prohibition to borrow for 
subnational governments, although this is often 
restricted to investment financing (see above). In 
spite of this fact subnational debt levels have 
remained fairly low across the EU with some 
exceptions (e.g. PT, NL and DK). However, ability 
to borrow by subnational governments is in some 
cases restricted to loans from commercial banks or, 
in the extreme, only from the state treasury, 
whereas issuing bonds in capital markets is 
prohibited. In some cases, subnational 
governments can issue bonds or obtain loans 
exclusively through a special public body, e.g. the 
municipal finance corporation in FI, which is 
backed by joint guarantee from all municipalities 
in the country. 
If subnational governments experience serious 
financial problems, in several cases they fall under 
strengthened surveillance by the central 
government and they have to negotiate with the 
latter, sometimes via special joint committees or 
boards, a stabilisation plan to restore fiscal 
sustainability. In other cases they are put under 
forced administration by the central government. 
Generally there is no formal procedure for 
insolvency or default of subnational governments. 
The overall impression is that, despite the frequent 
lack of formal guarantee by the central government 
on subnational financial obligations, a subnational 
default is de facto ruled out across the EU and the 
central government eventually intervenes to 
provide 'exceptional' transfers to bail-out the 
subnational entity in financial distress. The latter 
can in fact threaten to drastically cut service 
provision or argue that its spending obligations are 
mandated by national legislations and hence oblige 
the central government to cover its debt. In the 
extreme, this may occur as a result of legal actions 
in the constitutional court (as was the case for 
some Länder in DE, see also Von Hagen et al., 
2000).    
In some cases, the application of subnational fiscal 
rules has been circumvented by the practice of 
subnational governments to delegate the provision 
of some services to external enterprises of which 
they hold the ownership, totally or partially, as 
such enterprises are often out of the scope of 
application of those rules implying that their 
liabilities were not counted within the amount of 
debt or borrowing of subnational governments.  
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Another common way to circumvent fiscal rules at 
subnational level is by running arrears on 
payments to suppliers, taking advantage of the fact 
that subnational fiscal accounts are often set in 
cash terms.    
In several cases complex budgetary procedures are 
foreseen for subnational governments (apart from 
coordination with the national budget as mentioned 
above), detailing all the steps for drafting, adoption 
and monitoring of subnational budgets, typically 
including an important role of subnational elected 
assemblies, the obligation to communicate the 
adopted budget to the ministry of finance, 
attribution of tasks of monitoring execution and 
carrying out ex-post checks to external bodies(
175
) 
or auditors. A problem with such bodies may be 
their lack of full political independence as they are 
sometimes appointed by subnational policy-
makers.      
2.3. CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter has summarised main patterns of 
fiscal decentralisation arrangements across the EU 
based on individual country fiches compiled for all 
27 Member States. It showed that cross-country 
data available in Eurostat and described in Chapter 
IV.1, albeit rich, fail to capture all aspects and 
details of different national systems, and that 
country descriptions provide a useful set of 
complementary information. 
National systems across the EU show a significant 
degree of heterogeneity reflecting historical and 
institutional specificities. However a number of 
largely common patterns emerge, such as a rising 
importance of subnational levels of government as 
providers of services, including the attribution of 
responsibilities in important functions such as 
education, social protection and health care, albeit 
mostly with the task of delivering the services with  
regulation being largely left with the national level, 
the varying degree of availability of own resources 
(i.e. taxes set autonomously) or shared taxes 
compared to transfers across the EU, the fact that 
the constitutional status of subnational 
                                                          
(175) E.g. the stability council (for Länder) and supervisory 
agencies (for municipalities) in DE. These bodies also 
formulate budgetary forecasts at the beginning of the 
budgetary process. 
governments (i.e. federal vs. unitary countries) 
does not necessarily match the actual 
fiscal/budgetary weight of subnational tiers, the 
systematic attribution of certain revenue sources 
(e.g. property taxes) to subnational entities. 
This Section also highlighted that the existence of 
subnational tiers with at least some expenditure 
and revenue autonomy does create a number of 
challenges for overall efficiency of public services 
and fiscal discipline at the general government 
level. Divergences of spending and financing 
responsibilities, allocation of revenues often based 
on 'presumed' costs of services without rewarding 
efficiency gains, lack of or badly designed fiscal 
budgetary coordination across sectors of 
government, de facto impossibility to allow a 
default of a subnational entity which behaved in a 
fiscally irresponsible way, insufficient scale of 
subnational entities to efficiently run services, are 
all features which may weaken subnational 
incentives to run services in a cost-effective 
manner and to positively contribute to achieve 
national budgetary targets. 
Finally, subnational governments are often subject 
to fiscal rules, especially golden rules (borrowing 
allowed to finance investments) and borrowing 
limits, which again underline a general need to 
constrain subnational fiscal behaviour, and are also 
generally put under some form of monitoring by 
the central government (especially the ministry of 
finance), which is often substantially tightened in 
case they fall in fiscal distress or deviate from 
agreed targets negotiated with the central 
government.  
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation at national level and fiscal 
outcomes of the general government, is analysed, 
based on the different indicators of 
decentralisation, which were presented and 
described in Chapter IV.1. The purpose is to assess 
whether devolving expenditure functions and 
revenue sources to subnational entities, which has 
generally occurred across the EU over past years 
as shown in Chapters IV.1 and IV.2, may have 
adverse consequences on overall fiscal balances of 
the general government due to a loss of control of 
the central government on subnational fiscal 
behaviour and lower incentives for fiscal discipline 
at subnational level. This concern is very relevant 
and increasingly raised by EU policy-makers given 
that fiscal policy governance at the EU level and, 
with the recently adopted Fiscal Compact (see Part 
II), at the national level, is based on general 
government definitions. 
The fiscal outcomes considered are the budget 
balance and expenditures and revenues, taken 
separately. The analysis is done in two steps. 
Firstly, correlations between decentralisation and 
fiscal outcomes are presented and analysed in 
order to have prima face evidence on the 
budgetary impact of decentralisation. Secondly, 
the relationship between indicators of 
decentralisation and fiscal outcomes is also 
estimated via regression analysis. 
3.2. FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND FISCAL 
OUTCOMES: THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Theoretical priors can be highlighted as regards the 
sign of the effect of different dimensions of fiscal 
decentralisation on the main fiscal aggregates of 
the general government, according to the fiscal 
federalism literature (see among others Oates, 
1999 and 2006; Blöchliger and Petzold, 2009; 
Blöchliger and King, 2006; Blöchliger and 
Rabesona, 2009; IMF, 2009; Neyapti, 2010; De 
Mello, 2007; Darby et al., 2002). However, in 
most cases the net impact is a priori ambiguous as 
a result of conflicting arguments. 
Decentralization of expenditures 
The decentralisation of expenditures could have 
either positive or negative effects on the fiscal 
balance. The government balance is expected to 
improve via lower expenditures due to: 
(1) A more efficient expenditure allocation as 
public good provision by subnational governments 
is better tailored to subnational needs and 
preferences. 
(2) Competition across subnational 
governments with respect to the technology and 
methods of production of public goods, which 
encourages them to select and adopt the more cost-
effective ones. 
(3) Failure to internalise positive spill-overs 
of public expenditures to citizens of other 
subnational communities. 
On the other hand, there are arguments pointing to 
an increase in expenditures due to decentralisation 
of expenditures with adverse implications for the 
primary balance, i.e.: 
(1) Decentralisation may prevent the 
exploitation of economies of scale in the 
production of public goods. 
(2) Decentralisation entails unnecessary 
multiplication/overlapping of administrative 
procedures, especially due to shared competences 
across different territorial levels of administration 
over the same government function and unclear 
division of responsibilities among them. 
(3)  Lower productivity of subnational 
administration compared to the national one, due 
to greater capability of the latter to attract a more 
skilled labour force. 
(4) Greater proximity of subnational policy-
makers to subnational interest groups, which make 
the former more sensitive than national policy-
makers to lobbying for increased expenditures 
from the latter. 
Overall, the prediction of economic theory is that 
the impact on expenditures and the primary 
balance is a priori ambiguous. Moreover, a 
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significant share of subnational governments' 
expenditures is likely to be mandated by national 
directives and legislation, leaving only limited 
room for subnational governments to affect their 
overall size and evolution. If that is the case, 
expenditure decentralisation taken at face value 
would not tell much on the effective devolution of 
spending powers to subnational governments, and 
could then have no real impact on the magnitude 
of expenditures. (
176
)  
Decentralization of revenues 
Decentralisation of revenue sources can also affect 
fiscal balances. The literature generally underlines 
that if subnational governments can finance a large 
part of their expenditures with their own revenue 
sources (taxes and fees) they have stronger 
incentives to behave in a fiscally responsible way, 
with positive effects on the fiscal balance of the 
general government. The following arguments can 
explain this effect:  
(1) Subnational governments are more accountable 
to subnational voters on the way they manage their 
resources as the link between public services 
provided at subnational level and the taxes raised 
to finance them is stronger. 
(2) The central government can more easily resist 
pressures of subnational governments to cover an 
excess in their expenditures as the latter have 
sufficient revenue autonomy to deal with their 
expenditure obligations on their own. 
(3) Subnational policy-makers have a stronger 
incentive to provide high quality public services in 
order to contribute to greater economic growth in 
their community, as they would get the resulting 
dividend in the form of higher tax receipts, 
although the strength of this argument varies 
according to the type of tax devolved to 
subnational authorities. (
177
) 
On the other hand, if subnational governments 
largely rely on transfers from the central 
government to finance their expenditures, they can 
                                                          
(176) On the other hand, evidence from country fiches suggests 
that subnational governments are often assigned also 
increasing decision-making powers on devolved 
expenditures (see Chapter IV.2.)   
(177) It is likely to be weaker for property taxes than for local 
income or business taxes. 
easily justify large unfunded expenditures with the 
lack of own revenue sources and threaten to scale 
down public service provision, which is often 
mandated by national legislation, eventually 
forcing the central government to intervene to bail 
them out. This implies that subnational 
governments face a 'soft-budget constraint', with 
adverse effects on the general government fiscal 
balance. (
178
) 
Moreover, in presence of equalising transfers, i.e. 
transfers which are allocated in such a way as to 
fill the gap between expenditure needs and own 
revenues of subnational entities and hence imply 
some degree of redistribution from the richer to the 
poorer of them, subnational governments may fail 
to internalise the cost of financing additional 
expenditures, thereby contributing to expenditure 
and deficit bias.   
Finally the composition of subnational expenditure 
by government function and economic function, 
normally a neglected aspect in the fiscal federalism 
literature, may also weigh on the impact of 
decentralisation on fiscal outcomes. A higher 
relative weight of subnational governments in 
expenditure items more affected by demographic 
and political pressures, such as health care and 
social protection, may have an adverse effect on 
fiscal balances, since subnational governments 
may have lower incentives or ability to counteract 
such pressures. (
179
)  The same reasoning can by 
and large be extended to cases of strong 
decentralisation of expenditures on compensation 
of employees and social benefits. This effect can 
be tested by using figures on the breakdown of 
expenditure decentralisation by functions (such as 
health, education etc.) or economic category, 
which were also discussed in Chapter IV.1.     
                                                          
(178) However, a counter-argument is proposed in some papers.  
A larger weight of transfers may give the central 
government a stronger lever to control the fiscal behaviour 
of subnational governments and, hence, reduce the risk of 
subnational fiscal slippages. This effect should be 
especially relevant if most transfers to subnational 
governments are earmarked to specific expenditures, 
leaving little leeway to subnational governments to decide 
upon their use.  
(179) For instance, subnational administrations may lack the 
technical expertise to anticipate the future evolution of 
health expenditure or may have less political will to curb 
health expenditure because they would assume that the 
central government would eventually intervene to provide 
additional funding for such a politically and socially 
sensitive expenditure item. 
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Overall, although a number of theoretical 
predictions can be drawn from the literature about 
the impact of fiscal decentralisation on fiscal 
outcomes of the general government, they are 
often conflicting as regards its sign, implying that 
this is ultimately an empirical question. Therefore, 
the remainder of this Chapter turns to the empirical 
analysis of these issues. In Section 3.3 stylized 
facts will be presented. Then, in Section 3.4 the 
main hypotheses derived from theoretical 
predictions are reformulated and qualified based 
on the stylised facts (Subsection 3.4.1 below) and 
then tested through regression analysis.  
The effect of fiscal decentralisation can be tested 
by using the indicators which were introduced in 
Chapter IV.1 to describe the extent and main 
characteristics of fiscal decentralisation across the 
EU. These indicators are: 
i) expenditure decentralisation, defined as the 
percentage of subnational governments' 
expenditures in total expenditures of the general 
government;  
ii) own revenue decentralisation, defined as the 
percentage of subnational taxes and fees (i.e. 
subnational own revenues) in general government 
revenues; 
iii) revenue decentralisation, defined as the 
percentage of subnational revenues (including 
transfers) in general government revenues (this 
indicator will be used exclusively in the Section on 
stylised facts and not in the one on econometric 
analysis); 
iv) the percentage of tax revenues in subnational 
revenues; 
v) the percentage of transfers from the central 
government in subnational revenues; 
vi) subnational expenditure coverage by own 
revenues, defined as the percentage of subnational 
expenditures covered by subnational taxes and 
fees.
 
(
180
) 
                                                          
(180) The latter measures the decentralisation of revenues 
relative to expenditures. The complement to one of this 
indicator, i.e. the share of subnational expenditure not 
covered by own subnational revenues is generally called 
'vertical fiscal imbalance' (Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2011 and 
vii) transfer dependency, defined as the percentage 
of subnational expenditures covered by transfers. 
3.3. STYLISED FACTS ON DECENTRALISATION 
AND FISCAL OUTCOMES 
3.3.1. Pair-wise correlations between fiscal 
decentralisation and fiscal outcomes           
This Subsection presents evidence on pair-wise 
correlations between fiscal decentralisation and 
general government fiscal outcomes in order to 
identify a few stylised facts before moving to 
econometric analysis of the fiscal impact of 
decentralisation in Section 3.4 below. The data 
sample used consists of annual data covering all 
EU27 Member States in the period 1995-2010. 
(
181
)  
The first exercise consists of a comparison of 
average values of main fiscal outcomes, across 
high and low decentralisation subsamples of the 
data. To do this, the data are divided into two 
subsamples, with values of the different 
decentralisation indicators lower and higher, 
respectively, than their overall sample average. 
(
182
) The exercise is undertaken for four indicators 
of decentralisation mentioned in Section 3.2 
above: expenditure decentralisation, own revenue 
decentralisation, subnational expenditure coverage 
by own revenues, share of transfers in subnational 
revenues. The comparison is carried out for the 
following fiscal variables: primary balance (
183
), 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance, primary 
expenditures and total revenues of the general 
government, in order to assess the correlation of 
decentralisation with both the net fiscal balance 
                                                                                   
Karpowicz, 2012), as it captures the gap between 
expenditures and own revenues of subnational 
governments which must be covered either by transfers or 
subnational borrowing. It follows from the above 
considerations that a lower vertical fiscal imbalance should 
lead to a 'harder budget constraint' for subnational 
governments, with positive effects on fiscal balances. 
(181) This is the longest time period with available data by sector 
of government in Eurostat, except for the breakdown by 
functions (cofog) which is shorter, see below. 
(182) For instance, in the case of the indicator of overall 
expenditure decentralisation, the sample is divided between 
observations where the value of this indicator is below or 
above its sample average. 
(183) ESA95 figures, Excessive Deficit Procedure.  
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and the spending and revenue side, separately. 
Results are shown in Table IV.3.1. 
The following patterns emerge: 
i) High expenditure decentralisation goes together 
with a higher primary balance on average, higher 
(primary) expenditure and higher revenues of 
general government. (
184
) The same occurs with 
own revenue decentralisation. 
ii) High subnational expenditure coverage by own 
revenues is associated to higher primary balance, 
higher (primary) expenditures and revenues 
although the difference is smaller than between 
low and high decentralisation of expenditures.   
iii) Conversely, a higher share of transfers (or a 
lower share of own revenues) in subnational 
revenues is associated to lower primary balance, 
lower primary expenditure and lower revenues. 
(
185
)  
These main messages are by and large confirmed 
by computing correlations between country 
averages for the 1995-2010 period of the 
decentralisation indicators considered and country 
                                                          
(184) +2.1pp of GDP for the primary balance, +4pp for 
expenditures and +5½pp of GDP for revenues.  
(185) Looking at the link between decentralisation and the 
magnitude of subnational government expenditure (not 
shown), data show that the latter is significantly larger 
when decentralisation of either expenditures or revenues is 
higher than average. Less obviously, it is around 2pp 
higher on average when subnational expenditure coverage 
by own revenues is higher and transfer dependency lower. 
averages over the same period of the primary 
balance, expenditures and revenues. (
186
) 
However, comparisons of fiscal outcomes across 
low and high levels of a single decentralisation 
indicator do not control for the fact that different 
aspects of decentralisation may go together. It is 
quite likely, for instance, that decentralisation of 
expenditures goes together with decentralisation of 
own revenues and larger subnational responsibility 
to cover their expenditures with their own 
resources. Therefore, it is possible that the positive 
effect of expenditure decentralisation on the 
primary balance is in fact due to the greater 
subnational financial autonomy and responsibility 
which may often go with it. Controlling 
simultaneously for the fiscal impact of different 
decentralisation variables requires econometric 
analysis, which is carried out in Section 3.4 below; 
however two simpler exercises can already shed 
some light on these issues: 
(1) Looking at the relationship between 
different aspects of decentralisation to test whether 
expenditure decentralisation tends to be 
accompanied by greater subnational responsibility 
on the revenue side and a lower reliance on 
                                                          
(186) The figures are not shown. Specifically, across the EU the 
average of both expenditure and own revenue 
decentralisation is positively correlated with the average 
primary balance, cyclically adjusted primary balance, 
primary expenditures and revenues in the 1995–2010 
period.  The correlation coefficients are always in the range 
of 0.5-0.6. The average rate of coverage of subnational 
expenditures by subnational own revenues is positively 
correlated with primary expenditures and revenues, 
whereas both expenditures and revenues are negatively 
correlated with subnational dependency on transfers. As for 
the mix of revenue sources of subnational governments, the 
average share of taxes in total subnational revenues is 
positively correlated with expenditures and revenues. 
 
Table IV.3.1: Fiscal outcomes of general government (% of GDP), averages for observations with low and high values of different indicators 
of fiscal decentralisation (EU27 Member States, 1995-2010 period) 
pb capb exp rev
Expenditure decentralisation Low -0.8 -0.9 35.6 39.1
High 1.3 1.2 39.8 44.5
Subnational expenditure coverage by own revenues Low -0.2 -0.2 36.0 39.6
High 0.6 0.4 38.9 43.3
Own revenue decentralisation Low 0.0 -0.3 35.9 39.8
High 0.7 0.7 40.2 44.7
Share of transfers in subnational revenues Low 0.5 0.4 38.8 43.2
High -0.1 -0.2 36.0 39.6  
Notes: pb = primary balance of general government, capb = cyclically adjusted primary balance of general government, exp = primary expenditure of 
general government (% of GDP), rev = total revenues of general government (% of GDP). 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table IV.3.2: Conditional means of selected indicators of fiscal decentralisation for high vs. low expenditure and revenue decentralisation 
Expenditure 
decentralisation
Revenue 
decentralisation
Own revenue 
decentralisation
% of transfers in 
subnational revenues
Subnational expenditure 
coverage by own resources 
% of taxes in subnational  
revenues
Low 0.17 0.08 0.53 0.45 0.32
High 0.37 0.18 0.5 0.49 0.39
Revenue decentralisation 
(transfers included)
% of transfers in 
subnational revenues
Subnational expenditure 
coverage by own resources 
% of taxes in subnational  
revenues
Low 0.53 0.46 0.32
High 0.51 0.49 0.38  
Source: Commission sources. 
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transfers and to assess how the different aspects of 
revenue decentralisation considered so far 
(revenue decentralisation, share of taxes, share of 
transfers and subnational expenditure coverage by 
own revenues) tend to be combined with each 
other.    
(2) Computing averages of fiscal outcomes 
for low vs. high expenditure decentralisation 
controlling for high vs. low levels of the other 
indicators of decentralisation. 
Both exercises are carried out in the remainder of 
this Section. 
The upper part of Table IV.3.2 below compares the 
average values of the indicators capturing the 
different aspects of revenue decentralisation for 
low vs. high decentralisation of expenditures, 
whereas the bottom part compares the average 
shares of taxes and transfers in subnational 
revenues and the average level of subnational 
financial responsibility (i.e. coverage of their 
spending with own revenues) for low vs. high 
revenue decentralisation. (
187
)  
The Table shows that higher expenditure 
decentralisation is on average associated with 
higher revenue decentralisation, both including 
(first column) and excluding (second column) 
transfers, higher rate of coverage of subnational 
expenditure by own revenues, as well as a higher 
share of taxes and a (marginally) lower share of 
transfers in subnational revenues. Moreover, 
revenue decentralisation is accompanied by a 
higher share of taxes and a lower share of transfers 
in subnational revenues, as well as by higher 
                                                          
(187) I.e. the share of all revenues of subnational governments, 
including transfers from the central government, in general 
government revenues (see above). This indicator differs 
from own revenue decentralisation by the inclusion of 
transfers. 
subnational expenditure coverage with own 
revenues. 
These findings are by and large confirmed by pair-
wise correlations between the mean values of 
decentralisation indicators by country in the 1995-
2010 period. (
188
) 
Overall, it appears that expenditure 
decentralisation, own revenue decentralisation and 
subnational responsibility to cover their 
expenditures with their tax revenues and fees tend 
to go hand-in-hand across the EU. Moreover, in 
countries where total revenue decentralisation is 
high, taxes tend to be more important than 
transfers as subnational revenue source. These 
findings imply that simple relationships between 
individual aspects of decentralisation and fiscal 
outcomes should be interpreted with caution, 
without inferring too easily causal effects and that 
it is important to look at the effects of different 
decentralisation aspects simultaneously. A first 
attempt to do this is done with the exercise 
mentioned in point (2) and discussed below, 
whereas an econometric analysis is carried out in 
Section 3.4.   
Table IV.3.3 below compares the average values 
of primary balance, expenditures and revenues 
across the two sub-samples with low and high 
expenditure decentralisation, conditional on low or 
high level of own revenue decentralisation, 
subnational expenditure coverage by own 
                                                          
(188) These are not shown. The correlations between 
decentralisation of expenditures, on the one hand, and 
decentralisation of own revenues (taxes and fees), share of 
taxes in subnational revenues and subnational expenditure 
coverage with own resources are all positive and 
significant. Also, overall revenue decentralisation 
(including transfers) is positively correlated with the share 
of taxes in subnational revenues and negatively correlated 
with the share of transfers, although it is significant only in 
the first case. 
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resources and shares of taxes and transfers in 
subnational revenues.  
Compared to Table IV.3.1, this exercise allows to 
better disentangle the relationship between 
expenditure decentralisation and fiscal outturns 
from the one between the different aspects of 
revenue decentralisation and fiscal outturns.  
As regards the primary balance, the following 
patterns emerge: 
(i) Restricting the analysis to observations 
with low own-revenue decentralisation, low 
subnational expenditure coverage by own 
resources, low share of taxes and low share of 
transfers in subnational revenues, moving from 
low to high expenditure decentralisation is 
associated to an increase in primary balance. 
(ii) For high levels of expenditure 
decentralisation, moving from low to high own 
revenue decentralisation is associated to a decrease 
of primary balance, contrary to findings in Table 
IV.3.1.  
(iii) For high levels of expenditure 
decentralisation, moving from low to high share of 
transfers in subnational revenues is associated to a 
decrease in primary balance, whereas moving from 
low to high subnational expenditure coverage and 
from low to high share of taxes in subnational 
revenues goes together with an increase of the 
primary balance. 
As regards expenditures and revenues: 
(i) For low levels of own revenue 
decentralisation, subnational expenditure coverage 
and share of taxes and transfers in subnational 
revenues, moving from low to high expenditure 
decentralisation is associated to both higher 
expenditures and revenues. 
(ii) Once the level of expenditure 
decentralisation is high moving from low to high 
own revenue decentralisation, from low to high 
subnational expenditure coverage by own 
resources and from low to high share of taxes in 
subnational revenues is associated with a (quite 
sizeable) increase in expenditures and revenues. 
(iii) Once the level of expenditure 
decentralisation is high, moving from low to high 
weight of transfers in subnational revenues is 
 
Table IV.3.3: Conditional means of fiscal outcomes of general government (% of GDP) for low vs. high expenditure decentralisation, 
controlling for low vs. high values of other decentralisation indicators (by column) - EU-27 Member States, 1995-2010 
Low High Low High Low High
Low -0.62 -2.42 35.55 35.63 39.13 38.50
High 1.67 1.20 37.11 40.96 41.73 45.77
Low High Low High Low High
Low -1.23 -0.52 34.61 36.30 37.70 40.10
High 0.93 1.65 37.52 41.39 41.74 46.53
Low High Low High Low High
Low -0.57 -1.20 36.30 34.54 40.10 37.60
High 1.62 0.97 41.38 37.52 46.50 41.77
Low High Low High Low High
Low -1.01 -0.58 35.08 36.26 38.39 40.00
High 1.12 1.48 37.47 41.07 41.77 46.08
Primary balance Primary  expenditure Total revenues
Expenditure 
decentralisation
Primary balance Primary  expenditure Total revenues
Taxes (% subnational revenues) Taxes (% subnational revenues) Taxes (% subnational revenues)
Primary balance Primary  expenditure Total revenues
Transfers (% subnational revenues) Transfers (% subnational revenues) Transfers (% subnational revenues)
Subnational expenditure coverage by own 
resources
Subnational expenditure coverage by own 
resources
Subnational expenditure coverage by own 
resources
Own Revenue decentralisation Own Revenue decentralisation Own Revenue decentralisation
Primary balance Primary  expenditure Total revenues
 
Notes: the Table should be read in the following way, taking the example of the first four figures in the top-left corner (primary balance): the sample is 
broken down between observations with lower and higher than average expenditure decentralisation. Each of these subsamples is then broken down 
across cases with lower and higher than average own revenue decentralisation, so that the relationship between own revenue decentralisation and the 
primary balance can be (partly) isolated from the relationship between expenditure decentralisation and the primary balance 
Source: Commission services. 
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associated with a decrease in expenditures and 
revenues.  
3.3.2. Conclusions on stylised facts on the link 
between fiscal decentralisation and 
fiscal outcomes 
Overall, preliminary evidence based on comparing 
average fiscal outcomes in the EU for low vs. high 
fiscal decentralisation, looking at both the 
expenditure and revenue side of the latter, suggests 
that: 
(1) Decentralising expenditures does not 
appear to increase government deficit. On the 
contrary, it is associated with improved primary 
balance. This relationship is strengthened if 
accompanied by a large rate of coverage of 
subnational expenditures by own resources (i.e. 
taxes and fees) and a high weight of taxes in 
subnational revenues. Conversely this relationship 
is attenuated if transfers from the central 
government account for a large share of 
subnational revenues. 
(2) Expenditure decentralisation appears to 
go together with higher expenditures and revenues 
and this link is strengthened if accompanied by a 
large coverage of subnational expenditure with 
own resources, large share of taxes in subnational 
revenues, whereas it is weakened in case of a large 
share of transfers in subnational revenues. 
These facts appear to confirm the argument that 
subnational governments do not fully exploit 
economies of scale in public goods provision and 
tend to generate inefficiencies via overlapping and 
duplications of administrative procedures, leading 
to higher expenditures in more decentralised 
countries. However expenditure decentralisation is 
also associated with higher government revenues 
and this appears to more than offset the 
relationship with expenditures, resulting in a net 
positive link between expenditure decentralisation 
and the primary balance.  
All these relationships seem to be strengthened if 
expenditure decentralisation is accompanied by 
larger financial responsibility of subnational 
governments (
189
) and a larger share of taxes in 
                                                          
(189) They cover a large part of their expenditures with their tax 
revenues and fees. 
their revenues whereas they are partly counteracted 
if transfers account for a large share of subnational 
revenues. This appears to confirm the prediction 
that if subnational governments have to finance 
most of their spending with their own taxes and 
fees and these make up most of their revenues they 
tend to raise more revenues to cover their 
expenditure needs, whereas a large reliance on 
transfers creates a soft-budget constraint on 
subnational governments, reducing the positive 
effect of expenditure decentralisation on the 
primary balance.            
3.3.3. Stylised facts on decentralisation of 
individual expenditure functions and 
fiscal outcomes 
This Subsection complements the discussion in 
Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above, by presenting 
the main stylised facts on the link between 
expenditure decentralisation in individual 
government functions (i.e. education, public order, 
health care etc., see Chapter IV.1) and fiscal 
outcomes based on comparison of conditional 
means as done in Subsection 3.3.1. Essentially, the 
goal is to assess whether the main messages on the 
relationship between decentralisation and fiscal 
outcomes are enriched by looking also at the 
break-down of decentralisation by functions. For 
simplicity, no charts or tables are shown in this 
Subsection and only the main findings are briefly 
presented and discussed. 
(1) Looking at the relationship between the 
total expenditure in each function and its degree of 
decentralisation suggests that there is no 
systematic relationship between these two 
variables, except for social expenditure and, to a 
lesser extent, health care. Social and health care 
expenditures are on average around 4pp of GDP 
and 1pp of GDP higher, respectively, in countries 
where such functions are highly decentralised.        
(2) Looking at the relationship between 
decentralisation by function and the primary 
balance of the general government conditional on a 
high level of total expenditure decentralisation (in 
order to control for the effect of overall 
decentralisation) suggests that decentralising 
general services and education is associated with a 
lower primary balance, whereas higher 
decentralisation of health, economic affairs and 
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social protection goes together with a higher 
primary balance. 
(3) Repeating the exercise in (2) for 
expenditures and revenues (instead of the fiscal 
balance) suggests that overall expenditure 
decentralisation is no longer associated to higher 
total expenditures if education, social protection 
and health remain centralised, whereas it is 
associated to substantially higher expenditures if 
these three functions are decentralised. Similarly, 
expenditure decentralisation is no longer 
associated to larger total revenues when social 
protection and education are relatively centralised. 
The same caveat as for evidence presented in 
Subsection 3.3.1 also applies to stylised facts on 
the relationship between decentralisation by 
function and fiscal outcomes, i.e. no conclusions 
on causal effects should be drawn from them as 
their robustness should be tested with econometric 
analysis. In any case the above stylised facts 
suggest that the fiscal impact of total 
decentralisation of expenditure and of its 
composition by function should be tested at the 
same time.  The next Section turns to econometric 
analysis of the effect of fiscal decentralisation on 
fiscal outcomes.  
3.4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT 
OF DECENTRALISATION ON FISCAL 
BALANCE 
3.4.1. Model specification and main 
hypotheses  
This Section presents an econometric analysis of 
the impact of fiscal decentralisation on the primary 
balance of general government and on primary 
expenditures and revenues, taken separately. The 
model used is the fiscal reaction function – an 
equation which tests the impact of the outstanding 
government debt ratio on the primary balance after 
controlling for a number of macroeconomic and 
institutional variables. The basic underlying 
assumption is that governments are fiscally 
responsible and hence react to increasing 
(decreasing) levels of accumulated debt by 
increasing (decreasing) the primary balance. This 
methodology has become quite widespread in the 
empirical literature on fiscal policy (see Bohn, 
1998 and European Commission, 2011a) and has 
also been used recently to investigate the 
budgetary impact of fiscal decentralisation (Eyraud 
and Lusinyan, 2011 and Escolano et al., 2012). 
(
190
)  
Therefore, this Section presents and discusses 
estimates of fiscal reaction functions for the EU 
enriched with the indicators of fiscal 
decentralisation previously discussed. The 
dependent variable of the model is alternatively the 
primary balance, primary expenditures and total 
revenues of the general government. As discussed 
in Section 3.2 above, it is difficult to formulate 
clear cut predictions on the impact of the different 
aspects of fiscal decentralisation on fiscal 
outcomes as theoretical arguments are often 
conflicting. However, the literature presented in 
Section 3.2 above and the stylised facts discussed 
in Section 3.3 suggest a list of main hypotheses to 
be tested with regression analysis.  
(1) Expenditure decentralisation may lead to 
larger primary expenditures due to a number of 
reasons such as less exploitation of economies of 
scale, duplication and overlapping of 
administrative procedures, lower productivity of 
subnational administrations as they are less able to 
attract more skilled civil servants and greater 
proximity of subnational policy-makers to 
subnational interest groups.  
(2) The net effect of expenditure 
decentralisation on the primary balance should 
depend on how the former is combined with 
revenue decentralisation. Essentially, stylised facts 
suggest that if decentralised expenditures go 
together with large financial responsibility of 
subnational governments to cover them with their 
own resources (i.e. taxes and fees assigned to 
subnational governments) and taxes account for a 
large share of subnational revenues compared to 
transfers, there should be no adverse effect on the 
primary balance (or possibly even a positive one) 
as subnational governments are encouraged to 
raise more revenues to cover their larger 
expenditure responsibilities. On the other hand, the 
combination of high expenditure decentralisation 
with a strong reliance on transfers from the central 
government would be more harmful for fiscal 
balances as subnational governments would face a 
                                                          
(190) Both these papers use decentralisation indicators similar to 
those considered here. 
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soft budget constraint and are likely to be less 
concerned about balancing their expenditures with 
their revenues. (
191
)  
(3) The effect of total expenditure 
decentralisation on fiscal outcomes may differ 
according to the specific expenditure item which is 
decentralised. Decentralisation of health-care, 
social protection, education or general services 
may be particularly likely to lead to larger 
expenditures and/or a worse fiscal balance.    
(4) Finally, a greater share of subnational 
expenditures covered by subnational own taxes 
and fees (low vertical fiscal imbalance) implies 
greater financial responsibility at subnational level 
as the central government can more easily resist 
pressures to 'bail-out' subnational entities if the 
latter are endowed with sufficient own resources to 
finance their expenditures. In these situations there 
should be a positive effect on the fiscal balance, 
reflecting a positive effect on revenues and a 
negative effect on expenditures. However, 
descriptive evidence discussed in Section 3.3 
suggests a positive effect on both expenditures and 
revenues which needs to be tested through 
econometric analysis.   
(5) As for own revenue decentralisation – the 
share of subnational own revenues (taxes and fees, 
as transfers are excluded from own subnational 
revenues) in general government revenues – theory 
does not provide clear predictions on its impact on 
fiscal balances. On the one hand, a high value on 
this variable means that subnational governments 
have more own resources to cover a given amount 
of expenditures, leading to better fiscal balances. 
                                                          
(191) As explained in Chapter IV.1, figures on the shares of taxes 
in subnational revenues do not distinguish autonomous 
taxes, i.e. on which subnational governments are allowed to 
change main tax parameters, from the assignment of 
revenues from national taxes to subnational governments. 
This may prevent to fully capture the 'true' degree of 
subnational financial autonomy. Hence, a robustness check 
for the hypothesis (2) above, is carried out estimating the 
effect of an indicator of 'true' subnational tax autonomy 
compiled by the OECD Secretariat. The indicator measures 
the share of subnational tax revenues on which subnational 
governments can change the rate and/or base. However, 
this exercise implies a substantial reduction of available 
observations as non-OECD EU Member States are not 
included. Moreover, this indicator has not been computed 
with annual frequency and is available only for 1995, 2002, 
2005 and 2008, implying that the assumption of constant 
tax autonomy had to be made for missing years in order to 
compute regressions. 
On the other hand, this variable tells us nothing on 
the relative size of subnational own revenues 
compared to their expenditures which is probably 
a better way to capture subnational incentives to 
behave in a financially responsible way. Moreover, 
the impact of own revenue decentralisation may 
also differ based on whether it goes together with a 
high or low share of transfers/taxes in subnational 
revenues,
 
similarly to the case of expenditure 
decentralisation discussed above. 
3.4.2. Regression results on the effect of 
decentralisation on the primary balance 
The first set of estimates test the impact of 
decentralisation on the general government 
primary balance (as a share of GDP). The number 
of independent variables (apart from 
decentralisation) is limited in order to keep the 
specification of the model parsimonious, and 
includes (i) the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio, (ii) the 
lagged output gap to control for the budgetary 
effect of cyclical fluctuations, (iii) the occurrence 
of legislative election in the year. (
192
) Further 
control variables are included in the regressions for 
expenditures and revenues (see below).  
Then, the different decentralisation indicators are 
included to test the above hypotheses (see 
Subsection 3.4.1 above): expenditure 
decentralisation (
193
), own revenue decentralisation 
(
194
), the share of taxes and transfers in subnational 
revenues and the share of subnational expenditure 
that is covered by subnational own revenues. 
Moreover, as the above hypotheses (points 2 and 
5) also concern the impact of combinations of 
different aspects of decentralisation, the following 
interactive terms (i.e. the product of two variables) 
are also included in the regressions:  
(i) Expenditure decentralisation and the 
share of transfers in subnational revenues; 
(ii) Expenditure decentralisation and the 
share of taxes in subnational revenues; 
                                                          
(192) This is systematically found to have good explanatory 
power of the developments of fiscal balances (see among 
others Mendoza and Ostry (2008) and Gali and Perotti 
(2003). 
(193) Percentage of subnational government expenditures in 
general government expenditures. 
(194) Percentage of subnational government own revenues (taxes 
and fees) in general government revenues.  
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(iii) Own revenue decentralisation and the 
share of transfers in subnational revenues; 
(iv) Own revenue decentralisation and the 
share of taxes in subnational revenues. 
As in Section 3.3 above, the sample includes all 27 
EU Member States and covers the 1995–2010 
period. As the model specification considered 
includes lagged dependent variable among the 
explanatory variables (
195
) estimations are carried 
out with the Least Squares Dummy Variables 
Bias-Corrected estimator (LSDVC, Bruno, 2005), 
which corrects for the bias of Fixed Effect 
estimators in dynamic panel data models, i.e. 
panels which include the lagged dependent 
variable. 
Results of estimates for the primary balance are 
shown in Table IV.3.4. The lagged debt has an 
expected statistically significant positive 
coefficient in all specifications of the model, 
suggesting the existence of a debt-sustainability 
motive in the setting of fiscal policies, whereas the 
lagged output gap has a negative and mostly 
significant coefficient suggesting some degree of 
pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy across the EU. The 
occurrence of elections has, as expected, a 
negative impact on the primary balance, albeit not 
always significant.  
As for the indicators of decentralisation, 
expenditure decentralisation has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the primary 
balance, whereas own revenue decentralisation has 
a negative and significant effect. Subnational 
expenditure coverage has a positive and significant 
effect on the primary balance, which is in line with 
expectations. 
Expenditure decentralisation interacted with the 
share of transfers in subnational revenues has a 
negative effect on the primary balance (columns 2, 
10, 12 and 13) whereas it has a (further) positive 
effect if interacted with the share of taxes in 
subnational revenues (column 3). This confirms 
the expectation that expenditure decentralisation 
has a more favourable impact on the primary 
balance if accompanied by a large share of own 
                                                          
(195) This is the case, for instance, for the primary balance as it 
is commonly found to exhibit a high degree of time 
persistence 
taxes and fees in subnational governments and a 
small share of transfers from the central 
government. 
The interactive term of own revenue 
decentralisation with the share of taxes in 
subnational revenues, has a positive and significant 
coefficient (columns 6 and 8). Such an effect 
approximately offsets the negative effect on 
primary balance of own revenue decentralisation 
per se.  On the other hand, the interactive term of 
own revenue decentralisation and the share of 
transfers in subnational revenues has a negative 
and significant coefficient (column 9). The shares 
of taxes and transfers have, respectively, a positive 
and negative effect on the primary balance also 
when included individually (columns 4 and 5).  
Finally, as explained above (see footnote (189)), a 
robustness check of the impact of the weight of 
subnational taxes on the fiscal balance was carried 
out by estimating the effect of 'true' tax autonomy, 
i.e. the weight of taxes for which subnational 
governments can change rate and/or base (see 
above). This is captured via three interactive terms: 
(i) Share of subnational tax revenues on 
which subnational governments can exert 
autonomy multiplied by the share of taxes in total 
subnational revenues; this would capture the share 
of 'truly' autonomous revenues (column 13);  
(ii) Expenditure decentralisation times the 
term (i), in order to test the joint impact of large 
decentralisation on the spending side and large 
'true' revenue autonomy (column 11); 
(iii) Share of subnational expenditures 
covered by subnational taxes and fees times the 
share of subnational tax revenues on which 
subnational governments can exert autonomy; this 
would capture the coverage of subnational 
expenditures by effectively autonomous revenues 
(column 12). 
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Results confirm expectations: greater 'true' tax 
autonomy improves the primary balance as all the 
three terms have a positive and significant 
coefficient. (
196
)    
Table IV.3.5 presents the results of a model similar 
to the one used for Table IV.3.4, but enriched with 
the addition of terms interacting overall 
expenditure decentralisation with the 
decentralisation of expenditures in three 
government functions, i.e. health care, social 
protection and general services (columns 1 to 3) in 
order to test the hypothesis in point 3 above. These 
terms all have negative and significant 
coefficients, implying that if overall expenditure 
decentralisation is positive per se for the primary 
balance, this effect is partly counteracted if 
accompanied by large decentralisation in general 
services, social protection and health. (
197
) This 
                                                          
(196) Moreover, when the term (ii) is included the interactive 
term of expenditure decentralisation and the share of taxes 
in subnational revenues is no longer significant (column 
11), suggesting that it is the true tax autonomy rather than 
the share of tax revenues assigned to subnational 
governments as such which improves fiscal balances. 
 
(197) The same test was carried out also for decentralisation of 
education expenditures, which turned out to be 
insignificant. 
was already detected among the stylised facts in 
Section 3.3 only for general services. 
Interactive effects between overall expenditure 
decentralisation and decentralisation by economic 
function are also tested for public consumption, 
compensation of employees and social benefits 
(columns 4 to 6.) The coefficients for the first and 
the third term are insignificant, whereas the 
coefficient on employee compensation is positive 
and significant, suggesting, quite surprisingly, that 
a large subnational share in the expenditure for 
compensation of employees improves the positive 
effect of overall expenditure decentralisation on 
the primary balance. (
198
) The other indicators of 
decentralisation retain the usual sign and 
significance.  
                                                          
(198) Clearly, it is quite difficult to interpret this finding as there 
are no clear economic reasons on why local governments 
should be more disciplined than the central government in 
their wage expenditures. 
 
Table IV.3.4: Regressions on the effect of fiscal decentralisation on the primary balance of general government (LSDVC estimator, EU27, 
1995-2010) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
VARIABLES
L.D 0.03* 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03* 0.03** 0.03** 0.02* 0.03** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.04***
L.og -0.1** -0.12*** -0.1** -0.09* -0.09** -0.08* -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.1** -0.1**
Expdec 0.12** 1.19*** 0.13** 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.4*** 0.47*** 0.52*** 1.22*** 0.57*** 1.2*** 1.2***
Revdec -0.12* -1.15*** -0.43*** -0.36*** -0.45*** -0.81*** -0.73*** -1.27*** -0.5*** -1.48*** -1.34*** -1.7*** -1.7***
Expcov 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.37*** 0.3*** 0.3***
Expdec* trsf -1.12*** -0.89*** -0.76*** -0.74***
Ele -0.45* -0.43* -0.44* -0.44* -0.37 -0.42* -0.29 -0.28 -0.25 -0.3 -0.31 -0.26 -0.26
Expdec* tax 0.34** -0.02
% tax 0.08***
% trsf -0.11***
Revdec* tax 0.87*** 0.73***
Revdec *trsf -1.15***
Tax *auton 0.06**
Expdec *tax*auton 0.04***
Expcov* auton 0.05***
Obs. 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 297 297 297
Number of panel 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 21 21 21
Pb
 
Notes: List of variables: pb = primary balance of general government (% of GDP), L.D = lagged stock of debt of general government (% of GDP), 
L.og = Lagged output gap (% of potential output), Expdec = expenditure decentralisation, Revdec = own revenue decentralisation, Expcov = coverage 
of subnational expenditures by own resources, Expdec*trsf = expenditure decentralisation*share of transfers in subnational revenues, Ele = legislative 
elections (1 if elections occurred in the year, 0 otherwise), Expdec*tax = expenditure decentralisation*share of taxes in subnational revenues, % tax = 
share of taxes in subnational revenues, % trsf = % of transfers in subnational revenues, revdec*tax = own revenue decentralisation* share of taxes in 
subnational revenues, revdec*trsf = own revenue decentralisation* share of transfers in subnational revenues, tax*auton = share of taxes in subnational 
revenues*share of autonomous taxes in subnational tax revenues, expdec*tax*auton = expenditure decentralisation*share of taxes in subnational 
revenues*share of autonomous taxes in subnational tax revenues, expcov*auton = coverage of subnational expenditures by own resources* share of 
autonomous taxes in subnational tax revenues. 
***, **, *: coefficient estimates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Commission services. 
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3.4.3. Regression results on the effect of 
decentralisation on expenditures and 
revenues 
Expenditures 
Regressions were also estimated with general 
government primary expenditure (as a share of 
GDP), instead of the primary balance, as the 
dependent variable (see Annex 2). The model is 
adapted relative to the one for primary balance 
with the addition of inflation and trade openness as 
further control variables (Eyraud and Lusinyan, 
2011.) Focusing on the decentralisation indicators 
the following findings can be highlighted:  
(i) Overall expenditure decentralisation has a 
negative and significant coefficient, suggesting 
that expenditure decentralisation per se tends to 
decrease the magnitude of overall expenditures of 
the general government. 
(ii) Subnational own revenue decentralisation 
has a positive and significant effect on 
expenditures.  
(iii) The interaction between expenditure 
decentralisation and the share of transfers and of 
taxes in subnational revenues have a positive and 
negative effect, respectively (both significant). 
(iv) The same is found for the interaction 
between own revenue decentralisation and the 
share of transfers and taxes in subnational 
revenues, respectively. 
These findings contradict the stylised facts 
discussed in Section 3.3 above, which suggested a 
positive correlation between expenditure 
decentralisation and total expenditures. This 
confirms the need to interpret stylised facts based 
on simple correlations with special caution and the 
importance to check their robustness through 
econometric analysis. This finding also 
disconfirms the hypothesis (1) above and confirms 
opposite arguments proposed in the literature 
whereby decentralising expenditures should 
increase public sector efficiency due to better 
tailoring of public services to subnational 
preferences and 'healthy' competition and mutual 
learning across subnational governments on the 
most efficient ways to provide public services.  
Stylised facts in Section 3.3 also suggested that 
large subnational financial responsibility, a large 
share of taxes in subnational revenues and a lower 
 
Table IV.3.5: Results of regressions with the primary balance of general government as dependent variable and decentralisation by 
government function and by economic function included among regressors (LSDVC estimator, EU27, 1995-2010) 
1 2 3 4 5 6
VARIABLES
L.D 0.0530*** 0.0483*** 0.0358*** 0.0335*** 0.0286** 0.0333***
L.og -0.154*** -0.148*** -0.152*** -0.128*** -0.131*** -0.116***
Expdec 1.414*** 1.315*** 1.529*** 1.215*** 1.018*** 1.148***
Revdec -1.297*** -1.288*** -1.340*** -1.151*** -1.151*** -1.144***
Ele -0.504** -0.474* -0.518** -0.425* -0.395* -0.448**
Expdec * trsf -1.191*** -1.123*** -1.348*** -1.127*** -1.119*** -1.108***
Expdec * decHealth -0.123***
Expdec. * decSoc -0.242**
Expdec * decGS -0.528***
Expdec. * decCons -0.0788
Expdec * decWag 0.417**
Expdec. * decSocBen 0.188
Observations 382 382 383 405 405 405
Number of panel 27 27 27 27 27 27
pb
 
Notes: List of variables: see Table IV.3.4 above. New variables added: Expdec * decHealth = expenditure decentralisation * subnational share of 
general government expenditure for health care, Expdec * decSoc = expenditure decentralisation * subnational share of general government 
expenditure for social protection, Expdec * decGS = expenditure decentralisation * subnational share of general government expenditure for general 
services, Expdec * decCons = expenditure decentralisation * subnational share of general government expenditure for consumption, Expdec * decWag 
= expenditure decentralisation * subnational share of general government expenditure for compensation of employees, Expdec * decSocBen = 
expenditure decentralisation * subnational share of general government expenditure for social benefits. 
***, **, *: coefficients estimates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Commission services. 
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share of transfers were also associated to higher 
expenditures, whereas the reverse is found in the 
above regression which properly controls for the 
impact of several variables. In other words, 
whereas from the stylised facts it seemed that the 
positive effect of high subnational financial 
responsibility and high subnational taxes/low 
transfers on the primary balance only came from 
the revenue side, the regression shows that it also 
comes from restraints on expenditures, which is 
more consistent with literature predictions.    
As regards the functional composition of 
expenditures, the interactive term of expenditure 
decentralisation with decentralisation by function 
has a positive and significant coefficient only for 
expenditure on general services, meaning that if 
overall decentralisation leads per se to lower 
expenditures this is partly undone by large 
decentralisation of general services. Therefore, 
stylised facts suggesting a specific role of 
decentralisation of health, education and social 
protection in affecting expenditures are not 
confirmed.        
Revenues 
Finally, the impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
revenues was estimated through regressions with, 
alternatively, general government revenues and the 
tax burden (both as shares of GDP) as the 
dependent variable to add a further robustness 
check (see Annex 2). (
199
)  
Expenditure decentralisation does not appear to 
have a significant effect on revenues or on the tax 
burden. On the other hand, own revenue 
decentralisation has a negative and significant 
effect, whereas its interaction with the share of 
transfers becomes insignificant and its interaction 
with the share of taxes in subnational governments 
has a positive and significant effect on the tax 
burden only. Similarly the interaction between 
expenditure decentralisation and the share of 
transfers in subnational revenues is insignificant, 
whereas the interaction with the share of taxes is 
positive and significant. The subnational 
expenditure coverage by own resources has a 
positive and significant coefficient. 
                                                          
(199) To check for the possibility that tax revenues may be more 
affected by the economic incentives created by the 
governance structure of a country.  
Overall it appears that the impact of 
decentralisation is stronger on the expenditure than 
on the revenue side, although two dimensions of it 
also affect revenues in a way which is consistent 
with their impact on primary balance and 
expenditures. These are the decentralisation of 
own revenues, which according to these results 
increases spending and decreases revenues, 
thereby adversely affecting fiscal balances from 
both sides, and the subnational expenditure 
coverage by own resources, which decreases 
expenditures and increases revenues, hence 
positively affecting fiscal balances from both 
sides. Also, a high relative weight of taxes in 
subnational revenues appears to (weakly) improve 
revenues for a given level of expenditure and 
revenue decentralisation.  
3.5. FISCAL RULES, DECENTRALISATION AND 
FISCAL OUTCOMES  
This Section complements the analysis carried out 
so far by looking at the role of fiscal rules 
constraining the fiscal behaviour of subnational 
governments. Data used are the indexes of 
strictness of such rules computed by DG ECFIN 
based on information provided by the Member 
States. (
200
) Essentially, the aim is to assess two 
aspects: 
(1) Whether fiscal rules constraining the 
behaviour of subnational governments are used 
more frequently in highly decentralised countries 
and whether there is a tendency to adopt a specific 
type of rules (i.e. balanced budget vs. debt rules) at 
subnational level. (
201
) As regards the first 
question, it is logical to expect that when 
subnational governments have more fiscal power 
on both the expenditure and revenue side central 
governments attempt to constrain their behaviour 
via fiscal rules. 
(2) Whether the relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and fiscal outcomes changes in 
presence of strict subnational fiscal rules so that 
                                                          
(200) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_ 
indicators/fiscal_governance/index_en.htm 
(201) As regards the second point, it is expected that balanced 
budget rules should be more frequently used than debt rules 
at subnational level as subnational governments are quite 
constrained in their possibility to issue debt anyway (e.g. 
due to lower access to capital markets).  
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Table IV.3.6: Strictness of fiscal rules applying to subnational governments, averages for observations with low and high values of different 
indicators of fiscal decentralisation (EU27 Member States, 1995-2010 period) 
Expenditure decentralisation
Strictness fiscal rules – 
subnational gov.
Strictness debt rules – 
subnational gov.
Strictness balanced budget 
rules – subnational gov.
Low 1.9 1.2 0.6
High 4.9 1.1 2.4
Own revenues decentralisation
Low 2.6 1.3 0.7
High 4.4 0.9 2.7
Subnational expenditure coverage by 
own subnational resources
Low 3.5 1.6 1.0
High 3.2 0.8 1.9
% of taxes in subnational revenues
Low 3.3 1.7 0.7
High 3.4 0.6 2.2
Transfer dependency
Low 3.2 0.7 2.0
High 3.6 1.7 0.9  
Source: Commission services. 
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rules act as a substitute to subnational financial 
responsibility/large reliance on taxes as a tool to 
increase fiscal discipline.    
As regards question (1), Table IV.3.6 below, looks 
at whether different dimensions of fiscal 
decentralisation go together with stricter fiscal 
rules at subnational level. 
The Table shows that subnational fiscal rules tend 
to be much stricter when expenditure 
decentralisation and own revenue decentralisation 
are high. As for the type of rules used, on average, 
balanced budget rules applying to subnational 
governments are much stricter when expenditure 
and own revenue decentralisation are high, as well 
as when the tax share in subnational revenues and 
the subnational financial responsibility(
202
) are 
high, while they are looser when transfer 
dependency is higher. On the other hand, strictness 
of debt rules does not change significantly with 
expenditure decentralisation; however it is 
correlated with the other decentralisation 
indicators with opposite sign compared to balanced 
budget rules, i.e. debt rules are looser with high 
own revenue decentralisation, high expenditure 
coverage with own subnational revenues and high 
share of taxes in subnational revenues, whereas 
they are stricter when transfer dependency is 
lower.  
Overall, fiscal rules applying to subnational 
governments are stricter in more fiscally 
                                                          
(202) High expenditure coverage with own resources. 
decentralised countries, in line with expectations. 
With respect to the type of rules applying to 
subnational governments, balanced budget rules 
are stricter in countries with higher subnational 
financial responsibility and greater reliance on 
taxes compared to transfers, whereas debt rules are 
stricter in the opposite case.  
This appears to disconfirm the substitutability 
story as far as balanced budget rules are 
concerned, i.e. they are not used to correct for 
weak subnational fiscal discipline in case of high 
transfers and vertical fiscal imbalances. On the 
other hand, the argument may be valid as far as 
debt rules are concerned. Moreover, this finding 
raises the hypothesis that the positive effect of 
financial responsibility and high taxes/low 
transfers on the fiscal balance found in Section 3.4 
above may in reality be due to the more frequent 
use of balanced budget rules constraining 
subnational behaviour.  
These hypotheses were tested through regression 
analysis (see Table IV.3.7). The above model with 
the primary balance as dependent variable was 
enriched by including the strictness of rules 
applying to subnational governments (column 1), 
its balanced budget rule and debt rule component 
(column 2 and 3, respectively). Further tests were 
carried out with interactive terms testing the joint 
impact of balanced budget rules and, respectively, 
expenditure decentralisation with high share of 
taxes in subnational revenues and the subnational 
expenditure coverage by own resources (columns 4 
and 5 respectively, to test whether the effect of the 
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Table IV.3.7: Results of regressions on the effect of fiscal decentralisation and fiscal rules on primary balance and expenditures of the 
general government (EU27, 1995-2010, LSDVC estimator) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
VARIABLES
L.D 0.03** 0.0289** 0.0346*** 0.0289** 0.0294** 0.0283** 0.0287** 0.0337*** -0.0234* -0.0223*
L.og -0.0691* -0.0691* -0.0750* -0.0681* -0.0667 -0.0702* -0.0681 -0.0947** 0.174*** 0.179***
Expdec 0.398*** 0.400*** 0.403*** 0.397*** 0.399*** 0.402*** 0.396*** 1.232*** -0.782*** -0.790***
Revdec -0.995*** -1.004*** -1.012*** -0.995*** -1.000*** -1.001*** -0.988*** -1.494*** 0.936*** 0.951***
Expdec * tax 0.292** 0.328** 0.311** 0.333** 0.315** 0.337** 0.327**
Expcov 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.197*** 0.186*** 0.190*** 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.176*** -0.0850*** -0.0850***
frilg -0.0376
fribbr -0.137
fridr 0.183* -0.240**
Expcov * fribbr -0.00164
Expdec * fribbr -0.00403
Expdec * trsf -0.910*** 0.662*** 0.682***
Revdec * fribbr -0.00565
Expdec * trsf * fridr 0.0100* -0.0130**
 fridr
Expdec * tax * fribbr -0.0055
fribbr
Ele -0.282 -0.286 -0.288 -0.299 -0.29 -0.296 -0.297 -0.288 0.0739 0.0553
L.infl 0.0358*** 0.0358*** 0.0354***
TO -0.539 -0.625
Observations 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 401 401
Number of panel 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
pb primexp
 
Notes: List of variables: see Table IV.3.4 above, new variables added: Primexp = general government primary expenditures (% of GDP), L.infl = 
lagged inflation rate, TO = trade openness (% of exports plus imports in GDP), frilg = strictness of fiscal rules applying to Subnational Governments 
(SNG), fribbr = strictness of balanced budget rules applying to SNG, fridr = strictness of debt rules applying to SNG, Expcov * fribbr = coverage of 
subnational expenditures by own resources * strictness of balanced budget rules applying to SNG, Expdec * fribbr = expenditure decentralisation * 
strictness of balanced budget rules applying to SNG, Revdec * fribbr = own revenue decentralisation * strictness of balanced budget rules applying to 
SNG, Expdec * trsf * fridr =  expenditure decentralisation*share of transfers in subnational revenues* strictness of debt rules applying to SNG, Expdec 
* tax * fribbr = expenditure decentralisation*share of taxes in subnational revenues* strictness of balanced budget rules applying to SNG. 
***, **, *: coefficients estimates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Commission services. 
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latter variables is in fact due to the fact that they 
tend to be accompanied by balanced budget rules), 
the joint impact of balanced budget rules and, 
respectively, expenditure decentralisation (column 
6) and own revenue decentralisation (column 7) 
and the joint impact of debt rules and expenditure 
decentralisation with large share of transfers in 
subnational revenues (column 8, to test whether 
decentralisation with large transfers is less harmful 
for fiscal balance if accompanied by debt rules). 
Overall, regression results suggest that strictness of 
fiscal rules in general and of balanced budget rules 
in particular applying to subnational governments 
do not affect the impact of fiscal decentralisation 
on the primary balance. Specifically, the positive 
impact of subnational financial responsibility and a 
large reliance on taxes compared to transfers does 
not appear to be due to their positive correlation 
with the presence of balanced budget rules 
applying to subnational governments, as all the 
corresponding interactive terms are insignificant. 
On the other hand, debt rules applying to 
subnational governments appear to have a positive 
effect on fiscal balance on their own (column 4) 
and to slightly counteract the negative budgetary 
effect of expenditure decentralisation accompanied 
by large transfers. (
203
) 
Finally, in order to test if the positive effect of debt 
rules occurs via the expenditure side, two further 
tests were carried out by enriching the model for 
primary expenditures discussed in Section 3.4 
above with the two terms capturing the impact of 
debt rules (see above). Results show that debt rules 
have a negative and significant effect on primary 
expenditures (column 9) and that they reduce the 
positive impact on expenditures of expenditure 
decentralisation accompanied by large transfers 
(column 10). 
Overall, the conclusion is that, while balanced 
budget rules do not change the relationship 
                                                          
(203) See positive and significant coefficient of the 
corresponding interactive term in column 8.  
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between decentralisation and fiscal outcomes, debt 
rules applying to subnational governments reduce 
the negative effect on the fiscal balance of a large 
weight of transfers in subnational revenues, and 
this effect occurs through the expenditure side.    
3.6. CONCLUSIONS 
Although it is highly challenging to summarise in a 
few lines all the analysis shown in this Chapter, a 
number of key points can be highlighted as regards 
the effect of fiscal decentralisation on general 
government fiscal outcomes. 
(1) Expenditure decentralisation per se 
appears to be associated with better fiscal balances 
compared to cases of low decentralisation. This 
reflects a negative effect on expenditures whereas 
the effect on revenues is not significant according 
to regression analysis. This finding lends support 
to a few economic arguments proposed in the 
literature which underline that subnational 
governments should be more able to tailor public 
goods to subnational preferences and that 
competition and mutual learning among 
subnational governments should help them select 
more cost-effective techniques for the production 
of public goods. This should in turn lead to more 
efficient expenditure in more decentralised 
countries ceteris paribus with positive effects on 
the primary balance. 
(2) The revenue side of decentralisation plays 
a key role in shaping the net effects of 
decentralisation on fiscal outcomes. Regression 
results suggest that expenditure decentralisation 
accompanied by low subnational financial 
responsibility to cover their expenditures with their 
own resources (i.e. taxes and fees) and by a large 
share of transfers from the central government in 
subnational revenues is likely to be overall 
detrimental for the fiscal balance. On the other 
hand, the budgetary effect of decentralisation is 
more favourable if it goes together with a large 
coverage of subnational expenditures by own 
resources and a large weight of taxes in total 
subnational revenues. This result reflects effects on 
both the expenditure and (albeit to a lesser extent) 
the revenue side. 
This result confirms literature predictions which 
underline that if subnational governments largely 
depend on transfers from the central government 
they would be subject to a soft-budget constraint as 
they would take it for granted that possible excess 
spending from their part would be eventually 
covered by a 'bail-out' from the central 
government. On the other hand, if they can raise 
sufficient own resources to cover most of their 
expenditures and the weight of transfers is low the 
central government can more easily resist bail-out 
pressures. Moreover, in the latter case subnational 
policy-makers are more accountable to subnational 
voters as the link between subnational taxes paid 
and subnational public goods delivered is stronger 
which also exerts a disciplining effect on 
subnational governments fiscal behaviour. 
(3) This conclusion is strengthened by the 
finding on the positive effect on the primary 
balance of 'effective' tax autonomy, i.e. of a large 
weight of taxes on which subnational governments 
can exert autonomy with respect to the rate and/or 
the base. This suggests that the positive effect of 
decentralisation on primary balance is improved 
not only if subnational tax revenues are high and 
transfers low but also if subnational governments 
can set those taxes autonomously.    
(4) The most puzzling result concerns 
decentralisation of own revenue sources, i.e. a high 
share of tax revenues and fees assigned to 
subnational governments in total general 
government revenues, which has an adverse effect 
on the primary balance, reflecting an increasing 
effect on expenditures and a decreasing one on 
revenues. On the one hand, this contradicts the 
idea that devolving relatively large own revenue 
sources to subnational governments is positive for 
fiscal discipline which would follow logically from 
the above mentioned arguments on the benefit of 
subnational revenue autonomy, responsibility, 
avoiding soft-budget constraints etc. Upon closer 
reflection, though, this variable is less suitable than 
those discussed in point 2 above to capture those 
aspects as it tells nothing on the size of own 
revenues relative to subnational expenditures and 
on the relative weight of transfers vs. taxes and 
fees in subnational revenues. This does not yet 
explain the fact that it has an adverse effect on the 
budget balance, though, rather than being simply 
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insignificant. (
204
) Further research would be 
advisable on this issue. 
(5) Finally, divergences between stylised 
facts based on simple or conditional correlations 
and results of regression analysis, in particular 
with respect to the impact of expenditure 
decentralisation, subnational financial 
responsibility and the relative size of taxes vs. 
transfers on expenditures, highlight the need to 
simultaneously control for several features of fiscal 
decentralisation to disentangle their impact on the 
fiscal outcomes of the general government.    
(6) As for the impact of rules constraining the 
fiscal behaviour of subnational governments; 
stricter debt rules appear to affect positively the 
primary balance via restraints on expenditures. 
Moreover, they partly alleviate the negative effect 
of expenditure decentralisation combined with a 
large share of transfers in subnational revenues, 
suggesting a partial substitutability between debt 
rules and subnational fiscal responsibility/large 
share of own resources as a tool to encourage 
fiscal discipline. On the other hand, the budgetary 
impact of fiscal decentralisation does not appear to 
be affected by stricter balanced budget rules 
applying to subnational governments. 
Overall, it appears that fiscal decentralisation 
matters for fiscal outcomes and that the interplay 
between the expenditure and the revenue side of it 
is crucial to determine its net effect on fiscal 
balances. Overly pessimistic statements, often 
heard recently, on a generalised fiscal deterioration 
caused by increasing fiscal decentralisation across 
the EU do not seem to find support in the data. 
This may have occurred in some Member States, 
but probably not as a result of decentralisation per 
se but of a 'bad' design of decentralisation, i.e. one 
which does not ensure strong financial 
responsibility of subnational governments.    
                                                          
(204) Although an explanation could be that own revenue 
decentralisation may capture other effects than the 
devolvement of revenue sources to subnational 
governments, such as business cycle effects. An economic 
downturn would decrease general government revenues 
and so (if subnational revenues are kept constant) increase 
own revenue decentralisation via its denominator, even 
though no policy measure to increase decentralisation is 
enacted. At the same time this would also lead to a worse 
primary balance, being consistent with a negative sign of 
the revenue decentralisation coefficient in the regression.    
In methodological terms, the econometric analysis 
carried out in this Chapter draws on Escolano et al. 
(2012). However, several enrichments are 
introduced compared to this paper, such as testing 
the impact of subnational expenditure coverage by 
own resources, of effective subnational tax 
autonomy (as measured by the OECD Secretariat), 
of several interactions between different aspects of 
decentralisation (i.e. between expenditure and own 
revenue decentralisation, on the one hand, and the 
share of taxes and transfers, on the other hand; 
between effective tax autonomy, on the one hand, 
and expenditure decentralisation and  expenditure 
coverage by own resources, on the other hand) and 
of the functional composition of expenditure 
decentralisation. Furthermore, the Chapter extends 
the analysis of the impact of subnational fiscal 
rules by looking at the joint impact of expenditure 
decentralisation, share of transfers and rules, 
finding statistically significant results for debt 
rules as opposed to the above mentioned paper, 
and, finally, runs separate estimates on the impact 
of decentralisation on expenditures and revenues, 
in addition to those on the primary balance. 
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A1.1. BELGIUM 
1. General description 
Since 1970, five constitutional reforms have 
gradually transformed the Belgian unitary state 
into a federal state made up of three tiers of 
subnational government: six federated entities 
(three linguistic communities(
205
) and three 
territorial regions(
206
)), 11 provinces and 589 
municipalities. Regions and communities have 
legislative and administrative competences, while 
provinces and municipalities have administrative 
powers and implement upper levels' legislation. 
Belgium therefore has one of the most far-reaching 
levels of decentralisation in the EU. Although the 
decentralisation process has already transferred a 
considerable number of competences to the 
subnational levels, federalisation does not seem to 
have reached its endpoint as the federal 
government formed in December 2011 plans a 
sixth constitutional reform and a further transfer of 
competences. 
Since the first constitutional reform of 1970, the 
Belgian Constitution explicitly stipulates the 
existence of communities and regions. From that 
moment on, several waves of reform (1980, 1988-
1989, 1993, 2001) have transferred a considerable 
number of competences and hence spending 
authority to those federated entities. The 
distribution of competences among the federal 
state and the federated entities has been anchored 
in the Constitution. The federal government has 
spending power for all competences that do not 
expressly come under the authority of regions or 
communities. Regions are competent in areas 
linked to their territory. Communities are 
responsible for person-related matters. The 
distribution of theses competences leads 
communities and regions to realise almost 24% 
and provinces and municipalities approximately 
13% of total general government expenditure 
(12.7% and 7.2% of GDP)(
207
). 
                                                          
(205) The German-speaking Community, the French-speaking 
Community and the Flemish Community 
(206) The Wallonia Region, the Brussels-Capital Region and the 
Flemish Region 
(207) 2009 data providing from the OECD Fiscal 
Decentralisation database 
The transfer of the corresponding financial means 
is for the federated entities regulated by the 1989 
Special Financing Act, which was amended by the 
Special Act of 13 July 2001 to take into account 
the further decentralisation of competences. This 
has extended the fiscal autonomy of the federated 
entities but has also led to a complex system of 
grants, shared and own-source tax revenues. The 
type of revenue from which subnational 
governments can benefit differs considerably from 
one tier to another. Communities benefit from 
shared tax revenues (mainly personal income tax 
and VAT) and from some non-tax revenues, 
whereas regions do also perceive own-source tax 
revenues, like registration duties, property and 
vehicle taxes (8.9% of total general government 
revenues or 4.3% of GDP). Local authorities, i.e. 
provinces and municipalities, do not share taxes 
with the federal level but benefit from own-source 
tax revenues, general and earmarked grants. Their 
revenue represents 7.5% of total general 
government revenues or 3.6% of GDP. 
2. Government spending 
A substantial number of government functions 
were devolved to subnational entities in Belgium. 
In 2010, local authorities were in charge of EUR 
25 billion of public spending (13.8% of total 
public expenditure) and federated entities of EUR 
53 billion (28.9% of total public expenditure). As 
often subnational governments are only in charge 
of part of a government function, the remaining 
competences that were not expressly attributed to 
one of the sub-levels stay under the authority of 
the federal state. As a result, most of the 
government functions are scattered among the 
different government tiers.  
At local tier, subnational governments are mainly 
involved in general public services, education, 
social protection and public order and safety. 
Provinces have spending power in certain person-
related areas, like secondary and higher education, 
and are responsible for the general affairs of the 
provinces. Municipalities' spending competence 
includes local planning, elections and registration, 
as well as police and some social protection 
functions, like public social welfare centres. 
At the level of the federated entities education is 
by large the most important spending item, 
followed by economic affairs, social protection 
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and general services. Those competences that are 
person-related were mainly attributed to the 
communities, whereas territory-linked areas are 
under the competence of regions. Hence, 
communities are highly involved in education, as 
they finance large parts of primary, secondary and 
higher education. Regions are largely involved in 
economic affairs like agriculture and transport, as 
well as in environmental protection and housing.  
The federal state remains largely in charge of 
general public services and it is the only 
government tier competent for defence matters. 
The federal state spends almost two thirds of its 
budget on general services, while approximately 
5% is spent on defence. Although health is a 
person-related service and is therefore expected to 
be part of the communities' responsibilities, it is 
the federal state that has the largest spending 
power with respect to that economic function.  
The federated entities and local authorities are 
autonomous in designing and implementing 
policies in the areas of competence which were 
attributed to them(
208
). Once a responsibility is 
transferred to a subnational government, the 
federal state no longer has power to act or 
intervene regarding this matter. 
An analysis by type of expenditure highlights that 
more than 85% of expenditures are linked to 
current expenditures at all government levels. The 
remaining part of expenditures is related to the 
reimbursement of capital and the payment of 
interest costs. 
                                                          
(208) Areas of competence of communities include cultural 
matters, education (except for determining the beginning 
and end of compulsory schooling, minimum conditions 
governing the granting of diplomas, and the pension plan), 
services offered to individuals, the use of languages in 
respect of administrative matters, teaching and contacts 
between employers and their staff, intra-Community and 
international cooperation, including the conclusion of 
treaties, in respect of cultural matters, teaching and services 
offered to individuals. 
Areas of competence of regions include economic policy, 
including assistance in respect of investment and 
employment, employment, transportation, public works, 
financing of sub-ordinate powers, scientific policy 
pertaining to their fields of jurisdiction, energy, wastewater 
treatment and the protection and distribution of water, 
policy governing waste and environmental protection, 
monuments and sites, foreign trade, agriculture, 
international relations from the standpoint of the Regions' 
fields of jurisdiction. 
3. Financial arrangements 
Throughout the several constitutional reforms, 
subnational governments have gained a lot of 
fiscal autonomy, not only from an expenditure but 
also from a revenue point of view. The Special 
Financing Act of 1989 sets the pillars for revenue 
allocation to the federated entities and guarantees 
that the latter have the means to exercise their 
competences. At local tier, regions regulate the 
funding of the local authorities and can introduce 
limits (regarding type and rate) on taxes set by 
municipalities. Hence, municipalities and 
provinces are subject to different financing rules, 
according to the region in which they are located. 
Whether at federated or local level, subnational 
financing is done through tax revenues, as well as 
through grants from the upper government level. 
All subnational entities also have the possibility to 
borrow.  
Municipalities and provinces depend for almost 
half of their financing on grants from the regions. 
Those grants are allocated to municipal and 
provincial funds or are earmarked to specific 
projects. Local authorities are also financed 
through own-source taxes, which are mainly 
surtaxes on the federal personal income tax, the 
regional traffic tax and real estate tax for 
municipalities and on the regional real estate tax 
for provinces. Often the upper government level 
determines the tax base and the local authority sets 
the rate of the surtax. Local authorities are also 
free to levy other local taxes, like waste and leisure 
taxes. Other local revenues include interests 
received and fee revenues, which account for 
approximately 18% of total revenues.  
The financial autonomy of communities and 
regions differs considerably. Both communities 
and regions benefit from shared tax revenues and 
grants from the federal state. Only regions, 
however, levy their own-source taxes. The latter 
amount to approximately 16% of the federated 
entities' total revenues and include real estate 
taxes, registration duties, inheritance taxes and 
vehicle taxes. Regions are entirely free to set the 
tax base and tax rate of those regional taxes. 
Although the federated entities have the right to 
collect the taxes themselves, tax collection is 
ensured by the federal state. The lion's share of the 
regions and communities' revenue comes from 
shared taxes, i.e. a fraction of the proceeds 
Part IV 
Fiscal decentralisation in the EU - main characteristics and implications for fiscal outcomes 
 
213 
providing from the personal income tax and the 
value added tax, collected by the federal state. On 
top of this fraction, regions can decide to levy 
surtaxes on those federal state taxes. Additional 
means, amounting to almost 11% of total federated 
entity revenue, are transferred from the federal to 
the federated level in the form of grants. Those 
include grants for foreign students, for the 
Brussels-Capital Region, as well as a 
compensatory grant for abolishing the radio-
television licence fee. 
The increasing budgetary autonomy of subnational 
governments also includes the right to run deficits 
and to borrow accordingly. Although in the past 
budgetary correcting mechanisms and equalising 
transfers existed at almost all government levels, 
now only an automatic compensation mechanism 
remains regarding health spending by the federal 
government. 
4. Fiscal rules 
The project of joining the EU Economic and 
Monetary Union in 1992 gave Belgium an 
incentive to reduce its deficit and its debt ratio, 
which was the highest in the EU at that moment. In 
order to do so, the country engaged in a thorough 
reform of its fiscal framework. Two independent 
fiscal bodies (the National Account Institute (NAI) 
and a new section of the High Council of Finance 
(HCF)) were established to give the federal and 
federated governments advice on public finance 
issues. Moreover, numerical fiscal rules were 
introduced from 1990 on to monitor the budget 
balance, the expenditures and the revenues of the 
federal government, as well as of some subnational 
governments. 
The institutional part of the renewed fiscal 
framework has proven crucial, as with the 
increased fiscal autonomy of the subnational 
governments it guaranteed a coordination of the 
fiscal policies of the different government tiers. 
The annual budget recommendations of the HFC's 
advisory section were at the basis of budgetary 
conventions which acted as "internal stability 
pacts" by setting the medium-term budgetary 
targets for the different government tiers. Although 
never used, it allowed the federal level to impose 
borrowing limits to the regions in case they did not 
respect their budgetary targets. Regions cannot be 
liable, however, for providing fiscal surpluses to 
offset a potential federal deficit. 
The rule-based part of the reformed fiscal 
framework turned to be more problematic, as the 
improvement of the federal deficit and the debt 
ratio relaxed the fiscal tension from the end of the 
1990s on. Several fiscal rules at federal, regional 
and local level adopted earlier on, were abolished. 
As a result, only the federal ceiling for health 
spending and the regional budget balance rule 
were kept in place. This fiscal framework, 
however, may change following the sixth 
constitutional reform which was agreed upon in 
autumn 2011. 
The Council issued country-specific 
recommendations to Belgium with respect to 
subnational governments (see Box I.3.2 above). 
A1.2. BULGARIA 
1. General description 
Bulgaria is a unitary state. Article 136 of the 
Constitution ratified in 1991 enshrines the 
principle of local self-government. The Local Self-
Government and Local Administration Act was 
passed the same year, providing the legislative 
framework for the 264 Bulgarian municipalities.   
According to the Constitution, the territory is 
divided into regions and municipalities. While a 
region is defined as an administrative unit in 
charge of conducting the national policy for 
regional development and ensuring of harmony of 
national and local interest, the municipality is the 
only subnational level of the general government 
with fiscal autonomy. Municipalities have the right 
to cooperate in a way they can better protect their 
own interest. They are defined as legal entities in 
which government citizens participate directly and 
through elected bodies. Municipalities, in contrast 
to regions, possess their own budgets and are 
entitled to permanent revenues by law. According 
to 2010 figures, total spending by municipalities 
amounted to only 6% of GDP, around 16% of total 
public expenditure. In turn, in the same year 
municipalities' revenues also amounted to 6% of 
GDP, representing 18% of total revenues of the 
general government. 
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The National Association of Municipalities was 
constituted in 1996 and nowadays represents to all 
municipalities. Besides its contribution to 
developing the legislative framework applied to 
municipalities, the Association also makes 
proposals on their respective section of the draft 
budget. Since 1996 there have been ongoing 
efforts to deepen the decentralization process.   
2. Government spending 
According to the Local Self-Government and 
Local Administration Act there are two different 
types of powers devolved to municipalities. These 
are the State delegated services and the local 
services. 
State delegated services comprise the management 
and financing of a number of services, of which 
the State retains the responsibility to define the 
main policy principles, such as the type of 
services, the quality and the eligibility criteria 
thereof. According to the functional breakdown of 
public expenditure (COFOG) these delegated 
services to municipalities include education up to 
the secondary level, social protection services, 
such as family and child support and care for the 
elderly, healthcare and culture. However, the 
devolution of powers in the area of healthcare have 
limited to the ownership and maintenance of health 
care institutions in that since 2001 they have been 
transformed into legal entities under the meaning 
of the Commercial Law with state or municipal 
ownership . 
By contrast, municipalities have own 
responsibilities in some areas of general public 
services, housing and community amenities (public 
utilities and networks such as urban heat, 
electricity and water supply), economic affairs 
(urban public transport, construction and 
maintenance of roads, building and upkeep of 
public buildings and territorial development), 
environmental protection (including also sewerage 
and waste collection) and recreation culture and 
religion (public libraries, tourism, some cultural 
activities and sports facilities).  
3. Financial arrangements 
Municipalities are financed by three main sources, 
notably own revenues: including own local taxes 
(patent tax, property taxes, other taxes) and nontax 
revenue and assistance (revenue and income from 
property, local fees, fines, penalties, and forfeits, 
concessions, other nontax revenues ).  
The annual State Budget Law grants the provision 
of financing for current expenses in activities 
delegated by the state entirely with funds from the 
general subsidy for state-delegated activities, while 
the local activities are financed by own revenues, 
consisting of local taxes and fees, non tax 
revenues, as well as transfers from the Central 
Bank for local activities, including common 
equalising subsidy and transfer for winter 
maintenance and snow cleanup. 
3.1. Own revenues 
Tax revenues sum up to 35.8% of total revenues in 
municipal revenues in municipal budgets on 31 
December 2010. According to data from the report 
on municipal budget cash implementation, tax 
revenues, donations and aid sum up to 64.2% of 
own municipal resources on 31 December 2010. 
Revenues from municipal fees have the largest 
share of non tax revenues and donations in 
municipal budgets in 2010 – 69.3%. 
Municipalities have full powers on local fees and 
taxes. The Municipal Council determines the tax 
levels in line with the conditionalities, order and 
limits set by the Law on Local Taxes and Fees. 
3.2. Expenditures 
The expenditures on the activities delegated by the 
state to the municipalities and on the local 
activities are being distributed relatively equally, 
but municipal financing is predominantly with 
funds from transfers and interactions with the 
central budget – approximately 57% of total 
municipal revenues. Subsidies from the central 
budget for local activities finance 18-25% of 
expenditures on local activities. Subsidies from the 
central budget for activities delegated by the state 
finance approximately 98% of the expenditures on 
state activities. Municipal own resources finance 
predominantly local activities (over 90%) and co-
finance delegated activities. In the common 
municipal expenditure structure on 31.12.2010, 
according to data from the report on municipal 
budgets, activities delegated by the state total 49%, 
co-financing with own resources – 2.3%, and the 
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remaining 48.7% are expenditures on local 
activities. 
The expenditures on the state-delegated activities 
are financed through state transfer, determined by 
standards used for shaping the total amount of 
funds needed and as criteria for their distribution to 
the municipalities. The budget of each function 
delegated by the state is determined by established 
standards and natural indicators determined by the 
sectoral ministries. The standards are worked out 
in working groups consisting of representatives of 
the corresponding sectoral ministry, the Ministry 
of Finance and the National Association of 
Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria. This 
ensures comprehensible and transparent 
distribution of funds to the municipalities and 
ensures predictability in financing. 
3.3. Grants from the central government 
The transfers to municipalities are made on the 
basis of entirely comprehensible criteria. 
The targeted transfers amount to 90% compared to 
the non-targeted ones. The targeted transfers 
consist of: general subsidy for the activities 
delegated by the state, funds for winter 
maintenance, the target subsidy for capital 
expenditures (including: road maintenance and 
other expenditures whose purpose is determined by 
the municipal council), for co-financing municipal 
projects, funds for compensating travel 
expenditures (for students, pensionser, military 
handicaps) and other targeted transfers. 
Municipal capital expenditures are financed 
through a targeted subsidy distributed to projects 
by the municipal councils. In addition, a target 
subsidy is assigned to ecological projects and for 
maintenance and construction of municipal roads 
at parameters determined by the annual State Law 
Budget. The target subsidy is distributed on the 
basis of comprehensible criteria on population – 
weight 40%; number of cities/towns – weight 
40%; municipal territory – 20%. 
Additionally the municipalities receive transfers 
(within the limits of 8-17% of the total transfer 
size) for financing activities on specific 
programmes (for example: managing 
environmental activities, etc.). 
Non-targeted transfers consist of an equalizing 
subsidy assigned to municipalities to provide 
services to the public, as its size is approximately 
7-9% of the total transfer structure. The total 
amount of the equalizing subsidy is determined 
according to the rule in Art. 34, p. 5 from the Law 
on Municipal Budgets (valid since 2005), namely 
“The size of the general equalizing subsidy cannot 
be smaller than 10% of the report on own revenues 
of all municipalities for the previous year”. The 
subsidy is distributed to the municipalities 
according to a mechanism consisting criteria 
determined annually by the Minister of Finance 
and the National Association of Municipalities in 
the Republic of Bulgaria (Art. 34, p. 4 from the 
Law on Municipal Budgets). The mechanism for 
determining the municipal subsidies from the 
central budget is an annex in the State Budget 
Law. The municipalities are potential beneficiaries 
on four of the seven Operational Programmes 
financed by the Structural and Cohesion Funds in 
the EU (SCF). In order to be approved for 
financing, the municipal projects should meet all 
the criteria set by the European and Bulgarian 
legislation. 
4. Fiscal rules 
Municipal departments' monitoring – The 
Municipal Debt Law limits local government 
borrowing to financing of infrastructure 
investment and rollover of previously accumulated 
debt. There are no limits on the amount of 
borrowing of local governments; however there are 
limits on the debt service payments. Current 
observation of municipal debt amount is in place. 
Legislative changes were introduced form the 
beginning of 2011. According to the Municipal 
Debt Act: “Art 12. (1) (Amended 2010, effective 
1.01.2011) The annual amount of payments on the 
debt during each particular year may not exceed 15 
per cent of the sum total of revenues from own 
sources and the block equalizing grant under the 
last audited report on the implementation of the 
budget of the municipality.” (Guarantees rule) By 
the end of 2010 it was 25 per cent. “Article 17a. 
(New 2010, effective 1.01.2011) (1) The 
Municipal Council may not adopt decisions to 
assume long-term municipal debt after the expiry 
of 39 months of its election.” The nominal value of 
the guarantees may not exceed 5% of the 
abovementioned sum.  
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The debt rules have been very efficient in fostering 
the decrease of the consolidated debt in good 
economic times and preventing the accumulation 
of debt at local government level.  
Coverage and exclusion: Municipal debt includes 
the principal, interests and commissions excluding: 
(i) non-interest loans from the central budget made 
available to the local governments in order to 
finance projects and programmes co-financed by 
the EU funds until their reimbursement; (ii) debt to 
the Fund for Local Authorities and Governments 
(FLAG) aimed at providing bridge financing for 
co-financed with the EU projects; and (iii) debt 
assumed under the “Loan Agreement for Structural 
Programme Loan between the Republic of 
Bulgaria and the European Investment Bank” 
(pursuant to § 15 of the Transitional and Final 
Provisions of the 2011 State Budget Law) . 
When in previous periods the accumulated 
municipal debt or guarantees exceed 15% and 5%, 
respectively, of the sum of total own revenues and 
the total balancing subsidy under the last audited 
report for the municipal budget execution, local 
governments cannot issue new debt or grant new 
guarantees until the requirements of the rules are 
complied with. To prevent the accumulation of 
liabilities that should be serviced beyond the term 
of the local governments, they could issue long-
term debt only in the first 39 months after their 
election. 
The Ministry of Finance is monitoring the 
application of the rules based on a public registry 
for municipal debt, securities and guarantees. The 
content and quality requirements for the 
information provided in the registry are fixed by 
the Ministry of Finance. 
The rules have been amended and further 
strengthened in 2010 in order to preserve fiscal 
sustainability and avoid an accumulation of 
municipal debt and guarantees in particular by 
insulating local governments’ liabilities from the 
impact of political cycles. However, it is important 
to ensure that the capacity of highly indebted local 
government to provide the most important public 
services is not impaired. 
5. Other relevant institutional features 
Municipalities have total independence in 
forecasting their own revenues, as they conform to 
the level of local taxes determined by the 
municipal council regulations within the limits set 
by the Law on local taxes and fees. The 
expenditures forecasts for local activities shall be 
according to the strategies, forecasts and 
programmes for municipal development adopted 
by the municipal council, in line with the trends in 
the amount and types of public services provided 
and according to the resources available to the 
local government. 
The preparation of the municipal draft budget is 
organized by the municipal mayor in cooperation 
with the town and regional mayors. The revenue 
administration assists the municipality in 
determining the size of the annual and monthly 
revenues. 
The municipal budget determines and provides 
funds for financing local and state-delegated 
activities. 
The municipal mayor submits the draft budget for 
public debate by the local community. The 
municipal mayor submits the draft budget to the 
municipal council within 30 workdays after the 
State Budget Law for the corresponding year has 
been made official. 
The municipal council adopts the municipal budget 
within 45 workdays after the State Budget Law has 
been made official and in accordance with the 
common budget classification. The municipal draft 
budget is presented at the local branches of the 
Court of Auditors and at the Ministry of Finance 
within one month after it has been approved by the 
municipal council. 
Municipal (local) structures, their structural units 
and economic subjects applying budgets, 
budgetary and non-budgetary accounts and funds 
according to the Municipal Budget Law are 
included in the scope of budget enterprises defined 
in paragraph 1 from the Additional provisions in 
the Accounting Law. 
In addition, the Minister of Finance approves 
annually the Single Budget Classification as an 
accounting framework for cash basis reporting. 
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Municipalities and all budget enterprises report on 
the incoming and outgoing funds on a cash basis 
according to the Single Budget Classification. This 
report is the basis for periodic (monthly, quarterly 
and annual) report on the cash implementation of 
budget and non-budget accounts and funds. 
The annual report on the budget and non-budget 
accounts and funds cash implementation is a part 
of the annual financial report. 
According to the Municipal Budget Law the 
municipality prepares a budgetary forecast giving 
the parameters of municipal revenues and 
expenditures for the next three years. The 
municipal mayor presents at the Ministry of 
Finance a forecast for the amount of own revenues 
and local expenditures for the budgetary year, as 
well as the municipal intentions for debt 
accumulation in the following year.  
The process of decentralization, started in 2002, 
continues in 2012 as the main priorities and goals 
are set in the long term programme document 
Decentralization Strategy (2006-2015). It is related 
to conducting national policy for improving the 
territorial management and it determines the 
directions for distributing jurisdiction and financial 
resources among the central, regional and 
municipal level of government, aiming at a 
providing public services more effectively. In 2010 
the Council of Ministers adopted updated 
Decentralization Strategy and a Programme for the 
period 2010-2013 including measures, 
responsibilities and deadlines for implementation, 
such as for example giving more authority to the 
local government in relation to the transfer of 
special and professional schools without national 
importance. 
Each year the Council on public government 
decentralization prepares a report using an adopted 
system of indicators for monitoring evaluating the 
implementation and results of the Decentralization 
Strategy. 
The policies in the budget aim at creating 
opportunities for sustainable and balanced 
municipal development.  
Regarding tax policy and local budget revenues, 
the trend toward higher municipal financial 
autonomy is clearly visible in light of the provided 
full municipal authority in administering local 
taxes and the authority to determine independently 
the size of these taxes according to the conditions 
set in the Law on local taxes and fees. 
A1.3. CZECH REPUBLIC 
1. General description 
Overview 
The Czech Republic is a unitary state with two 
tiers of subnational self-governments: 14 regions 
(kraj) defined as "higher autonomous local 
government units" and about 6250 municipalities 
(obce). Prague has a special statute as both a 
municipality and a region.  
The existence of regions and municipalities is 
recognized in the constitution articles 99-104 
stating that the Czech Republic is divided into 
municipalities which are the basic units of 
territorial self-administration.  Higher units of 
territorial self-administration are regions. 
Recent institutional reforms 
The most recent major reform took place in 2000 
and entered into force in stages in 2001 and 2002. 
In 2001 14 new regions were established from the 
already existing administrative districts (okres) 
that existed since 1996. This led to a substantial 
inequality in terms of size of individual regions 
that was greater compared to the period 1949-1960 
when similar regions existed as well. At the end of 
2002 the administrative districts were abolished 
and their responsibilities were transferred.  
2. Government competencies (spending) 
There is a distinction between autonomous 
responsibilities and delegated responsibilities. In 
terms of the autonomous responsibilities, 
subnational governments have considerable legal 
freedom to handle questions of local interest in 
compliance with the law. Delegated 
responsibilities are executed in line with central 
government policy.  
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Regions 
Regions are autonomously responsible mainly for 
upper secondary education, the regional road 
network, regional economic development and 
planning, and healthcare. Similar areas are also the 
most significant in terms of spending. Education 
requires around 60% of total spending by regions 
while almost 20% of total spending is devoted to 
transport and infrastructure. 
Municipalities 
Municipal autonomous responsibilities include 
education (pre-elementary and primary schools), 
the provision of local social and welfare services 
(retirement homes, homes for disabled etc.), 
environment (water and waste management), 
public housing, local roads, city public transport, 
territorial planning, urban hygiene and others. In 
terms of spending, transport and infrastructure 
together with housing and education are the most 
significant elements of the overall spending. 
Education  
A municipality is obliged to create conditions for 
pre-school education in the last grade prior to 
commencing compulsory school attendance and 
conditions for compulsory school attendance of 
children. For such purposes a municipality can 
establish or close down a nursery and a primary 
school. Also, a municipality may establish and 
close down certain special types of schools such as 
artistic primary schools etc. 
A region is obliged to ensure conditions for 
secondary and tertiary professional education. For 
such purposes a region can establish and close 
down secondary schools and tertiary professional 
schools. 
Infrastructure/Transport 
Management, maintenance and repair of highways 
and category I roads is provided on a central level 
by the Road and Motorway Directorate of the 
Czech Republic.  Category II and III roads are 
owned by regions that are responsible for their 
management, maintenance and repair. 
Municipalities own local roads. Subnational 
governments have also number of responsibilities 
in terms bus and railway public transport.  
Healthcare 
The conditions for establishment and management 
of a healthcare facility are prescribed by law in 
accordance with uniform national guidelines. At 
the same time, health care facilities can be 
established not only by the Ministry of Health, but 
also by regions, municipalities, and private bodies.
 
(
209
) Subnational governments also provide 
guidance and coordinate in areas such as medical 
emergency service and medical and first aid, the 
quality of health care, the training of health 
professionals, central purchasing of 
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies and number 
of others.  
Social services 
There is a rather complex system of shared 
responsibilities in social services. Subnational 
governments, among other things, identify the 
needs of providing social services, ensure adequate 
availability of social facilities and cooperate 
together in preparing and implementing medium-
term development plan for social services. 
Municipalities were also responsible for accepting 
applications for certain social benefits and 
determining the adequacy and level of these 
benefits. However, as of 2012 Regional branches 
of the Labour Office of the Czech Republic are 
responsible for granting and disbursing these 
benefits. 
3. Financial arrangements 
Revenues of municipalities and regions can be 
divided into tax revenues, non-tax revenues and 
transfers.  
Tax revenues include both shared taxes and non-
shared taxes. Shared taxes include personal income 
tax, corporate income tax and value added tax. 
These taxes are collected centrally and are 
subsequently redistributed to regions and 
municipalities. Since 2008, new criteria were 
                                                          
(209) In terms of hospital, there were 166 hospitals in the Czech 
Republic of which 19 were set up by the Ministry, 24 by 
regions and 17 by municipalities in 2010. The rest includes 
either hospitals managed by other entities (such as 
ecclesiastical) but also hospitals that were turned into 
private companies. However, these private companies were 
mostly set up by a region or a municipality which now act 
as the only shareholder. (Institute of Health Information 
and Statistics of the Czech Republic - www.uzis.cz) 
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introduced for redistribution of shared taxes to 
municipalities. These are based mainly on the size 
of the population and also on the geographical size 
of municipality. The 4 biggest cities are excluded 
since they have special coefficients. In terms of 
regions, the law directly determines the share of 
individual regions on the total amount of shared 
taxes.  
Non-tax revenues include items such as interest 
income, revenues from renting property, own 
entrepreneurial activity etc.  
Finally, transfers represent a complicated system 
of various earmarked and non-earmarked items. In 
terms of delegated responsibilities, the central 
government provides a contribution to both regions 
and municipalities specifically aimed at these 
responsibilities. However, the funds provided do 
not fully cover all the costs and both municipalities 
and regions need to pay the rest of the costs from 
other sources. The current system doesn’t allow 
the central government to control the use of the 
funds or to obtain any feedback about efficiency 
etc. As a result, the contribution to cover delegated 
responsibilities can be spent on other purposes.  
Revenues of municipalities 
Municipalities derive about one half of their 
revenues from taxes that include both shared and 
non-shared taxes. In terms of shared taxes the 
value added tax is the most important one 
accounting for about 40% of overall tax revenues. 
Non-shared taxes include real estate tax and a 
special type of corporate income tax in cases when 
the municipality itself is a taxpayer. The rate of 
real estate tax can be partially affected by 
municipalities through a system of certain 
coefficients. Apart from these, various fees and 
charges are included in tax revenues. These 
include fees and charges related to environment, 
municipal waste, gaming machines, dogs etc. 
These own sources represent only about 14% of 
total tax revenues.
 
(
210
) There is also a tax incentive 
scheme by which municipalities are motivated to 
encourage entrepreneurship and employment in 
their territory in order to raise their tax revenues.  
Transfers represented about 36% of total revenues 
in 2010 of which almost 40% were provided by the 
                                                          
(210) Ministry of Finance, 2010 
Ministry of labour and social affairs and over 10% 
by the Ministry of Education. 
Revenues of regions 
The largest part of revenues for regions is 
represented by transfers that accounted for almost 
64% of total revenues in 2010. The vast majority 
of this, almost 90% of all transfers and loans from 
the state budget, was provided by the Ministry of 
Education. 
Tax revenues only include shared taxes and 
accounted for 32% of overall revenues in 2010. 
The value added tax is again the most important 
contributor accounting for over one half of overall 
tax revenues for regions. 
Education 
Funds from the state budget are provided for 
activities of schools and school facilities to be used 
for salaries and other non-investment costs. These 
funds from the state budget are provided on the 
basis of the real number of pupils or students and 
other criteria. The funds are transferred from the 
centre to individual regions that transfer them 
directly to individual schools.  
A municipality or a region cover the expenses of 
school facilities established by a municipality or a 
region with the exception of expenses paid from 
funds provided from the state budget (i.e. 
subnational governments provide operating 
subsidies directly to schools). 
Transport 
The biggest contributors in terms of providing 
funds are the State Fund for Transport 
Infrastructure (90%) and the Ministry of Transport. 
In terms of railway transportation, regions receive 
contribution from the state to cover the losses from 
maintaining public transport. However, this 
contribution is not sufficient and in recent years 
the major part of the losses had to be covered from 
the regions' own budget. Regions also receive 
contributions to cover loses in the intra-regional 
bus transport which does not include city public 
transport that is funded from the budgets of 
individual municipalities. 
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Healthcare 
Healthcare facilities are mainly financed by health 
insurance companies. For example hospitals, in 
terms of financing the most demanding element of 
the system, received over 80% of their overall 
revenues from health insurance companies in 
2010. Operating subsidies are provided by regions 
or municipalities and, in terms of hospitals, they 
accounted for 2% of total revenues in 2010. The 
rest represents other revenues including revenues 
from sold goods etc. Besides hospitals, subnational 
governments also provide operating subsidies to 
emergency medical service facilities, special 
medical institutes and other facilities.  
Social services 
Until 2012 the largest part of the funds provided 
by the state to municipalities was used as benefits 
(material need, care allowance) transferred to the 
citizens. However, Regional branches of the 
Labour Office of the Czech Republic are 
responsible for disbursing these benefits as of 
2012. The state also contributes to the financing of 
social service facilities in the form of subsidies to 
finance current expenditures. While regional 
authorities are involved in financial control and 
use of grants provided by the government, both 
regions and municipalities  also provide further 
grants to finance current and other expenditures of 
social service facilities. 
4. Deficit/debt 
Budgets of subnational governments do not have 
to be balanced as long as the deficit is financed 
either by surpluses from previous years or by loans 
or bonds.  
In 2010 the debt of municipalities was about 2% of 
GDP. Almost one half of this sum was caused by 
the 4 biggest cities. Smaller cities have to be much 
more careful in running deficits. Recently there 
were certain cases of smaller municipalities having 
problem with their deficit cause by excessive 
investments co-financed by EU funds.  
In terms of regions, their overall debt was much 
lower, only about 0.5% of GDP. 
In terms of fiscal rules, the Ministry of Finance 
calculates monitoring indicators, such as total 
liquidity and the share of non-own resources to 
total assets, and sends a letter to municipalities that 
do not comply with certain criteria. The list of 
municipalities with insufficient criteria values is 
sent to relevant regional authorities. Municipalities 
should explain reasons for not achieving the pre-
defined values. Ministry of Finance submits 
information on municipalities' management to the 
government annually at the end of September.  
The government is currently discussing a reform of 
fiscal framework which would also affect fiscal 
rules targeted at subnational governments. In 
addition, a reform of the system of shared taxes is 
also currently under discussion.  
A1.4. DENMARK 
1. General description 
Denmark is a unitary state where the central 
government is predominant. However, the 
Constitution of 5 June 1953 establishes the 
principle of municipal autonomy under supervision 
of the state. 
The administrative structure in Denmark consists 
of three tiers including the national government, 
regions and municipalities. The scope of both local 
layers is governed by national legislation. 
On 1 January 2007, the Local Government Reform 
came into force. The number of municipalities was 
reduced from 271 to 98 by mergers, and the 13 
counties were abolished and replaced by 5 regions. 
A reform of the grant and equalisation system was 
carried out, which takes into account the new 
distribution of tasks. 
Provision of public welfare service is 
predominantly carried out by the municipalities 
and partly by the regions. National legislation 
stipulates which services and to some extent a 
minimum quality of the services local government 
is to provide.  
Municipalities' activities are financed through the 
municipal income tax and land value tax and 
transfers from the state in the form of block grants 
and reimbursements of specific expenditures. In 
addition, municipalities have significant revenues 
from user charges, while interest income and 
Part IV 
Fiscal decentralisation in the EU - main characteristics and implications for fiscal outcomes 
 
221 
borrowing also contribute to municipal finance. 
Municipalities have autonomy to vary certain tax 
rates (municipal income tax and municipal tax on 
land value). 
Regions rely entirely on a block grant from the 
central government and activity-based funding 
from the central government and the 
municipalities. 
Every year, typically in June, the government sign 
an agreement on the following year's budgets in 
the municipalities and the regions with the 
municipalities' national association (Kommunernes 
Landsforening) and the regions national 
association (Danske Regioner), respectively. The 
agreements include boundaries for service and 
investment costs as well as targets for total local 
taxes. This practice has been in place since 1979. It 
should be noted that the agreements are signed for 
municipalities and regions as a whole, allowing a 
certain room for manoeuvre for the individual 
municipality/region. This also creates uncertainty 
of the overall enforcement of the agreements. 
Since the local government reform of 2007, the 
central government was given a clearer role in 
overseeing efficiency in the provision of municipal 
and regional services. In recent years the collective 
agreements have been supplemented by automatic 
mechanisms to ensure enforcement of the agreed 
level of local government spending and municipal 
tax collection.  
In 2010, total spending by local government 
amounted to 38.2% of GDP – around 2/3 of total 
public spending (including income transfers and 
capital investments). Total local government 
revenue excluding borrowing stood at 38.0% of 
GDP (including transfers from central 
government).  
2. Government spending 
The division of tasks between administrative levels 
and the responsibilities of municipalities and 
regions are defined in a variety of legislation on 
different subjects (rather than a law defining local 
responsibilities).  
Municipal responsibilities include: social services 
(including income replacing transfers); child care; 
compulsory education; special education for 
adults; rehabilitation and long-term care for the 
elderly; preventive health care; nature and 
environmental planning; local business services; 
promotion of tourism; participation in regional 
transport companies; maintenance of the local road 
network; libraries; local sports and cultural 
facilities; and a responsibility for employment, 
shared with the central government.  
The new regions took over responsibility for health 
care from the counties, including hospitals and 
public health insurance covering general 
practitioners and specialists, pharmaceuticals, etc. 
The regions also have a number of tasks involving 
regional development. 
In 2010, total spending by local government 
amounted to DKK 670 billion or 38.2% of GDP – 
around 2/3 of total public spending (including 
capital investments). 96% of local government 
spending was to cover current expenses. 
Municipalities account for the vast part of local 
government spending. 
Local government responsibilities mainly concern 
the practical provision of public goods, whereas 
the regulation of their (eligibility, quality and other 
requirements) is to a large extent determined by 
the central government. Municipalities are 
responsible for paying all income transfers to 
citizens and in some cases decide on eligibility 
according to nationally defined criteria. 
Municipalities are partly or fully reimbursed by the 
central government for their expenditures for 
income transfers. The rate of reimbursement varies 
among types of income transfers to provide 
appropriate incentives to municipalities, it is set by 
the central government, with local governments 
having no influence on it, and periodically revised. 
3. Financial arrangements 
In 2010, total local government revenue excluding 
borrowing stood at DKK 665 billion or 38.0% of 
GDP (including transfers from central 
government).  
Municipalities' activities are financed through the 
municipal income tax and land value tax and 
transfers from the state in the form of block grants 
and reimbursements of specific expenditures. In 
addition, municipalities have significant revenues 
from user charges, while interest income and 
borrowing also contribute to municipal finance. 
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The number of taxation levels was reduced from 
three to two in the 2007 reform, since the regions, 
unlike the counties, no longer have the authority to 
impose taxes. Their revenues consist of block 
grants and activity-based funding from the central 
government and the municipalities.  
DKK 232 billion or 35% of total local revenue was 
raised by municipal taxes in 2010.  
Central government transfers and grants 
represented 59% of total revenue in 2010. These 
falls into three categories: block grants, (partial) 
reimbursement of specific current spending and 
compensation for transfer of responsibilities.  
The remainder stemmed from the sale of goods 
and services, asset management and extraordinary 
revenue. 
Net borrowing of local governments varies around 
0 and amounted to 0.2% of GDP in 2010.  
The local taxes are: 
 Municipal income tax account for around 85% 
of local tax revenues. Municipalities are in 
principle free to set the tax rate as they wish. In 
2012, the average municipal income tax rate is 
24.923%. The lowest rate is 22.7% and the 
highest 27.2%. The tax base is defined by the 
parliament.  
 The municipalities levy a tax on the property's 
land value (on average land value represents 
about ¼ of the total property values). 
Municipalities can vary the rate between a 
minimum of 16‰ and a maximum of 34‰. 
The average tax rate is 24‰ in 2012. 
Commercial properties and some public 
buildings also pay municipal tax on land value. 
 Moreover, business properties pay municipal 
reimbursement duty on the building value and 
the land value. 
 Finally, the municipalities receive 3/25 of the 
corporate income tax paid by companies in 
their jurisdiction. 
The central government collects the local taxes and 
reimburses local governments monthly. 
The average municipal income tax rate has 
increased constantly since 1971. In the same 
period, the tax base has also been broadened. The 
increase in the average municipal income tax rate 
partly reflects increased expenditures and taxation 
agreed in the annual agreement on the economy of 
the municipalities and partly reflects breaches of 
the agreed levels of expenditures and taxation. 
The total tax revenues of municipalities as a whole 
is stipulated in the annual agreement between the 
central government and the municipalities' national 
association on the following year's budgets. 
Municipalities can change the balance between the 
income tax and the property value tax within the 
agreement. 
However, since the agreement is between the 
central government and the municipalities 
collectively, there is no guarantee that the sum of 
the municipalities' actions will fulfil the 
agreement. Since 2007, the collective agreements 
have been supplemented by automatic mechanisms 
to provide incentives to the individual municipality 
and ensure enforcement of the agreed level of local 
government spending and municipal tax collection 
(see Section 4).  
The Ministry of Economics and Internal affairs 
and the Ministry of Finance are responsible for the 
surveillance of the local entities budgets and 
accountings and handles block grants and 
equalisation, municipal taxes and municipal and 
regional borrowing. 
Since the local government reform of 2007, the 
central government was given a clearer role in 
overseeing efficiency in the provision of municipal 
and regional services.  
4. Fiscal rules 
Three main fiscal rules are in place along with 
general requirements for the budgeting and 
accounting at local government level to control the 
spending of local governments. 
Conditional block grants 
With effect for the year 2009, a part of the block 
grant to the municipalities (DKK 1 billion) was 
made dependent on the total budgeted public 
expenditure by the municipalities as a whole 
Part IV 
Fiscal decentralisation in the EU - main characteristics and implications for fiscal outcomes 
 
223 
keeping within the agreement. (
211
) In 2010, after 
the accounting of municipal expenditures in 2009 
showed a substantial excess spending compared to 
the budgets, the conditional part of the block grant 
to the municipalities was increased to DKK 3 
billion from the year 2011 and the conditionality 
was broadened to also cover the accounted 
expenditures. (
212
) If the municipalities as a whole 
exceed the budgeted expenditure in 2011 and 
beyond, the block grant for the following year is 
reduced with the same amount (up to DKK 3 
billion). The conditional block grant is reduced 
collectively for the municipalities as a whole in 
case of infringement of the 2011 budgets. For 
2012, however, 60% of the possible reduction will 
be applied to the individual municipality exceeding 
the budget with the reaming 40% reduction 
collectively. 
Tax mechanism 
As part of the strengthening of management of 
local spending and to keep the municipal tax 
revenues constant in real terms, a mechanism to 
reduce the block grant to municipalities in case of 
increases in municipal taxes was introduced from 
2009. (
213
) If the municipalities as a whole increase 
tax revenues in the budget (through overall 
increased rates of the municipal income tax, land 
value tax and reimbursement duty on business 
properties), the extra municipal revenues will be 
clawed back through a combination of individual 
and collective reductions in the block grant. The 
individual reduction of the block grant will amount 
to 75% of tax increase in the 1
st
 year in each 
municipality increasing taxes in the budget (if the 
municipalities as a whole increase taxes in that 
year) with the collective reduction representing the 
remaining 25% in the 1
st
 year. In the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 
year following a tax increase, the individual and 
collective reduction both amounts to 50% of the 
tax increase. In the 4
th
 year following a tax 
increase, the block grant of the individual 
municipality increasing taxes is 25% of the 
increase, while the collective reduction is 75%. In 
subsequent years, an overall municipal tax increase 
in year 1 lead to collective reduction of the block 
grant of 100% of the tax increase. (
214
) This 
                                                          
(211) L 172 (2007-082). 
(212) L 219 (2009-10). 
(213) L 173 (2007-082). 
(214) For 2009 and 2010, the individual reduction amounted to 
75%/50%/0% in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd year, respectively, in 
mechanism allows individual municipalities 
autonomy over their tax rates while ensuring better 
enforcement of the overall municipal spending and 
taxation level. 
Spending ceilings 
To further strengthen the control of public 
expenditures and ensure that fiscal targets are 
implemented, in March 2012 the government will 
present a bill introducing a framework and detailed 
rules for a new fiscal surveillance system. This 
new fiscal surveillance system will include binding 
expenditure ceilings for the state, municipalities 
and regions, respectively. The expenditure ceilings 
will each year be defined for a rolling four-year 
period and is to be adopted by the parliament. 
State, municipalities and regions must stay within 
the ceilings each year. New economic sanctions 
will be introduced to support compliance with the 
expenditure ceilings. 
Borrowing 
Municipalities have access to borrowing (including 
issuing bonds) and are allowed to issue guarantees 
under certain limitations. (
215
) Municipalities and 
regions can issue bonds in capital markets through 
their common credit institute (kommunekredit). 
Municipalities are allowed to take loans 
corresponding to the sum of expenditures in the 
fiscal year for specific purposes: 1) capital 
expenditures, 2) paying off existing loans and 3) 
the costs of deferred property values taxes granted 
to pensioners. 
Furthermore, the central government establish 
minor loan pools for specific purposes which the 
government wish to support in the annual 
agreement about the following year's budget 
between local governments' association and the 
central government. In 2012, these specific loan 
pools amount to DKK 1.6 billion for the 
municipalities. 
                                                                                   
each municipality following a tax increase. The collective 
reduction thus represented 25%/50% in years 1 and 2 
respectively and 100% in subsequent years. An extra year 
with 50%/50% individual/collective reduction was added 
as of 2011. 
(215) BEK nr 1238 af 15/12/2011. 
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Municipalities can issue loan guarantees. The 
amount of the loan guaranty is fully subtracted in 
the municipality's' allowed loan amount. However, 
this is not the case for loan guaranties for social 
housing. 
Municipalities' entering into rental- and lease 
agreements is perceived as borrowing when the 
lease / rental agreement replaces a capital 
expenditure and causes a deduction from the total 
borrowing limit. 
Regions have more restricted access to borrowing 
than the municipalities. (
216
) As a general rule, 
regions can only borrow or issue guarantees 
following a dispensation by the Ministry of 
Economics and Internal affairs. Regions may, 
however, without ministerial approval take up 
loans and issue guarantees for certain specified 
capital costs. Regions may only enter into rental- 
and lease agreements after approval by the 
Ministry of Economics and Internal affairs. 
For both municipalities and regions, the portion of 
loans of partnerships, cooperatives, limited 
liability companies, private foundations etc. with 
participation of municipalities/regions is deducted 
from the municipality's' allowed loan amount. Sale 
and lease-back contracts require the approval of 
the Ministry of Economics and Internal affairs. 
A liquidity rule stipulates that the liquidity of 
municipalities and regions measured over the last 
12 months cannot be negative (time deposits and 
bonds are included in the balance). 
Municipalities and regions had a gross debt of 
DKK 123 billion in 2010. 
Local entities in financial difficulties can be put 
under administration of the Ministry of Economy 
and Internal affairs.  
A1.5. GERMANY 
1. Introduction 
Germany is a federal state, in which the federal 
entities – the Länder – are the primary units to 
carry state powers. Five, together with the Eastern 
                                                          
(216) BEK nr 1299 af 15/12/2011. 
part of Berlin, have acceded to the Federation in 
1990. These entities display considerable 
heterogeneity. Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen are 
city-states;(
217
) among the others, territories range 
from 2,500 km² (Saarland) to 70,500 km² 
(Bavaria), populations from 1,000,000 (Saarland) 
to 17,800,000 (North-Rhine-Westphalia, NRW), 
and population densities from 71 (Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern) to 524 (NRW). The German 
constitution – Grundgesetz or Basic Law, BL 
hereafter – stipulates that “the exercise of state 
powers and the discharge of state functions is a 
matter for the Länder” unless otherwise specified 
by the Basic Law (Art. 30 BL). Its federal 
organisation is a constituent characteristic of 
Germany that enjoys special constitutional 
protection: the Basic Law rules out any 
constitutional amendment that would affect the 
division of the Federation into Länder and their 
participation on principle in the legislative process 
(Art. 79 (3) BL).  
This Chapter provides an overview of the decision-
making powers, spending responsibilities, and the 
assignment of revenues of the different sectors of 
general government – the Federation, the Länder, 
the municipalities, and the institutions of statutory 
social insurance – in Germany. Section 2 reviews 
the legislative, executive, and spending 
responsibilities by sectors of general government 
(Sections 2.1 to 2.3) respectively. Section 3 
provides an account of revue raising competences 
by sectors of general government (Section 3.1) as 
well as cross-sector transfers and equalisation 
transfers specifically (Section 3.2). Section 4 
portrays the elements of fiscal governance 
applying to public deficits and debt (Section 4.1) 
as well as mechanisms that improve co-ordination 
and fiscal planning across sectors of general 
government (Section 4.2). Section 5 concludes 
with a summary assessment of the German 
framework of fiscal federalism in view of fiscal 
stability.  
                                                          
(217) Berlin and Hamburg consist of a single administrative unit. 
Bremen consists of the municipalities of Bremen and 
Bremerhaven. 
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2. Responsibilities for the design, execution, 
and financing of policies by sectors of general 
government 
2.1 Legislative powers of the Federation 
and the Länder 
 Legislative powers are assigned to the Länder 
unless conferred on the Federation by the Basic 
Law (Art. 70 BL); in practice, both the Federation 
and the Länder play an important role in the 
legislative process. Concerning the legislative 
power of the Federation, the Basic Law 
distinguishes matters within the exclusive 
legislative power of the Federation (Art. 71) from 
matters which fall under concurrent legislative 
powers of the Federation and the Länder (Art. 72): 
in matters of the former, the Länder may legislate 
insofar as they are authorised by a federal law; in 
matters of the latter, the Länder may legislate as 
long as the Federation has not exercised its 
legislative power (Art. 72 (1)). (
218
) As a general 
rule, federal law takes precedence over Länder law 
(Art. 31 BL). In the adoption of federal law, 
Länder are represented by a constitutional body 
called Bundesrat, that comprises Länder 
government representatives, as opposed to the 
Bundestag, the genuine legislative body of the 
Federation. In certain areas including those with 
financial implications on the Länder, the adoption 
of federal legislation requires the consent of the 
Bundesrat. In all other areas, the Bundesrat has the 
right to suspend legislation, which can be 
overruled by the Bundestag though. Constitutional 
amendment requires a Bundesrat majority of two 
thirds. 
Most legislation in Germany is passed by the 
Federation and the Länder under concurrent 
legislation. Art. 73f. of the Basic Law specifies 
matters of exclusive legislative power of the 
Federation and of concurrent legislative power of 
the Federation and the Länder respectively. 
Exclusive Federation legislation extends over 
foreign affairs and defence, citizenship, migration, 
currency and measurement, customs and trade, 
federal railways, and postal and 
                                                          
(218) Concurrent legislation established by the Federation still 
allows for variance enacted by the Länder in certain areas; 
while in others, the Federation may legislate only to the 
extent that the establishment of equivalent living conditions 
or the maintenance of legal or economic unity renders it 
necessary to do so (Art. 72 (2) BL). 
telecommunication services. Concurrent legislation 
covers a broad area comprising civil and criminal 
law, court organisation and procedure, public 
welfare, economic legislation including industry, 
energy, commerce, banking, and insurance, labour 
law including employment agencies, as well as 
social security, including unemployment 
insurance, educational grants and the promotion of 
research, agriculture, urban real estate matters, 
economic aspects of hospitals, shipping, road 
traffic, and long-distance highways, most issues of 
environmental protection, regional planning, and 
state liability. Initially a small fraction, laws 
passed under concurrent legislation covered more 
than half of the federal legislation passed in the 
1990s. Concurrent legislation has often been 
difficult because of the frequent mismatch of 
political majorities in the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat, though. The fiscal federalism reforms 
of 2006 and 2009 realigned legislative powers 
somewhat to revert centralisation. Areas of 
legislation that have remained under Länder 
competence to date include education policy, 
municipal law, police law (except the Federal 
Office of Criminal Investigation), and the 
construction of roads (except federal motorways). 
In practice, most policy areas are shaped by joint 
legislative decision-making of the Federation and 
the Länder, notable exceptions being social 
security where policy is designed by the 
Federation, and education, which has remained 
under Länder competence (information from the 
ECFIN country questionnaire).  
Municipalities are granted by power of the Basic 
Law the right to regulate all local affairs on their 
own responsibility, within the limits established by 
law. However, municipalities cannot issue fiscal 
legislation themselves. Instead the main provisions 
governing the planning, structure, execution and 
accounting of local authority budgets are codified 
in the Local Authority Codes and in the local 
government constitutions of the Länder. (
219
) In 
order to regulate the individual aspects of local 
authority budgets, the Interior Ministers of the 
Länder have enacted several ordinances, 
compounded by special decrees. In particular, the 
Local Authority Budget Ordinance prescribes, 
among other things, how the budgets are to be 
structured. Local authority budgets are executed on 
the basis of the budget by-law, which must be 
                                                          
(219) Bundesministerium der Finanzen, (2008), p. 77. 
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adopted by the municipality anew each year. That 
by-law establishes the budget proper, the ceiling 
for short-term borrowing and the tax rates. 
As of 1999 the Länder envisaged replacing the 
traditional cameral system by introducing a system 
of double-entry budgeting and accounting, 
compounded by a reformed cash-based 
governmental budgeting and accounting system, 
and adopted this from 2003 onwards. (
220
) The 
underlying idea of this far-reaching reform was to 
base budgeting system on the actual consumption 
of resources rather than cash flows. The first states 
to have implemented the new system are North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, Lower Saxony and 
Saxony-Anhalt. Baden-Württemberg, 
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland und Saxony have 
also committed themselves to introducing double-
entry accounting. Schleswig-Holstein and Hesse 
permit their local authorities to choose between 
double-entry bookkeeping and an extended 
cameral accounting system. In deviation, the Free 
States of Bavaria and Thuringia plan to retain the 
traditional cameral accounting system, but also to 
allow their local authorities to introduce double-
entry bookkeeping on a voluntary basis.  
2.2 Executive powers of sectors of general 
government 
As a general rule, federal laws are executed by the 
Länder in their own right, unless provided for 
differently by the Basic Law (Art. 8ff. BL). Some 
federal legislation is also to be executed by the 
Länder on federal commission (Art. 85 BL). The 
federal government is in charge of oversight of the 
execution of federal laws by the Länder. The 
Federation is not entitled to assign governmental 
tasks to the municipal level (Art. 84 (1) BL). The 
Federation executes laws through its own 
administrative bodies specifically in the areas of 
foreign service, federal financial administration, 
federal waterways and shipping, policing activities 
related to the protection of the constitution and to 
dangers towards Germany’s external interests, 
social insurance institutions with jurisdictions 
extending over several Länder, armed forces and 
federal defence administration, air transport 
administration, sovereign functions of post and 
telecommunications, central banking, federal 
                                                          
(220) Ibid.  
waterways, inland shipping extending over several 
Länder, and maritime shipping, as well as in 
matters on which it has legislative power and may 
establish own administrative bodies (Art. 87ff. 
BL). In some areas – the peaceful production and 
use of nuclear energy, air transport administration, 
and rail transport administration – the Länder may 
be assigned the execution of legislation under 
exclusive federal competence on federal 
commission or in their own right respectively (Art. 
87ff. BL). In addition, there are special rule for the 
administration of federal waterways and 
motorways (Art. 90 BL).   
The Basic Law allows for some tasks that fall 
under the joint responsibility of the Federation and 
the Länder, the so-called joint tasks 
(Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) (Art. 91aff. BL). Joint 
responsibility is assigned for two tasks principally 
innate to the Länder: the improvement of regional 
economic structures and the improvement of the 
agrarian structure and of coastal protection (Art. 
91a (1)). Joint tasks are such on condition that they 
are important to society as a whole, and federal 
participation is necessary for the improvement of 
living conditions (Art. 91a). Besides, co-operation 
of the Federation and Länder is provided for in 
matters of scientific research with supra-regional 
relevance and the promotion of research facilities 
and projects (other than higher education 
institutions), projects and research at such 
institutions, the construction of large scientific 
installations, and the assessment of the 
performance of education systems in particular 
(Art. 91b BL). Voluntary co-operation of the 
Federation and the Länder is further provided for 
in the area of construction and operation of 
information technology systems (Art. 91c BL). 
Besides, concerning basic support for job-seekers, 
the Federation or the Länder or municipalities and 
their associations responsible according to Land 
law respectively shall generally co-operate in joint 
institutions (Art. 91e).  
In the area of social security, public tasks are 
delegated to autonomous institutions under public 
law. The pillars of the German statutory social 
security system comprise health insurance, pension 
funds, accident, long-term as well as 
unemployment insurance respectively. Since 2005, 
federal and regional insurance agencies are 
organised in a common umbrella association at the 
federal level, Deutsche Rentenversicherung. 
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Health insurance is provided by statutory carriers, 
each of which operates a long-term care fund as 
well. Statutory accident insurance is provided by 
occupational associations as well as public 
associations organised on territorial grounds. 
Unemployment insurance is provided by the 
Federal Employment Agency. The respective 
institutions enjoy administrative autonomy 
including financial and organisational self-
government; control of legality is carried out by 
the Federation (and by the Federal Ministry for 
Labour and Social Affairs specifically) unless the 
scope of the activity extends over no more than 
three Länder (Art. 87 (2) BL).  
Executive responsibilities of municipalities include 
notably public utilities such as the supply of water, 
gas, electricity, heating, refuse collection and 
wastewater services. They also include various 
aspects of town planning including land use and 
permission to build, road construction, green 
spaces, public transport. Apart from these 
mandatory tasks there are also voluntary ones such 
as the operation of cultural entities (theatres, opera 
houses, museums), sports facilities, or 
multifunctional municipality halls. Apart from 
these various tasks pertaining to local self-
government there are also tasks having been 
transferred upon municipalities by the federal or 
state government, including notably the tasks of 
the Registrar's Office, but also tasks relating to 
youth, schools, public health, social policy 
including the support of long-term jobseekers (in 
most cases jointly with the Federal Employment 
Agency, in some even alone). 
2.3 Spending responsibilities of the sectors 
of general government 
As a general principle, among the Federation and 
the Länder, spending responsibility for a 
government tasks is matching administrative 
responsibility (Art. 104a (1) BL). (
221
) Tasks 
carried out on federal commission are financed by 
the Federation (Art. 104a (2) BL). If money grants 
                                                          
(221) The link between administrative and financial 
responsibility is bidirectional: if a law provides that the 
Federation assumes at least 50 per cent of the expenditure, 
it will be executed by the Länder on federal commission 
(Art. 104a (3)). Federal laws that establish expenditure on 
money grants or in-kind benefits by the Länder – be it on 
federal commission or in their own right – require 
Bundesrat consent (Art. 104a (4)). 
are to be administered by the Länder on the 
grounds of a federal law, the Federation may pay 
for part or all of such grants. (
222
) The 
apportionment of expenditure on joint tasks is 
governed by special rules (Art. 91a ff. BL). Of the 
expenditures on the improvement of regional 
economic structures, 50 per cent have to be borne 
by the Federation. Of expenditures on 
improvement of the agrarian structure and of 
coastal preservation, the Federation has to bear at 
least one half of the expenditure, in the same 
proportion in each Land (Art. 91a (3) BL). The 
apportionment of expenditures related to co-
operation in the area of education and research and 
of information technology systems has to be 
regulated by agreement (Art. 91b (3) and Art. 91c 
(2) BL). Concerning expenditure related to basic 
support for persons seeking employment, if the 
respective tasks are executed by municipalities or 
associations of municipalities (at their request), the 
expenditures have to be borne by the Federation 
(Art. 91e (2) BL). Further, the Federation may 
grant financial assistance to the Länder for 
particularly important investment (Finanzhilfen für 
Investitionen, Art. 104b BL). Conditions for such 
grants are that the investment falls under the 
legislative remit of the Federation,(
223
) it is 
necessary to avert a disturbance of the overall 
economic equilibrium, equalise economic 
capacities within the federation, or promote 
economic growth (Art. 104b (1)). Such investment 
grants can only be temporary and have to be 
provided in descending annual contributions. 
Special rules also apply to fiscal consequences of 
international relations and obligations respectively. 
Specifically, the costs of occupation and internal 
and external burdens resulting from war are to be 
borne to the Federation (Art. 120 (1) BL). Costs 
stemming from a violation of obligations assumed 
under international or supranational law are 
assigned in accordance with the internal allocation 
of competencies and responsibilities between the 
                                                          
(222) Examples of such laws are are the Federal Training 
Assistance Act (Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz), the 
Housing Benefit Act (Wohngeldgesetz), and the Federal 
Parental Benefit and Parental Leave Act 
(Bundeselterngeld- und Elternzeitgesetz), where the 
Federation bears 65, 50, and 100 per cent of the funding 
respectively (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2010, p. 
14).  
(223) Exceptions to the confinement of investment support to the 
legislative remit of the Federation are allowed in cases of 
natural disasters or exceptional emergency situations 
beyond governmental control with substantial harm to state 
fiscal capacities.  
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Federation and the Länder (Art. 104a (6)). Of the 
costs arising from the breach of SGP provisions 
that transcend one specific Land, 15 per cent are 
assigned to the Federation, 35 per cent to the 
Länder as a whole, and 50 per cent to those Länder 
that have caused the fiscal burden (Art. 104a (6) 
BL). 
As a rule, the Federation and the Länder bear the 
administrative expenditure of their own authorities 
each (Art. 104a (5) BL). Such expenditures 
therefore have to be distinguished from purpose-
related expenditure. As an exception, if tasks 
related to basic support for persons seeking 
employment are executed by municipalities or 
their associations, all expenditure has to be 
covered by the Federation, including 
administrative expenditure (Art. 91e (2) BL).  
As in the case of the Federation and the Länder, as 
a general principle, spending and executive 
responsibilities match. Note that, in contrast to the 
federal and Länder levels, where there is one 
budget, local authority budgets are divided into an 
administrative budget and a capital budget. (
224
) 
The capital budget shows the revenue and 
expenditure affecting capital formation (including 
investment expenditure, new loans and loan 
repayments), while the other payment flows that 
do not affect capital formation are included in the 
administrative budget. 
Finally, the social insurance carriers bear their 
spending responsibilities under administrative 
autonomy.  
3. Arrangements determining the revenues of 
the sectors of general government 
3.1 Legislative powers of taxation and 
apportionment of tax revenue 
The assignment of taxing powers and tax revenues 
in Germany rests upon the principle that sectors of 
general government must have their means to meet 
the mandated tasks; powers to legislate on taxes 
are assigned to the Federation, the Länder, or both 
(Art. 105 BL). Exclusive legislative powers are 
conferred to the Federation with respect to customs 
duties and fiscal monopolies. The Federation 
enjoys concurrent legislative power with respect to 
                                                          
(224) Bundesministerium der Finanzen, (2008), p. 77. 
all other taxes where it receives part or all of the 
revenue, or on condition that the establishment of 
equivalent living conditions or the maintenance of 
legal or economic unity renders federal regulation 
necessary (Art. 72 (2) BL). The Länder have 
legislative powers with regard to local taxes on 
consumption and expenditures, and may besides 
establish the rate of the tax on acquisition of real 
estate. (
225
) Bundesrat consent is required for 
federal legislation on taxes where part or all of the 
revenue goes to the Länder or municipalities. The 
financial autonomy of the municipalities 
guaranteed by the Basic Law includes the right to a 
source of tax revenues upon economic ability and 
the right to establish the rates of taxation of these 
sources (Art. 28 (2) BL).  However, unlike in the 
higher levels of government, local authorities are 
bound by principles relating to the raising of 
revenue. (
226
) Specifically, under the said 
principles, the revenues necessary to meet 
municipal obligations are to be generated firstly by 
means of special charges (fees, contributions, 
charges under private law), to the extent that this is 
reasonable and necessary, for services provided. 
Thereafter, these services are to be financed by 
taxes insofar as the other sources of revenue 
(including transfers from reserves, cost refunds, 
general financial grants from the Länder) do not 
suffice. Only as a last recourse, funds may be 
obtained by borrowing.  
Tax revenues are distributed among sectors of 
general government under separate apportionment 
or shared apportionment. Under separate 
apportionment, customs duties, taxes on 
consumption unless not regulated differently, taxes 
on transactions related to motorised vehicles, taxes 
on capital transactions and insurance, and the 
surtax on income tax and corporation taxes among 
others are federal taxes (Art. 106 (1) BL). Revenue 
from the property tax, the inheritance tax, the 
motor vehicle tax, taxes on certain transactions, 
and taxes on beer and gambling establishments 
goes to the Länder (Art. 106 (2) BL). 
Municipalities receive revenue from taxes on real 
property, trades, and from local taxes on 
consumption and expenditures. By apportionment, 
the income tax, corporation tax and VAT are joint 
taxes: their revenues accrue to the Federation, the 
                                                          
(225) Municipalities have the right to establish the rates on taxes 
on real property and trades (Art. 106 (6) BL).  
(226) Ibid. 
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Länder, and the municipalities in different 
quantities (Art. 106 (3) BL). The Federation and 
Länder receive income tax and corporation tax 
revenues in equal shares (Art. 106 (3) BL). Based 
on federal legislation requiring Bundesrat consent, 
a share of the income tax revenue has to be 
distributed to the municipalities according to the 
taxpaying ability of the inhabitants. (
227
) The 
apportionment of VAT (turnover tax) revenues to 
the Federation and the Länder is determined by 
federal law with Bundesrat consent, in line with 
expenditure needs established by multi-annual 
planning and the aim to achieve a fair balance and 
ensure the uniformity of living standards (Art. 106 
(3) BL). Of the Länder VAT share, at least 75 per 
cent is distributed among the Länder according to 
their populations (Umsatzsteuer-
Vorwegausgleich); the remainder is distributed 
within the framework of horizontal equalisation 
(Ergänzungszuweisungen)(Art. 107 (1) BL, see 
below). (
228
) Part of VAT revenue also goes from 
the Länder to their municipalities, based on a 
formula reflecting geographical and economic 
factors (Art. 106 (5a) BL). Finally, Länder 
legislation has to establish a share of the joint tax 
revenue to accrue to municipalities; it may also 
assign part of other Länder tax revenues to them 
(Art. 106 (7) BL). As a result of the above system 
of joint tax apportionment, the Federation and the 
Länder receive 50 per cent of the corporation tax 
each. Of the income tax, 42.5 per cent go to the 
Federation and the Länder each, while the 
municipalities receive 15 per cent as established by 
the Municipal Finance Reform Act 
(Gemeindefinanzreformgesetz). Of the VAT, a 
share from the Federation goes to the European 
Union, that is recalculated annually. In 2011, the 
planned VAT revenue shares were as follows: 53 
per cent to the Federation, 45 per cent to the 
Länder, and 2 per cent to the municipalities 
(Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2012). In 
addition, there are special rules regulating the 
apportionment of motor vehicle tax and federal 
grants for local mass transit (Art. 106a and 106b 
BL).  
                                                          
(227) The same law provide the municipalities with the right to 
establish supplementary or reduced rates with respect to their share of the tax (Art. 106 
(5) BL). 
(228) This apportionment of VAT share among the Länder according to 
their revenue raising capacity constitutes the first in the multi-step process of 
horizontal fiscal equalisation as described in section 3.2. 
Municipalities also receive their share in the 
intergovernmental distribution of tax revenues. As 
to the shared taxes, they receive shares of income 
tax and VAT. In particular, they are empowered to 
draw on the property tax and the local business tax 
(raised on top of corporate tax and mainly based 
on company profits albeit corrected for a number 
of items), of which a minor part are still ultimately 
paid to the Länder and federal governments. To 
this add local taxes on consumption and 
expenditure (including taxes on hunting, fishing, 
drinks, dog ownership, second residences).  
Joint taxes provide the largest part of federal 
revenues. For instance, of the total projected 
federal gross revenues of 306 billion euro in 2011, 
about 60 per cent were receipts from joint taxes, 
while about 30 per cent were federal tax revenues, 
in addition to other revenues amounting to 10 per 
cent.  
The pillars of social security receive revenues from 
contributions of contributors – typically by 
employers and employees in equal shares – that are 
complemented by grants (see Section 3.2). Social 
security contribution ceilings 
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenzen) and contribution 
rates (Beitragssätze) are established by concurrent 
legislation, i.e. in practice by governmental 
ordinance with the consent of the Bundesrat. The 
tasks of the statutory accident insurance providers 
are financed by employers and the Federation, the 
Länder or the municipalities respectively; 
contributions are being established ex-post to 
cover outlays based on employment compensation, 
occupational risk and the number of inhabitants (in 
the case of municipal bodies) and insured members 
respectively.  
3.2 Fiscal transfers across and within 
sectors of general government 
To equip each Land with the necessary means to 
cover their necessary expenditures and ensure 
equivalent living conditions, Germany operates a 
powerful system of fiscal equalisation involving 
the Federation and the Länder. It consists of three 
schemes: (1) primary horizontal equalisation 
between the Länder (gesamtdeutscher 
Finanzausgleich) by means of distributing part of 
the Länder share of VAT according to revenue 
raising capacities (Art. 107 (1) BL), (2) secondary 
horizontal equalisation – Länderfinanzausgleich in 
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the narrow sense – across the Länder (Art. 107 (2) 
BL), and (3) secondary vertical equalisation by 
supplementary federal grants 
(Bundesergänzungszuweisungen)(Art. 107 (2) BL). 
In the first step, a maximum of 25 per cent of the 
Länder share of VAT goes to the Länder with 
below-average revenue from income tax, 
corporation tax and the Länder taxes 
(Umsatzsteuer-Ergänzungsanteile) as established 
by Art. 107 (1) BL. Receipts are established 
according to the volume of the Länder receipts 
from the joint taxes (without VAT) plus the 
Länder taxes. The second step further equalises tax 
revenues at the Länder level (Art. 107 (2) BL), 
based on a measure of fiscal capability and a 
measure of theoretical equal revenues. The former 
consists of the sum of tax revenues at Länder level 
and 64 per cent of municipal tax revenues in the 
respective Land. The latter is calculated in the 
same way, but using average per capita revenues; 
adjustments then are made to reflect structural 
characteristics of the city states (with adjustment 
coefficients of 1.35) and some Länder of the 
former GDR with low population densities (with 
adjustment coefficients of 1.02 to 1.05). Länder 
with a negative difference between the two indices 
are entitled to equalisation payments from the 
Länder with above average capabilities, where 
contributions and receipts decrease towards the 
mean respectively. In the third step, supplementary 
non-earmarked grants are provided by the 
Federation to Länder with subpar fiscal capacity, 
levelling the gap between the revenues against 
99.5 per cent of the mean by 77.5 per cent 
(Bundesergänzungszuweisungen). Even further to 
that, Länder with weak revenue raising capability 
receive transfers to compensate from specific 
spending needs (Art. 107 (2) BL)(Sonderbedarfs-
Bundesergänzungszuweisungen). In 2011, such 
transfers were granted (1) to Berlin and the five 
eastern Länder to cope with investment backlogs 
resulting from the separation of Germany within 
the renewed Solidarity Pact (Solidarpakt II); these 
payments will be discontinued as of 2020;(
229
) (2) 
the five eastern Länder (without Berlin) to support 
fiscal needs from structural unemployment and the 
combination of unemployment benefits and 
welfare aid, and (3) grants to fiscally weak small 
                                                          
(229) The first cycle of the Solidarity Pact was established in 
1995. As a result of a challenge by Baden-Württemberg, 
Bavaria, and Hesse, the solidarity pact was renewed in 
2005, limiting the transfers and scheduling their 
discontinuation after 2019.  
Länder to compensate for above average expenses 
on political governance. In sum, these equalisation 
funds provide considerable and projectable 
statutory transfers to the Länder with below-
average fiscal capability.  
The variance of per capita revenues across the 
Länder has been considerably compressed by 
fiscal equalisation. In 2011, the three mechanisms 
(without transfers for specific needs) reduced the 
range of Länder tax revenues relative to the 
average from 156 and 128 to 51 per cent 
(Hamburg and Bavaria versus Thuringia) to 105 to 
98 per cent (Hesse versus 
Saxony)(Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2011). 
The volumes involved in the first and the second 
step amounted to about 7.3 billion euro, i.e. around 
3.3 per cent of the total amount of Länder revenues 
without federal grants (but including the VAT 
Länder share), while the federal grants under the 
third step made up 2.6 billion euro, 1.2 per cent of 
the Länder revenues without these grants. The 
largest part of revenue – 90 per cent of the vertical 
distribution of VAT (step one), and 81 per cent 
respectively involved in horizontal redistribution 
and the non-earmarked federal transfers (steps two 
and three) – were received by the ex-GDR eastern 
Länder. The first step reduced the relative fiscal 
positions of seven countries (Hamburg, Bavaria, 
Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-
Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Schleswig-
Holstein) while improving positions of the others. 
In the second and third step were twelve and 
eleven recipient Länder respectively (Lower 
Saxony, Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-
Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, Thuringia, 
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Saarland, Berlin, and Bremen, and North Rhine-
Westphalia (only step 2). The federal grants for 
special needs (Sonderbedarfs-
Bundesergänzungszuweisungen) made up for a 
total of another 12 billion euro. Non-earmarked 
grants to the Länder made up about 10 per cent of 
the projected budget – 28.8 billion euro – in 2011.  
Revenues of the social insurance institutions, 
including unemployment insurance, are 
complemented by federal grants as established by 
the Basic Law (Art. 120 (1) BL). In case of the 
statutory pension insurance scheme, Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung, the Federation provides co-
funding by balancing the difference between 
revenues and expenditure. In the federal budget 
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plan of 2011, grants to the pension scheme 
amounted to 26 per cent of the federal budget; high 
subsidies also result from the merger of the social 
insurance funds of the former GDR with the 
German statutory insurance carrier. Bodies of the 
statutory health insurance system (Gesetzliche 
Krankenversicherung) also receive annual grants 
to compensate for the execution of tasks that are 
outside their immediate remit (such as co-
insurance of non-contributing family members); 
these were projected to amount to 5 per cent of the 
federal budget (amounting to 15.3 billion euro) in 
2011. (
230
) 
The own revenues of municipalities are augmented 
by equalisation revenues. With the exception of the 
three city states, municipalities receive an 
additional source of revenue where required to 
minimise differences in financial power among the 
municipalities. Indeed on average this is the largest 
spending item in Länder budgets. This system of 
vertical and sometimes horizontal equalisation 
(where municipalities become net contributors) 
within each Land varies and is laid down in 
individual Länder laws. Some of these vertical 
transfers are disbursed as matching grants, 
involving co-financing, occasionally also by the 
federal government or the EU. Those matching 
grants would typically be for transport and other 
infrastructure projects. However the largest part of 
the equalisation transfers is paid out 
unconditionally, with spending decisions being 
fully at the discretion of the recipients. The fiscal 
transfers are calculated on the basis of two criteria: 
fiscal capacity and fiscal need. Fiscal capacity is 
computed based on tax revenue at standardised tax 
rates, while fiscal need is determined on the basis 
of a politically chosen acceptable amount of 
spending per resident. 
For 2011, the Federation has allocated 11.2 per 
cent of its planned budget related to basic benefits 
to jobseekers, that are administered by 
municipalities or their associations.  
                                                          
(230) Concerning employment, the federal budget plan 2011 
foresees no grant to the Federal Employment Agency 
(2010, such grants made up 5.2 billion euro or 1.7 per cent 
of the budget), while loans of comparable magnitude – 5.4 
billion euro – are budgeted instead.  
4 Fiscal governance 
4.1 Provisions on public borrowing, 
issuance of bonds, insolvency, and bailout 
Applying to the Federation and the Länder, before 
2011, public borrowing was restricted by 
constitutional provisions in principle but less so in 
practice. The “golden rule” was introduced into the 
Basic Law in 1969 to ban financing non-
investment expenditure from credit; similar 
provisions were enshrined in Länder constitutions. 
(
231
) Exceptions made allowed to prevent 
disturbances to the economic equilibrium. 
Arbitrary application of this possibility resulted in 
the rise in public debt at the Länder level. Fiscal 
imbalances have become particularly pressing in 
three Länder: Berlin, Bremen and Saarland. 
With entry into force in 2011, Germany introduced 
a constitutional structural budget balance rule 
applicable to the Federation and the Länder. 
Specifically, the amendments agreed in 2009(
232
) 
require that the budgets of the Federation and the 
Länder be balanced without revenues from credit 
(Art. 109 (3) BL). For the Federation, this 
principle is established to be satisfied when 
revenue from borrowing does not exceed 0.35 per 
cent of nominal GDP, while cyclical effects have 
to be taken into account symmetrically. (
233
) The 
Basic Law further establishes a notional control 
account where deviations from the ceiling are 
recorded; debits on this account exceeding 1.5 per 
cent of GDP have to be reduced in accordance 
with the economic cycle (Art. 115 (2) BL). The 
established credit limits may be exceeded in the 
case of natural catastrophes or unusual emergency 
situations beyond governmental control and with 
substantial harm to the state’s financial capacity. 
Such deviation requires decision by the majority of 
Bundestag members as well as the submission of 
                                                          
(231) Before the 1969 reform, the Basic Law allowed public 
borrowing only to cover extraordinary needs and only for 
profitable purposes. The reform in 1969 enabled debt-
financed public expenditure for economic stabilisation.  
(232) In the deliberation phase, the Länder maintained strong 
reservations against the introduction of the debt brake, 
based on their right to fiscal autonomy; positions only 
moved in the course of the financial crisis 2008. 
Schleswig-Holstein even – unsuccessfully – challenged the 
debt brake at the federal Constitutional Court in 2010.  
(233) At the level of the Federation, cyclical adjustment is done 
using the common OECD/Commission methodology. On 
the Länder level, there is a lack of an agreed methodology 
for cyclical adjustment: this may result in differences in the 
effective implementation of the rule.  
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an amortisation plan including repayment of such 
excess credit within an appropriate time horizon. 
The deficit ceiling of the budget balance rule is 
phased in with a transition period to gradually 
reduce the excess structural deficit by about 0.3 
per cent of GDP p.a. to reach the ceiling as from 
2016. For the Länder, a transition period is granted 
to reduce excess structural deficits and comply as 
of 2020. During the adjustment path, Schleswig-
Holstein, Berlin, Bremen, Saarland, and Saxony-
Anhalt, Länder with particularly difficult fiscal 
positions will receive assistance payments 
provided in equal shares by the Federation and the 
other Länder (Konsolidierungshilfen). These 
grants are conditional on compliance with an 
agreed consolidation path.  
Seemingly strong at first sight, the debt brake 
carries implementation risks at the federal level; 
substantial scope for variation in the transposition 
to constitutional and secondary law at Länder level 
adds to the risk of inconsistent and overly 
permissible application. Specifically, at the federal 
level, inconsistent accounting provisions, the lack 
of consideration of financial transactions, and 
insufficient consideration of fiscal positions of the 
social security sector and of special funds have 
been identified as potential obstacles to an 
effective containment of debt 
(Sachverständigenrat, 2011). The Länder are free 
to specify the legal basis and relevant 
implementation provisions. Four Länder have 
already enshrined balanced budget rules in their 
constitution, while in another such an amendment 
is being drafted. Another six Länder have 
incorporated budget balance rules in their state 
budget acts. The latter typically allow for more 
generous possibilities for non-compliance though, 
and can besides be modified by ordinary 
legislative procedures. (
234
) Further scope for 
differences in implementation is given by the 
choice with regard to applying the debt brake to 
nominal or structural budget balances, the 
methodology for cyclical adjustment, or whether to 
use a control account. (
235
) The effectiveness of 
                                                          
(234) Schleswig-Holstein, Hessen, Rhineland-Palatinate, and 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern have enshrined a debt brake in 
their constitutions, while such amendment is in the process 
of adoption in Lower Saxony. Baden-Württemberg, 
Bavaria, Hamburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia 
have adopted balanced budget rules in their budget acts 
(Landeshaushaltsordnungen).  
(235) E.g., to date, only Rhineland-Palatinate has set up a control 
account similar to the one at the federal level. , based on a 
debt brake provisions at the Länder level might 
further be hampered by the insufficient coverage 
of municipal public finances (Sachverständigenrat, 
2011).  
The institutional framework to monitor compliance 
with the debt brake has been strengthened in 
Germany, while enforcement provisions are less 
strict. Compliance with the constitutional debt 
brake at both the federal and the Länder level is 
monitored by the newly established Stability 
Council that is composed of the federal ministers 
of finance and economics and the finance ministers 
of the Länder. Assessments are based on a 
federation wide early warning system to indicate 
fiscal distress: in their presence, a consolidation 
will be established in the concerned Land. (
236
)
 
Concerning enforcement provisions, there is the 
option of filing an action with the Federal 
constitutional court (covering the Länder as well 
as of 2020) or at the Länder constitutional courts 
in case that respective constitutional amendments 
have been made at the level of the respective Land. 
Additional sanctions are available for the 
recipients of consolidation support (see Section 3) 
that are suspended in case of non-compliance.  
Budget balance rules have also been in place for 
the local government sector, typically codified in 
the Länder Local Authority Acts. Local authority 
budget law generally obliges the municipalities to 
balance revenues and expenditure in its 
administrative and capital accounts, but does 
permit some borrowing, for investment purposes in 
particular. The monitoring is carried out by the 
municipal supervisory agencies of the Länder. The 
local authority supervisory agencies can refuse the 
authorisation of the municipal budgets in case of 
non-compliance. They can impose sanctions 
against the local authority concerned. 
Municipalities with financial difficulties can be 
obliged to implement consolidation programmes. 
In particular cases, the supervisory agencies can 
                                                                                   
federation wide early warning system to indicate fiscal 
distress.235 The Stability Council 
(236) Potential fiscal distress is monitored using the following 
indicators: structural budget balance per capita, borrowing-
to-expenditure ratio, interest-tax ratio and debt level per 
capita. When three of these indicators exceed the 
established thresholds, budgetary distress is identified. 
Threshold are defined against the Länder average. 
Therefore, a simultaneous worsening of the fiscal situation 
of the Länder is left undetected. 
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also temporarily take over the administration of the 
municipality. The rule has been respected in more 
than 50% of cases and contributes to fiscal 
discipline. Non-compliance is justified mostly by 
poor financial endowment of the local authorities.  
Default of public authorities has not been a 
credible scenario in Germany in the past, but 
expectations could be changing at present. 
Specifically, according to the bankruptcy code 
(Insolvenzordnung), bankruptcy procedures against 
public bodies are inadmissible. At the same time, 
the highly indebted Länder recurrently obtained 
large transfer payments to alleviate their fiscal 
distress. In 1988, Bremen and Saarland turned to 
the Constitutional Court to demand transfer 
payments from the Federation, arguing that their 
high levels of debts resulted from adverse 
economic developments outside their control and 
claiming that they would be unable to fulfil their 
constitutional mandate otherwise. A ruling of the 
Constitutional Court of 1992 posited that financial 
support indeed was to be granted to states in 
financial hardship. As a result of a Constitutional 
Court decision of 2005, payments to Bremen and 
Saarland are to be discontinued until 2019# (Stehn 
and Fedelino, p. 9).  
In the event of municipalities being highly 
indebted or experiencing payment difficulties, the 
responsibility rests with the government of the 
respective Land to restore the financial capability 
of the municipalities concerned. To that end many 
Länder have implemented or announced 
programmes for local authority debt reduction and 
fiscal consolidation. Regional government support 
generally is linked to consolidation efforts at the 
local authority level. Municipalities are not 
directly involved in the debt brake. However, at 
present there are concerns that its introduction at 
state level may imply a shift of the financial 
burden to municipalities. 
4.2 Medium-term planning and other 
budgetary procedures 
Although not legally binding, some co-ordination 
is applied in medium-term budgetary planning of 
the Federation and the Länder. For the Federation, 
medium-term planning is anchored in the Basic 
Law (Art. 110 BL). A medium-term financial plan 
is adopted with the federal budget each year, it 
extends over three forthcoming years. The plan 
includes detailed projections for the main 
expenditure items by spending areas and revenues 
broken down on different taxes. The budgetary 
targets can be revised, but medium-term planning 
is part of the coalition negotiations, so that new 
drafts are in line with (maintained or revised) 
budgetary objectives. Owing to their fiscal 
autonomy, the Länder operate separate procedures 
for medium-term budgetary planning that 
correspond to that of the federal level. Co-
ordination of medium-term planning between the 
Federation and the Länder is provided by the 
Stability Council. The Stability Council makes 
recommendations for budgetary discipline and for 
a common line on expenditure specifically. 
Furthermore, it biannually discusses budget 
projections for the federation and the Länder used 
as inputs to the Stability Programme.  
Consistency of budgetary planning across sectors 
of general government is also by the work of 
independent fiscal institutions traditionally 
operating in Germany. Specifically, projections for 
taxes provided by five economic research 
institutes, the Bundesbank, the German Council of 
Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat) and the 
federal Ministry of Finance are co-ordinated by the 
Working Party on Tax Revenue Forecasting 
(Arbeitskreis Steuerschätzung). This body acts as 
advisory council to the federal Ministry of Finance 
and consists of representatives of the federal 
ministries of finance and economic affairs, the five 
research institutes, the federal Statistical Office, 
the Bundesbank, the German Council of Economic 
Experts, and the Federal Union of Central 
Associations of Local Authorities 
(Bundesvereinigung der kommunalen 
Spitzenverbände). The co-ordinated tax revenue 
estimates are extrapolated to tax revenue for the 
federal government, the Länder governments, the 
local authorities, and the EU; this provides the 
grounds for the annual budget and medium-term 
budgetary planning of the Federation. The 
consistency of budgetary planning across sectors 
of general government is further enhanced by the 
scrutiny of independent fiscal institutions. Notably, 
the Council of Economic Experts 
(Sachverständigenrat), a body of independent 
economic experts, provides fiscal analyses as well 
as macroeconomic forecasts and long-term 
projections for all general government, and 
assesses the medium-term budgetary framework of 
the Federation. Yet another institution, the Joint 
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Macroeconomic Forecast initiative of leading 
research institutes (Gemeinschaftsprognose), co-
ordinates the data, assumptions and conclusions 
applied by several leading research institutions in 
their analyses of general government public 
finance, and also scrutinises the medium-term 
planning framework of the Federation. Finally, the 
Advisory Board to the Federal Ministry of Finance 
advises the ministry on all issues of fiscal policy, 
covering all general government and fiscal 
relations between its sectors as well. 
The Council issued country-specific 
recommendations to Germany with respect to 
subnational governments (see Box I.3.2 above). 
A1.6. ESTONIA 
1. General description 
Estonia is a unitary country. It has a two-tier 
government structure introduced in 1993, which 
includes the central government and 266 local 
governments. The municipalities have their own 
councils elected every four years and their own 
budget. The size of the local governments varies 
greatly: the biggest municipality is the capital city 
Tallinn, while around two thirds of the local 
governments have less than 3000 inhabitants. The 
local governments can form districts on their 
territory in accordance with the law. 
The local governments are integrated into 15 
counties, which are not a separate governance tier, 
but state administrative units. Their role is to 
facilitate coordination between the state and the 
local level in implementing regional development 
programmes. The counties' governors are 
appointed by the government in consultation with 
the local governments to represent interests of the 
state in the county.   
Basic provisions concerning local governments are 
established in the Constitution and regulated by 
laws. The main legal act governing municipalities 
is the Local Government Organisation Act (1993). 
Estonia ratified the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government without reservations in 1994. 
Since then, the local governance framework 
remained broadly stable. 
According to the OECD data (
237
), in 2010, the 
total expenditure and revenue of the local 
governments amounted to EUR 1435.4 m and 
1467.9 m, respectively, which is around 25% of 
general government expenditure (slightly below 
the historical average) or 10% of GDP. Taxes 
represent around 46% and grants 42% of the total 
local government revenue, while the respective 
shares for the central government are 86% and 0%.   
2. Government spending 
The main areas of responsibilities of the local 
governments include education, health care, 
culture and sports, social welfare services, housing 
and utilities, waste management, maintenance of 
infrastructure, and spatial planning: 
 Education accounts for roughly 40% of all total 
expenditure of the local governments and 58% 
of the total education budget. Local 
governments' responsibility is to organise 
maintenance of public pre-schooling (e.g. 
kindergartens), basic and secondary schools, 
and to cover their operational expenses 
(teachers' salaries, etc). The local governments 
are also responsible for organising student 
transport. The state is responsible for 
development of education policies and for 
establishing the overall standards in the 
education system (such as qualifications and 
basic salaries of teachers).  
 Healthcare accounts for 16% of the total 
expenditure of the local governments and for 
about one third of the total healthcare budget. 
However, this data does not reflect the fact that 
the healthcare is funded from the budget of the 
Estonian Health Insurance Fund (HIF), who 
with the central government is responsible for 
policy development and implementation. While 
formally local governments own local 
hospitals, their operational expenditures are 
financed from the HIF. Local governments are 
partly responsible for the provision of the first 
level health care services (family physician), 
though the counties (state) have the overall 
responsibility. 
                                                          
(237) OECD Fiscal Decentralisation Data includes expenditure 
of both local governments and dependant units (hospitals).  
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 Social welfare services account for 8% of the 
total expenditure of the local governments. 
Local authorities are responsible for organising 
maintenance of social welfare institutions 
owned by them (e.g shelters, care homes, etc.) 
and for organising social assistance and welfare 
for elderly, disabled, and other persons in need 
of assistance (e.g. homeless). The state is 
responsible for the development of the social 
welfare policy, the identification of social 
needs, and for the organisation of victim 
support and conciliation service.  
 Economic activities (provision of transport), 
recreation (culture and sports), and housing and 
utilities (water supply, heat supply, waste 
management, etc.) are under responsibility of 
the local governments.  
3. Financing 
According to the Estonian legislation, the state 
budget and the local governments' budgets are 
separated. Local governments may use the 
following means to finance their expenditures: 
shared (state) and local taxes; grants and 
allocations from the state budget; locally generated 
income fees and proceeds from municipal 
property. There is a mechanism for equalisation of 
revenue between the municipalities. 
Revenues from taxes 
 The biggest portion of income for the local 
budgets comes from the state personal income 
tax (46% of total revenues in 2010(
238
). This is 
a shared tax, and the local authorities receive 
11.4% of resident’s total revenue(239). The tax 
threshold and tax exemptions are not applied to 
the local government share, but are settled fully 
out of the state share. This means that in 
practice the local share of the tax revenues was 
as high as 80%. 
 Land tax accounted for 4% of the local 
governments' revenues in 2010. While it is a 
state tax by law, it is fully paid into the local 
budgets. The tax base and the limits of the tax 
                                                          
(238) Data based on local budget execution reports prepared by 
the Estonian Statistical Office. It excludes expenditure of 
the dependent units (hospitals). 
(239) The personal income tax rate is 21%, to be reduced in 2015 
to 20% 
rate (0.1–2.5% of the estimated value of land; 
0.1–2.0% for agricultural land) are set by law, 
and the local authorities can determine the tax 
rate within those limits. In 2013, Estonia 
abolished the land tax requirement for the most 
of the residential land provided that the primary 
residence of a taxpayer is located on that land.  
 Local governments can impose and levy local 
taxes and user charges in accordance with law. 
The main local taxes include advertisement tax, 
road and street closure tax, motor vehicle tax, 
animal tax, entertainment tax, and parking 
charges. However, the local taxes and fines 
represented only about 1% of the total local 
revenues in 2010.  
State grants and allocations 
The second largest source of income for the local 
governments are grants from the state budget 
which accounted for 34% of the total revenues in 
2010. They are allocated through the equalisation 
fund and the block grant (together representing 
some 90% of total grant distribution), and through 
earmarked grants from ministries and state 
agencies.  
 The purpose of the block grants (ca 3.5% of the 
2012 state budget expenditure) is to support 
service delivery in several areas. The most 
important area (87% all grants) is education, as 
the local authorities are obliged to maintain 
their school houses and to pay salaries to 
teachers. Other areas include the subsistence 
benefits, some types of social benefits and 
services, a support for registration of the 
changes in population (birth and deaths), and a 
support to small islands.  
 The purpose of the equalisation fund (ca 1.1% 
of 2012 the state budget expenditure) is to 
balance the excessive differences among the 
income bases of different local authorities, and 
to ensure that all municipalities provide 
adequate public services to their inhabitants. 
The amount of the equalisation fund in a draft 
state budget and its distribution among 
municipalities are determined in the 
negotiations between the local governments 
and the state. The equalisation grants are 
divided between the local governments based 
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on the equalisation mechanism that takes into 
account the average expenditure need based on 
population size and age structure, and the 
weighted lagged accounting revenues. Overall, 
a large majority of the local governments 
receives the equalisation grants, with a notable 
exception of Tallinn area and the oil-shale 
production region in the north-east of Estonia. 
 Other earmarked grants cover mainly local 
governments' activities to maintain and develop 
infrastructure and are provided from the annual 
budgets of ministries.  
Other sources of revenue 
Local governments receive revenue from their 
economic activity (sale of goods and services, ca 
11% of revenues in 2010), property income 
(2.4%), and a sale of property (1%). The amounts 
of fees for the use of natural resources and water, 
as well as the size of the share paid into the local 
budgets are determined by a government decree.  
4. Fiscal rules 
The difference between the revenues and 
expenditures of the local governments is financed 
by borrowing. In 2009, local governments' debt 
burden reached 50.8%(
240
). Due to eroding revenue 
base during the financial crisis, one-off measures 
were introduced to limit the borrowing by local 
authorities. Consequently, the debt burden of local 
governments fell slightly to 50% in 2010, 
marginally outpassing the 60% threshold only in 
Harju and Parnu counties (60.7 and 60.5%, 
respectively). 
From 2009 until end-2011, the local government 
could undertake new financial obligations (i.e. take 
loans, issue debt securities, sign financial leasing 
agreements) only under the double condition that 
the total amount of the outstanding financial 
obligations by a local government and their 
servicing would not exceed 60% and 20%, 
respectively, of the budget revenue planned for a 
given budget year (excluding the earmarked 
transfers from the state budget). Moreover, since 
2009, the local governments could only borrow to 
                                                          
(240) Debt divided by net revenue, based on the local 
governments budget execution reports. Data provided by 
the Estonian Statistical Office. 
co-finance structural funds and to re-finance their 
existing liabilities, and only with the consent of the 
Ministry of Finance. 
As of 2012, a new local government financial 
management act is in force, which makes 
provisions for medium- to long-term financing 
frameworks, modernises and increases 
transparency of financial governance, and 
reinforces fiscal discipline of the local 
governments. It establishes a net debt ceiling (debt 
minus liquid assets) of 60%-100%(
241
) of the 
operational revenue in the current fiscal year 
depending on a self-financing capacity of 
municipalities. The ceiling is allowed to be 
exceeded by the amount of a 'bridge financing', 
essentially in order to ensure sufficient co-
financing of the EU structural funds. The bridge 
loan can be taken in the amount of targeted foreign 
financing and received co-financing to provide 
payments until the receipt of the targeted financing 
and co-financing. The new rule is applicable to all 
borrowing by the local governments and their 
dependent units, with no escape clauses.  
The responsibility for monitoring and enforcement 
of the rule lies with the Ministry of Finance. In 
case of deviations, the Ministry of Finance makes 
proposals to correct the situation. A local 
government has to submit to the Ministry of 
Finance an operational plan for t+3 years 
indicating measures to ensure financial discipline. 
In case of a risk of a difficult financial situation, 
the Ministry of Finance forms a committee 
independent of the local government at risk, which 
in cooperation with the local government prepares 
a recovery plan for t+4 years, which includes be a 
sound financial plan.  
To ensure implementation and timely submission 
of the corrective plans, the Ministry of Finance can 
suspend the transfers from the equalisation fund 
and of the income tax share of the local 
governments. In practice this means that the 
financial sanctions are only applied if the local 
governments ignore or disobey the corrective 
procedure.  
                                                          
(241) Exceptionally, in 2012 local governments cannot take new 
loans if it results in a debt burden of over 60%. Local 
governments whose debt is already above 60% cannot 
borrow at all in 2012.  
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A1.7. IRELAND 
1. General description 
Ireland is a unitary country. The Irish Constitution 
recognises the role of local government in 
providing a forum for the democratic 
representation of local communities, in exercising 
and performing at local level powers and functions 
conferred by law and in promoting by its initiatives 
the interests of such communities. The Local 
Government Act 2001 is the principal legal code 
governing local government in terms of structures, 
operations and functions. In addition to the 2001 
Act, the operation of local authorities is affected 
by a range of other legislation dealing with specific 
services such as housing, roads, planning and 
waste. 
Ireland has a three-tier government structure – 
central government and two-tiers of local 
government. 26 county councils and 5 city 
councils are the primary units of local government, 
which cover the entire territory of the state. In the 
second tier of the local government are 80 town 
councils with limited functions in smaller urban 
areas. (
242
)  
The most recent wide-ranging reform of the local 
government sector was in 2001. It simplified the 
fragmented structure that existed since 1898 and 
introduced the second tier of the local government. 
Several lower-level reforms are on-going, 
including merging of some local authorities; 
efficiency reforms (shared services, common 
procurement platform, staff number reductions) 
and improvements in budget control and reporting 
framework. 
Elected members of the local authority form the 
principal decision-making body in each authority. 
They adopt an annual budget, pass or revoke local 
laws (secondary legislation), approve borrowing 
and lay down the policy framework under which 
the county managers must operate. The county or 
city managers are appointed chief executives with 
delegated powers to manage local authorities on 
daily basis. 
                                                          
(242) Administrative areas of town councils are limited and do 
not cover the whole country. Town councils do not have all 
functions of the county councils – both institution levels 
have distinctive responsibilities in the same territory. 
Local government sector in Ireland is one of the 
smallest in Europe. Total expenditure of the local 
governments amounted to 6.8% of GDP in 2010 
on unconsolidated based. Level of control of the 
local authorities is even lower as the central 
government funds about 60% of local government 
expenditure.  
2. Government spending 
Local authorities are responsible for an extensive 
range of services including housing, roads, water 
services, community development, environmental 
services and protection, planning, fire services, 
libraries, arts and culture, parks, open spaces and 
leisure facilities, higher education grants to 
students(
243
), motor tax collection, maintaining the 
register of electors, and other services. Local 
authorities are exclusively responsible for certain 
services, notably water supply, waste water 
management and fire-protection services, as well 
as cover large share of other public services in 
their area of responsibility. However, they are not 
autonomous in the decision making process, as 
services are largely coordinated and funded by the 
central government. Higher control of local 
authorities and lower central government funding 
are in the areas of housing and urban development, 
cultural services and fire protection. The range of 
services provided by the local government sector 
in Ireland is relatively narrow in an international 
context, with a number of key services such as 
health and policing being provided through central 
government systems. However, local government, 
and government in general, is highly involved in 
the housing market as compared to other Member 
States. Local authorities' housing services account 
for a quarter of their budget and serve almost 16% 
households in Ireland. They include local 
authority-owned housing (7% of all households), 
rent supplement schemes (6%)(
244
), housing leased 
by local authorities (2%) and housing owned by 
approved voluntary and co-operative housing 
bodies (1%). 
                                                          
(243) The Higher Education Grants Scheme is one of four 
different student grant schemes and it is processed by local 
authorities, while money comes from the central 
government (the Department of Education and Skills). 
Most of the responsibility for education system rests with 
the central government. Universities in Ireland are 
classified outside the government sector.  
(244) Provided by central government (Department of Social 
Protection) 
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Total expenditure of the local government sector 
amounted to EUR 10.5 billion in 2010 on 
unconsolidated bases (about 15% of general 
government expenditure excluding banking 
support measures), of which EUR 6.7 billion in 
current expenditure and EUR 3.8 billion in capital 
expenditure. Current expenditure covers the 
service provision costs of local authorities, 
including staff salaries, housing maintenance, 
pensions, operational costs of water treatment 
plants, etc. Current expenditure is funded through 
a combination of commercial rates, charges for 
goods and services, specific and general grants 
from central government. Local authorities employ 
approximately 30.6 thousand people – about 10% 
of total public service employees. Capital 
expenditure is spent on road construction, building 
or purchase of houses, swimming pools, libraries, 
etc. Capital expenditure is funded through a 
combination of central government grants, 
borrowings and income from other sources such as 
development levy contributions. While local 
authorities spend some 70% of the general 
government investment, central government 
determines large share of investment priorities as 
specific capital grants from central government 
account for around one-third of capital spending. 
Road construction and maintenance is supervised 
and coordinated, and funded from the National 
Roads Authority (part of the central government). 
Other projects are coordinated between local 
authorities and respective central government 
departments. For example, water supply and waste 
water infrastructure is administered and 
maintained by the local authorities, but it is largely 
funded by the Department of Environment, 
Community and Local Government, also being 
involved in the decision making process.  
3. Financial arrangements 
Main source of local government revenue is grants 
from the central government, which accounted for 
60% of total revenue in 2010. There are two types 
of central government grants to local authorities – 
general and specific. General grants are not 
constrained by specific spending parameters and 
include most of the financing allocated from the 
Local Government Fund. Specific grants are 
earmarked for specific purposes and cover the 
delivery of specific state services or projects 
through local government such as roads or higher 
education grants. Local Government Fund is made 
up of a contribution from the central government 
and motor tax receipts. Motor tax is collected by 
the local authorities, but rates are set at the national 
level, as well as revenue is recorded in the central 
government accounts. General grants account for 
90% of the fund and the rest is specific grants for 
non-national roads. General grants are structured 
to bring about equalisation of resources among 
local authorities over time. For the purposes of 
allocations, a range of factors is taken into account, 
including each local authority’s expenditure and 
revenue, as well as the overall amount of funding 
available for distribution. A computer-based model 
assists in determining whether spending level and 
resources are adequate in each local authority.  
High share of specific grants in revenue implies 
limited control of local authorities over this part of 
their budgets. Excluding expenditure funded by 
specific grants, local governments have discretion 
over some 7% of general government expenditure 
(about 3% of GDP). The share of the grants in the 
local government has increased as other revenue 
sources declined during the financial crises. This 
has required an appropriate adjustment in 
expenditure of the local authorities, given 
borrowing restrictions.  
Other major revenue source of local government is 
commercial rates, charges for goods and services 
and development contributions. The local 
authorities have some control over this revenue 
and its use, although some charges (such as 
planning application fees) are set centrally.  
Commercial rates are property taxes (indirect 
taxation) levied on commercial property. Revenue 
from commercial rates amounted to 13% of total 
local government revenue in 2010 (0.9% of GDP). 
The level of the rate is determined each year by 
local authorities as part of their annual budgetary 
process. The rates are applied on the value of the 
property determined by the Commissioner of 
Valuation, which periodically revaluates 
commercial properties in local authorities.  
Charges are levied on services provided by local 
authorities, for example, commercial water 
charges, housing rents, waste charges, parking 
charges, planning application fees, refuse and 
landfill charges, library fees and fire charges. 
Development contributions are paid to local 
governments as a condition of planning 
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permissions and allow recouping some of the 
public costs for providing public infrastructure and 
facilities that benefit development in the area. 
Development contributions and related capital 
expenditure have substantially declined after the 
crash in the property market.  
In order to place local government on a sound 
financial footing and reduce reliance on the central 
government grants, new income streams are being 
developed. A charge on non-principal private 
residences of EUR 200 was introduced in 2009 and 
an additional household charge of EUR 100 in 
2012. Both charges yield more than 0.1% of GDP. 
Further revenue-increasing measures will be 
introduced in 2013-15, in line with fiscal 
adjustment plans, yielding additional 0.4% of 
GDP. In particular, a valuation-based property tax 
will be introduced replacing the current interim 
measures.  
In the national accounts, different charges and 
development contributions are recorded as sales, 
property income and transfers from private sector. 
Total revenue of this kind amounted to 23% of 
total local government revenue in 2010 (1.5% of 
GDP). Social contributions received by local 
government sector are those paid on wages for 
own employees.  
4. Fiscal rules 
A fiscal rule for local government sector was 
established in 2004 – the sector's fiscal deficit on 
ESA95 basis should not exceed EUR 200 million 
in any year. The rule was established as a political 
agreement and is laid down in administrative 
circulars. The implementation of the rule is 
controlled by the Department of the Environment, 
Community and Local Government. The overall 
deficit rule is expressed in the operational limits 
for local government borrowing taking into 
account existing loan repayments.  
The adherence to the rule is monitored by current 
and capital account controls, and loan sanctions. 
Control measures have been tightened since 2009 
to strengthen adherence to the rule. Accrual-based 
fiscal target can be measured from both the non-
financial transactions and the financial balance 
sheets. The former are recorded in current and 
capital accounts of the local authorities, which are 
required to have balanced revenue–expenditure 
positions. However, as these accounts include 
certain financial transactions, a control of financial 
balance sheets and borrowing limits are necessary.  
Borrowings by the local authorities are sanctioned 
by minister, ensuring that the required borrowing 
limits are respected. The budgets of local 
authorities are monitored throughout the year and 
any expenditure overruns should be compensated 
for by either a reduction in another expenditure 
area or increased income. 
Local government debt was at 3.4% of GDP in 
2010, of which 2.8% to central government and 
0.6% to private sector. While default by local 
government is possible, it is most likely to be bail-
out the central government. In 2010, the central 
government repaid some of the loans of local 
authorities in financial difficulties. Alternatively, 
these troubled authorities would have cut their 
services.  
A1.8. GREECE 
1. General description 
The Greek state has been highly centralised since 
its founding in 1832. This situation has been 
gradually changed since the adhesion to the 
European Union in 1981. In 1987, 13 programme-
regions were established by a presidential decree. 
In 1994, the 51 nomoi (prefectures), which have 
been acting as state territorial administration units 
for 160 years, became self-governments with 
directly elected prefects and councils (law 2218/94 
on the establishment of democratically elected 
government at prefecture level). In 1997, the law 
2539/97 on the "formation of the first level of local 
government" was an attempt to empower the 
municipalities by increasing their size. This 
programme, called Cappodistrias Plan reduced the 
number of primary local authorities from 5825 in 
1997 to 1034 in 2005. In 2001 a constitutional 
revision reinforced decentralization and explicitly 
stated that there are two levels of local government 
in Greece. From 2003, discussions between the 
Hellenic Ministry of interior, the Parliament and 
local authorities were focused on redrawing (under 
a Cappodistrias 2 plan) the administrative 
boundaries of the local authorities, in order to 
better profit from EU funding.  
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Greece is a unitary state with a two-tier 
government structure. Its constitution was ratified 
on June 11, 1975. The articles 101 and 102 recall 
the principles of decentralisation and local 
autonomy. The 2001 constitutional revision 
explicitly states that the administration of local 
affairs shall be exercised by local governments of 
first and second level and that they enjoy 
administrative and financial independence. In 
particular the article 102, paragraph 5 of the 
constitution states: "The state takes all the 
legislative, regulatory and fiscal measures needed 
for guaranteeing the economic and resources 
autonomy of the local self-Government 
Organizations (OTA), together with assuming the 
responsibility of securing administration 
transparency of these resources". 
Law 3852/2010 on the "New architecture of self-
governance and decentralized administration- 
Programme Kallikratis" is the most recent 
modification of the decentralised governance in 
Greece.  
In particular, there are two levels of subnational 
self-governments: 
 At the first level, 325 municipalities have been 
established (substituting the 1034 ones from 
the previous legislation). Each is comprised by 
the unification of a number of the pre-existing 
local departments which have been renamed as 
local communes (when population is up to 
2000) or municipal communes (when 
population is more than 2000).   
 
The municipalities (the 1
st
 level of self-
governance) are self-governed autonomous 
public law legal entities. They are governed by 
the municipal council (the number of its 
members varies with the corresponding 
population), the economic committee, the 
committee of quality of life (for municipalities 
of more than 10000 inhabitants), the executive 
committee and the mayor. Each of the 
municipal communes and local communes are 
governed by the council and a council 
president. 
 At the 2nd level, 13 regions (peripheries; in the 
previous legislation they were the decentralised 
state administration units) are established. 
Those are governed by the Head of the Region 
(peripheriarchis), the vice-heads of the region 
(antiperipheriarchis) the Region Council, the 
economic committee and the executive 
committee. The number of these offices is 
determined by the law according to the 
population features of each region.  
At the national level Greece is divided in 7 
integrated decentralised state administration units, 
called Decentralised Administrations 
(apokendrwmenes diikiseis), for each of which a 
Secretary General is appointed by the central 
government. 
After Kallikratis Law implementation, subnational 
governments have undertaken extended 
competences  in functions such as environment, 
life quality, social protection, education, culture 
and sports, agriculture, breeding and fishery 
development, etc (as set by Law 3852/2010).  
Subnational governments' share of responsibility 
has increased after Kallikratis Law implementation 
as they have also accepted exclusive duties, in all 
cases served under central government directives. 
They do not have autonomy in legislation but 
according to Constitution (Syntagma) they have 
administrative and financial autonomy. 
2. Revenues of the decentralized self-
governments 
Law 1828/1989 introduced the model of direct 
state funding to the local self-governments through 
institutionalisation of the Central Autonomous 
Resources (Kendrikoi Autoteleis Poroi, KAP) 
within the national budget. 
After 20 years in service the KAPs have been 
restructured according to the Law 3852/2010 
(Kallikratis) aiming to the long term economic 
sustainability of the local government finances and 
their protection towards economic risks. The new 
sources of these funds are as follows: 
 The revenues for the municipal KAPs are  
i) The 21,3% of the total annual receipts of the 
income tax of the physical persons and legal 
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entities, once revenues earmarked for OGA have 
been deducted; 
ii) The 12% of the V.A.T. total annual revenues; 
and 
iii) The 50% of the total annual receipts on regular 
property tax. 
Two thirds (2/3) of the category (i) revenues and 
the total of (ii) and (iii), comprise the account 
covering operational and other general 
expenditures of the KAP. The rest one third (1/3) 
of the (i) category covers investment expenditures. 
KAP covers 46%-49% of total Revenues of 
municipalities (and this share is planned to 
decrease according the Medium Term Fiscal 
Strategy 2013-2016. 
 The revenues of the regional KAPs are: 
i) The 2,40% of the total annual receipts of the 
income tax of the physical persons and legal 
entities, once revenues earmarked for OGA have 
been deducted; 
ii) The 4% of the V.A.T. total annual revenues. 
Those revenues are distributed to the regional 
accounts specific for operational and other general 
costs and, to the regional accounts specific for 
investment expenditure, according to a common 
decision taken by the ministry of Internal Affairs, 
the ministry of Decentralization, the ministry of 
Economics after consultation of the Union of the 
Regions. Recently, an annual cap of 5.200 mln 
Euros has been introduced as part of the Medium 
Term Fiscal Strategy for the sum of the earmarked 
revenues for municipal and regional local 
governments. On a Regular Basis, Regions’ 
Revenues come from KAPs and a part of it comes 
from Public Investment Programs. Additional 
Revenues include income from taxes of movable 
and immovable property, insurance contributions, 
fines and fees. 
3. Municipal expenditures and revenues (other 
than the KAPs) 
Expenditures of municipalities include: (i) 
Operational costs such as remuneration and 
personnel expenses, remuneration of elected and 
other staff; costs for serving the public trust (i.e. 
loans for covering operational and investment 
costs), costs for consumable goods (i.e. school 
maintenance and building materials); leasing costs 
and other general operational costs. (ii) 
Investments such us purchase of buildings, 
technical works and procurement of fixed assets; 
works; fixed assets/holdings in enterprises, and 
(iii) payments, returns and forecasts incurred in 
previous years. 
Revenues may be distinguished as regular and 
irregular. Regular revenues are (i) revenues from 
immovable properties (i.e. rents from the use of 
public areas such as forest rents or fish-farm rents), 
(ii) revenues from movable properties (i.e. capital 
interest etc), (iii) revenues from retaliatory fees 
(e.g. cleaning, lighting, port, water, and sewer 
fees), (vi) revenues from royalties and services 
(e.g. revenues from cemeteries and 
slaughterhouses, fees on gross tradesmen income), 
(v) revenues from taxes and duties (electricity tax, 
beer tax, other municipality specific taxes)(
245
). 
Irregular revenues are mainly: revenues from 
selling immovable and movable property; 
subsidies for covering operational costs; 
investment subsidies (state or community funds); 
donations and inheritance; surcharges fines and 
fees (e.g. parking fines); loans. Taxes and their 
range are set by legislation with the only exception 
being the retaliatory fees for which municipalities 
can set their own rate. 
4. Fiscal Decentralisation 
The article 261 of the Law 3852/2010, explicitly 
states measures concerning fiscal decentralization 
of taxation.  
1. A percentage of the actual increase of the VAT 
receipts within the administrative territory of a 
municipality will be assigned to the municipality 
concerned and it will exclusively be used for 
services of social solidarity. This is an attempt of 
                                                          
(245) The main taxes and fees (imposed as taxes) are 6. 
Electricity tax, beer tax, immovable property charge, gross 
income fee, sojourn fee and local tax of Dodecanese. Total 
taxes and fees imposed by municipalities are about 40. 
Apart from the main 6 the rest of them account for an 
important part of total revenues from taxes-fees. 
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certification, reception and allocation of local 
public revenues by the local government itself. 
2.  A percentage of 20 of the property tax revenues 
may be considered as local municipal revenue 
depending on the total amount of taxes collected in 
the administrative area of a municipality and the 
related ministerial decision. This revenue is 
allocated to actions concerning urbanization and 
related services. 
3. The municipalities are given the power to ask 
for information on wealth elements (properties and 
income) of the physical and legal persons in their 
administrative territory. 
5. Credit Policy 
Regions and municipalities may take loans from 
financial organisations in the country or abroad 
only in the context of financial investment and 
debt financing purposes and, under the constraints: 
(a) that the annual cost of a debt financing does not 
exceed the 20% of its annual regular revenues; (b) 
the total debt of the region/municipality 
proceeding to borrowing does not exceed a 
threshold percentage of its total revenues. This 
threshold is determined by a ministerial decision. 
The total debt of the region/municipality is defined 
as the sum of its short and long term obligations. 
Subnational governments can issue bonds but this 
has not been applied yet. Local Government debt 
contributed with a minor percentage to General 
Government fiscal slippages. 
Budgetary (5 years' term same as the mandate of 
the local governments) and financial control of the 
local governments is made by the Conference of 
Auditors (Elegktiko Synedrio). There have been 
cases of bail-outs of local governments in financial 
difficulties. 
A1.9. SPAIN 
1. General description 
Spain is a highly decentralized country with a 
significant share of spending powers devolved to 
the regions denominated Autonomous 
Communities (CCAA henceforth), mainly on 
health care, education and social services. Article 2 
of the Constitution ratified in 1978(
246
) guarantees 
the right of the CC.AA. and the regions to have 
their self government and ensures the solidarity 
amongst them. In turn, Article 137 sets out that 
CC.AA., provinces and municipalities enjoy 
autonomy for the management of their respective 
interests. Article 140 also ensures full autonomy to 
the municipalities.  
As a snapshot, around 35% of total consolidated 
general government expenditure is made by the 
CCAA, whereas local governments are responsible 
for some 13%. Hence, altogether public spending 
under the responsibility of State (CCAA) and local 
governments amounts to almost 48% of total 
general government spending. Likewise, Spain 
also enjoys a high degree of fiscal autonomy. A 
sizeable share of tax receipts and fees are 
transferred to subnational governments, while at 
the same time they enjoy a high regulatory 
capacity over both shared and transferred taxes. 
Thus, shared and transferred taxes to the CCAA 
and local governments amount to some 29% and 
15% of total consolidated government revenues, 
respectively; the remaining 56% remains in the 
hands of the Central Government.   
The Autonomous Communities are divided into 
two main groups, namely the Autonomous 
Communities (CCAA) of Ordinary Regime and the 
Communities with Foral Regime. The financing 
systems differ between the two groups. The 
Autonomous Communities of Ordinary Regime 
are Andalusia, Galicia, Cantabria, Asturias, 
Castile-León, Castile-La Mancha, Aragón, La 
Rioja, Catalonia, Comunidad de Madrid, 
Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Murcia, 
Balearic and Canary Islands, and the autonomous 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Their financing 
system of the Autonomous Communities (CCAA) 
of Ordinary Regime in Spain has been revised very 
recently (Law 22/2009 of 18 December). In turn, 
the Communities with Foral Regime are Navarre 
and the Basque Country, which enjoy full fiscal 
autonomy excluding customs tariffs, with the 
limitation that the overall effective tax burden does 
not fall below that of the rest of Spain.  
                                                          
(246) http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/enlaces/ 
documentos/ConstitucionCASTELLANO.pdf or also in its 
English translation 
http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/c78/ 
cons_ingl.pdf  
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Finally, the principles of the Social Security(
247
) 
are enshrined in Article 41 of the Constitution and 
its main tasks are assigned to different public 
agencies within the general government.  
2. Government spending 
The central government holds full legislative 
power only in the areas of international relations, 
nationality, migration, political asylum rights, 
defence, justice, customs, currency, general 
finance and Central Government debt, commercial, 
criminal, labour, civil and intellectual property 
legislation, general coordination of the public 
Health Care system and legislation on 
pharmaceutical products. The central government 
also has legislative powers on the basic legislation, 
definition of principles and economic regime of 
the Social Security including Health Care, 
although the provision of services is devolved to 
the CC.AA. and Local Governments. In many 
areas the central government shares competences 
with the CC.AA. 
By the functional breakdown of public expenditure 
(COFOG) the assignment of the different 
competences can be summarized as follows: 
 General public services: Definition of policy 
principles and their implementation lie within 
the remit of the central government except for 
debt issuance by CC.AA. and Local 
Governments. 
 Defence: Full responsibility of the central 
government. 
 Public order and safety: The definition of 
policy principles lie within the remit of the 
central government except for the areas of 
police and fire protection services. The 
effective implementation of public order and 
                                                          
(247) These agencies are the National Social Security Institute 
(INSS in its acronym in Spanish), the National Institute of 
Healthcare Management (INGS), the National Institute of 
Social Services (IMSERSO), the Social Institute of the 
Navy (ISM) and the General Treasury of the Social 
Security (TGSS). However, this national institutional 
definition of the Social Security does not coincide with the 
Social Security subsector as defined in ESA95, which 
comprises the Social Security System (the main function of 
which is the functioning of the public pension system), the 
Public National Employment Service (SPEE in its acronym 
in Spanish) and the Wage Guarantee Fund (FOGASA). 
safety policies is accomplished by the central 
government, the CC.AA and the municipalities.  
 Economic affairs: The definition of policy 
principles lies within the remit of the central 
government, while spending powers 
concerning areas such as agriculture, forestry, 
mining, fishing, construction, transport and 
communication have been devolved to the 
CC.AA. Local Governments have also powers 
on public transport within their geographical 
area. 
 Environmental protection: The definition of 
policy principles and the implementation of 
these policies lie within the remit of the central 
government. The CC.AA. enjoy additional 
legislative power, while municipalities also 
enjoy spending powers on waste management 
and pollution abatement.  
 Housing and community amenities: These 
spending competences have been mostly 
transferred to the municipalities, although the 
CC.AA can define the basic principles of town 
and country planning and housing.  
 Health: The definition of policy principles and 
general coordination lie within the remit of the 
central government, whereas the effective 
spending powers have been devolved to the 
CC.AA. However, the legislation on 
pharmaceuticals lies exclusively on the hands 
of the central government. 
 Recreation culture and religion: The definition 
of policy principles and general coordination 
lie within the remit of the central government, 
whereas the effective spending powers have 
been devolved to the CC.AA. 
 Education: The definition of policy principles 
and general coordination lie within the remit of 
the central government; the effective spending 
powers have been devolved to the CC.AA. 
 Social protection: The definition of policy 
principles and general coordination lie within 
the remit of the social security, as well as 
effective spending on areas such as 
unemployment and old age. Effective spending 
powers on social services have been devolved 
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to the CC.AA and, to a lower extent, to 
municipalities. 
3. Financial arrangements 
3.1. Autonomous Communities 
There are basically two different financing systems 
for Autonomous Communities in Spain depending 
on their regime. The two Communities with Foral 
Regime, notably Navarre and the Basque Country, 
enjoy full fiscal autonomy excluding customs 
tariffs, with the limitation that the overall effective 
tax burden does not fall below that of the rest of 
Spain. They are responsible for taxes collected in 
their respective territory and negotiate the amount 
to be transferred to the central government on 
account of such taxes for responsibilities 
remaining centralized, and in proportion to their 
relative income and population. This transfer is set 
to evolve in line with the observed growth rate of 
the Central Government's tax revenues. This 
agreement is revised every five years. In turn, the 
Autonomous Communities (CCAA) of Ordinary 
Regime enjoy a different financing system that has 
been revised very recently (Law 22/2009 of 18 
December). This system is described in greater 
detail in the next subsection. 
The financing system of Autonomous Communities 
of Ordinary Regime 
The current financing system introduced some 
amendments to the previous one in effect until 
2008. In essence, the functioning of the financing 
system can be summarized as follows:  
a. The new system first determines the funding 
needs (spending needs in the previous system) for 
all the CCAA in a base year augmented with 
additional resources contributed by the Central 
Government.  
b. These funding requirements are distributed 
among the CCAA according to the agreed criteria 
concerning the so-called "essential public 
services"(
248
) (Guarantee Fund) and confronted 
with the 75% of the transferred tax revenues in 
each Autonomous Community. The difference 
                                                          
(248) In the previous system funding needs were distributed 
according to all the powers transferred. 
between them takes the form of a grant from (+) or 
to (-) the Central Government. 
c. Levelling transfers are set to ensure that each 
Autonomous Community receives enough 
resources in the base year for the competences 
assumed (Global Sufficiency Fund).  
d. Two additional Convergence funds are set, 
notably the Competitiveness Fund and the 
Cooperation Fund, whose basic function is to 
provide certain CCAA. with additional resources. 
e. Finally, standards for the evolution of transfers 
are set. In practice, there are advanced payments 
on account of budgetary projections in the Central 
Government Budget for a given year, with its final 
settlement normally taking place after two years.  
a. Overall financing needs in the base year  
For each Autonomous Community the resources in 
the base year were gauged on the basis of the funds 
that it would have received under the previous 
system. Thus, the overall funding needs in the base 
year were assimilated to the finally settled ones by 
the previous funding system, augmented with 
additional resources that amounted to some € 7.4 
billions (0.7% of GDP). These additional resources 
were allotted according to some pre-determined 
criteria.  
b. Tax capacity  
The tax capacity of CCAA to finance the 
expenditure related to the spending powers 
assumed is also estimated for the base year. Such 
tax capacity includes both the collection of taxes 
assigned and the specific fees linked to the powers 
assumed.  
TThe new system raised the amount of taxes 
transferred (personal income tax, VAT and excise 
duties) and tax powers on the personal income tax 
and other traditionally transferred taxes such as 
Property Transfer and Stamp duty, Inheritance and 
Gift, taxes on gaming, hydrocarbon-oil taxes, taxes 
on certain means of transport and fees. 
Specifically, the share of taxes transferred to the 
CC.AA. are: 
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 Personal Income Tax: 50% of total net tax 
revenues thereof (33% in the previous system), 
with normative capacity on the regional rate 
(progressive) without restrictions on brackets, 
though subject to approval. CC.AA. also have 
normative capacity on personal and family 
allowances (± 15% limit for each of the 
components) and deductions for personal 
circumstances, business and housing 
investments. However, the definition of family 
circumstances covered by such allowances 
cannot be changed. Restrictions on the number 
of income brackets and marginal rates were 
removed on condition that the autonomic rate is 
progressive. Moreover, regional rates are 
subject to annual approval.  
 VAT: 50% of total receipts thereof (35% in the 
previous system), although with no normative 
capacity. These are distributed among CCAA 
according to regional consumption indexes 
gauged by the National Statistical Office (INE). 
 Excise duties on manufactured production of 
alcohol, tobacco and hydrocarbons: 58% of 
total net tax revenues thereof (40% in the 
previous system), with no normative capacity. 
These revenues are distributed among CCAA 
according to regional consumption indexes 
gauged by the National Statistical Office (INE), 
the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism 
or the Tobacco Market Commissioner.  
 Hydrocarbon-oil retail sales: 100%, with some 
normative capacity on the tax rate. 
 Electricity: 100% of total net tax revenues, 
with no normative capacity. These revenues are 
distributed among CCAA according to regional 
consumption indexes gauged by the National 
Statistical Office (INE) and the Ministry of 
Industry, Energy and Tourism. 
 Property Transfer and Stamp Duty: 100%, with 
normative capacity on the tax rate (except for 
corporate transactions) and on deductions and 
allowances. 
 Registration of motor vehicles: 100%, with 
some normative capacity on the tax rate. 
 Taxes on gaming: 100%, with normative 
capacity on exemptions, rate, tax base, fixed 
fees, allowances and accrual. 
 Wealth tax:(249) 100%, with full normative 
capacity on the tax rate, allowances and 
allowances. 
 Inheritance and gift tax: 100%, with full 
normative capacity on the tax rate and some 
normative capacity regarding reductions in the 
tax base, deductions, allowances and 
coefficients of existing wealth. 
c. Guarantee fund for essential public services in 
the base year  
The distributing criteria of resources across CCAA 
only apply to the so-called "essential public 
services of the welfare state", namely health care, 
education and social services. (
250
) A Guarantee 
Fund for Essential Public Services (Guarantee 
Fund henceforth) aims to ensure uniform access to 
these basic services to all citizens regardless of 
their place of residence. All CCAA contribute 75% 
of the tax revenues and fees assigned to them to 
this fund,(
251
) to which € 8.7 billions contributed 
by the Central Government were added in the base 
year. Notwithstanding the way these funds are 
gauged, most financial resources assigned to the 
CC.AA. are not earmarked. 
This fund was theoretically distributed among the 
CCAA based on the so-called "adjusted 
population", which is gauged as a weighted 
average of seven variables: population (30%), area 
(1.8%), dispersion (0.6%), insularity (0.6%), 
equivalent protected population (38%), population 
aged 65 years or above (8.5%) and population up 
to 16 years of age (20.5%).  
Thus, the net transfer from the Guarantee Fund 
(NT) was gauged as the difference between the 
amount of the share of each Autonomous 
Community in the Guarantee Fund in the base year 
                                                          
(249) This tax was withdrawn in 2009 and has temporarily been 
re-introduced to assuage the budgetary impact of the crisis. 
The tax is envisaged to take effect in 2012 and 2013.   
(250) In the previous system only the first two were considered 
as such. 
(251) All the calculations are based on "normative taxes", which 
basically consist on taxes transferred to the CC.AA. before 
exerting their normative capacity. 
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(GF) and amount of its contribution (75% of its 
respective tax revenues in normative terms 
(TREV). Such net transfer takes the form of a 
grant between the Central Government and the 
relevant Autonomous Community according to the 
following formula: 
NTi = GFi - 75% TREVi  
d. Global Sufficiency Fund in the base year  
In order to ensure enough resources for the 
competences assumed, a levelling grant called 
Global Sufficiency Fund (GSFi) for the base year 
and for each Autonomous Community was set. 
Such grant covered the difference between the 
overall financing needs (NFi), on the one hand, 
and the sum of the tax capacity (TREVi) and the 
transfer (positive or negative) from the Guarantee 
Fund, on the other. In practical terms this implies 
that each Autonomous Community will have the 
25% of its tax revenue in normative terms, plus its 
participation in the Guarantee Fund, plus its share 
on the Global Sufficiency Fund to cover its 
financing needs.  
NFi = 25% TREVi + GFi + GSFi  
This Global Sufficiency Fund consists of a transfer 
from the central government to respective 
Autonomous Community if overall spending needs 
exceed the resources provided jointly by the fiscal 
capacity and the participation in the Guarantee 
Fund, or a transfer from the Autonomous 
Community concerned to the Central Government 
otherwise.  
e. Additional resources  
The Central Government provides additional 
resources to the CCAA to strengthen the Welfare 
State according to some different criteria under the 
umbrella of the so-called Competitiveness Fund 
and the Cooperation Fund. Both funds amount to 
some € 3.7 billions, around 0.4% of GDP. The 
former aims to strengthen horizontal equity and 
reduce differences in per capita funding across 
CCAA; the latter is intended to promote regional 
income convergence. These funds are primarily 
assigned to the CCAA with lower revenues, per 
capita income and population density. 
f. Evolution of the system in subsequent years  
After the base year the CCAA obtain their 
corresponding share of the transferred taxes, 
jointly with the corresponding (positive or 
negative) grants from the Guarantee and Global 
Sufficiency Funds. The variables of distribution of 
the Guarantee Fund are reviewed annually, 
although final settlements typically take place with 
a two-year delay due to data availability 
limitations. The Central Government contribution 
to the Guarantee Fund and the Global Sufficiency 
Fund are set to evolve in line with the observed 
growth rate the Central Government's tax 
revenues. Finally, tThe structural variables of the 
system are revised every five years. 
3.2. Local Governments 
The Royal Legislative Decree 2/2004, of 5 March 
2004,(
252
) which approves the revised text of the 
Local Tax Offices Regulatory Law, forms the basis 
of the local financing system. According to Article 
2 therein, the resources of local governments 
consist of revenues stemming from its property, 
own taxes, fees and surcharges accrued on taxes of 
CC.AA., their agreed shares on central government 
and CC.AA. taxes, subsidies, regulated prices, 
fines and sanctions within the remit of their powers 
and resources stemming from credit operations and 
debt issuance.  
In particular, own taxes are divided in two groups: 
regular-basis taxes and other taxes. The former 
comprise taxes on immovable property, the local 
business tax and the tax on motor vehicles; the 
latter comprise taxes on construction, settlements 
and works and the tax on the increase in the value 
of land of urban nature. Town/city councils can 
raise or lower tax rates and establish discretionary 
tax benefits but are not allowed to set new taxes. 
Municipalities that are capitals of a province or 
Autonomous Community, or which have over 
75,000 inhabitants , are assigned a part of the 
Personal Income Tax, VAT and special taxes on 
alcohol, hydrocarbons and tobacco products 
(approximately between 1% and 2%, depending on 
the tax and whether it is a municipal or provincial 
                                                          
(252) http://www.minhap.gob.es/Documentacion/ 
Publico/NormativaDoctrina/FinanciacionTerritorial/Financ
iacion%20Local/REAL%20DECRETO%20LEGISLATIV
O%202%202004%20_Haciendas%20Locales_.pdf 
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one). The so-called “tourist municipalities”(253) 
enjoy somewhat similar special regime.     
4. Fiscal rules 
Fiscal rule 
The current Budgetary Stability Act entered into 
force in 2008. (
254
)  According to it, the general 
government as a whole, its subsectors and public-
owned entities must attach to the principle of 
budgetary stability. Budgetary stability implies that 
the Central Government, the Autonomous 
Communities and the Local Governments have to 
be in balance or in surplus in an ESA95 basis 
along the economic cycle. This implies that their 
cyclically adjusted balances have to be in balance 
or in surplus. In their case, an upper and a lower 
threshold for GDP growth are defined. Hence, if 
GDP growth falls short the lower threshold, the 
general government as a whole could register a 
deficit no higher than 1% of GDP, of which the 
central government deficit should not exceed 0.2% 
of GDP, the deficit of the Autonomous 
Communities should not exceed 0.75% of GDP 
and the deficit of the Local Governments should 
not exceed 0.05% of GDP. If GDP growth stands 
between both thresholds, these subsectors and the 
general government as a whole should be in 
balance at least. Finally, if GDP growth exceeds 
the upper thresholds these subsectors and the 
general government as a whole should register 
surpluses. Moreover, the Social Security subsector 
is set to be in balance or in surplus, regardless of 
the cyclical position.  
Higher deficits, however, are exceptionally 
allowed if they are devoted to financing productive 
investment projects, including Research, 
Development and Innovation. Higher deficit 
derived from these programmes cannot exceed 
0.2% of GDP in the central government, 0.25% of 
GDP for the Autonomous Communities as a whole 
and 0.05% of GDP in the Local Governments 
subsector. 
                                                          
(253) These are places that, although they do not comply with the 
requirements for accessing the tax assignment system, do 
have a population of over 20,000 inhabitants and a greater 
number of second homes than first homes. 
(254) This Act revised the first Budgetary Stability Act due to 
2001 and in force between 2002 and 2007. 
In the case of the Central Government, a ceiling on 
total non-financial expenditure is set in the Budget 
Law each year. No expenditure ceiling though is 
set for either the Autonomous Communities or the 
Local Governments. 
Budgetary targets 
Budgetary targets have to be formulated within a 
multiannual scenario. In the first semester of the 
year the government has to set the budgetary 
targets (as a percentage of GDP) for the general 
government as a whole, its subsectors and each of 
the different entities therein for the next three 
years. Such targets will be set on the basis of a 
report on the cyclical position of the economy 
conducted by the Bank of Spain, and taking into 
account the economic forecast by the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank.  
Accountability and enforcement 
Before the 1
st
 of October each year the Ministry of 
Finance will submit to the Government a report 
assessing the degree of compliance with the 
budgetary targets in the previous year. This report 
will be made public. In case of deviations from the 
specified targets, the Autonomous Community or 
the Local Government concerned has to present a 
3-year rebalancing plan. In case of non-compliance 
with the previous provisions the Government will 
be entitled to impose constraints to credit or debt 
issuance to the relevant entity. 
Sanction mechanism 
In case of non-compliance the concerned 
administration will have to contribute to any 
financial sanction raised according to the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact in proportion to its fiscal 
slippage.  
Debt issuance and bailouts 
Autonomous Communities and Local governments 
can issue debt on condition of compliance with 
their budgetary targets. In case of non-compliance 
with the budgetary stability target, but with an 
approved corrective plan, any new long-term 
indebtedness is subject to approval by the Central 
Government. In case of not having any approved 
corrective plan, all indebtedness operation 
regardless of the term is subject to approval. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
248 
In any case, the central government will not bail 
any autonomous community or local government 
out in case of default. 
Due to the current economic and financial crisis 
the budgetary targets have been missed since 2008 
on. No default by any entity within the general 
government has taken place.  
5. Other relevant institutional features 
In normal years spending by subnational 
governments, especially on healthcare, has risen at 
elevated rates. Buoyant revenues, partly linked to 
the housing sector, allowed offsetting to a large 
extent such spending increase. However, the 
collapse of tax revenues due to the economic and 
financial crisis has unveiled the main weaknesses 
of the system as expenditure levels at the onset of 
the crisis were clearly oversized. On the other 
hand, the normative capacity of Autonomous 
Communities on a number of taxes has mainly 
been used to raise allowances and deductions, 
thereby increasing tax expenditure, while being 
largely reluctant to use it to increase taxes.  
The system lacked credible enough incentives to 
prevent fiscal profligacy by regional and local 
administration. No expenditure ceiling rule applied 
to subnational levels of government prior to the 
approval of the new Budgetary Stability and 
Financial Sustainability Act. The new Law though 
aims to fill this gap, jointly with imposing more 
stringent deficit criteria. This is a promising step to 
underpin budgetary discipline.  
The new Budgetary Stability and Financial 
Sustainability Act, amending the previous 
Budgetary Stability Act, has been passed and 
entered into force on 28 April 2012. The basic 
principles of the reformed law are: 
 The general government deficit in structural 
terms cannot exceed 0.4% of GDP in periods of 
low or negative growth. The structural balance 
will be gauged according to the methodology 
employed by the European Commission.  
 The general government and its subsectors are 
subject to the principle of financial 
sustainability to meet present and future 
expenditure needs within the deficit and debt 
limits enshrined in the Spanish and European 
legislation. In this connection, no bail-out 
clauses among the different subsectors are 
established. 
 A transition period is envisaged to resume to 
debt levels below 60% of GDP. 
 An expenditure ceiling is set for all entities 
within the general government. Thus, the 
relevant government expenditure should not 
breach the reference rate of medium-term GDP 
growth. This reference growth rate will be 
gauged according to the methodology 
employed by the European Commission. 
 The sanction mechanism is reinforced. 
The Council issued country-specific 
recommendations to Spain with respect to 
subnational governments (see Box I.3.2 above). 
A1.10. FRANCE 
1. General description 
France is a unitary state where the central 
government is predominant. However, the 
Constitution adopted on 4 October 1958 recognises 
the principle of local government autonomy. This 
principle has been consolidated since the 
constitutional reform of 28 March 2003. 
The country is broken down into three tiers of 
subnational government the main units of which, 
defined by the Constitution as collectivités 
territoriales, are the regions, the departments, and 
the municipalities (and also the overseas 
territories). There is no subordinated link between 
the three entities; all three layers are governed by 
national legislation. There are 22 regions and 96 
departments of mainland France, 4 regions and 6 
departments overseas, and nearly 37 000 
municipalities, which can gather within 
établissements publics de coopération 
intercommunale (EPCI). A small number of local 
governments, known as collectivités territoriales à 
statut particulier, have slightly different 
administrative frameworks; among these are the 
island of Corsica and the country’s largest cities. 
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The so-called Defferre laws of 1982–83 together 
with the 2003 constitutional reform are the main 
institutional reforms that have shaped over time 
the current system. Prior to these French 
municipalities and departments enjoyed a limited 
autonomy, and the chief executive of the 
department was the government-appointed prefect 
(préfet) who also had strong powers over other 
local authorities. 
The decentralisation process initiated in the early 
1980s translated into a number of key changes. 
The administrative stewardship of the prefect was 
replaced by a legal check and balance exercised by 
the administrative courts and the regional courts of 
auditors. Departmental executive power was 
transferred from the prefect to the president of the 
departmental council (Conseil général). Regions 
were given full powers and recognised as 
collectivités territoriales, with directly elected 
regional councils and the power to elect their 
executive. The law also devolved to local 
governments many functions hitherto belonging to 
the central government, in particular economic 
development, social welfare, regional planning, 
secondary schools, cultural matters, etc. 
The 2003 constitutional reform introduced the 
principle of financial autonomy of local 
governments. The changes also introduced the 
possibility of holding local referenda and the right 
to petition. New responsibilities were also 
transferred to local governments as part of the 
Decentralisation Act that followed in 2004, 
particularly to regions and departments 
(responsibility of non-teaching staff in schools, 
vocational training, ports, airports, etc.). 
In 2010, total spending by local government 
amounted to 11.8% of GDP(
255
). Three quarters 
                                                          
(255) To be noted is one of the measures of November 7 (article 
108 of LFI 2012) : 
'Chaque année, le Gouvernement dépose en annexe au projet 
de loi de finances un rapport qui comporte une 
présentation de la structure et de l’évolution des dépenses 
ainsi que de l’état de la dette des collectivités territoriales. 
A cette fin, les régions, les départements et les communes 
ou les établissements publics de coopération 
intercommunale de plus de 50 000 habitants transmettent 
au représentant de l’Etat, dans des conditions fixées par 
décret en Conseil d’Etat pris après avis du comité des 
finances locales, un rapport présentant notamment : 
• les orientations budgétaires, 
• les engagements pluriannuels envisagés, 
• la composition et l’évolution de la dette, 
were to cover current expenses. Total revenue 
excluding borrowing stood at 11.7% of GDP. 55% 
of total revenue was covered by taxes set and 
raised locally or by shared taxes. The main direct 
taxes are the property tax on buildings and land, 
the residence tax and up until 2009 the local 
business tax. Central government transfers and 
grants represented 28% of total revenue. These fall 
into two categories: grants and subsidies for 
current spending and compensation for transfer of 
responsibilities, and grants and subsidies for 
capital expenditure. Borrowing is yet another 
source of revenue for local governments in France, 
and represents around 1% of GDP each year. Local 
authorities do not need to seek central government 
authorisation in order to borrow money but all 
resources from borrowing can only be spent on 
investment (not current spending)(
256
). 
2. Government spending 
Municipalities benefit from a general 
responsibilities clause: they can intervene over and 
above their responsibilities in all fields of local 
interest. Traditional responsibilities include 
register office functions, electoral functions, social 
aid, primary education, sports and art facilities, 
maintenance of municipal roads, land development 
and planning, local public order, and local public 
utilities. Departments are mainly in charge of 
social assistance and medical prevention, 
construction and maintenance of secondary roads, 
construction and maintenance of secondary 
schools and management of some non-teaching 
staff (collèges), culture and heritage, economic 
development, and environment. Regions are 
responsible for economic development, territorial 
development and planning, transport, vocational 
training programmes, construction and 
maintenance of secondary schools and 
management of some non-teaching staff (lycées), 
as well as special education institutions.  
In 2010, total spending by local governments 
amounted to EUR 228.7 billion or 11.8% of GDP. 
Based on the COFOG classification, local 
                                                                                   
• ainsi que la composition et l’évolution des dépenses de 
personnel, de subvention, de communication et 
d’immobilier'.  
(256) Funds obtained through borrowing can no longer be used to 
service outstanding debt (which has to be financed by a 
surplus of the operating budget). 
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governments spent 18% of their budget on general 
public services, 17% on social protection, 16% on 
education, 15% on housing and community 
amenities, 13% on economic affairs, 9% on 
recreation, culture and religion, 8% on 
environmental protection, and 4% on other 
functions. The share of social protection in total 
expenditure has increased substantially since 2000 
(+4 pps.) while that of general public policies has 
registered a significant decrease (–6 pps.). 
Among capital expenditure items, housing and 
community amenities accounted for one third of 
total spending, general public policies and 
education represented approximately 15% each, 
followed by recreation, culture and religion (12%), 
economic affairs (10%), and environmental 
protection (9%).  
Local government responsibilities mainly concern 
the implementation of policies, whereas their 
regulation is generally entrusted to the central 
government. In the case of education, for instance, 
overall standards (i.e. requirements of educational 
institutions, level of qualification of teachers, etc.) 
are set by the central government, whereas 
municipalities are responsible for establishing, 
reorganising and closing education institutions. 
The same goes for social allowances such as the 
revenu de solidarité active, the allocation 
personnalisée pour l’autonomie and the prestation 
de compensation du handicap: local governments 
are responsible for paying such allowances(
257
), 
while the amount and eligibility criteria are 
determined nationally. 
3. Financial arrangements 
In 2010, total revenue of local governments 
excluding borrowing stood at EUR 227 billion, or 
11.7% of GDP. 
Tax revenue (own-source local taxes and shared 
taxes) accounted for 55% of total revenue while 
operating and investment grants represented 
approximately 28%(
258
). The remainder stemmed 
from the sale of goods and services to end users, 
                                                          
(257) Including associated proximity services (monitoring, 
activation measures etc.). 
(258) Figures reported here come from Dexia Crédit Local’s 
Note de conjuncture available at: http://public-dexia-
clf.dexwired.net/collectivites-
locales/expertise/Documents/ndc_france_2011.pdf 
asset management and extraordinary revenue. 
Municipal and departmental revenue was mainly 
tax-based, while that of regions was broadly 
balanced between tax revenue and grants. 
Own-source tax revenue, which represents 80 to 
100% of total tax revenue for each of the three 
tiers of collectivités territoriales, mainly comes 
from four direct local taxes, which account for 
nearly two thirds of total tax revenue. These are 
levied by local governments and by some inter-
municipal cooperation structures. French local 
taxation works on a system of rate stacking: the 
overall rate of each tax is calculated by summing 
up rates imposed by different local government 
tiers, thus varying across land areas. However, the 
role of regions and departments in setting tax rates 
has recently decreased, while they are not 
empowered to set up new taxes. The central 
government collects the local taxes annually, and 
reimburses local governments monthly. 
The four main local taxes are: 
 The CET (contribution économique 
territoriale) which replaces the local business 
tax (taxe professionnelle). The local business 
tax was paid by companies and was essentially 
based on the rental value of fixed assets. It was 
subject to exemptions decided by the central 
government. This tax was abolished in 2010 
and replaced by a new economic contribution 
for business, the CET, a flat-rate tax on 
network businesses, and new tax revenue were 
transferred to local governments. The CET tax 
comprises a land tax levied on companies 
(cotisation foncière des enterprises or CFE) 
and a new levy on the value added by a 
company (cotisation sur la valeur ajoutée des 
enterprises or CVAE). Local government 
(municipalities) can only set the rate for the 
CFE.  
 The property tax on buildings, paid by property 
owners (companies and individuals), is based 
on the property’s theoretical rental value 
according to the local land registry, and is 
adjusted in line with inflation. As of 2011, the 
tax rate is set only by departments and 
municipalities. 
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 The residence tax, paid by the residents of 
housing buildings, is also based on the 
property’s theoretical rental value and adjusted 
in line with inflation. There are exemptions for 
over 60s, low-income households and also if 
the property is incapable of occupation due to it 
needing extensive renovation. As of 2011, the 
tax rate is set only at the municipal level. 
 The property tax is also paid by owners of non-
built land (companies and individual). As of 
2011, the tax rate is set only at the municipal 
level. 
Local governments levy other own-source direct or 
indirect taxes, including transfer taxes on property 
transactions (municipalities and departments), a 
transport contribution (municipalities), a 
household waste disposal tax (municipalities), a 
vehicle registration tax and a tax on driving 
licences (regions), an electricity tax (municipalities 
and departments), and various town planning taxes 
levied by local governments as a whole. 
The central government has increasingly shared 
tax revenue with local governments to compensate 
for transferred responsibilities and reforms such 
the local business tax abolition. Regions have been 
receiving a fraction of the domestic tax on 
petroleum products (taxe intérieure sur les 
produits pétroliers or TIPP) and a surcharge on the 
apprenticeship tax (taxe additionnelle à la taxe 
d’apprentissage) since 2005. Departments have 
also been receiving a fraction of the TIPP tax and a 
fraction of the special tax on insurance contracts 
(taxe spéciale sur les conventions d’assurance or 
TSCA) since 2005. Except for an earmarked share 
of the TIPP tax, where regions have the power to 
set rates (within a limited range), local 
governments do not fix the rate of any of these 
indirect taxes. Some new tax revenue has been 
transferred to local governments since 2011 as part 
of the local business tax reform, including the 
remaining fraction of the TSCA tax. 
Grants from the central government consist of 
operating grants and capital expenditure grants 
(82% and 18% respectively in 2010). In the past 
the central government set up various mechanisms 
(pacte de stabilité, contrat de croissance et de 
stabilité, contrat de stabilité) aiming at better 
controlling increase in grants. Under the second 
multi-annual public finance planning act, which 
covers the period 2011–14, transfers to local 
governments have been frozen in nominal 
terms(
259
). 
                                                          
(259) And a 200 M€ decrease was voted in the 2012 budget law 
as part of the fiscal consolidation package. 
 
 
Box IV.A1.1: Equalisation mechanisms across subnational entities in France*
The basis for vertical equalisation is the "financial potential", applicable to all subnational entities and set 
each year by the Finance Law. This corresponds first to the income which would be generated if the local 
government concerned were applying to its tax base, and for the four main local taxes presented above, the 
average rate observed nation-wide at a similar level of sub-government. Since 2005, was added to this "tax 
potential" the amount perceived the preceding year from the global operating grant (regions and EPCI are 
also concerned since 2011 only). The financial potential therefore corresponds to the revenue the 
subnational entity should be able to rely on if it were applying "average" tax policies.  
With the dying out of the "professional tax" in 2011, it was also decided to create for a fund for horizontal 
equalisation at the municipal level (fonds de péréquation national des recettes intercommunales et 
communales (FPIC)), on the model of a fund created specifically in 2010 for the Ile-de-France region (Paris 
and surroundings). The FPIC will begin operating in 2012.  
 
* For more information, please refer to Péréquation financière entre les collectivités territoriales : les choix 
de la commission des finances du Sénat,.Rapport d'information n° 731 (2010-2011) de MM. Philippe 
DALLIER, Charles GUENÉ, Pierre JARLIER et Albéric de MONTGOLFIER, fait au nom de la 
commission des finances, déposé le 6 juillet 2011, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r10-731/r10-731.html .  
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The main operating grant is the so-called global 
operating grant (dotation globale de 
fonctionnement or DGF), which amounted to EUR 
41.1 billion in 2010 and represented around 85% 
of all operating grants. It has increased drastically 
since the 2004 budget, which simplified operating 
grant structure by integrating various grants and 
compensations for tax exemptions into the DGF. 
This reform also introduced a share for regions, 
and reviewed financial equalisation mechanisms: 
each local government receives a fixed grant, 
where the amount allowed may vary according to 
local needs, and an equalisation fraction with a 
view to remedying the adverse effects of the 
unequal distribution of resources and expenditure 
requirements.  
In addition, capital expenditure grants include 
reimbursement of the VAT that local governments 
pay on investment spending, a rural area 
equipments grant, a school equipments grant for 
regions and departments, and also some ministerial 
subsidies.  
4. Fiscal rules 
Principles of sincerity and balance cover both the 
operating and capital formation sections of the 
budget of all subnational entities, requiring 
expenditure and revenue to match in each section. 
The term budget as used under the rule refers to 
the voted budget. Ex-post, the budget can be 
unbalanced but deficits(
260
) may not exceed 5% of 
the year’s current revenue (10% for small 
municipalities). There are no pre-existing escape 
clauses. Average deficits, observed ex post, shrank 
from close to 5% of the annual revenue in 2007 
and 2008 to less than 1% in 2010(
261
).   
The golden rule applicable to the collectivités 
territoriales prohibits current expenditure to be 
financed by debt; borrowing can thus only be used 
to finance capital expenditure and is today used to 
cover about one third of investment spending 
undertaken by subnational entities(
262
). This also 
                                                          
(260) Of the operating part of the budget. 
(261) For detailed statistics, see Insee "Dépenses et recettes des 
collectivités locales (S13131)", available at  
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/comptes-
nationaux/tableau.asp?sous_theme=3.2&xml=t_3206  
(262) Net borrowing is at 5/10% of investment but gross 
borrowing is at around 16M€ for 45 M€ of capital 
expenditures. 
means that debt annuities, in turn, have to be 
financed by own resources(
263
). The rule has been 
into force since 1983 for municipalities and 
departments, and since 1988 for regions. 
Any decision to borrow is subject to ex-post legal 
control on the decision to borrow. It is also subject 
to a budgetary control by the central government 
representative – the prefect – together with the 
regional chamber of auditors to ensure that debt 
annuity has been included in the budget as a 
compulsory expenditure and to check compliance 
with the rule. In case a significant deficit is 
recorded (see above mentioned thresholds), the 
regional chamber of auditors shall propose 
corrective action within one month. 
Since 1982 French local governments have been 
able to borrow freely, without requiring central 
government’s permission. The outstanding amount 
of subnational government debt, which has 
substantially decreased since the 1990s, 
represented 6.3% of GDP in 2011(
264
) (mainly 
driven by regions and municipalities), thus less 
than one tenth of the outstanding debt of the public 
sector. Banks have been the biggest source of 
external funding to local governments, which 
borrow around EUR 20 billion or 1% of GDP each 
year in the form of loans, structured loans, 
revolving loans, and foreign currency loans. 
Although legally allowed, direct financing via 
capital markets has been little used to date. 
Local governments are obliged to deposit their 
liquid assets and cash with the French treasury in a 
non-interest bearing cash account. They are 
therefore not allowed to invest their daily cash 
with banks. However, local governments are 
entitled to use bank lines to cover their day-to-day 
liquidity shortfalls. 
Local governments cannot be declared bankrupt. 
In the event of default, there is no central 
government guarantee. For example, when the 
cities of Angoulême and Briançon defaulted on 
their debt, in 1991 and 1992 respectively, they had 
to negotiate a debt rescheduling with their 
creditors and had to undertake a stringent plan for 
                                                          
(263) It is in fact even tighter than this, as resources of the 
investment part of the budget cannot be used to that 
purpose. 
(264) ) Eurostat's Excessive Deficit Procedure press release, 
April 2012. 
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the consolidation of their public finances. In case 
of extreme liquidity tensions, the central 
government may however provide local 
governments with exceptional transfers in the form 
of advances on tax payments; for instance, 
Angoulême was granted 10.7 million francs (about 
1.5 EUR mn) over 7 years, in 1991, to support the 
stabilization of its financial situation and meet 
mandatory payments. Furthermore, the 
representative of the central government can put 
local governments under supervision (tutelle de 
l’État).   
A1.11. ITALY  
1. General description 
As in many other European countries, fiscal 
decentralisation in Italy has historically been 
driven by pressures from regions for more direct 
participation and control in the political process. 
Italy is currently composed of 20 regions, 
including five that have a special status granting 
them more autonomy(
265
), 110 provinces and 8092 
municipalities. Regions were granted political 
autonomy by the 1948 Constitution of the Italian 
Republic, but the actual implementation of 
regional autonomy was postponed until the first 
regional elections of 1970. Since then, the Italian 
public finances have been characterised by a 
combination of high centralisation of revenue and 
sizeable decentralisation of expenditure, 
corresponding to an important devolution of 
functions to the lower government levels. 
Subnational powers of taxation increased 
somewhat in the 1990s, alongside a further 
decentralisation of administrative functions.  
In 2001 a Constitutional reform introduced deep 
changes in the relationships between State, regions 
and local authorities, opening the way to fiscal 
federalism. However, delays in the adoption of the 
ordinary legislation required to allow the entry into 
force of the new fiscal configuration has kept alive 
a system where the funding of subnational 
government expenditure is highly dependent on 
transfers from the centre.  A crucial step was taken 
in May 2009, with the approval of a framework 
                                                          
(265) The five regions with special status are Friuli Venezia 
Giulia, Sardegna, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle 
D'Aosta. 
law that delegated the government to adopt 
legislative decrees enacting fiscal federalism, on 
the basis of identified principles and guidelines.  
In 2009, sub-central government expenditure 
amounted to 31% of general government 
expenditure (15% of GDP), while local 
government revenue excluding transfers from the 
central government is estimated at 17% of general 
government revenue (8% of GDP). In this context 
of relatively high subnational government 
spending but limited revenue de-centralisation, 
fiscal relations between the central government 
and the local authorities during the past decade 
have been regulated by a domestic stability pact 
(DSP), setting annual constraints on expenditure 
and/or the budget balance of the subnational units, 
and a health pact, controlling regional 
governments' spending on health services. 
Parliament is now about to adopt a bill introducing 
a balanced budget rule in the Italian Constitution 
that applies to all government levels.  
2. Government spending 
A major Constitutional reform of the distribution 
of powers across levels of government was 
approved by the Italian Parliament in 2001. The 
reform increased the regulatory and spending 
functions falling under the jurisdiction of sub-
central governments.  
The Italian central government is exclusively, or 
near-exclusively, responsible for expenditure on 
social protection transfers (38% of total general 
government expenditure), defence (3%), and 
public order and safety (4%). On the other hand, 
health care (14% of total general government 
expenditure) is practically completely devolved to 
the regions. Sub-central authorities also make a 
large majority of national spending on housing and 
community amenities (1.5% of total general 
government expenditure) and on environmental 
protection (1.5%), reflecting the limited scope for 
economies of scale in centralised provision of such 
services. Municipalities and regions are also 
directly responsible for town planning.  
The new Title V of the Constitution and 
subsequent legislation also specified functions of 
shared competence between the central and sub-
central governments. These include general public 
services (18% of total general government 
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expenditure, more than half of which is accounted 
for by debt servicing expenditure by the central 
government), education (10%), economic affairs 
(8%), and recreation, culture and religion (1.5%). 
Following conflicts over the actual division of 
responsibilities in the areas of shared competence, 
the Constitutional Court stated that responsibilities 
should be split up as follows: (a) the central 
government legislates the fundamental principles 
for the exercise of the power in question; (b) the 
region undertakes the financing, administrative, 
and management functions for this exercise; and 
(c) the local authorities perform “hands on” 
delivery of services unless there are strong reasons 
to do so at a higher level. 
Table IV.A1.1 lists the different competencies 
devolved to the three tiers of sub-central 
governments in Italy.  
Expenditure by regional governments accounts for 
around two-thirds of total sub-central government 
expenditure in Italy. Reflecting the fact that 80% 
of regional expenditure goes to health care 
provision, the purchase of goods and services and 
wages account for 50% and 25% of regional 
spending respectively. Provinces account for only 
5% of sub-central government expenditure, or less 
than 2% of total general government spending. 
Their very limited role in the current fiscal 
devolution set-up confirms that there is scope for 
administrative expenditure savings through the 
integration of their functions in the other two tiers 
of sub-central governments, as has been stipulated 
in the December economic and budgetary package. 
Capital expenditure is a relatively important part of 
the combined budget of municipalities and 
provinces, with investment spending representing 
around 20-25% of their total expenditure between 
2005 and 2010.  
3. Financial arrangements 
The Constitution (Art.119) establishes that 
subnational governments have revenue autonomy 
to perform the new functions attributed to them. 
Specifically, they can raise revenue from: 
 Own taxes; 
 Shares in the national tax revenue; 
 Equalising transfers for territories having lower 
per-capita taxable capacity. 
A golden rule is, however, envisaged for 
subnational governments, which are allowed to 
borrow only for investment financing. Moreover, 
the central government has the possibility to 
allocate supplementary resources to subnational 
governments in order to promote economic 
development and social cohesion or to perform 
functions that go beyond their normal remit. 
In 2009, the total revenue of sub-central 
governments in Italy amounted to 33% of 
(consolidated) general government revenue (15% 
of GDP). Transfers from the central government 
accounted for 50% of sub-central revenue (8% of 
GDP).  
Sub-central government revenue from indirect 
taxation (excluding taxation on property) was in 
2009 the most important source of own-revenue 
for sub-central authorities, accounting for more 
than 25% of their total revenue (4% of GDP). 
Almost 60% of the sub-central government 
indirect tax revenue is collected through a regional 
tax on productive activity (IRAP - Imposta 
regionale sulle attività produttive). IRAP is a tax 
on the value added of firms, with some tax 
deductions for labour costs gradually introduced 
since the inception of the tax in 1998 (including in 
the December 2011 budgetary package). The basic 
rate of IRAP stands at 3.9%, with regions having 
the power to increase or reduce the rate by around 
1%. Sub-central authorities also receive a share of 
the national revenue from VAT, which in 2010 
was equivalent to 10% of sub-central indirect tax 
revenue. The distribution of national VAT revenue 
across regions takes into account health-related 
indicators designed to measure regional 
differences in health spending pressures. The five 
special-statute regions are entitled to a higher share 
of the national taxes due on economic activity 
carried out in their territories. Other important 
sources of indirect taxation for sub-central 
governments include taxation on car insurance and 
motor vehicle registration (6% of sub-central 
government indirect tax revenue), taxation on 
building permits (5%) and a surtax on electricity 
consumption (3%). 
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Sub-central taxes on personal income (IRPEF - 
Imposta sul reddito delle persone fisiche) were 
equivalent to 10% of sub-central revenue (1.5% of 
GDP). Regional and municipal income surtaxes 
are levied on top of the national income tax, using 
the same tax base. The regional income surtax in 
2010 stood at 0.9%, but the regions can increase it 
to 1.4%. Regions running substantial financial 
deficits on health care provision have been 
authorised to increase their surtax to 1.7%. The 
December 2011 package increased the basic rate of 
regional income tax from 0.9% to 1.23% as from 
the 2011 tax year. The maximum municipal 
income surtax rate is 0.8%, although the rate is 
automatically increased by 0.3% for municipalities 
in breach of "stability pact" provisions.  
Taxation on property (ICI – Imposta Comunale 
sugli Immobili) accounted for less than 5% of sub-
central revenue (0.5% of GDP) in 2009, with the 
intakes accruing to municipalities. The tax base is 
based on so-called cadastral values of property, 
which are official reference values that take into 
account property specificities but which are well 
below market values. The importance of property 
taxation for financing the activities of 
municipalities is expected to increase substantially 
starting from the current year, especially with the 
widening of the property tax base to include homes 
of first residence.  
4. Fiscal rules 
Fiscal relations between the central and sub-central 
governments have been regulated over the past 
decade through a domestic stability pact (DSP) 
and, for spending on health services, a health pact. 
The entry into force of fiscal federalism's 
permanent provisions will make both pacts 
unnecessary; however, they will remain in place in 
the current long transition period. 
4.1 Domestic Stability Pact  
A Domestic Stability Pact (DSP) was introduced 
for the first time in the budget law for 1999 to 
improve the governance of fiscal relations between 
the central and sub-central governments. The DSP 
rules, which are established each year by the 
budget law, set annual constraints on expenditure 
and/or the budget balance of the sub-central 
governments. The rules changed substantially over 
time, in part reflecting successive attempts to 
correct identified weaknesses in rules set in 
preceding years. Although enforcement 
mechanisms have been strengthened, the frequent 
changes in the DSP targets and coverage have 
reduced the effectiveness of the DSP as a tool for 
the central government to ensure budgetary 
discipline at local level and as a mechanism for 
expenditure planning by sub-central governments. 
Initially, regions and local governments respected 
 
Table IV.A1.1: Subnational government competencies in Italy following the 2001 constitutional reform 
Municipalities Provinces Regions
Social housing Road network maintenance Health
Town planning Transport Health centres and hospitals
Aid to the disabled and other social
services
Secondary schools (construction of
buildings)
Vocational training
Local public transport
Environment including protection and
improvement of the energy resources
Culture
Road network maintenance Cultural heritage Town planning
Local police Household waste and sewage
Road networks, civil engineering and
regional railway transport
Pre-primary (all), primary and vocational
schools (building construction and
maintenance)
Management of employment services and
subsidies 
Agriculture
Culture Vocational teaching Environment
Sport Economic development
Country side planning and economic
development
Sewage and waste disposal
Management of employment services and
subsidies
Social services
Upkeep of pharmacies in rural areas Education  
Source: ISAE. 
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the DSP rules, but the high degree of compliance 
was primarily the result of the relatively 
unambitious constraints set by the rules. Regional 
and other local administrations in breach of the 
DSP must increase regional/local surtax rates. In 
case of serious and protracted breach, the central 
government can replace locally elected 
administrators with centrally appointed 
commissioners.  
As from 2012, sub-central governments have to 
provide a significant contribution to the national 
consolidation effort, by around 0.4% of GDP per 
year. This will be shared among them also 
according to a system based on "virtuosity", 
namely the respect of previous years' DSPs, and 
pending the identification of essential service 
levels and their standard cost.  
4.2 Health Pact 
The Health Pact is a separate fiscal mechanism 
governing regional government's health-related 
spending. The Pact, which is updated every three 
years, sets limits to current and capital expenditure 
for health care by region. Sanctions apply to 
regions exceeding their limit: local tax shares are 
increased, citizens' contributions to costs are 
raised, and/or administrative sanctions (including 
the dismissal of administrators) are imposed. Still, 
over the last decade, annual health expenditure 
exceeded its funding by around 0.3 pp. of GDP per 
year on average. The health pact also incorporates 
specific caps on the share of pharmaceutical 
expenditure in total health expenditure, with the 
purpose of encouraging savings both through 
tougher price negotiations with suppliers and the 
wider use of generic drugs. 
5. Design of a new institutional set-up  
5.1 The 2009 framework law on fiscal 
federalism  
The implementation of the Constitutional 
provisions granting greater financial 
responsibilities to sub-central authorities requires 
enabling legislation. Postponement of the adoption 
of such legislation sustained a system where the 
funding of subnational government expenditure 
remains highly dependent on transfers from the 
centre. A crucial step was taken in May 2009, with 
the adoption of a framework law setting down 
broad guidelines to support the transition towards a 
more complete federal fiscal structure by 2017. 
The law, however, still required the central 
government to adopt, in agreement with the 
subnational governments, enacting decrees in order 
to specify the rules governing fiscal federalism. To 
date, eight decrees have been adopted by 
government and approved in Parliament, including 
on the definition of essential financing needs and 
standard costs for sub-regional authorities 
(November 2010), the role of municipalities in tax 
assessments (March 2011), allocation of additional 
financial resources to less prosperous areas (May 
2011), standard costs and financial needs for health 
care provision (May 2011), and sanctioning and 
reward mechanisms (September 2011). This 
Section describes the fiscal federalism set up that 
is expected to take place over the next few years as 
a result of the 2009 framework law and subsequent 
legislation.   
The most innovative and important principle 
established in the 2009 framework law consists in 
the introduction of the so called “standard cost” 
criterion in place of the “historical expenditure” 
criterion used so far to determine the costs 
necessary to the pursuit of the functions entrusted 
to the territorial bodies. Standards of quality and 
efficiency are to be adopted in establishing proper 
unit costs and service provision methods and 
procedures. Subnational governments providing 
essential services at a higher cost, or offering more 
services that those identified as standard needs of 
the population have to raise additional sources of 
financing. Another key principle is the 
introduction of equalisation transfers redistributing 
revenue across subnational governments. These 
transfers will partially compensate for differences 
in fiscal capacity, as measured assuming identical 
tax rates, so as to bridge the financing gap in 
providing essential services.  
The main sources of financing for regions will 
continue to be the regional tax on productive 
activity (IRAP), part of the revenue from VAT, 
and the surcharge on the personal income tax. 
Regions will be able to increase the latter by up to 
0.5 pp. in 2013, 1.1 pp. (cumulative) by 2014 and 
2.1 pp. as from 2015. An equalizing fund will 
transfer resources to regions with lower fiscal 
capacity.  
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The decree law on municipal fiscal federalism sets 
up a temporary experimental re-balancing fund 
("Fondo sperimentale di riequilibrio") to 
aggregate all the proceeds that are intended to 
replace permanent and general transfers from other 
administrations, namely: 30% of the recurrent 
taxes raised on real estate property part of the 
resources coming from a new tax on property 
leasing (21.6% from 2012 onwards), and a share in 
VAT revenues. The aim of this fund, which will 
cease to operate after 2013, is to ensure a gradual 
and geographically-balanced devolution to 
municipalities of real estate taxation. In a second 
and final phase, which was originally planned to 
get underway in 2014, existing taxes are planned 
to be replaced by two new forms of municipal 
taxes: (i) a municipal tax on real property (unified 
municipal tax IMU) that would combine the 
current ICI tax and the part of personal income tax 
(IRPEF) payable on property income; (ii) a 
secondary municipal tax on the occupancy of state 
property.  
In December 2011, the Italian government brought 
forward to 2012 the introduction of the unified 
municipal tax (IMU) and extended it to owner-
occupied dwellings (homes of first residence) that 
had been excluded from taxation in 2008. Part of 
the receipts from IMU will be initially assigned to 
the central government. The government also 
announced plans for a substantial revision to the 
cadastral property valuation register, which is the 
tax base of IMU. 
Although several enacting decrees specifying the 
rules governing fiscal federalism have been 
adopted in 2010 and 2011, crucial details are still 
to be determined through administrative acts. 
Chief among them are the revenue sharing 
mechanism and the definition of essential levels of 
services and their standard costs. They will have to 
be defined by 2016, with fiscal federalism 
expected to enter into full force by the end of 
2017. 
5.2 Constitutional amendments establishing 
balanced budgets principle 
On 15 December 2011, the Italian parliament 
approved a bill introducing a balanced budget rule 
in the Italian Constitution. The amendments 
approved by parliament as part of this process 
included changes to Article 119 that establish the 
financial autonomy of subnational governments. 
The amending provisions introduce the principle 
that subnational governments must balance 
revenue and expenditure in their budgets. The 
Constitutional amendment also retains the existing 
possibility for subnational governments to resort to 
indebtedness to fund investments, but under the 
condition that the aggregate budget of all sub-
central governments within a region must be in 
balance. The key to the success of this new 
provision to contribute to the achievement of a 
balanced budget for the whole general government 
will hinge on enforcement mechanisms for 
execution. Effective ordinary legislation will need 
to be designed, specifying the balance to be 
considered, modalities of application (e.g. on 
cyclical conditions) and appropriate correction 
mechanisms, as required by the fiscal compact. 
The Council issued country-specific 
recommendations to Italy with respect to 
subnational governments (see Box I.3.2 above). 
A1.12. CYPRUS 
1. General description 
Cyprus became an independent republic on the 
16th August 1960. It is a member of the United 
Nations, the Council of Europe, the 
Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement. 
According to the above treaty, Britain retains two 
Sovereign Bases (158.5 sq. km) on the island, at 
Dekeleia and Akrotiri-Episkopi. 
 
Administrative districts 
Cyprus is divided into six administrative districts 
(eparcheies). These are: Nicosia, Limassol, Pafos, 
Larnaka, (in the government-controlled areas) and 
Famagusta and Keryneia (in the occupied areas). 
Each District is headed by a District Officer 
(eparchos) who is essentially the local 
representative or extended arm of the government. 
The District Officer acts as the chief-coordinator 
of the activities of all Ministries in the District. 
District Officers are answerable to the Ministry of 
the Interior, which is headed by a Permanent 
Secretary as chief administrator. 
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Local authorities 
Municipalities and Communes are the two types of 
local authorities and are governed by separate 
laws. In principle, Municipalities constitute the 
form of local government in urban and tourist 
centres while communities constitute the local 
structure in rural areas. 33 municipalities 
(dimarchia) account for about 60 per cent of the 
population, while 353 communes (koinotita) cover 
the rest of the population. The functions of 
Municipalities are determined by the 
Municipalities' Law of 1985. Their finances derive 
from municipal taxes, fees and duties as well as 
state subsidies. 
In October 1985, a new comprehensive law on 
local government, the Municipalities' Law 111 of 
1985, was passed by the House of Representatives. 
This Law has since been amended by 25 amending 
Laws. In addition to the six principal (Nicosia, 
Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, Paphos and 
Kyrenia) and nine rural communities, the Law 
provided for the establishment of new 
municipalities. According to this Law, any 
commune may become a municipality by local 
referendum, subject to the approval of the Council 
of Ministers, provided it has either a population of 
more than 5,000 or has the economic resources to 
function as a municipality. Eleven new 
municipalities were established in 1986, five in 
1994 and one more in 1996, increasing the number 
to thirty-three. 
Mayors are elected directly by the citizens on a 
separate ballot, for a term of five years and are the 
executive authority of the municipalities. The 
Mayor represents the municipality in a court of 
Law and before any state authority, and presides 
over all Council meetings, Administrative 
Committee meetings and any other municipal 
committee. He executes the Council's decisions 
and heads all municipal services which he directs 
and supervises. 
Municipal councils, which are the policy-making 
bodies of the municipalities, are elected directly by 
the citizens for a term of five years, but separately 
from the Mayor. The Council appoints the 
members of the Administrative Committee. The 
latter's duties include the preparation of the 
municipality's budgets and annual financial 
statements, the provision of assistance and advice 
to the Mayor in the execution of his duties, 
coordination of the work of other committees 
appointed by the Council and the carrying out of 
any other duties entrusted to it by the Council or 
the Mayor. The Council may also set up ad-hoc or 
standing committees which have an advisory role. 
 
According to the law, the main responsibilities of 
municipalities are the construction, maintenance 
and lighting of streets, the collection, disposal and 
treatment of waste, the protection and 
improvement of the environment and the good 
appearance of the municipal areas, the 
construction, development and maintenance of 
municipal gardens and parks and the protection of 
public health. The Municipal Council has the 
authority to promote, depending on its finances, a 
vast range of activities and events including the 
arts, education, sport and social services. In 
addition to the Municipalities Law, there are 
several laws giving municipalities' important 
powers other than those already mentioned. Such 
laws are the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, 
the Town Planning Law, the Civil Marriages Law 
and the Sewerage Systems Law. 
2. Local government finances  
The main sources of revenue of municipalities are 
municipal taxes, fees and duties (professional tax, 
immovable property tax, hotel accommodation tax, 
fees for issuing permits and licences, fees for 
refuse collection, fines etc.), as well as state 
subsidies. Taxes, duties and fees represent the 
major source of revenue while state grants and 
subsidies amount to only a small percentage of the 
income. The central government, however, usually 
finances major infrastructure projects undertaken 
by the municipalities, but this is dependent very 
much on each individual project. The yearly 
budgets of the municipalities are submitted to the 
Council of Ministers for approval and their 
accounts are audited annually by the Auditor 
General of the Republic. Municipal loans also need 
to be approved by the Council of Ministers. The 
following figures concerning municipalities 
finances are rough estimations and may vary 
among municipalities: 
Municipalities’ revenues mainly come from (i) 
government subsidies estimated to approximately 
40% of total revenues; taxes, licence fees and 
rights estimated to approximately 45% of total 
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revenues and; fines approximately to 5% of total 
revenues 
Municipalities' expenditure is mainly categorised 
into: (i) salaries and payments to pension schemes 
estimated to approximately 55%-65% of the total 
spending; (ii) utility works/maintenance 
approximately 15% of the total and; (iii) loan 
repayments to approximately 10%-15% of total 
spending. 
A1.13. LATVIA 
1. General description 
Latvia is a unitary country. Local self-government 
is only indirectly recognised in the Constitution via 
references in certain articles. 
A major territorial administrative reform took 
effect from July 2009, implementing a two-tier 
government structure, including the central 
government and local governments, the latter 
comprising 9 republican cities and 110 local 
municipalities. Before the reform, the government 
structure had three tiers and included over 500 
local government units, with districts being the 
intermediate level. As a result of the reform, 
 Most municipalities were amalgamated into 
larger ones, by forcing rural municipalities 
which did not have the scale and resources to 
efficiently provide public services under their 
competence, to merge with others. 
 Districts were abolished. 
To facilitate planning and resource management, 
the municipalities are furthermore integrated into 
five planning regions since 2003. These do not 
represent a separate governance tier but 
nevertheless play an important administrative role 
as an interface between state administration and 
local governments in preparing, co-ordinating and 
implementing regional development programmes, 
including those co-financed from the EU structural 
funds. Legally these regions have a status of 
derived public persons. The governing bodies of 
planning regions are elected by municipalities, 
while their operational costs are covered from the 
state budget.  
Main legal acts governing municipalities in Latvia 
are the Law on Self-governments (in force since 
1995), the Law on the Equalisation of Self-
government Finances (in force since 1998) and the 
Law on the Stabilisation of Self-government 
finances and the Monitoring of the Financial 
Activities of Self-governments (in force since 
1999). The territorial administrative reform was 
implemented on the basis of the Administrative-
Territorial Reform Law (in force since 2005). 
2. Government spending 
The main autonomous functions of local 
governments are the provision of utilities (water 
supply and sewerage, supply of heat, management 
of municipal waste, water management etc.); 
provision of education services (including pre-
school, primary and general secondary education, 
extracurricular training etc.); ensuring access to 
health care and promoting healthy lifestyle; 
maintaining public facilities (buildings, streets, 
roads, parks etc.); providing social assistance to 
poor and socially vulnerable persons; determining 
procedures for utilisation of public-use forests and 
waters; maintaining of cultural objects and 
preservation of traditions; performing civil status 
document registrations; issuing permits and 
licences for commercial activity and others.  
Total expenditure of local governments amounted 
to LVL 1,534 m in 2010, which formed 27% of 
general government expenditure (broadly 
corresponding to historical average) or 12% of 
GDP. 
Education is by far the largest expenditure 
category in local governments' budgets, 
representing ca 37% of their total expenditure in 
2010; local governments are responsible for 
delivering ca 70% of the overall education budget. 
The role of local governments in the provision of 
pre-school, primary and secondary education is, 
however, restricted to the implementing the 
education policy by establishing, reorganising and 
closing education institutions, while overall 
standards (i.e. requirements for educational 
institutions, level of qualification of teachers and 
their basic salaries etc.) are set by the central 
government. Following the implementation of the 
"money follows a pupil" principle from 2009, local 
governments receive transfers from the central 
government in accordance with the number of 
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children enrolled in schools and pre-school 
establishments on their territory , but they can 
supplement educational expenditure from own 
resources.  
The provision of healthcare services is organised at 
the level of the central government and direct 
involvement of local governments in health 
services provision is relatively limited. 
Nevertheless, municipalities can play an important 
role in ensuring the accessibility of healthcare 
services (e.g., organising transport for socially 
vulnerable patients to reach a health 
establishment), as well as by providing the 
necessary infrastructure and support services (e.g. 
rooms for general practitioners). Moreover, as 
most formal health establishments in Latvia are 
owned as limited liability companies either by 
state or by municipalities, the municipalities may 
be confronted with a need to cover operational 
losses of municipal hospitals. The healthcare 
related expenditure accounts for around 9% of 
municipalities' budgets.  
Municipalities have an almost exclusive 
competence with regard to the provision of 
housing and community amenities, which accounts 
for another 10% of their budgets' expenditure side. 
Moreover, provision of public transport services is 
another area where the local governments play an 
important role by organising urban public transport 
in cities and regional transport at the level of 
planning regions; this function is partly covered by 
earmarked transfers form the central government.  
With regard to the social sphere, the autonomous 
role of municipalities relates to the provision of 
social assistance to socially vulnerable citizens and 
groups; this function accounts for another 10% of 
municipal expenditure (while social insurance and 
categorical social benefits are financed 
respectively by the Social Insurance Agency and 
the Ministry of Welfare). While legal minimum 
requirements governing the provision of social 
assistance are set in the law, the financing for the 
social assistance function of local governments is 
not allocated from the central budget(
266
) and its 
                                                          
(266) Except in 2009-2012 when the provision of Guaranteed 
Minimum Income (GMI) was 50% co-financed and the 
provision of housing benefits 20% co-financed from the 
state budget under the Emergency Social Safety Net 
Strategy. 
financing remains the responsibility of local 
governments. 
Overall, local governments in Latvia play an 
important role in ensuring that state's basic 
functions are delivered to citizens according to 
appropriate standards, from the provision of basic 
infrastructure and transport services to social 
assistance and the provision of preschool, primary 
and secondary education. However, only part of 
the financing for implementing these functions is 
provided from the central government budget. 
3. Financial arrangements 
Local governments in Latvia do not have own-
source taxes. The financing mainly comes from 
shared taxes (56% of total revenue of local 
governments in 2010) and grants from the central 
government (36% of total revenue in 2010). 
Furthermore, within the local governments' sector 
there is a mechanism for redistributing revenue 
between richer and poorer municipalities. 
Shared taxes include: 
 The Personal Income Tax, which is the most 
important tax revenue source for municipalities 
(representing close to 50% of overall revenue 
and over 85% of tax revenue of local 
governments). The overall tax rate, base and 
sharing formula of the PIT are however defined 
by the central government and these parameters 
have been frequently changed in the recent 
past. Thus, until 2009 the personal income tax 
rate was set at a flat rate of 25 %, while the 
share of local governments in the overall PIT 
revenue was gradually increasing from 71.6% 
in 2005 to 83% in 2009. However, the flat rate 
was lowered to 23% in 2010, increased to 26% 
2011 and lowered again to 25% in 2011, while 
the share of local governments was first 
lowered to 80% in 2010, then increased to 82% 
in 2011 and lowered again to 80% in 2012. 
These frequent changes create an unstable 
planning environment for local governments; 
moreover, the tax revenue itself is rather 
volatile, making local governments' revenue 
base highly cycle-sensitive. However, the fact 
that local governments receive their share 
based on forecasted rather than actual tax 
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collection, adds some predictability for local 
governments. 
 The real estate and land tax (representing 7% 
of local governments' total revenue and 12% of 
tax revenue in 2010). Municipalities receive 
100% of the receipts from this tax, although 
currently they have no leeway over the tax rate 
or base; however, according to current plans 
local governments will receive considerable 
flexibility in application of the real estate and 
land tax rates from 2013. 
 Other taxes include ca ¼ of gambling tax and 
below half of the natural resources tax 
collected at the level of the general 
government; these taxes together represented 
0.5% of local governments' total revenue and 
1% of tax revenue in 2010. In particular the 
natural resource tax has a potential to become 
more prominent revenue source in the future. 
 Other sources of own non-tax revenue are 
formed by self-earned revenue (e.g. payments 
for services), non-tax revenue (e.g. property 
income) and to a marginal extent donations. 
These other sources accounted for 9% of total 
revenue of local governments in 2010. 
Grants from the central government formed ca 
35% of total revenue of local governments in 
recent years. All these grants are earmarked; they 
cover education expenditures (i.e. teachers' salaries 
and education activities) as the biggest category, 
road maintenance (via the Road Fund), investment 
projects and other.    
In addition to own revenue and earmarked grants 
from the central government, there is a mechanism 
for re-distribution of revenue through the Local 
Government Finance Equalisation Fund (LGFEF), 
with the aim to ensure availability of sufficient 
resources also for regions with lower tax base. The 
fund is mainly financed by municipalities with 
more solid revenue base (in particular the city of 
Riga) and, to a much lesser extent, by the central 
government. According to the law, its total 
envelope is decided annually via negotiations 
between the central government and the Latvian 
association of local and regional governments. The 
redistribution formula is based on expenditure 
need, i.e. the minimal amount required to carry out 
municipal tasks, calculated based on demographic 
and other criteria, and on revenue equalisation, so 
that municipalities with tax revenue from PIT and 
real estate tax which exceeds by 10% or more their 
calculated expenditure needs have to contribute to 
the Fund. Most municipalities are net receivers 
from the LGFEF. 
Overall, while the local governments are free to 
attribute non-earmarked revenue sources (which 
form approximately two-thirds of total revenue) 
across expenditure categories – including to top up 
earmarked grants – several minimum requirements 
for the provision of services are set in legislation, 
thus limiting notably the discretion of local 
governments and possibly creating disparities in 
the standard of provision of various services across 
the municipalities. Most of the revenue sources of 
local governments have a marked cyclical nature, 
while the ability to raise own taxes currently does 
not exist (although a more flexible approach with 
regard to the real estate and land tax will be 
adopted from 2013). During years of fiscal 
consolidation in 2009-2012, local governments 
shared the burden of the adjustment, as their 
revenue sources (notably personal income tax) 
considerably declined both as a result of both 
cyclical developments and discretionary policy 
decisions, while expenditure pressures coming 
from social assistance needs increased. 
4. Fiscal rules 
The main fiscal rule applicable to local 
governments is a debt rule, which targets 
stabilisation of local governments' debt level in 
nominal terms and thus acts as a de fact budget 
balance rule. According to the legislation, annual 
debt servicing by a municipality should not exceed 
20% of its local tax revenue. The borrowing and 
issuing of guarantees by municipalities is 
constrained by the central government on an 
annual basis, with aggregate borrowing and 
guarantees limits being negotiated between 
municipalities and the central government and 
these limits included in the annual budget law. 
During the budgetary year, the municipalities are 
allowed to take loans and to provide loan 
guaranties only within these limits. Furthermore, 
regarding each individual loan within the limit, the 
municipalities must consult the Board monitoring 
and supervising municipal loans and loan 
guaranties, which involves officials of the ministry 
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of finance. Such permissions are granted only for 
financing of investment projects – and in more 
recent years only for investments co-financed from 
EU structural funds – thus imitating the "golden 
rule". The rule has been in place since 1994 and 
generally respected, thus contributing to limiting 
the expenditure growth and nominal debt levels of 
local governments. The gross debt of local 
governments amounted to 6.4% of GDP as of end-
2010.  
Given the considerable volatility of local 
governments' revenue and restrictive borrowing 
regulation, several municipalities use 
precautionary savings; as of end-2010 accumulated 
liquid assets of local governments amounted to 
2.4% of GDP. 
In case of intra-year financial difficulties, short-
term borrowing is allowed only to cover a short-
term deficit and has to be repaid within a year. The 
main lender of local governments is the State 
Treasury, although few bigger municipalities have 
loans from financial institutions; loans taken from 
another institution need to be authorised by the 
minister of finance. The Treasury can impose 
sanctions to local governments if they do not 
comply with repayment obligations. Municipalities 
in financial difficulties, as stipulated by law, are 
required to prepare and implement a financial 
stabilisation plan under a supervisor appointed by 
the minister of finance. Currently only one 
municipality is under the financial supervision 
procedure, although the number was considerably 
higher before the implementation of the territorial 
reform. 
As a result of the debt rule and other financial 
requirements applicable to municipalities, their 
fiscal position has been overall sound in recent 
years and their debt level is modest. Given the 
involvement of central government in setting 
borrowing limits and borrowing procedures for 
municipalities, it is unlikely that local governments 
can pose a serious threat to meeting fiscal targets 
at the general government level, although 
expenditure of local governments financed from 
previously accumulated reserves falls outside the 
control of the central government. Before the 
2009-2010 crisis local governments (similarly to 
the central government) contributed to the 
loosening of the fiscal position of Latvia by 
spending large part of the windfall revenue, 
although some municipalities did accumulate 
precautionary reserves. While at the level of the 
central government the envisaged Fiscal Discipline 
Law is expected to substantially improve the 
counter-cyclical nature of fiscal policy making, no 
particular changes are foreseen at the level of 
municipalities. 
A1.14. LITHUANIA 
1. General description 
Lithuania is a unitary country. The government 
structure has three tiers, with 10 counties being the 
intermediate level. There are 60 local governments 
whose self-governing right is secured by the 
Constitution and other laws.  
The development and operation of local 
governments are legally defined in the Constitution 
of the Republic of Lithuania and in the Law on 
Local Self-government. The Constitution grants 
administrative units the right to free and 
independent governance within the limits of their 
competence, implemented through local 
government councils. Members of local 
government councils are elected for three-year 
terms in direct elections. Law establishes that local 
government councils have the right to form 
executive bodies for the direct implementation of 
laws and the decisions of the government and local 
government council.  
The Constitution gives local governments the right 
to draft and approve their own budgets, to establish 
local duties and to levy taxes and duties. Local 
governments also must have a reliable financial 
basis. According to the Law on Methodology for 
the Establishment of Local Government Budgetary 
Revenues, part of the personal income tax income 
is ascribed to the local government budget.  
In the Law on Local Government, local authority 
functions are strictly defined and according to 
decision making freedom they are divided into: (i) 
independent, (ii) ascribed (insufficiently 
independent), (iii) state (relegated by the state to 
municipalities for execution), and (iv) 
conventional. The Laws on Budget Structure and 
on Local Government define their financial 
resources that could be split into tax and non-tax 
income and state budget transfers. Local 
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authorities may also use bank credits, take and 
give loans in the order established by law. All 
financial resources of local authorities are included 
in local government budgets which according to 
the Constitution and the Law on Budget Structure 
are independent. Independent municipal functions 
are financed at most by tax and non-tax income of 
local governments. Execution of state and a part of 
ascribed functions as well as projects of the 
Parliament and Government are financed by 
transfers from the state budget of special purpose. 
The local government expenditure and revenue are 
around 25-30% of total general government 
expenditure and revenue and these make around 
10% of GDP.  
2. Government spending 
Local governments are charged with providing 
services in the fields of education, social security, 
health care, culture and leisure and communal 
economy. 
 In the field of education local governments 
establish, reorganize and abolish primary and 
secondary schools, as well as appoint and 
dismiss, with the approval of the Ministry of 
Education and the county governor, the heads 
of these institutions. They also approve the 
regulations of educational institutions, ensure 
their functioning and maintenance, administer 
the registration of children under the age of 
sixteen and organize transport to school for 
children in remote areas. 
 The functions of local governments concerning 
social security focus on providing social 
services and benefits. Local governments may 
also engage in social care if they have adequate 
material resources. Generally local 
governments establish, reorganize and abolish 
local government institutions in charge of 
social services and regulate the activities of 
social service providers. Local governments 
also collect and analyse data on persons who 
are in need of social support, administer their 
registration and establish the scope and 
methods of assistance. 
 Concerning health care, local governments 
manage primary health care centres, clinics and 
ambulance services, centres of psychological 
health and a number of other public health 
institutions. Local governments also organize 
health control. 
 In the field of culture and leisure local 
governments manage libraries, museums, 
cinemas, theatres and other cultural 
establishments. Since such institutions may be 
subordinate to various central, regional and 
municipal organs, local governments are 
responsible only for those that they establish. 
However, they may not reorganize or abolish 
such institutions without the permission of the 
Ministry of Culture. 
 Concerning economic issues, local government 
services provide communal services such as 
water, gas, electricity and heating supply; 
waste collection and treatment; and 
administration of engineering networks. These 
services may be provided by state and local 
government enterprises, joint-stock companies, 
private and non-profit companies. Local 
governments also address public transport, 
construction and maintenance of local roads 
and various construction projects. 
There are no specific legal restrictions on the 
privatisation of local services, but local 
governments manage a number of companies 
specifically designated for such service provision 
that would not be able to function without local 
government support. Local governments have the 
right to privatise up to 30% of their shares in such 
companies. 
3. Financial arrangements  
The National budget is comprised of the state 
budget and of independent budgets of local 
authorities. The latter have to be balanced.  
The process of designing budgets of local 
authorities is regulated mainly by the Law of the 
Budget Structure and the Law of the Methods for 
Determining Local Authority Budged Income and 
Government decision. Designing their budgets, the 
local authorities must observe the financial indices 
for local authorities' budgets approved by the 
Parliament. The local authorities have to approve 
their budgets no later than in two months after 
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approval of financial indicators of the state and 
local authorities' budgets. Thus, rather strict time 
limits are set for local authorities to adjust and 
coordinate financial indicators of their budgets 
with those approved by the Parliament. If a local 
authority fails to confirm its budget before the end 
of the budgetary year, then in the following year its 
activities are limited and it is allowed only to 
pursue existing obligations (i.e. not allowed to take 
new obligations) and to serve debt until the budget 
is approved. Resources allocated to that purpose 
cannot exceed 1/12 of the last year’s budget per 
month (until the budget is approved). Because a 
fortnight is likely to be short to adopt the budgets 
of the local government (following the adoption of 
the financial indicators by the Parliament, probably 
there are only two weeks left before the end of the 
year, see above), execution of the functions of the 
local authorities might be limited until the budgets 
are adopted(
267
). Following the requirements of the 
law, a local authority has to submit to the Ministry 
of finance not only approved budgets, but also the 
estimate of the privatisation fund. 
Lithuanian legal acts set the following kinds of 
budget receipts for local authorities: 
 Tax revenue, comprised of taxes assigned to 
local authorities and part of common taxes set 
by law. 
 Non-tax revenue received from the property of 
a local authority, local levies, fines, and other 
non-tax sources. 
 Transfers from the state budget, allotted for 
equalising the differences of income and 
expenditure among local authorities and for 
performing the functions relegated by the state. 
Tax revenue includes following different taxes: (i) 
part of personal income tax, after mandatory health 
insurance deduction, (ii) land tax, (iii) tax on 
renting state land and use of state water reservoirs 
for commercial or amateur fishing, (iv) tax on real 
estate of enterprises and organizations, (v) stamp 
duties, (vi) tax on the use of marketplaces, (vii) 
                                                          
(267) Essentially, this implies that the local authorities may not 
manage to approve their budgets by the end of the year and 
hence their functions and budgetary means might be 
limited for a few weeks or months in the following year 
until their budgets are approved. 
inheritance and donations tax and (vii) other minor 
taxes established by law. 
Non-tax revenues include (i) revenues received 
from municipal property, (ii) fines and revenues 
from the sequestration of property, (iii) local 
duties, (iv) revenue from the services of local 
government budgetary institutions, (v) interest on 
funds in current accounts, (vi) revenue from non-
agricultural state land leasing or sales in 
accordance with established procedures, and (vii) 
other non-tax revenues established by law. 
The local government can set the level of the tax 
on income from economic activities requiring a 
business certificate and on related charges, the 
level of the real estate tax, within the limits set by 
the Law on Immovable property, and rates of the 
taxes for the state land lease within the limits set 
by laws or decisions of the Government. In other 
cases (i.e. for the remaining taxes) the local 
government can reduce the rate of the tax or grant 
an exemption from it and cover the financial losses 
from its budget. The local government has no 
freedom of imposing taxes on personal income of 
residents, on pollution of the environment and on 
natural resources of the state. 
Transfers from the state budget are either general 
or earmarked. The allocation from the state budget 
are regulated by the Law of the on the 
Methodology of Municipal Budget Income 
Estimation. The general transfers are for creation 
of reserves for unforeseen expenses during the 
planned budgetary year, for the equalization of tax-
related revenues and for the equalization of 
structural differences in expenditures caused by 
objective factors that do not depend on local 
government activities. The earmarked transfers are 
allocated to perform state functions prescribed to 
municipalities and implement programs approved 
by the Parliament and the Government. Amounts 
of transfers are approved by the Law on State and 
Municipality Budget Financial Indices of the 
corresponding budgetary year, based on rules set 
by the Government. These transfers are related to 
very clear functions to be performed by the local 
government assigned by different ministries and 
the needs are calculated according to approved 
methodology. Since 2009, if these funds are not 
used for purpose of a specific function they have to 
be returned back to the state budget at the end of 
the budget year.  
Part IV 
Fiscal decentralisation in the EU - main characteristics and implications for fiscal outcomes 
 
265 
According to the Law on Charges municipal 
councils have the right to determine eleven types 
of local charges. Income from local charges 
comprises only 1% of all the municipal budget 
revenue. In accordance with the Law of Charges, 
the local council has a right to set local charges in 
its territory for giving permissions. The council of 
a local government makes its own decision on 
local charges and approves the rules. A local 
government may index the size of charge once a 
year, in case the annual price index of 
commodities is larger than 1.1.  
As mentioned above, budgets of local authorities 
have to be formed without deficit, i.e., expenditure 
should not exceed revenues. Local authority is 
under an obligation, set by law, to undertake 
functions committed to them. Appropriations for 
local authorities can be used only to carry out the 
state functions devolved by law to local authorities 
as well as to pursue the programmes approved of 
the common councils. 
However, local authorities are also permitted to 
raise short-term and long-term domestic and 
foreign loans if they fail to balance their budget, 
according to the decision by the Government. 
Concerning borrowing rules for local governments, 
borrowing can be permitted only for following 
purposes: 
 Take long-term domestic and foreign loans to 
finance investment projects, to buy movable 
and immovable properties, to cover debts; 
 Take short-term domestic and foreign loans to 
cover a temporary income shortfall in a fiscal 
year, if committed budgetary means are 
insufficient; 
 Provide guarantees for loans to companies 
controlled by the municipality used to finance 
investment projects. 
Borrowing limits are set annually and approved by 
the Parliament in the Law on State and Local 
Government Budgets. 2012 budget law sets 
borrowing limits for local authorities as following: 
 The debt of municipalities, with the exception 
of Vilnius city municipality, cannot exceed 
70% of the approved 2012 municipal budget 
revenues (excluding state grants of special 
purposes). For Vilnius city municipality debt 
cannot exceed 120% of the approved 2012 
municipal budget revenues (excluding state 
grants of special purposes), at least 30% of it 
can only be related with payments for arrears in 
services provided until 31 December 2011. 
 The municipality's annual net borrowing shall 
not exceed 20% (the Vilnius city municipality 
– 35%) of approved 2012 municipal budget 
revenues (excluding state grants of special 
purposes); 
 Loans to be repaid in 2012 and subsequent 
years and interest to be paid may not exceed 
15% of the approved municipal budget 
revenues (excluding state grants of special 
purposes); 
 Guarantees provided by the municipal may not 
exceed 10% of the approved 2012 municipal 
budget revenues (excluding state grants of 
special purposes). 
 According to 2012 budget law, municipalities 
(except Vilnius) with a debt of more than 45% 
of the approved 2012 municipal budget 
revenues (excluding state grants of special 
purposes) in 2012 can borrow only for 
implementation of projects co-financed by the 
EU and other international financial support. 
Vilnius city municipality can borrow only to 
cover the payments for services provided until 
31 December 2011 and the implementation of 
projects funded by the EU and other 
international donors. 
Local authorities have to inform the Ministry of 
Finance about undertaken borrowing and provided 
guarantees according to the rules defined by the 
Ministry.  
According the Law on Local Self-government, a 
controller elected by the local council supervises 
the use of municipal budgetary funds and the 
legitimacy, suitability and effectiveness of the 
municipal property use and state property entrusted 
to the local authority. The main problem seems to 
be the lack of independence from the local 
government council as the council may dismiss the 
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controller by a majority vote on proposal of at least 
one-third of the councillors.  
The State Audit Office, which is subordinated to 
the Parliament, supervises the legal and effective 
use of state property, the fulfilment of the state 
budget and financial discipline of state institutions. 
While performing its functions concerning local 
self-governments, the State Audit Office 
determines if local authorities are using state funds 
appropriately and efficiently and, if necessary, 
evaluates municipal budget performance and the 
economic and financial activities of municipal 
offices and enterprises. 
4. Fiscal rules 
Until 2011, the main fiscal rule concerning the 
local government budget was a balanced budget 
rule, which requested that the approved local 
budget has to be balanced as defined by the Law 
on Budget Structure. However, as the local 
authorities might receive additional revenue than 
planned in the budget and also use borrowed funds 
(for limited purposes as described above), 
budgetary outturn might result in a deficit. 
Therefore, the Law was amended in 2010. 
Currently, the Law states that the approved deficit 
of the municipal budget must not exceed the 
planned borrowing (within the approved 
borrowing limits set by the Law on State and Local 
Government Budgets) for financing of investment 
projects. To ensure that local government does not 
borrow more than set in the limits, the Government 
representative participates in the council meetings 
and ensures supervision before the local 
government makes a decision for additional 
spending. However, there are no official sanctions 
set in legislation. 
Therefore, the main fiscal rule applicable to local 
governments is a debt rule, which targets 
stabilisation of local governments' debt level in 
nominal terms. Annually the Law on State and 
Local Government Budgets sets clear limits for 
additional long-term borrowing, debt servicing 
(shall not exceed 15% of its budget revenue) and 
guarantees issued by municipalities. During the 
budgetary year, the municipalities are allowed to 
take loans and to provide loan guaranties only 
within these limits. The gross debt of local 
governments increased somewhat from 1.3% of 
GDP in 2008 to 1.8% of GDP in 2011 but 
remained limited compared to the general 
government debt of around 40% of GDP. 
Municipalities can take long-term loans for 
investment purposes only; short-term loans are 
only to cover temporary revenue shortfalls. 
A1.15. LUXEMBOURG 
1. General description 
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is a unitary 
state. Luxembourg's 106 municipalities 
(communes) are the only tier of subnational 
government. Their autonomy is anchored in the 
Constitution(
268
). Communes have mandatory 
responsibilities defined by the Constitution or 
delegated by laws related to spatial planning, 
enforcement of public order and safety, 
organization of nursery and primary school 
education and supply of public utilities and 
networks (local road network, drinking water 
distribution, sewerage, waste collection and 
disposal, cemeteries,…). In addition, communes 
have optional responsibilities such as providing 
infrastructure for sports, culture, tourism, health 
care or public transport. In order to increase 
efficiency, communes are allowed to form legal 
associations ('syndicats de communes') to fulfil 
certain services jointly. A territorial reorganisation 
of the communes is on-going in order to increase 
quality and efficiency of services. 
Municipalities are allowed to impose communal 
taxes after approval by the central government. 
Total expenditure of local governments amounted 
to EUR 2283.9 million in 2011, which represents 
12.7 % of general government expenditure and 5.2 
% of GDP. In 2011, local government realized a 
consolidated surplus of EUR 50 mio (0.12% of 
GDP). Gross debt of local government amounted 
to around 975 million EUR or 2.3% of GDP. 
2. Government spending 
The main areas of spending of local government 
are education, general public services, economic 
affairs, recreation and culture, and environment 
                                                          
(268) Art. 107 of the Constitution: Communes form autonomous 
authorities, on a territorial basis, possessing legal 
personality and administrating through their institutions, 
their patrimony and own interests under central 
government control. 
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protection. The Minister of the Interior supervises 
municipal acts and can reject municipal budgets. 
For this administrative surveillance, the communes 
are grouped into three administrative districts 
(Luxembourg, Diekirch and Grevenmacher), each 
managed by a district commissioner appointed by 
the government. The City of Luxembourg falls 
outside these districts and reports directly to the 
Minister of the Interior.  
3. Financial arrangements 
Luxembourg communes receive an overall grant 
from the State via the communal financial 
endowment fund (Fonds communal de dotation 
financière or FCDF). The FCDF is funded by 
revenues from taxes on alcohol, 10% of VAT 
revenues, 20% of the motor vehicle taxes and by a 
budget line from the Ministry of the Interior. The 
yearly transfer from the fund to the communes is 
determined as the sum of 18% of personal income 
tax receipts, 10% of VAT receipts, and 20% of 
motor vehicle tax receipts, on top of a subsidy 
which is established on an annual basis. It 
amounted to EUR 740 million in 2010, 
representing one third of overall communal 
revenues. The amount is divided between 
communes in accordance with the municipality's 
surface and population. 
Beside this general grant from the FCDF, 
municipalities receive earmarked grants for 
specific purposes, such as musical education, 
nurseries and compensation of employees in the 
municipal administration. 
Local authorities have also limited availability to 
raise their own revenues via taxes. All municipal 
taxes, levies and fees must be approved by the 
municipal council and the central government. 
Most taxes are collected by the central 
government, and then transferred to local 
authorities. Total local government receipts from 
own taxes amounted to EUR 742 million in 2011, 
representing about 32% of their total revenue and 
around 6.7% of total general government tax 
revenue. 
The municipal business tax (impôt commercial 
communal or ICC) accounts for around one fourth 
of total revenues. This tax on local business profits 
is levied by the central administration for the 
benefit of municipalities. Municipalities are 
allowed to set the rate freely but the rates must be 
approved by the government. The municipalities 
are allowed to collect a property tax (impôt foncier 
or IF), which nowadays only represents a small 
share of their revenues (around 1.5%). 
Furthermore, a variety of other taxes exist 
(property transfer duty, gaming taxes, tourist tax, 
dog tax, etc) which constitute however only a 
minor share of overall municipal revenue. 
Municipalities have also some own revenues from 
the provisions of services (autres recettes propres 
des communes or ARP) such as drinking water 
supply, waste water treatment, waste collection, 
distribution of electricity and gas. Lastly they also 
get part of their revenue from own property.  
In addition, municipalities receive extra-ordinary 
revenues. The Ministry of the Interior allocates 
earmarked grants to municipalities and inter-
municipal groupings for basic utilities, constituting 
capital expenditure arising from the municipalities' 
mandatory missions. These grants are targeted 
towards the creation or expansion of schools, town 
halls, infrastructure for water supply, technical 
services and cemeteries. 
4. Fiscal rules 
The Interior Ministry is responsible for the 
budgetary surveillance of local authorities. 
According to the Communal Law, municipalities 
are not allowed to run an operating deficit. 
Investments can be financed by issuing debt if no 
other financing is possible or viable and only when 
a regular reimbursement of the annuities is ensured 
through the operation budget(
269
).  
A1.16. HUNGARY 
1. General description 
Fiscal governance in Hungary is characterised by a 
mixed, hybrid system with a decentralised 
structure, strong financial dependence on the 
centre and, until recently, broad local public 
service obligations. 
In 1990, after the change in the political regime, 
local communities (regardless of their size) were 
                                                          
(269) Art. 118 of the Loi communale of 13 Dec 1988 
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given the right for self-governance, which was also 
enshrined in the constitution. The intermediate 
layer of counties was kept but municipals were not 
subordinated to counties and thus their influence 
on local affairs was significantly reduced. This 
resulted in a very fragmented, decentralised 
structure with nearly 3200 municipalities and with 
an average population of around 3100. 
Municipalities enjoy a wide range of freedoms 
(independence, legislative power, right to levy 
taxes, etc.) but, at the same time, the 1990 Act on 
Local Governments (ALG) also delegated to the 
local level the delivery of a sizable part of public 
services. According to the COFOG classification, 
in 2010, 66% of government expenditure on 
education was carried out at the local level; this 
ratio stood at 37% for health, 44% for spending on 
recreation and culture, and 73.5% for 
environmental protection. Overall, local authorities 
are responsible for ¼ of total government 
expenditure. 
Thus, there are effectively two layers of public 
administration in Hungary: the central 
administration and the local governments of the 
municipalities. The rather small average size of the 
latter together with an extensive range of 
mandatory services makes the Hungarian system 
distinct from other unitary models, such as the 
Mediterranean-type system (small units, fewer 
responsibilities) or the Scandinavian-type system 
(larger units, wide range of competences). Some 
features, such as the 'multi-purpose micro-regional 
associations', were introduced to move towards a 
more balanced mix of size and competence at the 
local level. Also, the main role of the additional 
layer of counties has been to bundle together some 
of the public services (especially in the education 
sector) of small municipalities or parishes by 
taking over both their service obligation and the 
associated central transfers. Nevertheless, the 
apparent mismatch between the size of local units 
and their obligation in delivering public services 
has been a driving factor in the evolution of 
subnational fiscal governance in Hungary. 
Local governments also got a free-hand in 
managing their financial affairs. They had acquired 
the ownership of formerly state-owned local 
properties, received block grants and shared taxes 
from central government and were free to issue 
liabilities. However, the wide range of service 
obligations relative to the average size (and thus 
revenue raising capacity) of municipalities created 
a challenge in financing the activities of the local 
level. At the same time, the lack of fiscal space of 
the general government led to decreasing 
allocation of funds to municipalities, together with 
the increasing use of earmarking or ex post 
financing through reimbursement formulas. 
Local governments compensated shrinking fiscal 
transfers by a rundown of their wealth; initially 
through sales of assets and eventually through 
growing indebtedness. Ineffective regulations and 
the practice of central government to cover local 
deficits created the perception of a soft budget 
constraint and diminished incentives to fill the 
financing gap through raising local taxes. 
The Hungarian subnational fiscal governance 
system has become almost dysfunctional, with 
entities inadequate in size to deliver the wide range 
of obligatory services and lacking both the 
incentives and the institutions to ensure prudent 
financial management at the local level. However, 
the ALG being an organic law, little changes to the 
regulatory environment were possible until 
recently. The amended the ALG, which has come 
into force on 1 January 2012, has significantly 
reduced the range of obligatory services, especially 
in the education and health sectors. Moreover, a 
draft law on the establishment of administrative 
micro-regions ("járás") has been submitted to 
Parliament in late March 2012. The new regulation 
foresees that a number of public tasks will be 
carried out by these new districts (notably, 
permission for buildings, issuance of various IDs, 
etc). These efforts should bring the optimal size of 
local public service provision better aligned with 
the actual size of municipalities, reducing their 
reliance on vertical government transfers. 
However, the implications of the amended ALG on 
the functioning of intra-government transfers and 
on public financial management as whole are not 
yet known. 
2. Government spending 
The 1990 ALG assigned numerous service 
obligations to the local level. The compulsory 
responsibilities of local entities included education 
(up to secondary level), health (basic medical care, 
specialised health services and hospitals), social 
welfare, provision of local public utilities and 
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tourism. The overall expenditure of local 
governments reached to 12.7% of GDP in 2010, 
which is in line with the EU average of 12.2%. 
Spending in education is mainly covered by 
normative grants, whereas operational grants 
primarily contribute to healthcare services and 
public goods provision (e.g. public lightning, 
infrastructure). These grants from central 
government are, in effect, formula-based 
reimbursements of (part of) the expenditure by 
local authorities. Thus, unlike block grants, they de 
facto limit the municipalities' room for manoeuvre 
when it comes to reshuffling funds between the 
different expenditure items. Besides these funding 
constraints, the municipalities enjoy a substantial 
flexibility with respect to the quality of the service 
they provide. This has led to a significant 
dispersion in the quality of obligatory public 
services, especially in the health sector. 
Difficulties in funding and the cash-based 
accounting and budgeting system (in which the 
costs of the 'wear and tear' are not shown 
explicitly) led to an under-spending on fixed 
capital. Indeed, gross fixed capital formation in the 
first decade of the 2000s was only sufficient to 
cover amortisation; the former averaged at 1.8% 
and the latter at 1.7% of GDP. At the same time, in 
EU27 fixed capital investments of local 
governments amounted to 1.5% of GDP but it 
more than covered the consumption of capital 
which averaged at 1% of GDP. 
The recently amended ALG, in parallel to 
completely evacuating the county level activities, 
shifted to the central administration the duties 
related to secondary education and hospital 
services. This rearrangement of duties is expected 
to considerably alleviate the burden of local 
authorities and to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public services by leaving those 
tasks at the municipal level in which they are 
likely to be more competent than the state. 
3. Financial arrangements 
Revenues of local governments come from own 
resources, shared taxes, state transfers and other 
grants. Own-source revenues and grants from the 
central budget each cover around one third of total 
revenues. Shared taxes, investment grants 
(including EU grants) and grant-like revenues from 
other government entities (such as the Health 
Insurance Fund and the Labour Market Fund) 
make up the remaining one third. 
Local governments have the authority to levy local 
taxes, the most important of which is the business 
tax levied on gross corporate profits, covering 
more than 80% of all local taxes. Local authorities 
can decide on the tax rate (within the ceiling of 
2%) but revenues are effectively collected by the 
central tax authority. The vehicle tax (which was 
initially shared with the central budget) is collected 
the same way, but it amounts to only 7% of all 
own-source revenues. A similar amount is raised 
through the locally collected property tax (levied 
on buildings and land). 
Revenues from the personal income tax (PIT) are 
shared between the central and local levels through 
different channels. First, some of the PIT receipts 
used to be passed on to municipalities in the form 
of normative grants. However, starting from 
January 2012, all normative grants have been 
delinked from PIT, while maintaining their level; 
thereby reducing the cyclicality of state transfers. 
Second, 8% of PIT revenue is allocated to the 
municipalities based on the residence of the tax 
payer, representing 4% of total revenues of the 
local government level. Finally, the PIT is the 
source for the revenue equalising grant which is 
used to diminish the gap between municipalities 
stemming from their different fiscal capacity. 
Around ¾ of the transfers from the central budget 
are provided as normative grants. Investment 
grants, revenue equalising transfers and 
operational grants make up the remaining part. 
While only a small part of the normative grants are 
explicitly earmarked for specific purposes, general 
normative grants are also allocated to narrowly 
defined functions, mostly in the fields of 
education, social protection and culture. These 
transfers are in general based on expenditure needs 
rather than on actual output (also with a view to 
balance the financial disparities among 
municipalities), a feature that effectively 
discourages raising the efficiency or the quality of 
local public services. Moreover, the nearly 100 
normative titles and the more than 150 operational 
grants (prior to the recent reduction in obligatory 
services) also makes the system administratively 
very costly, while frequent changes in the formulas 
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increases uncertainty and hinders medium-term 
planning. 
The equalisation system for local governments 
includes adjustments to the normative grants, a 
designated equalising transfer and a mandatory 
deficit grant. The latter was designed to cover the 
deficits that the municipalities encounter for no 
fault of their own. While deficit grants are used 
extensively (roughly one third of local 
governments received a mandatory deficit grant 
and even more received a discretionary deficit 
grant) the amount so distributed has remained 
limited (less than 0.1% of GDP). 
To summarise, local governments enjoy – by 
design – a great deal of autonomy; however, the 
mix of local public services is determined to a 
large extent by their financial ties with central 
budget. At the same time, the intra-governmental 
financial system is overly complicated and without 
a clear relationship between different instruments 
and their policy purposes (e.g. the equalisation 
system). Hence, this government structure is not 
conducive to raising the efficiency and quality of 
public goods provision or to improving financial 
prudency at the subnational level. 
4. Fiscal rules 
Given the legal independence of local authorities, 
ensured by the Constitution, little constraints apply 
to the financing or wealth management of 
municipalities. In fact, local governments are 
allowed to borrow from financial institutions or 
directly from the market (by issuing bonds). Also, 
until recently, there has been no procedure put in 
place that would have allowed the central 
administration to oversee such borrowing. 
Furthermore, no 'golden rule' exists; hence, even 
operational deficits were often financed by 
borrowing or disinvestment (i.e. sale of assets). As 
a result, assets in the local government sector have 
been declining while the sector's debt has been 
increasing in the past decade. This serious problem 
has been long recognised and the recently 
amended ALG now forbids operational deficits. 
However, it is yet unclear how this will be 
enforced in practice. 
In fact, government control (either central or local) 
over local financial affairs are also hindered by the 
extensive use of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
the public service provision. Transparency of 
financial management is further reduced by the 
possibility for local governments to open an 
account in commercial banks and by the use of 
cash-based accounting and reporting systems. 
Moreover, in case of insolvency of a local 
authority existing procedures only concern settling 
liabilities vis-à-vis creditors but no remedial action 
is triggered to correct structural problems or to 
prevent the recurrence of such situations. 
Finally, there is no 'national stability pact' type 
agreement between the central and the local levels. 
On a positive note, fiscal rules governing public 
finances at subnational level have been 
strengthened by the 2011 Economic Stability Act. 
In particular, municipalities engaging in new 
financial liabilities are in general subject to 
authorization by the central government (both for 
new loans and for rolling over existing ones). 
Loans can be taken out only for investment 
purposes (operational loans with a longer maturity 
are forbidden) and only if debt redemption would 
not exceed 50% of own revenues in any given year 
during the maturity of the loan contract (a more 
precise formulation is yet to be established by 
secondary legislation). 
Prior to the new regulation and starting from 1996, 
the Local Government Act set a ceiling on the debt 
stock of subnational governments, which was 
specified at 70% of the "annual own revenue 
capacity" (calculated as receipts from local taxes 
and other revenues minus interest payments). 
However, this provision was not monitored or 
enforced by any official entity. As a result, from 
the early 2000s, local governments started to 
increasingly circumvent the regulation e.g. by 
accumulating debt in the books of local 
government-owned public companies instead of 
their own accounts. Indeed, the consolidated debt 
of local governments increased from roughly HUF 
200 billion in 2000 to more than HUF 1200 billion 
(4½ % of GDP) in 2011; although this amount has 
been reduced by HUF 180 billion in 2012, due to 
the fact that the central government took over both 
the assets and the liabilities of the counties. In 
addition, according to the State Audit Office, 80% 
of the servicing costs of the liabilities (mostly 
accumulated in 2007-2008) will weigh on local 
governments' budget starting from 2014. 
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A1.17. MALTA 
1. General description 
As one of the most centralised countries in the EU, 
Malta has a three-tiered unitary government 
system, based on central government, regional 
committees and local councils.  There are also 
administrative committees which fall under their 
respective Local Council. . Local government 
(local councils) was established in 1993 through 
the Local Councils Act, which is the regulatory 
primary legislation, complemented with subsidiary 
legislation on financial, tendering, audit, human 
resources and other matters. The Local Councils 
Act was modelled on the European Charter of 
Local Self-government of the Council of Europe 
and has been amended on several occasions.. The 
system of local government is also entrenched in 
the Constitution of Malta through an amendment 
in 2001(
270
).  
There are currently 5 Regional Committees, 68 
Local Councils and 16 Administrative 
Committees. According to Eurostat’s Government 
Finance Statistics for 2010, local government 
expenditure represents around 1.5% of total 
general government expenditure (0.7% of GDP), 
mainly taking the form of intermediate 
consumption (64%), followed by investment 
(21%) and compensation of employees (15%). 
Local government revenue corresponds to around 
1.7% of total general government revenue (0.7% 
of GDP). 
2. Government spending 
Local authorities have gradually gained more 
responsibilities over the years. They have powers 
in the areas of environment, internal security and 
infrastructure. In particular, they are responsible 
for the general upkeep and embellishment of the 
locality, establishment and maintenance of 
playgrounds, public gardens, local libraries and 
sports facilities, local enforcement, refuse 
collection  and carry out general administrative 
                                                          
(270) "The State shall adopt a system of local government 
whereby the territory of Malta shall be divided into such 
number of localities as may by law be from to time 
determined, each locality to be administered by Local 
Council elected by the residents of the locality and 
established and operating in terms of such law as may from 
time to time be in force" 
duties for the central government, such as the 
collection of government rents and funds, and 
answering government-related public inquiries. 
Local Councils do not participate directly in 
national economic planning. Their participation in 
national spatial planning is limited; they are 
allowed to make recommendations to any 
competent authority in relation to any planning or 
building scheme. 
3. Financial arrangements 
Local Councils depend mainly on central 
government for their financing. Their annual 
financial allocation is determined by a formula in 
the Local Councils Act. Originally the formula for 
allocating funds to Councils was based on each 
locality’s population and surface area. However, in 
1999, a new funding formula was introduced to 
better reflect the financial needs of each locality, 
based on the cost it incurs for the provision of local 
services and administration. This funding formula 
was further refined in 2009. The Minister for 
Finance may approve a supplementary allocation if 
it is found, after due consultation with the Minister 
responsible for local government, that the original 
amount was insufficient, while payments to cover 
special needs of a locality or localities are possible 
in exceptional cases.  Since 2009  
Local Councils have benefitted from a number of 
financial schemes launched by central government.  
These schemes have been directed towards all 
aspects of society and include such diverse areas 
as: accesibility, cultural activities, alternative 
energy, sustainable localities and localities with 
special needs.   
Local Councils are empowered to raise funds “by 
means of any scheme designed to provide 
additional funds”. They enact bye-laws to charge 
fees for, for instance, advertisements on (Council) 
street furniture and notice boards, the 
administration of (Council) property and use of 
(Council) facilities, etc. Local Councils may also 
be empowered to act as agents for public bodies or 
government departments, for instance when the 
handling of licences is delegated to the local level, 
in which case they can be granted a percentage of 
the collected fees.  
Local Councils need written authorisation from 
both the Minister responsible for local government 
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and the Minister for Finance in order to take a 
bank loan (there are no statutory criteria for such 
loan approvals but Councils have to follow a strict 
procedure in applying for such loan approvals) and 
the local commercial banks are the main sources of 
their borrowing. There are no provisions regarding 
guarantees given by the state or by other bodies.  
4. Fiscal rules 
There are no fiscal rules guiding the finances of 
local government. However, a portion of the 
financial allocation of a local council may be 
retained if necessary to correct a local deficit or a 
balance below the benchmark established in its 
annual budget. A persistent breach of financial 
responsibilities could constitute a ground for the 
Prime Minister to advise the President to dissolve 
the local council concerned. 
5. Other relevant institutional features 
The local councils’ accounts are audited by local 
government auditors under the responsibility of the 
Auditor General. The auditors also verify that 
proper arrangements are in place for securing 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
A1.18. THE NETHERLANDS 
1. General description 
The Netherlands is a unitary state, defined in its 
Constitution (last revised in 2002) as decentralised 
with a three-tier government structure (provinces 
and municipalities). 
Throughout history the Netherlands was first 
constituted as a federal republic of sovereign 
provinces in the 16
th
 century, but a unitary and 
centralised form of government prevailed since the 
Napoleonic period. In the past 30 years the country 
has, still being a strong unitary state, moved 
somewhat towards a more decentralised model 
which increased the responsibilities of local 
governments. Municipalities remain by far the 
most important level of local government, and 
since the Second World War a steadfast 
consolidation trend, driven by efficiency 
considerations, has seen their number cut from 
over 1100 to 430 currently. Their expenditure 
amounts to around 10% of GDP (2009 figures), 
while the 12 provinces spend around 1% of GDP. 
Joint arrangements among (mainly) municipalities 
also exist. (
271
) In parallel to this tiered system, an 
additional feature of Dutch public administration 
rooted in history and the topographic specificities 
of the country is the separate, autonomous network 
of water authorities(
272
) which raise their own 
taxes and run specific elections.   
While an overwhelming majority of revenue is 
raised by the central government, sizeable transfers 
grant significant spending responsibilities to the 
provincial and, in particular, municipal levels. The 
main responsibilities of provinces cover 
environmental and infrastructure issues at regional 
levels, whereas municipalities are in charge of 
delivering some major expenditure items such as 
social protection, health, primary education, and 
housing.  
The recent trend over the past two decades has 
been to accompany the greater transfer of these 
tasks to municipalities with an increased focus on 
resource efficiency, through e.g. greater 
accountability and financial controls, aligned 
incentives for spending, and fewer earmarked 
transfers.  
2. Government spending 
By and large, government functions in the 
Netherlands remain largely centralised, whereby 
policy is determined centrally and implemented 
subnationally through the provincial and municipal 
governments' delegated authority. This is for 
instance the case for education, social and 
healthcare policy: the financial responsibility and 
discipline of municipalities is spurred by financial 
management incentives but leaves little policy 
discretion. Only for a few areas directly relevant to 
local/regional-scale management, responsibilities 
                                                          
(271) Joint arrangements are partnerships between different 
government levels, mainly municipalities (in isolated cases, 
central government, provinces and water boards may be 
involved). Municipalities work together especially in the 
field of public transport, employment, health, waste 
disposal, and environmental management and planning 
(source: CBS). Joint arrangements represent a combined 
total annual expenditure of around €7.5 bn. 
(272) Water authorities form a separate network of public 
administrations mirroring the general government's 
structure at local, provincial and national level. The nature 
of their activity dealing mostly with large-scale 
infrastructure funding also implies much longer term 
financial commitments.   
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are more equally shared across government tiers 
e.g. spatial planning, transport and environmental 
issues.  The main areas where spending is 
devolved to regional and local authorities reflect 
the increasing transfer of spending competences to 
the local level. 
For instance, the government's major expenditure 
item, social protection, is split between 
government layers, with municipalities assuming 
charges such as social assistance (incl. minimum 
income), unemployment benefits, support to 
families and the elderly, special care… whereas 
provinces focus their action on child/youth action 
programmes.  
3. Financial arrangements 
The power of provinces and municipalities to raise 
tax revenue is very limited. The provinces' only 
source of own revenue stems from collecting a 
share of the national car registration tax (in the 
form of a surcharge, with a capped rate). 
Municipalities can collect tax and sales revenue on 
a broader variety of local bases (e.g. real estate, 
building permits, parking fees, sewage, rubbish 
collection, pets, tourism…) but this still only 
constitutes a limited share of their operational 
income. 
Most of the revenue of subnational governments is 
therefore based on transfers from central 
government. In the case of municipalities (the 
major tier of subnational government) transfers 
make up almost 2/3 of their revenue. 
General transfers 
General transfers to municipalities (respectively 
provinces) are managed through the operation of a 
dedicated fund and distributed using a formula 
based on fairly sophisticated criteria. (
273
) The size 
                                                          
(273) Which "[not only takes into] account the number of 
inhabitants, but corrects also for differences in tax earning 
capacity (real estate value of dwellings and business 
property) and external circumstances, like a regional 
function or the social and physical structure. Indicators 
used are the number of households receiving social 
benefits, number of people from ethnic minority groups, 
number of young or elderly, density of addresses and the 
surface area of the historical centre. However, differences 
in other revenues, like interest, dividend or from the sale of 
land, are not taken into account. Supplementary to the 
general distribution formulae, the Frisian Islands and the 
four major cities receive a fixed amount." (Bos, 2010) 
of the municipality and provincial funds is indexed 
on the overall expenditure of central government, 
which has the drawback of occasionally increasing 
their allocation with no specific increase in 
matching responsibilities; however, austerity at 
central government level also results in a shared 
effort at subnational scales. 
Provinces and municipalities then dispose of a 
certain leeway in the use of the general funds, 
while having to fulfil their devolved competences. 
The recent trend has moved towards more aligned 
incentive schemes in those areas of responsibility, 
e.g. social services: "More incentives implied a change in 
financing Dutch social assistance benefits. In the past, 
municipalities could claim most of their expenses on social 
benefits to the central government. However, since 2004, they 
receive a fixed budget which is insulated from the macro-
economic developments through a calculation by the CPB. As a 
consequence, municipalities now have an incentive to reduce 
the number of social assistance benefits." 
Earmarked transfers 
In addition to the general transfers channelled 
through the municipality / provincial funds, 
subnational governments still receive a large share 
of specific transfers allocated by the central 
government for devolved implementation of 
specific missions. The breakdown by government 
ministries illustrates the predominance of social 
service costs in specific transfers.  
4. Fiscal rules 
Provincial governments exert a role of financial 
control over municipalities; however, both tiers of 
subnational governments may borrow without any 
prior authorisation and from the establishment of 
their choice; bond emissions are rarely used (Dexia 
2008).  
In practice however, since the medium-term 
budgetary framework imposes a "golden rule" for 
subnational governments’ budgets, borrowing is 
only used to finance investment, which is defined 
using self-defined accounting standards(
274
). No 
upper limit to borrowing has been set so 
subnational governments can borrow as long as 
they can finance the debt service. 
                                                          
(274) This budget balance would therefore technically result in a 
deficit by ESA standards. 
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Following decentralisation efforts between the two 
world wars, the debt of municipalities had 
increased sharply in the 1920s to over 40% of 
GDP. It stabilised around 20-30% of GDP in the 
1970s where it still constituted the overwhelming 
majority of Dutch public sector debt. With 
increased fiscal discipline the trend has been 
steadily decreasing since then, when at the same 
time central government debt increased 
significantly. By 2009, the outstanding debt of the 
Dutch subnational public sector (mostly 
municipalities) had been reduced to 8.2% of Dutch 
GDP (still, the second highest level in the EU) at 
nearly 47.9 bn€ (2'890€ per inhabitant, the highest 
amount in the EU). 
In the unlikely event of a municipality threatening 
to declare bankruptcy, the entity in question would 
lose control over their budget and the national 
government takes charge. The strictest form is the 
control under article 12 of the "financiele 
verhoudingswet". In 2009-2012, 4 municipalities 
were under this special control scheme of the 
central government and received in total around 
22.4 million euro (2011) in financial support. 
A1.19. AUSTRIA 
1. General description 
Austria is a federation, where government 
responsibilities are shared among three different 
territorial levels: federal, regional (9 states) and 
local (2357 municipalities). As in other similarly 
organised countries, the reasoning behind the 
federal structure is that it provides increased 
efficiency from the decentralisation of allocative 
functions and that public services should be 
produced and financed in accordance with the 
preferences of the residents of the area that enjoys 
the benefits(
275
). Compared with the degree of 
fiscal decentralisation in other countries, Austria is 
moderate in terms of the share of sub-national 
government outlays in total general government 
spending (34% in 2010) and at the lower-medium 
end when it comes to the contribution of sub-
                                                          
(275) Balassone F. and D. Franco (2005), Fiscal federalism in 
Fiscal Policy in Economic and Monetary Union, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK 
national governments’ own revenue to total public 
sector revenue (2%)(
276
).   
The relations between the three layers of 
government in Austria are defined by the Fiscal 
Constitutional Law (1948) and governed by the 
periodically negotiated Fiscal Equalisation Law 
(Finanzausgleichsgesetz - FAG) and the Austrian 
Stability Pact (ASP). The three layers of 
government coordinate their medium-term 
budgetary plans in the FAG, which allocates the 
revenues to territorial authorities for the period of 
six years (previously four years). The law specifies 
the types of taxes that are to be shared among the 
three levels of government, as well as the 
proportion at which they are to be divided among 
them. Revenues from most of the tax categories 
are collected by the federal government and then 
distributed to the three levels according to the key 
agreed on in the FAG negotiations. A part of the 
revenue from the shared taxes is withheld before 
the distribution to the various levels of government 
and earmarked for special purposes, e.g. financing 
of family benefits. The FAG also determines the 
horizontal distribution of revenues at the regional 
and local level. The rules set out in the FAG are 
rather complex and lacking in transparency. Not 
only are revenues from most individual taxes 
shared among the three territorial levels in fixed 
proportions, but also decision-making in many 
areas is divided among various levels of authority. 
Revenue-raising and spending responsibilities for 
different activities do not reside within the same 
level of government. In its present form, the 
system does not encourage the agents involved to 
use resources in the most efficient way and keep 
firm control over spending. Therefore, there is 
considerable potential for increasing efficiency in 
the public sector.  
2. Government spending 
Austria's Fiscal Constitutional Law defines the 
spending competences of the federal government, 
the main ones being tertiary education, parts of 
social policy (family allowances and private sector 
pensions), unemployment benefits, internal 
security, justice, foreign policy, defence and 
national infrastructure. The competences not listed 
                                                          
(276) Bergvall, D. et al (2006), Intergovernmental Transfers and 
Decentralised Public Spending, OECD, Journal on 
Budgeting, Volume 5, No. 4 
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by the Constitution fall in the remit of the states. 
These include: social assistance, health care 
(hospitals), parts of primary and secondary 
education, environment and regional infrastructure. 
Communes are responsible mainly for local 
planning, the functioning of local infrastructure 
(roads, waste and water management) as well as 
for providing such services as obligatory 
education, kindergartens, old peoples' homes etc. 
The problem with the Austrian municipalities lies 
in the fact that many of them are very small (more 
than half of them have less than 5000 inhabitants), 
which makes the provision of local services very 
costly.   
A marked weakness of the set-up of inter-
governmental relations in Austria lies in the fact 
that in many areas the decision-making, funding 
and spending responsibilities are shared by 
different levels of government. Streamlining of 
these competences could potentially result in 
significant efficiency gains and reduction in public 
expenditure. The most notable examples here are 
health care and education systems.  
The Austrian health care system is organised is a 
fairly complex way. The social security system 
funds practising physicians. In terms of hospitals, 
the federal government sets out framework 
conditions, but the real decision-making powers lie 
with the states, even though they provide less than 
half of the government outlays for hospitals (the 
rest comes from social insurance as well as from 
the federal and local governments). In running 
hospitals, the states and municipalities do not 
always pursue an exclusively health services 
provision agenda. There are also economic and 
political interests at stake, which make closing 
down of redundant hospitals literally impossible in 
many cases. Since different actors are responsible 
for the in-patient and out-patient services, there is 
no incentive to move workload from costly 
hospitals to practising physicians whose services 
are cheaper. The number of hospital stays in 
Austria is one of the highest among the OECD 
countries. According to the federal audit court, 
hospital services worth more than 1% of GDP 
should be shifted from the hospital service to 
practising physicians(
277
).  
The financing of the education system is also 
highly controversial. The federal government is 
responsible for the curriculum and funds teacher 
salaries to a large extent. The latter, though, are 
formally employed by the states, which have far-
reaching competences in terms of organisation of 
schooling (among others the determination of pupil 
numbers per class and teaching periods). Such 
division of competences does not encourage 
effective allocation of resources. In fact, cross-
country efficiency analyses show that Austria 
spends roughly the same amount on education as 
other economies (i.e. Finland), but the 
performance in PISA is relatively poor.  
3. Financial arrangements 
The three layers of government coordinate their 
medium-term budgetary plans in the FAG, which 
allocates the revenues to territorial authorities, 
usually for the period of six years. The law 
specifies the types of taxes that are to be shared 
among the three levels of government, as well as 
the proportion according to which they are to be 
divided among them. Most of the tax categories 
are collected by the federal government and then 
distributed to the three levels according to the key 
agreed on in the FAG negotiations. A part of the 
revenue from the shared taxes is withheld before 
the distribution to the various levels of government 
and earmarked for special purposes, e.g. financing 
of family benefits. The federal government 
receives about 73% of the remaining revenue from 
the shared taxes. The states and municipalities get 
about 15% and 12%, respectively(
278
). A 
significant part of the shared revenue that flows to 
the regional and local governments is earmarked 
for special spending activities. Some of these flows 
require co-financing by the sub-national 
authorities. As a last step, the FAG determines a 
horizontal distribution of the revenue at the 
regional and local level.  
                                                          
(277) Vorschläge des Rechnungshofes zur Verwaltungsreform 
und zum Bürokratieabbau, Positionen Reihe 2007/1, 
August 2007 
(278) Fuentes, A. et al (2006), Reforming federal fiscal relations 
in Austria, OECD, Economic Department Working Papers 
no. 474 
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Own tax resources (generated and collected within 
a given state or municipality) constitute a 
significant part of the local government revenue. 
However, the only significant tax parameter, which 
municipalities can set autonomously, is the real 
estate tax rate. Own tax resources are negligible in 
the case of the states, indicating a very low degree 
of tax autonomy. In fact, by international standards 
Austria is one of the countries where the share of 
own tax in the regional government’s revenue is 
the lowest (about 2% of the total)(
279
). On the one 
hand, economic theory suggests that the central 
government should collect taxes from tax bases 
that are more mobile, more sensitive to cyclical 
factors and less uniformly distributed(
280
). On the 
other hand, though, splitting the funding and 
spending powers, like in Austria, weakens the 
cost-benefit relationship associated with public 
services, thereby reducing the allocative 
advantages of a federal structure(
281
).  
The FAG also defines rules governing the inter-
governmental transfers which in 2009 constituted 
41%, 16% and 27% of the total revenues of the 
regional authorities, local authorities and social 
security funds respectively(
282
). The system of 
transfers was established to ensure that each level 
of government has at its disposal sufficient means 
to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the 
legislation. However, these transfers make the 
fiscal relations between the three layers of 
government overly complex and in many instances 
discourage efficient use of funds. The FAG 
negotiated in 2008 introduced the conversion of 
some of the transfers from the federal government 
to the state and local governments into revenue 
shares which are devoted to certain activities (e.g. 
housing assistance scheme and road maintenance). 
This introduced some transparency to the most 
opaque part of fiscal federal relations, but further 
steps toward simplification of the system are 
needed.   
Austria's Federal Budgetary Law enables the 
federal finance minister to enter into credit 
                                                          
(279) Schratzenstaller, M. (2007), Undurchschaubares 
Transfergeflecht in der Standard, 25 October  
(280) Balassone F., Franco, D. (2005), Fiscal federalism in 
Fiscal Policy in Economic and Monetary Union, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK 
(281) Oates, W. (1972), Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich 
(282) Öffentliche Haushalte in Österreich (2010), editor G. 
Steger, Verlag Österreich, Vienna  
transactions on behalf of the states through the 
Austrian Federal Financing Agency (AFFA). The 
Agency carries out a quarterly survey of the states' 
financial needs. The amount of debt issued by the 
federal government for the financing of the states 
cannot surpass 20% of total general government 
expenditure in the given year. In the period 2009-
2011 about 4.4% of the potential amount was used 
on average(
283
). Austria's Fiscal Constitutional 
Law gives the states the competence to adopt 
legislation regulating credit operations of the 
communes. As a general rule, municipalities are 
only allowed to take loans in order to cover 
extraordinary expenditure. However, the 
conditions which govern granting the approval for 
drawing debt by communes differ significantly 
between states in terms of e.g. which types of 
transactions have to be notified and starting from 
which amount. Nevertheless, a common feature is 
that in most states, the credit approval conditions 
concerning cities are more lenient than those 
regarding smaller local governments on the 
assumption that the former are equipped with 
superior know-how in terms of debt risk 
management(
284
). The AFFA plays only advisory 
role for the municipalities.   
4. Fiscal rules 
The Austrian Stability Pact (ASP), which 
prescribes deficit/surplus targets (so-called 
“stability contributions”) to the federal, regional 
and local governments, was first set up informally 
in 1996 in the context of Austria’s preparation for 
entering the euro area, which required significant 
fiscal consolidation. The ASP was meant to solve 
the asymmetry created by the high degree of 
decentralisation of fiscal policy responsibilities at 
national level on the one hand and the introduction 
– at the European level - of rules (i.e. Stability and 
Growth Pact) on the other, assigning responsibility 
for the general government balance solely to 
central governments. In 1999, this enforcement 
mechanism was formalised for the first time. Its 
successors were then adopted for the 2001-2004, 
2005-2008, 2008-2013 and 2011-2014 periods. 
                                                          
(283) Refinanzierungsmöglichkeiten der Bundesländer über die 
OeBFA (2011), presentation by M. Oberndorfer, Vienna, 
November  
(284) Grossmann, B. and E. Hauth, (2009), Kommunales 
Risikomanagement und Aufsichtsbehördliche Kontrolle in 
Österreich,  Studie im Auftrag des 
Staatsschuldenausschusses, April 2009 
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The FAG foresees financial sanctions in case a 
State does not ratify the ASP. Once ASP is ratified 
it fixes the amount of the sanction in case of non-
compliance, which takes the form of an interest-
bearing deposit. If in the following year the 
respective target is not reached, the deposit is 
supposed to be transferred to those governments 
that are in compliance. However, if the target is 
achieved, the deposit would be reimbursed. The 
sanction option has never been used under the Pact 
as it covered all deviations from numerical targets 
(negative deviations were compensated by positive 
deviations).  
The ASP is a useful tool aimed at involving all 
levels of government in the consolidation of public 
finances. In providing for legally-enshrined 
budgetary commitments across various 
government levels, Austria can be considered as a 
benchmark in the EU. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that after an initial stage of general 
compliance with the Pact in the years 1999-2002, 
slippages occurred in individual years at all levels 
of government. However, since according to the 
ASP's rule the targets were met on average within 
the duration of the subsequent Pacts, the sanctions 
foreseen by the ASP have never been used. 
Initially budgetary surpluses were meant to make 
up only for the slippages in the past and were not 
supposed to be carried over to future years. 
Subsequently, the initial approach towards carry-
overs was criticised as pro-cyclical and carry-over 
of surpluses was admitted with the aim of reaching 
the goals on average within the duration of the 
Pact. It should be noted that, striving to fulfil their 
obligation under the ASP, sub-national 
governments resorted to some methods that went 
against the spirit of the Pact, such as 
reclassification of public entities, transfer of real 
assets to various federal and regional real estate 
companies, etc. These were, however, not accepted 
as part of the stability contributions. Following the 
recent financial and economic crisis, the 
discrepancy between the ASP goals and the 
budgetary outcomes became so significant that the 
goals were revised in March 2011. This revision 
was accompanied by strengthening of the 
enforcement mechanism of the Pact, which 
consisted among others in shifting the focus back 
to attaining the budgetary goals in individual years, 
enhancing the role of the Court of Auditors and 
making the launch of the sanctioning procedure 
automatic. This should increase the effectiveness 
of the Pact, but at the same time it should be noted 
that the revised budgetary goals under the 2011-
2014 Pact were significantly less ambitious than 
those in the past. In the Pact editions between 2001 
and 2010, the local and state governments were 
required to run balanced budget or come up with 
surpluses, respectively, whereas now deficits 
(albeit gradually decreasing) are allowed on both 
levels. Also, the federal government now has the 
right to close its books with much higher deficits 
than in the past (average deficit of 2.5% of GDP in 
the period 2011-14 versus 1.2% of GDP in the 
years 2001-2010).     
Currently, the latest edition of the ASP is being 
renegotiated yet again in order to align it with the 
debt brake ("Schuldenbremse") introduced in 
December 2011, which limits the structural federal 
government deficit to 0.35% of GDP starting in 
2017. The original attempt to anchor the debt 
brake limiting the structural general government 
deficit to 0.45% of GDP in the Constitution failed 
due to insufficient support by the parliamentary 
opposition parties. In spite of the lack of the 
constitutional status i.e. not having bearing on sub-
national authorities, the states committed to respect 
it too. This is supposed to be reflected in the 
updated goals of the ASP, which should be agreed 
on in May 2012. 
5. Need for reform 
The need for reform of the set-up of the fiscal 
relations between the three layers of government in 
Austria has been discussed for decades. Numerous 
experts' groups put forward various proposals as to 
how to simplify these relations and adjust them to 
the changed economic reality. In spite of the 
general consensus on the issue, the implementation 
of the suggested reforms has so far been very 
limited. The most urgent problem which needs 
addressing is the fragmentation of the various 
competences between the three levels of 
government. It seems that without bringing 
together the decision-making powers with funding 
and spending competences in a given area, the 
system will continue discouraging cost-cutting and 
efficient use of public means. The streamlining of 
competences should be accompanied by significant 
expansion of the tax autonomy of the sub-national 
authorities in order to strengthen the latter's 
accountability to voters and tax payers. The 
complicated system of transfers between the 
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federal, regional and local authorities, which has 
grown over time to such an extent that it is almost 
completely opaque, should be substantially 
simplified to allow analysis of flows between the 
three layers of government. The division of 
responsibility for certain areas as well as the 
general formulation of goals of the FAG should be 
reviewed in order to bring it up to date with today's 
economic reality and in particular with its 
international context(
285
). Last but not least, 
merging small municipalities and improving the 
legal environment for cooperation between them 
(in particular across different states) could 
significantly contribute to raising the efficiency of 
provision of local services.  
The Council issued country-specific 
recommendations to Austria with respect to 
subnational governments (see Box I.3.2 above). 
A1.20. POLAND 
1. General description 
The public administration reform of 1999 aimed at 
the decentralisation of power and fostering self-
determination by the local communities. It 
established a three-tiered system of local public 
administration. According to the Constitution, 
local governments assume the public tasks which 
are not explicitly assigned to the other organs of 
public administration. The entities of different 
tiers, although territorially overlapping, are 
independent of each other in the sense that entities 
of a higher level do not exercise authority or 
control over the entities of a lower level. 
2. Tiers of local government and their 
responsibilities 
The basic tier of local government in Poland is a 
gmina (commune/municipality) which is defined 
as a self-governing community of people 
inhabiting a defined territory. Currently there are 
2479 gminas, 1571 of which are classified as rural, 
602 as rural-municipal, and 306 as municipal. A 
gmina can be established, dissolved, merged or 
divided by the national government on the basis of 
                                                          
(285) Grundlegende Reform des Finanzausgleichs: 
Reformoptionen und Reformstrategien (2011), Technische 
Universität Wien, Vienna, January  
its ability to effectively exercise its public 
functions. The law guarantees gminas autonomy in 
all matters of local concern which are not regulated 
by other legislation or assigned to other tiers of 
local government; grants them legal identities, 
ownership rights and independent budgets. In 
broad terms, a gmina is responsible for meeting the 
collective needs of the community. In this context, 
it assumes two types of tasks: those which are 
directly assigned to it by laws ('own tasks') and 
those which are delegated by the central level of 
government ('delegated tasks'). Own tasks are 
divided into obligatory, which a gmina is obliged 
to assume due to their elementary character, and 
facultative which should be assumed to a degree 
depending on the financial resources and local 
community's needs. In particular, most important 
areas of gmina's own responsibilities include: 
public transportation, water supply and sewage 
treatment, waste collection and disposal, energy 
and heating systems, local roads and buildings, 
land use and spatial planning, municipal 
cemeteries, libraries and cultural services, non-
obligatory pre-school education for children from 
3 to 5 years of age, obligatory pre-school 
education for children of 6 years and primary 
education.    
The second level of local administration are 
powiats (county) which, depending on the 
character of the municipality, can have two 
different legal forms. Usually powiats are 
composed of several gminas and have separate 
administrative organs (currently there are 314 of 
them). However, larger cities (65 of them) are 
categorised as 'cities with powiat status' (city 
county / miasto na prawach powiatu), which are, 
de facto, gminas which assume also the tasks and 
responsibilities of a powiat (they have no separate 
gmina's and powiat's organs). In several cases, 
cities have been separated from its rural 
neighbourhoods to constitute an independent 'city 
with powiat status'. This has administratively 
separated the population of a significant area from 
an infrastructure (mainly secondary education) and 
own financial resources (tax base being 
concentrated in the cities), contributing to 
widening economic and social disparities within 
the same region. A powiat as a new entity 
introduced by 1999 reform has been assigned 
relatively narrowly defined range of 
responsibilities, including: managing general 
healthcare and hospital services (whose financing 
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remains however within the responsibility of the 
National Health Fund), secondary education, 
roads, sanitary and health inspection, public safety 
and social welfare services (in particular running 
local employment offices responsible for active 
labour market policies and the payment of 
unemployment benefits).       
A third, highest level of territorial division is a 
voivodship (województwo), where two tiers of 
government co-exist with separate responsibilities. 
Since the administrative reform, the 
representatives of the central government (voivods) 
have seen their competences shrinking 
considerably at the benefit of independent regional 
bodies (sejmik). While the former have maintained 
some role in maintaining the police, security and 
criminal justice functions of the national 
government and monitoring the use of grants by 
local governments, the latter have become fully 
responsible for the primary function of a 
voivodship which is regional development 
planning (as such they are the main players in the 
process of planning and management of the EU 
structural funds), and a number of other tasks, such 
as higher education, culture, health care and 
transport infrastructure. Currently Poland is 
divided into 16 voivodships.    
3. Local government's finances 
The amount of tasks and degree of responsibilities 
are reflected in the structure of financial resources 
used by different tiers of local government. Over 
the past decade local governments have been 
responsible for providing an increasing amount of 
public goods and services to their respective 
populations (a real increase of ca. 70% in total 
revenues and expenditures). Among them, gminas' 
budgets, given the widest range of tasks, accounted 
for almost half of total public finances managed by 
the local governments. Cities with powiat status, 
given the significant size of population covered, 
but relatively small number, accounted for over 
30%, powiats for less than 20% and voivodships, 
due to their limited responsibilities, for less than 
10%. 
Revenues 
The law defines three basic categories of revenues 
of local government entities: own revenues, 
general subsidy from the state budget and 
appropriated allocations. In 2010, ca. 48% of 
revenues of all local government entities came 
from own revenues, 29% were transferred as 
subsidies from the state budget, and 23% were 
earmarked grants. 
Own revenues consist of incomes from local taxes 
(only for gminas and large municipalities), user 
fees, charges and fines, revenues of productive 
entities owned by the local government, income 
from the sale or rental of municipal property, and 
shares of revenues from personal income tax (PIT) 
and corporate income tax (CIT) paid by 
individuals and companies who are 
residents/located on the territory of the entity. 
Local taxes levied by gminas include: real estate 
tax (flat per metre charge on land and a percentage 
of the construction costs of buildings), agricultural 
and forestry tax (based on the price of per hectare 
yields of particular types of land), motor vehicle 
tax, inheritance and donation tax, tax on civil law 
transactions, and a simplified income tax on small 
businesses. 
The share of income tax revenues transferred to an 
entity amounts to 39.34% of PIT and 6.71% of 
CIT revenues collected on the territory of a gmina, 
10.25% of PIT and 1.40% of CIT revenues 
collected in a powiat, and 1.60% of PIT and 
14.75% of CIT revenues collected in a voivodship.  
Total amount of the general subsidy transferred 
from the state budget to the local government 
entities is defined annually in the budget law, 
separately for gminas, powiats and voivodships. 
The subsidy has a redistributive function: the size 
of a major ('equalization') component depends on 
the sum of tax revenues (local taxes plus share of 
PIT and CIT) per inhabitant of a gmina and, to a 
minor extent, on its density of population. A minor 
('balancing') component is distributed among 
gminas according to the amount of housing 
subsidies paid by them and overall level of their 
population's wealth. For powiats and voivodships a 
similar mechanism is complemented with slightly 
different criteria. In case of powiats, the size of a 
subsidy is determined by tax revenues per 
inhabitant, the level of unemployment, and a 
combination of factors: total length of local, 
regional and national roads, size of family 
transfers, and a trend in a powiat's revenues. For 
voivodships, it depends on the tax revenues per 
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inhabitant and the overall number of inhabitants 
(higher subsidy for small voivodships), and a 
number of other factors: the length of regional 
roads, unemployment rate, subsidies to regional 
railway operation and GDP per capita. A separate 
education subsidy is distributed among entities 
(gminas, powiats and voivodships) by the Minister 
of Education, taking into account the range of 
education tasks under their responsibility. The 
subsidy is the main source of financing for primary 
and secondary level of education in Poland. The 
current formula takes into account the number of 
pupils weighted according to the type of schools 
they attend and the pupil-per-teacher ratio in the 
area. Such formula implicitly favours rural areas, 
where the latter ratio is the lowest. 
The third source of local governments' revenue is 
earmarked grants. They are either paid from the 
state budget, in the framework of the programmes 
financed from the EU funds, or from other 
earmarked funds. The former ones are allocated for 
the execution of the own functions of the local 
government and the functions delegated or 
commissioned to them by the national government. 
They must be co-financed (at least 50%) from own 
resources of an entity and are mainly granted for 
investments in education, culture and sports.  
Expenditures 
Local government entities spend their resources on 
current expenditures, including mainly wages and 
salaries, purchase of goods and services, social 
benefits, grants for subordinate organisational 
entities, and debt service, and on investment 
expenditures.  
The structure of expenditure of various levels of 
local government reflects main tasks and 
responsibilities legally assigned to them. While 
classification of public expenditure according to 
COFOG is not available at a regional and local 
level, a national budget classification can serve as 
a proxy. Gminas' main items of expenditure are: 
education (33.3%) and social protection (16.5%), 
powiats and large municipalities finance mostly 
education (respectively 28.5% and 27.8%) and 
transport and communication (respectively 21.7% 
and 20.3%), while voivodships are predominantly 
responsible for financing transport and 
communication (39.1%). 
4. Fiscal framework 
Apart from the legal obligation to exercise the 
functions assigned to them by law, freedom of the 
local government entities to pursue their 
autonomous fiscal policy is constrained by the 
fiscal framework composed of medium-term 
programming and fiscal rules.  
Medium-term programming involves both central 
government (in a form of Multiannual Financial 
Plan of the State) and all levels of local 
government. Multiannual Financial Projections are 
prepared for the current and at least three 
subsequent budget years, but the coverage may be 
extended if investment projects are implemented 
over a longer time span. The Projection is 
established together with the annual budget 
resolution and submitted to a local accounting 
council for agreement. The document indicates the 
level of revenues and expenditures for the entire 
programming period, serves as a numerical 
guidance for the fiscal policy adopted in the annual 
budgets and provides a limit for the budget deficit 
and debt for a given year, although is not binding 
in more specific details. 
Local governments are also subject to a series of 
fiscal rules. The general rule can be considered as 
a type of golden rule: it states that current 
expenditures planned for a given budget year 
cannot be higher than the sum of current revenues, 
budget surplus from the previous year and 
unassigned resources. An additional rule applying 
to debt and interest paid on it is expected to change 
soon. The current rule, in force until end 2013, 
requires that the overall debt level of each entity 
do not exceed 60% of its revenues at the end of 
each year and each quarter (although bonds issued 
and loans incurred in order to co-finance the EU-
financed projects are not accounted for). At the 
same time, the interest paid on the debt cannot 
exceed 15%(
286
) of the planned revenues. From 
2014, a new, more flexible rule established by the 
Public Finance Law of 27 August 2009(
287
), will 
enter into force. It introduces an individual 
coefficient of debt, which defines the specific 
maximum expenditure on debt service for each 
                                                          
(286) If the state budget debt exceeds 55% of GDP, the limit will 
be lowered automatically to 12%. 
(287) A 4-year vacatio legis has been decided in order to allow 
the local governments to adopt their budgetary policy to the 
new rules. 
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local government entity. It is calculated as a three-
year average ratio of the sum of current surplus 
(current revenues minus current expenditure) and 
sales to total revenues. The new rule, contrary to 
the existing one, will allow the entities to devise 
their individual fiscal strategy in a more flexible 
manner, depending on their ability to raise 
additional debt in order to finance sustainable 
investment projects. 
The Council issued country-specific 
recommendations to Poland with respect to 
subnational governments (see Box I.3.2 above). 
A1.21. PORTUGAL 
1. General description 
Portugal is a relatively centralized country, but 
subnational governments enjoy a very large degree 
of autonomy including at the financial level. 
Subnational governments in Portugal are 
composed of 308 municipalities and two 
autonomous regions, each subnational structure 
being governed by a separate law. (
288
) Portugal 
has no formal regional level, except for two 
autonomous regions that cover the islands of 
Azores and Madeira. The two regions enjoy 
broader autonomy than municipalities. They have 
their own regional legislative assembly, their own 
regional government presidents (Presidente do 
Governo Regional) and their own regional 
secretaries (Secretários Regionais). The two 
regions also include municipalities and parishes 
governed by regional regulations and inspection 
bodies. 
Municipalities are politically and administratively 
independent from central government. They have a 
municipal assembly, a mayor (presidente da 
Câmara municipal) and an executive council 
(Câmara municipal) elected for a four-year term. 
Municipalities are subdivided into parishes 
(freguesias), which also have an independent 
status, being in charge of some local administrative 
tasks (there are currently, 4,259 parishes). The 
majority of municipalities are small in size (less 
than 50,000 inhabitants). 
                                                          
(288) Local Finance Law 2/2007 of 15 January, and subsequent 
amendments and Regional Finance Law, Organic Law 
1/2007 as amended by Organic Laws 1/2010 and 2/2010. 
There has been growing devolution of tasks to 
subnational government levels. According to the 
Constitution, the allocation of responsibilities 
among levels of government is based on the 
subsidiarity principle. The subsidiarity principle 
also applies to Azores and Madeira, but their own 
regulations prevail over national ones. The 
devolution of tasks at local level is revised 
annually through a Protocol signed between the 
central government and the Association of 
Municipalities. The Association of Municipalities 
and the Association of Parishes take part in the 
formal consultation procedures established by the 
constitution or by law. They are also consulted by 
the government on an ad hoc basis, in some cases 
informally before the formal consultation 
procedures, and are informed on developments of 
central government policy such as the preparation 
of the state budget and the Stability and Growth 
Program. 
2. Government spending  
Spending at subnational government level has been 
increasing steadily over the last decade, with 
budget deficits widening over the last five years. 
The increase in spending is mostly due to an 
increase in current expenditure, mainly 
compensation of employees and intermediate 
consumption, which has markedly contributed to 
general government current expenditure. 
Expenditure competences do not seem to be 
defined clearly and are revised on an annual basis 
through the signature of annual protocols between 
the central and subnational governments. 
Subnational governments are responsible for a 
significant part of general government investment, 
which however has fallen sharply in the last years. 
A review of the adequate levels of investment at 
local level is needed to help eliminate 
inefficiencies and redundancies. 
The structure of subnational governments' 
expenditure in Portugal is similar to other EU 
countries, with a high percentage of total 
expenditures on general public services. Data 
indicates important responsibilities in providing 
housing and community amenities, environmental 
protection, and recreation, culture and religion and 
general public services, while responsibilities in 
health, education and social protection are shared 
with central government. An increase in the 
education services attribution can be observed 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
282 
since 2006. Municipalities play an important role 
in licensing, as well as in supervising and 
enforcing national regulations, in areas such as 
water supply, drainage network, urban waste 
disposal, parks and gardens, street repairs, social 
and cultural facilities, primary schools and the 
municipal road network. The shared competencies 
between local governments and central 
government are being revised annually through a 
Protocol, and are not considered and/or reviewed 
in a multi-annual framework.  
3. Financial arrangements  
About 40 per cent of regional governments' 
revenues and about 50 per cent of local 
municipalities' revenues derive from transfers. 
According to the Regional Finance Law, the 
transfers are updated annually according to the rate 
of change of the current expenditure(
289
) of the 
State in the year previous to the State budget 
authorising the transfers. The allocation between 
regions is determined by their population, their 
relative periphery distances, the number of islands 
and a tax ratio. The regions also benefit from a 
Cohesion Fund for investment projects. Each year 
funds are transferred from the State budget to this 
Fund according to the ratio between regional and 
national GDP per capita.  
Own revenues are collected by the central 
government’s tax administration (Autoridade 
Tributária) for all local and regional entities 
besides Madeira, which has its own tax 
administration. The information on taxes paid is 
sent monthly to them by the central tax 
administration as requested by law. Municipalities 
in the regions benefit from the same revenue and 
transfers system as all other municipalities on the 
mainland. Own revenues represent about 30 per 
cent of local governments' revenues and 56 per 
cent of regions' revenues. In addition, regions 
retain all taxes levied on their territory. 
Municipalities' own revenues include according to 
the Local Finance Law: i) a 5 per cent share in 
state personal income tax collected from residents; 
ii) own taxes (property taxes, surcharges on state 
corporate income tax, tax on vehicles, fees and 
fines), iii) a block grant defined as a share of 
                                                          
(289) It excludes the transfer for social security and contribution 
to the civil servant pension system. 
central government revenues (currently set at 25.3 
per cent) from personal and corporate income tax 
and value added tax as accrued in the year before 
the last in which the state budget authorising the 
transfers refers; and iv) an earmarked grant to 
finance tasks and responsibilities transferred from 
the central government. The revenue-sharing 
between central government and local 
governments is carried out according to detailed 
formulas set out in the Local Finance Law, through 
the following funds:  
 the Financial Balance Fund (FEF), composed 
of: i) the General Municipal Fund (FGM), 
adjusts the resources of each administrative 
level to its respective attributes and 
competences; and ii) the Municipal Cohesion 
Fund (FCM), designed to correct asymmetries 
among local authorities resulting from different 
capacities to collect revenue or different 
expenditure needs. The two sub-funds are equal 
in size and are financed through the block grant 
of 23.5 per cent. 
 The Municipal Social Fund (FSM), an 
earmarked grant to finance responsibilities 
transferred from the central government in 
education, health and social services. If the 
municipality does exhaust the allocated 
amount, the savings are deducted from the 
amount to be received the following year. 
 The Parishes Financing Fund (FFF), financed 
through a share of 2.5 per cent of central 
government average tax revenues obtained 
from personal and corporate income tax and 
value added tax. 
Municipalities can legally exercise tax powers only 
to the extent defined in the Local Finance Law. 
They can adjust the tax rate or base for the taxes 
under their powers according to the law. Although 
the overall amount of transfers from State's tax 
revenues is determined in the Local Finance Law, 
the central government can modify the attribution 
by a discretionary decision. Moreover, the overall 
growth in transfers is capped at 5 per cent. 
There is no budget calendar for subnational 
governments. They finalise their draft budgets 
following the submission of the State budget to 
Parliament. The State budget conveys the 
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information on transfers as well as on central 
government’s tax revenue, which serves as a basis 
for projecting local and regional taxes. Before the 
State budget submission there is very little 
exchange of information between the central 
government and subnational levels. As a 
consequence, regional and local governments’ 
budgets have consistently overestimated their 
projected revenue. During the last five years, 
average collected revenues were equivalent to only 
65 per cent of the amounts projected by local 
governments. Revenue overestimation together 
with a weak public financial management is the 
main cause for the weak budgetary execution. 
4. Fiscal rules  
Portugal imposes debt rules and borrowing 
constraints to subnational governments. The Local 
and Regional Finance Laws define: (i) net debt 
ceilings, and borrowing constraints for local 
governments, (ii) and a debt service rule for 
regions. In addition, the 2012 budget law prohibits 
any increase in the net debt of regions and 
municipalities in 2012. This target temporarily 
supersedes other borrowing constraints. 
Net indebtedness of municipalities cannot exceed 
125 per cent of the sum of own taxes, shared tax, 
intergovernmental transfers and dividends from 
municipal enterprises recorded in the previous 
year. (
290
) Within the this limit: i) medium- and 
long-term financial liabilities, which are earmarked 
for investment purposes, cannot exceed 100 p.p.; 
and ii) short-term financial liabilities, which are to 
be used for cash management purposes only, 
cannot exceed 10 p.p. If a municipality exceeds the 
limit for net indebtedness, and/or for medium- and 
long-term financial liabilities, it must reduce it by 
at least 10 per cent per year until it falls back 
within the limit. In addition, if a municipality 
exceeds the limit for net indebtedness, the transfers 
it receives from central government are reduced by 
a corresponding amount. The money is then 
allocated to a regularisation fund (Fundo de 
                                                          
(290) Net indebtedness is defined as the difference between the 
sum of liabilities (financial and non-financial) and the sum 
of financial assets, including those pertaining to 
associations of municipalities and enterprises owned by 
local governments. Loans for financing urban rehabilitation 
programs, those related to EU co-financed projects and 
those for areas affected by public disaster are excluded 
from the computation of net indebtedness by authorization 
of the Ministry of Finance.  
Regularizaçao Municipal) to deal with situations of 
structural financial imbalances of municipalities.  
A situation of financial imbalance becomes 
“structural” if at least three of the following 
conditions occur: a) medium- and long-term 
financial liabilities exceed the 100 per cent limit; 
b) net indebtedness is higher than 175 per cent of 
previous year revenues; c) arrears exceed 50 per 
cent of revenues of previous year; d) total financial 
liabilities (including those not included in the 
computation of the net indebtedness limit) in 
excess of 300 per cent of last year revenues; e) 
average length of arrears above 6 months; f) failure 
to reduce liabilities by at least 10 per cent per year 
if the limits for net indebtedness and medium- and 
long-term financial debt are exceeded. The 
municipality is required to prepare an adjustment 
plan which, in this case, needs the approval of the 
Ministry of Finance. Approval of the plan gives 
access to the regularisation fund. The municipality 
must report quarterly on the implementation of the 
plan. Failure to report or to implement the plan 
results in the retention of 20 per cent of transfers 
from the central government. (
291
)  
The institutional framework that sets out 
indebtedness limits for local governments in 
relation to past revenues weakens the budgetary 
constraints in a pro-cyclical pattern. Growing 
revenues in good times raise the nominal amount 
of permitted borrowing under the debt ceiling, 
while servicing the liabilities incurred becomes 
more difficult during downturns when revenue 
transfers are declining. As a consequence, regional 
and local governments have built up significant 
amounts of debt over the last decade. Financial 
debt reached 5½ per cent of GDP at end-2010(
292
), 
while debt to suppliers above 90 days stood at 
EUR 2.7 billion (about 1.6 per cent of GDP) at 
end-2011 according to the survey on arrears. 
                                                          
(291) On a voluntary basis, a municipality may declare to be in a 
situation of “temporary imbalance” and trigger a 
rebalancing procedure which foresees the preparation of a 
debt restructuring plan and of measures to reduce 
expenditure and increase revenues. Any of the following 
triggering criteria can be used: a) breaching the net 
indebtedness limit; b) arrears in excess of 40 per cent of 
previous year revenues; c) total financial liabilities 
(including those not considered to compute the net 
indebtedness limit) in excess of 200 per cent of revenues; 
d) average length of arrears above 6 months. 
(292) Municipalities’ debt represented 3½ percent of GDP at the 
end of 2010, and Madeira’s amounted to 1.8 percent of 
GDP.  
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Moreover, a significant number of local state-
owned enterprises and other quasi-fiscal entities 
have been created by municipalities. Although, 
municipalities are not allowed by law to guarantee 
debt of these entities, the creation of such entities 
allows further accumulation of debt outside the 
local governments’ balance sheet and weakens 
their current indebtedness ceilings. New legislation 
enacted end- 2011 establishes mandatory rules on 
transparency and information on the operation of 
the local business sector and suspends the creation 
of new businesses by municipalities, inter- 
municipalities and metropolitan areas, as well as 
the acquisition of shares by them.  
The government has tried to address growing 
financial imbalances in subnational governments 
through a number of measures: i) triggering of 
corrective actions as stipulated by the Local 
Finance Law through the adoption by 
municipalities of “financial rebalancing 
programmes”; ii) ad hoc measures included in the 
annual budget law, such as a limit of zero net 
indebtedness on aggregate local governments; and 
iii) several measures under the Economic 
Adjustment Programme for Portugal (See Box 
IV.A1.2). Currently, there are 50 municipalities 
who should fall under the structural financial 
rebalancing programme according to the criteria 
set by the law. 
In addition, a financial assistance programme 
between the central government and the 
Autonomous Region of Madeira was concluded in 
January 2012 to limit the fiscal risks that the 
region is causing on the Portuguese public 
finances. The arrangement includes fiscal 
consolidation measures, but also measure for 
structural performance such as introducing an 
effective commitment control system, an 
integrated financial management information 
system, accounting, fiscal monitoring and 
reporting in line with central administration, a 
restructuring plan for regional publicly-owned 
enterprises, and cost benefit analysis for 
investment projects and PPPs. 
 
 
Box IV.A1.2: Subnational governments' institutional reform under the Economic Adjustment 
Programme of Portugal
1/ The Local and Regional Finance Laws will be revised to adapt subnational budgetary frameworks to the 
principles and rules of the revised Budgetary Framework Law, namely (i) the inclusion of all relevant public 
entities in the perimeter of local and regional government; (ii) the multi-annual framework with expenditure, 
budget balance and indebtedness rules; and (iii) the interaction with the Fiscal Council. 
2/ Public financial management measures for fiscal reporting and monitoring and accounting in line with 
central administration will be implemented, and an effective commitment control system will be introduced. 
The number of public employees will be reduced by 2 per cent per year over the duration of the program. 
3/ The fiscal rules for subnational governments will be reviewed and early triggers for corrective action will 
be introduced. At municipality level, fiscal rules will not be defined in structural terms as at the national 
level, other solutions to correct for possible pro-cyclical bias will be determined. By contrast, at regional 
level, the fiscal rules at the national level may be replicated conditional on appropriate development of 
statistical methods for regional GDP figures. These have the advantage of being simple and easy to 
understand. 
4/ A procedure for an orderly debt resolution for regional and local governments will be designed and 
implemented.  
5/ The revenue sharing mechanisms are to be revised and a fully-fledged medium-term fiscal framework in 
line with the central government will be introduced. The revisions also need to be designed in the light of the 
new EU fiscal framework. 
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A1.22. ROMANIA 
1. General description 
Romania is a unitary national state with a 
predominant central government and a two-tier 
structure of local government(
293
). The territorial 
administrative framework(
294
) consists of 41 
counties (judete)(
295
) and the capital city of 
Bucharest, which are defined by limited autonomy, 
both in terms of decisional power, and financial 
and fiscal areas. A second-tier local administration 
is made out of localities (localitati). In 2011, there 
were 3,181 such jurisdictions, consisting of 2,861 
communes (comune)(
296
), 217 towns (orase), 103 
cities (municipii). The city of Bucharest has a dual 
status of municipality and county. 
During the last two decades, Romania has made 
important steps in adjusting its system for 
financing the administrative-territorial units, which 
could be broadly divided into 3 separate reform 
cycles: (i) covering the period 1991-1994, in which 
important steps were made with regard to the 
administrative structure and financing of public 
local authorities (including the local tax system); 
(ii) concerning the period 1998-2000, which saw a 
further increase of the revenues transferred to the 
local budgets (from 3.6% to 6.5% of GDP between 
1998-2001); and (iii) covering the period 2001 
onwards, with the adoption of the 215/2001 Local 
Public Administration Act that set out the general 
conditions for self-government, autonomy and 
organisation at public level and the 273/2006 
Local Public Finances Act that set out the 
framework and the rules for revenues and spending 
at local level.  These changes were mainly driven 
by the need to increase the performance of local 
public administration, as well as to assure a high 
                                                          
(293) This is according to the Constitution of Romania (articles 
119-120), adopted in 1991, amended in 2003 and 2011, as 
well as in the Law on Public Administration (as amended 
in 1996). 
(294) Historically, the public administration in Romania was 
subject to multiple reforms (i.e. approximately 30 reforms 
during the last two centuries). The current structure is the 
result of this step-by-step approach in institutionalising the 
local and regional administrative structures. 
(295) The counties are formally grouped into 8 development 
regions, according to the NUTS-2 criteria. The regions are 
not territorial-administrative units, but rather created as a 
group of counties, aiming to facilitate the implementation 
of the European regional development policy. 
(296) The communes together comprise more than 13,000 
villages, with populations of up to 5,000 inhabitants each. 
level of transparency and stability of the inter-
governmental fiscal relationship. Several other acts 
(e.g. the 195/2006 Framework Law on 
Decentralisation, the 286/2006 Local Public 
Administration Act, and the 51/2006 Community 
Services of Public Interest Act) reinforced the 
reforming process of local public administration. 
In 2010, total spending by local government 
amounted to 9.6% of GDP (excluding the interest), 
of which over 70% are used to cover current 
expenses. Total revenue accounted for 9.7% of 
GDP. Central government transfers and grants(
297
) 
represented almost 7.6% of GDP, around 19% of 
total public expenditure. Local authorities also 
have the possibility of borrowing money within a 
total annual ceiling approved by the central 
government.  
2. Government spending 
The responsibilities of local government mainly 
concern the implementation of certain public 
policies, with some autonomy in particular over 
capital expenditure for the supporting local 
infrastructure, while their regulation is conducted 
by the central government. Nevertheless, 
municipalities exert some management control on 
specific public utilities (e.g. water supply, 
sewerage, waste, district heating, and in larger 
cities public transportation). The majority of sub-
national discretionary spending is devoted to 
community infrastructure, street maintenance, 
cultural programs, school operating and 
maintenance, and social assistance programs. 
In 2010, total spending by local governments 
amounted to EUR 11.9 billion or 9.8% of GDP. 
Based on the functional breakdown of public 
expenditure (i.e. COFOG classification), the 
budgets of local governments are dominated by 
spending on education. Education accounted for 
more than 20% of local government expenditure, 
closely followed by economic affairs with 19%. 
However, with regard to the education, their role is 
rather limited, mainly acting as paymasters, as well 
as for operating and maintaining school buildings 
(financed from discretionary revenues). Similarly, 
                                                          
(297) They fall into two categories: grants and subsidies for 
current spending and compensation for transfer of 
responsibilities, and grants and subsidies for capital 
expenditure. 
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they act as agents of centrally-financed social 
assistance programs (e.g. guaranteed minimum 
income).  
An analysis by type of expenditure shows that 
current expenditure accounted for EUR 8,578.6 
million and represented more than 71.4% of sub-
national public expenditure, while the remaining 
part is related to the reimbursement of capital and 
the payment of interest costs. In the last years, 
local investment has been on the rise, mainly as a 
result of the greater decentralisation. In particular, 
the ratio of capital expenditure in total expenditure 
for counties stood at 26.5%, due to their increased 
responsibilities in the management of public 
services, as well as maintaining the road network 
and public transportation. 
3. Financial arrangements 
Local budgets are highly dependent on the 
transfers received from the central budget. A small 
number of local communities generate sufficient 
revenues by their own. The source of revenues for 
local administration is divided into several 
categories: (i) current fiscal revenues (e.g. taxes on 
properties, land and transportation vehicles); (ii) 
current non-fiscal revenues (e.g. transfers and 
grants from the state budget); (iii) capital revenues 
(e.g. through the privatization process); and (iv) 
revenues from special sources (e.g. taxes and 
unused expense allocations for year t, which are 
carried forward to year t+1). 
In 2009, the largest single source of local 
government revenue (i.e. 28% of the total sub-
national revenues) consisted of earmarked grants 
for decentralized functions, followed by the 
personal income tax (i.e. 25%) and local taxes and 
fees (14%). Subventions, which consist of 
earmarked subsidies from sectoral ministries, 
comprised another 10% of total revenues. 
Following an ever increasing budgetary autonomy 
of local governments, the equalization plays an 
important role and implies a greater responsibility 
with regard to efficiency and rationality of 
utilizing local resources. That is why budgetary 
correcting mechanisms and equalising transfers are 
set in place. Their aim is to correct imbalances that 
occur locally both vertically (e.g. local taxes do not 
cover the public expenditures), and horizontally, 
because not all local communities are financially 
sound.  
4. Fiscal rules 
There are two fiscal rules currently applying in 
Romania (i.e. budget balance rule, and debt rule), 
both having a statutory basis in the Local Finance 
Public Law. 'The budget balance rule' is applicable 
to local governments, being in force since 1990. 
Loans used to finance investment and debt 
refinancing are excluded from the scope of this 
rule. 'Debt rule' is defined as a ceiling (i.e. 
percentage) of current revenue and is in force since 
1999. Local government cannot contract or 
guarantee loans if their annual public debt service 
(e.g. principal payment, interest, commissions) 
including the loan they want to contract, is greater 
than 30% of their own revenue. From this rule, the 
loans for co-financing EU projects are excluded. 
Local lending is subject to authorisation by a 
central commission organised at the level of the 
Ministry of Public Finance. 
A1.23. SLOVENIA 
1. General description 
The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia 
provides for a decentralised, two-tier(
298
) 
government structure, composed of central 
government and local governments 
(municipalities). This structure was shaped in the 
second half of the 1990s when the number of 
municipalities gradually increased from 60 to 
almost 200; it now stands at 211. 
Municipalities are responsible for local functions 
they can provide independently for their 
inhabitants (original functions) and for functions 
transferred by the central government, with their 
consent and if sufficient financing is provided 
(transferred functions). More than half of their 
revenue comes from the redistribution of personal 
income tax. 
                                                          
(298) The Constitution foresees the possible formation of 
regions, which is the autonomous local government level to 
administer local functions of a broader importance than 
those of municipalities as well as other functions as defined 
by law. However, this provision has to date not been 
implemented. 
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According to the OECD Fiscal Decentralisation 
database, the share of municipalities' expenditure 
in total consolidated general government 
expenditure was 25.5% in 2010, corresponding to 
about 10% of GDP. Their share in total 
consolidated general government revenue was 
15.4% (5.9% of GDP). Municipalities usually 
record a marginal deficit position of around 0.1% 
of GDP (over the period 2001-2011, the deficit 
was higher at around ½% of GDP on average in 
the years 2008-2010)(
299
). 
There are also two social security funds: the 
pension and disability insurance fund (PDIF) and 
the health insurance fund (HIF). Any PDIF deficit 
is covered by financing from the central budget, 
while the HIF has been in deficit in recent years, 
following several years of surpluses. 
2. Government spending 
According to the COFOG classification of 
government expenditure, municipalities’ main 
functions are: (i) economic affairs, especially road 
transport (24% of their total spending in 2010); (ii) 
education, especially pre-primary and primary 
education (20%); (iii) general public services 
(17%); and (iv) recreation, culture and religion 
(16%). Other non-negligible functions in terms of 
spending are environmental protection (waste and 
waste water management) and housing. 
Policies for pre-primary and primary education are 
designed, and standards formulated, at the central 
level, whereas municipalities ensure their 
implementation, with some autonomy in particular 
over capital expenditure for the supporting 
infrastructure. Municipalities have some more 
autonomy in policy and decision making for the 
other main functions highlighted above. 
The PDIF administers various old-age and 
disability pension schemes. The HIF pays for the 
provision of medical services and related 
compensations of policyholders. 
                                                          
(299) The municipalities’ revenue and expenditure shares as 
percentage of GDP do not add up to the deficit ratios 
because in the database consolidated total general 
government expenditure is defined as global total 
expenditure at general government level plus the total 
inter-governmental property expenditure and consolidated 
total general government revenue is global total revenue at 
general government level plus the total inter-governmental 
property income. 
3. Financial arrangements 
Municipalities’ financial arrangements are based 
on the concepts of “adequate spending” and 
“adequate funding” and the principle of 
proportionality between responsibilities and 
resources(
300
). Adequate spending is the amount a 
municipality is assumed to spend on its 
responsibilities. It is based on a formula including 
a lump sum per inhabitant(
301
) and the number of 
inhabitants adjusted for the situation of the 
municipality on some specific parameters (such as 
its relative area surface, length of local roads and 
proportion of inhabitants under 15 and over 65). It 
is financed through the redistribution of personal 
income tax (PIT) revenue, which is based on the 
concept of adequate funding and represents around 
58% of municipalities’ total revenue, and, where 
needed, additional government transfers(
302
). 
Municipalities’ revenues also consist of other own 
resources and municipal fees. Examples of the 
former are taxes on vessels, on inheritance and 
gifts and on winnings from conventional games of 
chance as well as real estate turnover tax; 
municipalities have no autonomy for setting 
underlying tax rates or bases. They do have this 
autonomy (to some extent) for municipal fees, 
including concessions, fines, environmental 
                                                          
(300) Financial arrangements are presented in detail in the 
Municipalities' Financing Act and the Public Finance Act. 
(301) Set at €554.50 in 2012 at the state level. 
(302) Adequate funding is based on a similar formula as adequate 
spending but with the adjustment reflecting each 
municipality’s specific situation assuming a lower weight. 
In year t, the central government redistributes 54% of PIT 
revenue paid in year t-2 indexed for inflation in years t-1 
and t, in three steps. First, 70% of this amount is 
redistributed, based on the proportion of total PIT collected 
in each municipality (and limited to its adequate funding). 
Second, additional PIT revenue, eventually increased by 
part of redistributed PIT revenue from the first step which 
already exceeded adequate funding for individual 
municipalities, is allocated up to the total adequate funding 
for all other municipalities (solidarity compensation). 
Third, in case the total available amount of PIT revenue 
exceeds total adequate funding, the remainder is further 
redistributed to proportionally cover as much as possible 
the gap with municipalities’ adequate spending (additional 
solidarity compensation). If a municipality’s total PIT 
revenue still falls short of its adequate spending (expected 
to apply to 150 municipalities in 2012), it receives an 
additional equalising transfer from the central government 
(financial compensation) to fill the gap. Municipalities 
with a higher proportion of high-income earners end up 
with redistributed PIT revenue exceeding the amount they 
are assumed to spend on their responsibilities (adequate 
spending). 
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charges(
303
) and payments for local public services. 
Finally, municipalities receive property income as 
well as donations and transfers from the EU and 
central government for specific purposes (e.g. 
investment).  
The PDIF is funded with mandatory contributions 
for pension and disability insurance as well as with 
transfers from the central government budget, 
which must fully cover any gap between PDIF 
expenditure and revenue. These transfers are on an 
increasing trend and stood at around 4% of GDP in 
2011. The PDIF is not permitted to accumulate 
debt. 
The HIF is funded with mandatory contributions 
for health insurance. It was in surplus until 2008; 
its deficits since then have been covered by 
reserves. 
4. Fiscal rules 
Municipalities are only allowed to borrow 
domestically, and for investment purposes, up to a 
certain ceiling. A municipality can also borrow for 
liquidity purposes up to 5% of the last adopted 
budget. Debt assumptions are prohibited and 
municipalities cannot issue bonds but they can 
issue debt guarantees for indirect budgetary 
users(
304
) and local public enterprises. The 
Minister of Finance has to authorise any borrowing 
when the repayment is not foreseen to occur within 
the same budgetary year. 
The Municipalities' Financing Act specifies a debt 
rule for municipalities. The annual ceiling for their 
payment of loans principal and interest, financial 
leasing, trade credits and contingent liabilities is 
set at 8% of their revenue in the previous year 
(excluding donations, investment transfers from 
the central government, EU funds and revenue 
from business activities). The rule is based on cash 
accounting and there are no predefined escape 
clauses. It was introduced in 1995 and the most 
recent revisions have made the rule more coherent 
by abolishing special treatment of certain 
                                                          
(303) Environmental charges are earmarked for infrastructure 
and implementation of environmental measures and 
standards. 
(304) These are institutes and foundations, i.e. legal entities for 
the provision of specific public services, such as schools, 
libraries, medical centres, sports and cultural centres, etc.... 
There are some 1500 indirect budgetary users in Slovenia. 
investments (e.g. in education, housing, water 
supply). It is monitored and enforced by the 
Ministry of Finance. Over-indebted municipalities 
are not authorised to borrow by the Ministry of 
Finance and first have to reduce their debts. The 
available information does not suggest that any 
municipality has ever defaulted or been bailed out, 
although there are few municipalities with blocked 
transaction accounts due to over-indebtedness. 
The local debt rule generally appears to have 
ensured that municipalities curb their expenditure 
rather than break the debt ceiling. Municipalities 
are estimated to spend on average around 5.4% of 
their revenue on the annual payment of liabilities, 
which suggests that they are generally below the 
8% threshold by a relatively wide margin. Still, 
local government debt in ESA95 terms increased 
from 0.7% to 1.7% of GDP between 2007 and 
2010 and the number of municipalities without 
debt has shrunk. To improve public finance 
surveillance at the local level, the government 
intends to launch an online tool for an up-to-date 
and comprehensive calculation of individual 
municipalities' indebtedness levels in the near 
future. 
5. Other relevant institutional features 
Several legal provisions seek to limit deviations 
from the fiscal targets adopted by the municipality 
council. During the budget execution phase, the 
mayor can, on a proposal from the municipal 
department responsible for finance, impose a 
temporary moratorium (of up to 45-days) on new 
expenditure by (i) blocking new contracts from 
being signed; (ii) prolonging payment periods; and 
(iii) ending the redistribution of budgetary funds 
among users. If such a moratorium is not 
sufficient, the mayor must propose a 
supplementary budget and can prolong the 
moratorium until this supplementary budget is 
approved. These arrangements are similar those for 
the central government budget. 
A1.24. SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
1. Introduction 
Slovak Republic is a unitary state with two tiers of 
sub national entities: 8 regions (VUC) and 2887 
municipalities (obce). The existence of 
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municipality and region (higher territorial unit) is 
embodied in the Constitution which states that the 
basic unit of territorial self-administration is the 
municipality. The territorial self-administration is 
then composed of a municipality and a higher 
territorial unit. Both levels of subnational 
government are independent territorially and 
administratively and they are also independent of 
each other. 
Significant changes to the system took place 
between 2001 and 2003. In 2001 the regional 
governments were established as units of self-
administration and in 2002 the transfer of 
competences to regions and municipalities began. 
Between 2002 and 2003 over 90 competencies 
were transferred to regions and over 60 to 
municipalities. (
305
) In 2004, administrative 
districts (okres) were abolished.  
2. Government spending 
Main responsibilities of municipalities lie in the 
fields of education, social welfare for elderly, 
social housing (construction and maintenance), 
local utilities, health (outpatients departments, 
hospitals and medical centres of first type), tourism 
and public order. In terms of spending, over 30% 
of overall expenditures in 2011 were devoted to 
education where municipalities are responsible for 
preschool education (kindergartens, nursery), 
primary education and activities which are not 
directly related to primary education such as art 
schools, school kitchens and canteens etc. 
Main responsibilities of regions are in the fields of 
secondary education, social welfare and social 
policy, regional roads, transport, railways, health 
(hospitals and medical centres of second type, non-
state health care) and regional development. 
Education is again the most significant area of 
spending with almost 40% of overall expenditures 
devoted to it in 2011. 
3. Financial arrangements 
Municipalities and regions provide services in two 
different ways - through autonomous and 
delegated competences. These two ways differ in 
degrees of competences and ways of financing. 
                                                          
(305) http://www.infostat.sk/vdc/pdf/slavikdoc.pdf 
When exercising autonomous responsibilities the 
subnational government is bounded by the 
Constitution and laws but the actual exercise 
powers are under the discretion of a municipality 
or a region. Subnational governments decide 
independently and carry out all autonomous 
responsibilities as defined by law and the state 
only monitors whether subnational governments 
comply with the law. Autonomous competences of 
subnational governments are funded from own 
revenues.  
For example, in case of education, financing of art 
schools, kindergartens, language schools, clubs, 
children's educational centres for leisure activities 
and other facilities within the scope of autonomous 
responsibilities of subnational governments is 
secured in this way (i.e. from own revenues). 
In terms of delegated responsibilities, subnational 
governments have a role of executive bodies that 
apply state administration under the control of the 
state. Subnational authority is bound not only by 
the Constitution and law, but also by lower levels 
of legislation such as government regulations, 
decrees, ministerial actions etc. Although 
subnational governments finance these services 
from their budget, the funds in fact come from the 
state budget and individual ministries in the form 
of transfers. In this case, the state controls 
extensively the use of the funds provided to 
subnational governments. For example, current 
expenditures on education in primary and 
secondary schools are funded in this way.  
Revenues   
Revenues of both levels of subnational 
governments come from shared taxes, own 
revenues and grants. Shared taxes include personal 
income tax which is collected by the state and 
shared among regions (23.5%), municipalities 
(70.3%) and the central government (6.2%). The 
sharing key is a function of demographic criteria. 
From January 2012 a new rule for sharing tax 
income revenue entered into force setting new 
shares for government layers - regions (21.9%), 
municipalities (65.4%) and the central government 
(12.7%). 
For municipalities, tax revenues account for over 
50% of overall revenues. These include own-
source revenues such as the real estate tax and 
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other taxes on goods and services on which 
municipalities can freely decide the rate (except 
for a capping). However, the personal income tax 
revenues is the most important revenue source 
accounting for almost 70% of all tax revenues in 
2010. This can in a way problematic because 
revenues from the personal income tax are rather 
cyclical.  
Grants represented almost 35% of total revenues 
and they were all earmarked to cover all delegated 
responsibilities or to finance specific projects.  
For regions, tax revenues represented about 47% 
of total revenues in 2010 of which over one quarter 
is own-source revenue from the vehicle tax. The 
rest comes again from the personal income tax. 
Grants accounted for over 45% of total revenues in 
2010 and were again all earmarked to cover all 
delegated responsibilities (or to finance specific 
projects). 
4. Fiscal rules 
Fiscal rules aimed at local governments include a 
debt rule, a budget balance rule and recently 
certain new measures embodied in the constitution.  
Debt rule states that subnational governments are 
allowed to take out credit/loan/issue bonds only if: 
a) the total sum of the debt of the municipality or 
self-governing region does not exceed 60 % of 
final current revenues of the preceding budget year 
and b) the sum of the annual instalments of the 
loans does not exceed 25% of final current 
revenues of the preceding budget year.  
Budget balance rule says that the current budget 
(one part of the overall budgets of local 
governments) has to be adopted either as balanced 
or in surplus. The Act on budgetary rules of 
subnational governments lists possible exceptions, 
for example in cases when a subsidy from the state 
budget is envisaged or when EU financing is 
budgeted for the fiscal year in question. Capital 
budget may be set up with a deficit if this deficit 
can be covered from previous years, and 
reimbursable sources of financing (loans), or if this 
deficit is covered by the current budget surplus in 
the budget year. 
Generally, it can be said that the budget balance 
rule has been respected. If a subnational entity 
breaks rules the Ministry of Finance may impose a 
fine of up to €16 597. However, this kind of 
punishment is not automatic and has been used 
only in exceptional cases when certain 
municipalities did not provide their financial 
statements..  
Finally, Constitutional law no 493/2011 article 6 
paragraph (3) states that if the total debt of the 
municipality or higher territorial unit reaches 60% 
of actual current income of previous financial year 
or more, municipality or higher regional units are 
obliged to pay a fine imposed by the Ministry of 
Finance amounting to 5% of the difference 
between the total debt and 60% of actual current 
income of the previous financial year. The 
paragraph will be effective from 1.1.2015. 
In terms of bankruptcy, subnational governments 
cannot declare bankruptcy. Constitutional law no 
493/2011 article 6 paragraph (1) states that the 
Government does not guarantee funding for 
provision the solvency and is not responsible for 
the solvency of the village or higher territorial unit. 
A procedure for dealing with insolvency of a 
municipality or higher territorial unit is provided in 
a secondary legislation. In case of serious financial 
difficulties municipalities are obliged to introduce 
"recovery regime" (1
st
 mode) which gives 
municipalities 120 days to demonstrate an 
improvement in their financial condition. If they 
fail to meet this deadline the Ministry of Finance is 
entitled to decide about the introduction of forced 
administration (2
nd
 mode) in which case the 
Ministry has the authority to approve all financial 
transactions and to request adoption of revenue 
raising measures. The Ministry does not provide 
additional funds to a municipality. Out of 2900 
municipalities, 12 municipalities introduced a 
recovery regime in 2011. Forced administration 
was used in 6 municipalities since 2005. 
A1.25. FINLAND 
1. General description 
Finland is unitary country with two-tier 
government structure. Municipalities are self-
governing units where the highest decision-making 
authority is vested in local councils elected by 
residents. Autonomy of the local authorities is 
protected by the constitution. The law on local 
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self-governance (Kuntalaki) states that the local 
authorities have to perform the functions delegated 
to them in the laws and can decide to take other 
functions by virtue of their autonomy. Local 
authorities may not be allotted new functions or 
duties, nor shall they be deprived of functions or 
rights, other than by passing legislation to this 
effect. 
Municipalities have very important role in Finnish 
public finances. They are responsible for wide 
variety of public services, they have right to levy 
taxes on their inhabitants. The budgets of local and 
joint municipal authorities were approximately 42 
billion euros in 2011 or 22% of GDP. Some 430 
000 employees, or close to 20% of the Finnish 
workforce, are working for the municipalities. 
The tax ratio, i.e. the ratio of taxes and compulsory 
social security contributions to gross domestic 
product was 42.9 per cent in 2011 in Finland. 
Local governments collected 19.2 billion euros or 
10% of the GDP in local taxes. In addition, the 
local governments receive revenues from state 
transfers and for the provision of their services. 
The stock of loans of local municipalities is ca 
12.2 bln euros at the end of 2011.  
The Ministry of the Finance is monitoring the 
operations and finances of local authorities in 
general and ensures that municipal autonomy is 
taken into account in the preparation of legislation 
concerning local authorities. Central Government's 
Regional Administrative Agencies 
(Aluehallintovirasto) supervise the activities of the 
municipalities, verifying that these are in line with 
the laws in force. They also investigate any 
complaints in this regard. However, this does not 
give rise to three-tier structure.  
At the beginning of year 2012, Finland had 336 
municipalities. The municipalities are relatively 
small – there are less than 6000 inhabitants in 
more than half of the municipalities. Seven urban 
municipalities have more than 100,000 inhabitants. 
Municipalities are encouraged to form joint 
municipal authorities to provide services to their 
inhabitants. There are ca. 180 joint authorities in 
Finland. These are set up by two or more local 
authorities to carry out specific tasks on a 
permanent basis. The most important joint 
authorities are hospital districts, districts for care 
of the disabled and joint authorities for the 
performance of functions related to public health 
and education. Three-quarters of all joint authority 
expenditure is incurred from organising health 
services.  
There is also special joint authority called regional 
council or “Maakuntaliito” which consists of the 
municipalities in given geographical region 
corresponding to the NUTS region. There are 19 
regions in Finland and it is obligatory for the 
municipalities of the given region to be associated 
with a regional council. However, this must also 
not be confused with three-tier governance system. 
The councils are responsible for regional 
development, including the EU structural funds 
programmes and regional spatial planning. These 
represent and promote the regions but their 
economic importance is limited – the total number 
of staff of all offices is about 650 persons, the 
budgets about 50 million euros or around 1% of 
local government sector expenditure. 
The number of municipalities has been declining 
(there were 452 municipalities in the beginning of 
year 2000) but is generally still considered to be 
too large in Finland, arising concerns that the 
municipalities are not efficient in delivering the 
services. Fusions of municipalities have been 
encouraged by the government. There is an on-
going debate regarding the reorganization of local 
authorities, dramatically lowering the number of 
the municipalities, mainly in order to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of their services. The reform 
would also concern legislation governing the 
activities of the municipalities.  
Municipal finances are based on annual budgeting. 
This consists of the budget for the next financial 
year and budget framework for minimum three 
years, including the budget year. The law requires 
that the budget must be in balance over the four-
year period. Ministry of Finance supervises the 
compliance regarding the budget balance rule. The 
primary responsibility rests within the municipality 
itself – committee appointed by the council 
monitors and reviews the execution of the budget, 
including the achievement of the objectives set in 
the budget. Activities and accounts of 
municipalities are subject to annual audits by 
professional audit companies. Auditors report to 
the municipal council. 
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2. Government spending 
Local governments' budgetary expenditure in 2011 
was 40.4 bln euros while the general government 
sector spent 103.5 bln euros. Largest share of 
expenditure goes towards the production of basic 
services, the most important of which relate to 
social welfare and health care, education and 
culture, the environment and local infrastructure. 
In each area there is an elaborate division of labour 
between the central and local government, clearly 
defined in the legislation. Generally, central 
government agencies are responsible for making 
the transfer payments to the citizens while local 
authorities provide the services. Nature and quality 
of the services (for example, the content of the 
curricula at schools or the required medical 
services) is mostly pre-defined in legislation. Often 
the legislation defines the objective the 
municipality has to reach but leaves its hands free 
in choosing the means. Municipal council has to 
decide on the allocation of resources to achieve 
targets set by the laws. In most cases the council is 
free to select the level of resources but can be 
made responsible when standards are not met. This 
includes the possibility to levy fines on the 
municipality.  
As an example of the division of labour, central 
government agency KELA is responsible for the 
payment of pensions, including disability pensions, 
and compensation for the medication. Similarly, 
they pay compensation for income lost due to 
sickness and compensate some form of treatment 
received in the private medical services sector. At 
the same time, the local authorities are responsible 
for the organization of the provision of medical 
services in medical centres and hospitals. They 
organize children’s day-care, services for the 
elderly, including long-term care etc. In principle, 
the inhabitants are expected to use the services 
offered by their municipality.  
Important challenge in this system is that the 
services are fragmented and citizens have unequal 
access to the services depending on the 
municipality where they live. Fragmentation 
increases costs per se, but apparent lack of 
competition in service provision has enabled 
steady decrease in the productivity in delivering 
these services.  
49% of municipal expenditure was directed 
towards social welfare and healthcare services in 
2011. Education and culture accounted for 22% of 
expenditure, municipal investments 11%. Debt 
servicing expenditure was 4% of the total 
expenditure.  
In the provision of education, the municipalities 
are responsible for all levels of primary and 
secondary schools. They are also responsible for 
life-long learning activities and youth activities. 
Universities are independent institutions, with 
autonomy granted in the constitution and 
governance regulated by special legislative acts.  
In addition, the municipalities are responsible for 
spatial planning and supervising the construction 
activities. Municipalities arrange the provision of 
water, energy and waste services, take care of the 
streets and environmental protection. Often these 
services are provided by companies owned by the 
municipalities or groups of municipalities.  
3. Financial arrangements 
Taking the example of year 2010, the tax revenue 
of the local authorities accounted for 46% of their 
total revenue. It consists of municipal tax on 
earned income, real estate tax and part of company 
tax. Average municipal tax rate is 18.3%. The tax 
rate of the municipal income tax  can be set to any 
level decided by the council, but according to the 
law the tax rate is flat and the tax base is earned 
income, capital income is not taxed by the local 
authorities.  
Land and buildings are subject to real estate tax, 
except land used for agriculture or forestry. Tax is 
paid by the owner of the real estate, taxable value 
is defined in the act on the valuation of assets in 
taxation. Municipal councils can determine the 
rates in the limits set by law. These limits are 
rather low for primary residences and higher for 
real estate related to business and industry. 
Interesting aspect is punitive rate towards empty 
lots allocated for construction.  
Corporation tax is tax collected from companies, 
the rate of which is 26% of the taxable income of a 
corporation. This tax is paid to the state, 
municipalities and parishes of the Finnish 
Evangelical Lutheran and Finnish Orthodox 
Churches. The share of municipalities is ca 1/5 of 
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the tax collected. However, this tax is national tax 
and municipalities do not have right to decide on 
the level or base of the tax.  
Operating revenue accounted for 27% of the 
revenues, its sources are revenues from companies 
owned by the municipalities in water, energy, and 
waste and public transport sectors. Some revenue 
is also earned by the provision of social and health 
services. Education is always provided free of 
charge.  
Further 18% of local government revenues 
stemmed from the central government transfers 
(7.7 billion). Central government finances certain 
state functions delegated to the municipalities. 
These include obligations of the municipalities to 
provide services in education, day-care for 
children, healthcare, social security, protection of 
minors, assistance to disabled, prevention of health 
hazards, environmental services, consumer 
protection and culture, including the provision of 
library services.  
The government transfers are also aimed at 
streamlining the economic differences between the 
municipalities in order to achieve uniform level of 
services across the country. Municipalities can also 
apply for additional discretionary governmental 
support in case of lasting economic difficulties. 
However, the discretionary support is used on very 
limited cases and the amounts granted are small. In 
2011, 63 municipalities applied for the exceptional 
support (for the amount of €70 mln) and it was 
granted to 31 in the amount of €20 mln. Largest 
amount granted was €1.2 mln euros. As such, the 
possibility to receive discretionary support does 
not lower the fiscal discipline of municipalities. 
Any request for discretionary support must include 
a programme to balance the budget. Special 
conditions could be set by the government and the 
municipality cannot count that the support would 
be awarded also in the following years. The 
complicated formulas for determining the central 
government transfers take into account the 
presumed costs of providing the services, 
population structure and density, existence of 
island conditions, remoteness from larger centres, 
unemployment level, number of disabled and 
elderly needing care etc. If the estimated tax 
income per capita is lower than 91.86% of national 
average, government transfer is increased. The 
transfers are based on the central government 
estimations of the cost of required services' 
provision but the funds are not earmarked to 
specific activities. This means that there is 
incentive to be economical in service provision – 
cost-efficiency enables additional expenditure in 
other areas whereas the municipality does not have 
possibility to receive additional transfers when 
actual cost for some service proves to be higher 
than central government calculation foresees. 
4. Fiscal rules 
Local governments are obliged by law to keep 
their budgets balanced over a four-year period and 
municipalities generally abide by the law. The 
Ministry of Finance monitors the ability of the 
municipalities to meet their funding needs and 
forecasts short-term trends in local government 
finances, both in individual municipalities and at 
regional level. The government has specific 
powers to enforce a review of a municipality’s 
finances and to work toward a recovery plan if the 
local government has fallen below target financial 
ratios. In case the ratios are breached in two 
consecutive years, a special committee is formed. 
This includes representative from the Ministry of 
Finance, representative from the municipality 
under question and an independent chairperson. 
The committee forms a proposal on the necessary 
measures to guarantee the continued delivery of 
services to the citizens. Based on the review, 
Ministry of Finance can decide to start the 
procedures to merge the municipality with another.  
Municipalities are not subject to the bankruptcy 
law. 
So far, on the aggregate level, local government 
deficits and debt have remained modest (local debt 
amounts only to about 6% of GDP).  
The municipal council has very wide authority: it 
sets the tax rates, decides on the general principles 
for the charges to be collected for services and 
other performances, sets operational and financial 
targets for a municipal enterprise, decides whether 
to provide a guarantee or other security for another 
party’s debt, decide on the principles for the 
financial remunerations of elected officials, 
chooses the auditor and approves the financial 
statements.  
When approving the budget, the council must also 
approve a financial plan for three or more years. 
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The financial plan must be in balance or show a 
surplus during the planning period of maximum 
four years.  
Municipalities are also subject to strict reporting 
rules. Financial statements on each financial year 
have to be drawn up by the end of March of the 
following year and submitted to the auditors for 
inspection. The documents include a report on 
operations, providing an account of how far the 
operational and financial targets set by the council 
have been achieved.  
Auditors (professional audit organisations) verify 
that the local authority has been administered in 
accordance with the law and council decisions, 
financial statements give correct and adequate 
information on finances and that the information 
given on the bases for and use of government 
grants is correct.  
5. Other relevant institutional features 
Local government lending is dominated by 
Municipality Finance Corporation (Kuntarahoitus 
OY). Owned by municipalities and the Finnish 
state, Municipality Finance is a credit institution in 
the service of its members. The credit ratings for 
Municipality Finance's long-term funding are the 
highest possible: Aaa from Moody's, and AAA 
from Standard & Poor's and thus the institution has 
access to low-cost funding. 
Municipality Finance offers financial services on 
market terms for municipalities, municipal 
federations, municipally controlled organisations 
and non-profit housing organisations. The 
company's funding is obtained from both 
international capital markets and domestic 
investors. 
All the borrowing is guaranteed by the Municipal 
Guarantee Board. Almost all Finnish 
municipalities are members of the MGB and are 
consequently liable for its liabilities. If a municipal 
member failed to pay on its obligation, other 
members would be jointly liable for the shortfall 
according to their share of participation to the 
MGB.  
Municipality Finance has not suffered any loan 
defaults. It is not obliged to extend a loan and may 
decline a loan application, although the strengths 
of the Finnish local government and government-
related sectors make a refusal unlikely.  
A1.26. SWEDEN 
1. General description 
Sweden is a decentralised country with a high 
degree of local self-governance. Local government 
has a long tradition in Sweden. The country's 290 
municipalities and 20 county councils and regions 
are responsible for providing a significant 
proportion of all public services. They have a 
considerable degree of autonomy and have 
independent powers of taxation. Local self-
government and the right to levy taxes are 
stipulated in the Instrument of Government, one of 
the four pillars of the Swedish Constitution. 
There is no hierarchical relation between 
municipalities, county councils and regions, since 
all have their own self-governing local authorities 
with responsibility for different activities. The only 
exception is Gotland, an island in the Baltic Sea, 
where the municipality also has the responsibilities 
and tasks normally associated with a county 
council. A region is a county council with 
extended responsibilities. 
About half of all public revenues and expenditures 
relate to subnational governments, corresponding 
to about 24% of GDP. Tax revenues, most of 
which consist of taxes on earned income, make up 
about two thirds of overall revenues, with general 
state transfers providing another 15% and targeted 
state transfers, user fees, rents and other revenues 
making up the rest. 
2. Government spending 
The municipalities are legally or contractually 
responsible for providing the following services: 
social services, childcare and preschools, elderly 
care, support for the physically and intellectually 
disabled, primary and secondary education(
306
), 
planning and building issues, health and 
environmental protection, refuse collection and 
waste management, emergency services and 
emergency preparedness and water and sewerage. 
                                                          
(306) All compulsory education is the responsibility of 
municipalities. 
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Other activities are provided on a voluntary basis, 
such as leisure activities, cultural activities (apart 
from libraries, which are a statutory 
responsibility), housing, energy as well as 
industrial and commercial services.  
The county councils are legally obliged to provide 
health care (managing and financing hospitals), 
dental care for people up to the age of 20 and 
public transport (in some cases, public transport is 
managed in cooperation with municipalities). 
Other activities are provided on a voluntary basis, 
such as cultural activities, education, tourism 
services and regional development. 
Generally, subnational governments enjoy a 
relatively high degree of freedom to organise their 
activities, which can be adapted to local 
circumstances. The Local Government Act 
governs the responsibilities, obligations and 
mandate of local governments. There are some 
restrictions on what local government can do, 
notably in the commercial sector in cases where 
they enter into competition with private firms(
307
). 
The distribution of municipalities' expenditures is 
as follows: kindergartens and after-school care 
14%, education 28%, elderly care 19%, support for 
handicapped people 11%, economic support 3%, 
other individual and family support 4%, business 
activities 5%, and others 16%. For the counties, 
the largest items are various forms of health care 
79%, support for medicine expenditure 8%, 
transport and infrastructure 6%, dental care 4% 
and regional development 2%. 
3. Financial arrangements 
Municipalities, county councils and regions are 
entitled to levy taxes in order to finance their 
activities. Taxes are levied as a percentage of the 
inhabitants' income. Municipalities, county 
councils and regions decide on their own tax rates. 
The average, overall local tax rate is 30 per cent. 
Approximately 20 per cent goes to the 
municipalities and 10 per cent to the county 
councils and regions. Tax revenues are the largest 
source of income for Sweden's municipalities, 
                                                          
(307) The Competition Act was modified in this sense in 2010 
giving the Competition Authority to take action against 
local, regional and central  government that are deemed to 
harm competition. 
county councils and regions and account for 
approximately two-thirds of their total income. 
Technically, it is collected by the state, but the 
revenues are redistributed to the various 
subnational levels according to their tax base and 
applicable tax rates.  
Grants from the State are either general or 
targeted. General state grants represent 15% and 
9% of total revenues for municipalities and 
counties, respectively. These are paid per 
inhabitant. Each municipality, county council or 
region can use this money on the basis of local 
conditions(
308
). Targeted grants, which make up 3-
4% of total revenues, must be used to finance 
specific activities(
309
), sometimes over a specific 
period of time. 
There are major variations in the average income 
of the inhabitants of Sweden's municipalities, 
county councils and regions. The cost per 
inhabitant, for providing the services to which they 
are entitled, also varies. In order to ensure fairness, 
a system has been introduced with the aim of 
providing equitable conditions in all 
municipalities, county councils and regions. This is 
the local government equalisation system, which 
entails redistributing the revenues of the 
municipalities, county councils and regions on the 
basis of their tax base and level of expenditure(
310
). 
The equalisation system is managed by the State. 
Municipalities, county councils and regions may 
charge users for their services. A non-profit 
principle applies, however, which means that fees 
may not be higher than the costs relating to the 
service concerned. Fees account for about 6% and 
3% of revenues for municipalities and counties, 
respectively. If the municipalities, county councils 
and regions are obliged to provide a service, they 
may only charge for the service if specifically 
permitted to do so by law. 
                                                          
(308) General grants come with no strings attached, but as local 
gov't spending to a large degree is made up of the wage 
bill, increasing central government grants to local gov't is a 
rather efficient way of counteracting cyclical downturns, as 
it may prevent local gov't from reducing staff in cyclical 
downturns (which they otherwise may deem necessary to 
comply with the local gov't balanced budget requirement). 
(309) Specific grants can be given for any purpose and depends 
on the priorities of the central gov't at any given moment in 
time. 
(310) Measured by structural factors, such as age structure etc. 
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4. Fiscal rules 
Municipalities and counties are subject to a 
balanced-budget requirement, meaning that they 
cannot plan a budget with a deficit. The law 
requires them to conduct their financial planning in 
a prudent way, which has come to mean in practice 
that they should aim for a surplus of about 2% of 
total revenues from taxes and general state grants. 
Since 2005, the average has been 3%. If, ex post, 
there is a deficit, it has to be compensated within 
three years, unless special circumstances apply, for 
which exceptions can be granted(
311
). The 
experience so far is that municipalities and 
counties take this requirement seriously and the 
rule has thus contributed to the overall positive 
performance of Swedish public finances. There are 
no formal sanctions for breaches of the rules, but 
the system has so far worked on the basis of self-
discipline, relying on voters to punish bad financial 
management.  
A1.27. UNITED KINGDOM 
1. General description 
The United Kingdom is constitutionally a unitary 
state: ultimate sovereignty resides with the UK 
Parliament, and it is up to Parliament to decide 
what powers and responsibilities (if any) it 
devolves to local or regional bodies, and how such 
bodies are organised and financed. This contrasts 
with federations such as Germany and the United 
States of America, where the autonomy of 
subnational authorities (Länder in Germany or 
states of the USA) and the division of powers 
between federal and subnational governments are 
constitutionally entrenched. Historically, the UK 
has been relatively centralised even compared with 
other unitary states. 
Devolved country governments 
The United Kingdom consists of four countries: 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. 
The territorial organisation of the UK is highly 
complex and differs widely across the four 
countries, not least because devolution was 
                                                          
(311) Exceptions could be related to unrealized capital losses on 
financial assets (to avoid the ups and downs of the stock 
market to lead to yearly fluctuations in the operations of 
local gov't) or other (unspecified) special circumstances. 
designed differently for each of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland 
There are three devolved national administrations. 
Each was set up in 1997 or later and they have 
varying power and are situated in Belfast, Cardiff 
and Edinburgh; the capitals of Northern Ireland, 
Wales and Scotland respectively. The 3 nations 
have their own institutions, legislative (Wales – 
only secondary ones) and administrative powers, 
i.e. they can modify all laws in their sphere. 
Scotland and Northern Ireland particularise the 
central powers, while Wales specifies the assigned 
ones.  
Unlike the other countries of the UK England 
(which has over 80% of the UK population) has no 
devolved assembly or government of its own but is 
represented solely by the UK parliament and 
government. English regions (9) have only 
administrative competences (and the Regional 
Development agencies (RDAs) have been 
abolished).  
Local government 
Systems of subnational authorities differ across the 
UK: 
 In England there are 34 shire counties (divided 
into 238 districts), 47 shire unitary authorities, 
33 London boroughs (overseen by the Greater 
London Authority - GLA) and 36 metropolitan 
(urban) unitary authorities(
312
). England 
therefore has a total of 389 territorial 
governments, 354 at local level and 35 at 
intermediate level (county councils and the 
GLA) 
 in Wales – 22 unitary authorities 
 in Scotland – 32 unitary authorities,  
                                                          
(312) See Dexia (2008). Only the shire counties and GLA are 
'intermediate' – all the other entities are 'local'. The London 
boroughs, other urban metropolitan authorities and shire 
unitary authorities are all basically at the same level and 
similar size (usually around 100,000 – 300,000 inhabitants) 
with similar powers except that in London some powers are 
with the higher level GLA. The shire districts are often a 
bit smaller and more 'local'.  A lot of UK 'local' 
governments have much larger populations than the lowest 
tier of government would have in most other countries (a 
few of the biggest unitary authorities have over 500,000 
people). 
Part IV 
Fiscal decentralisation in the EU - main characteristics and implications for fiscal outcomes 
 
297 
 Northern Ireland has 26 district councils.  
All local authorities of all types have only 
administrative competences. There are also some 
smaller-scale community, parish and town councils 
which deliver some services for local authorities at 
a very local level(
313
).  
2. Government spending 
The UK government remains responsible for 
national policy on all matters that have not been 
devolved, including foreign affairs, defence, social 
security, macro-economic management and trade.  
It is also responsible for government policy in 
England on all the matters that have been devolved 
to Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. The UK 
Parliament is still able to pass legislation for any 
part of the UK, though in practice it only deals 
with devolved matters with the agreement of the 
devolved governments. 
Local government spending is about a quarter of 
all public spending in the UK. Local authorities are 
funded by a combination of grants from central 
government, Council Tax and business rates. In 
Northern Ireland, district councils still raise money 
through a domestic rate and a business rate. 
The main responsibilities of Scottish, Wales and 
Northern Ireland central authorities are local and 
regional planning, economic development, 
transport, agriculture, forestry and fishery, 
environment, housing, health, education(
314
), 
culture and leisure. Scotland and Northern Ireland 
has additional competences of local government 
organisation, civil law (only Scotland), and police 
and public order. Scotland’s unitary authorities and 
Northern Ireland’s councils are assigned areas of 
local planning, registration, primary and secondary 
education, traffic, public transport, highways, 
personal social services(
315
), housing, consumer 
                                                          
(313) For more details, see http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/pesa_2011_chapter7.pdf. 
(314) The Scottish and Welsh governments do have some 
autonomy in running services. On education, local 
authorities have traditionally run schools (not higher 
education) although there is now a mix with 'academies' 
and 'free schools' which are funded centrally and not under 
local authority control, while other schools remain under 
local authority control. 
(315) 'personal social services' is usually referred to in the UK as 
meaning social care for the elderly and disabled (washing, 
protection, culture and recreation, fire and police 
services, refuse disposal.  
The capital city London has a special statute, with 
the Greater London Authority (GLA) holding 
some powers allocated to local authorities and 
counties elsewhere (the GLA covers the 33 local 
authorities that are part of London). The GLA is 
responsible for strategic planning, economic 
development, transport, environment, public 
health, fire services, police, and culture. Counties 
have powers in areas of local planning, transport, 
primary and secondary education, culture and 
leisure, personal social services, consumer 
protection, refuse disposal, fire services and police. 
Districts have competences of local planning 
(shared with county), registration, housing, 
environment, culture and recreation(
316
). 
However, even in many of the policy areas 
administered by local government, implementation 
is still largely on the basis of national policy rules 
and guidelines. This limits the ability of local 
government to vary the way in which it operates 
policy much from a nationally set template (for 
example education, planning)(
317
). 
                                                                                   
cleaning, providing meals, etc.) and services to provide 
support to other vulnerable people (e.g. social workers 
whose job it is to work with problem families and protect 
children). 
(316) Some local authorities are trying to move to having more 
shared services where a number of local authorities provide 
a single service. 
(317) The current UK government has a policy of 'localism' see 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/localgovernment/decentral
isation/) whereby local bodies are meant to be given 
increasing autonomy.  
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3. Financial arrangements 
Tax 
All taxes are set and collected by the British 
government, aside from Council tax (for local 
government), and in Scotland the power to vary 
income tax by 3% (so far unused).  
Tax (and social security) policy remains almost 
entirely the preserve of the UK central 
government, meaning that, crucially, devolved and 
local authorities have little control over their 
overall budgets. By international standards, UK 
government finances are highly centralised. The 
UK has 95% of tax revenue going to central 
government. 
About 85% of taxation revenue is collected by 
national government. Local authorities impose a 
council tax on property. Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland set rates for business property 
taxes, in England they are set by the central 
authorities. The revenue is allocated to local 
authorities on a per capita basis. Scotland has 
control over local government taxation and can 
vary the rate of income tax, but it has no 
borrowing powers. The revenue is mainly in form 
of transfers. Wales and Northern Ireland have no 
taxation autonomy and receive block grants. The 
Greater London gets a share of council taxes in 
addition to intergovernmental grants. 
A large proportion of local authority spending is 
financed from central government grants. 
However, they are also entitled to levy one tax, i.e. 
the Council Tax. This is a domestic property tax 
the rate of which subnational governments can 
change to raise revenue to finance spending, 
whereas they cannot change the tax base(
318
). It 
provides about a quarter of local funding. Local 
authorities set the total Council Tax based on their 
overall budget for the year. Each household pays 
an amount depending on the value of their home. 
The government has powers to ensure that 
increases in local authority budgets and Council 
Tax are not excessive. The current Government 
has decided in April 2012 that any council that 
budgets for an increase in council tax of 3.5% or 
more will be capped unless they have their budget 
passed by a local referendum(
319
). Central 
government has also offered additional grant to 
councils who budget for increases of less than 
2.5%. 
                                                          
(318) An adjustment is made so that local authorities with low 
value property and so low council tax revenues get a more 
generous block grant from central government 
(319) Some councils have predictably responded by budgeting 
for an increase of 3.49%. 
 
Table IV.A1.2: Local government in England - Functions and powers 
Arrangement Upper tier authority Lower tier authority
Shire counties
waste management, education, libraries,
social services, transport, strategic planning,
consumer protection, police, fire
housing, waste collection, council tax
collection, local planning, licensing,
cemeteries and crematoria
Unitary authorities
Metropolitan counties
Greater London
transport, strategic planning, regional
development, police, fire
housing, waste collection, council tax
collection, education, libraries, social
services, local planning, consumer
protection, licensing, cemeteries and
crematoria †
housing, waste collection, council tax collection, education, libraries, social services,
transport, planning, consumer protection, licensing, police, fire, cemeteries and
crematoria †
housing, waste management, waste collection, council tax collection, education, 
libraries, social services, transport, planning, consumer protection, licensing, cemeteries 
and crematoria †, police and fire come under Shire councils
 
+ = in practice, some functions take place at a strategic level through joint boards and arrangements. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Business rates are a property tax on businesses and 
other non-domestic properties. Their formal name 
is national non-domestic rates. The national rates 
are set by central government. The revenue is 
collected by local authorities, pooled by central 
government, and then redistributed to local 
authorities(
320). As such local authorities don’t 
benefit directly from increased business activity 
but they are often responsible for providing 
infrastructure for new commercial development. 
To remedy the disincentive to development this 
creates (especially given up-front costs that may 
not be compensated at the time), the government is 
introducing a system whereby local authorities will 
be allowed to retain additional revenue from new 
commercial developments for a number of years. 
Local authorities may also impose charges for 
services as an additional revenue source and to 
recoup the cost of service provision where 
appropriate (for example parking charges and 
charges for recreational and personal care 
services). Due to the ongoing squeeze on their 
budgets as a result of fiscal consolidation, many 
local authorities are currently increasing both the 
scope of charges and their level. 
Overall the key point to note about the UK system 
is that although some taxes are collected at local 
level and a lot of spending is administered at local 
level, subnational governments have very limited 
scope to borrow or to affect the overall level of tax 
and government spending. Fiscal policy in the UK 
is therefore effectively set and controlled almost 
exclusively by national government – if the UK 
misses deficit targets it will not be due to the 
actions of subnational governments. 
Provision of Funds and equalisation 
Central government (or the devolved government 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) provides 
specific and general grants to enable local 
authorities to deliver all the necessary services. To 
divide up the funding, the government uses a 
system that takes into account the number and 
value of properties in each area, and how much it 
                                                          
(320) Redistribution is broadly on a per capita basis but there are 
some adjustments based on the cost of providing services – 
for instance Westminster in central London gets extra 
money for the cost of providing services to the unusually 
large number of people that pass through the borough and 
travel around its streets.  
costs to provide services there. Given this, and that 
locally raised taxation provides only a minority of 
local government budgets while central 
government grants provide the majority, UK local 
government financing is strongly characterised by 
equalising transfers. 
Local authority spending is the sum of central 
government support for local authorities within 
Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) and 
Departmental Annually Managed Expenditure 
(AME), plus locally financed expenditure in AME 
(council tax and other local revenue). Central 
government support for local authorities consists 
of current and capital grants, and supported capital 
expenditure (permissions to borrow).  
The largest grants are the revenue support 
grant(
321
) and the redistribution of pooled national 
non-domestic rates (NNDR). These count within 
the Communities and Local Government (CLG) 
departmental expenditure limit. Other departments 
provide grants for specific purposes (for example 
education) and these also count in the department's 
DEL, as does supported capital expenditure. 
Departmental annually managed expenditure 
(AME) includes grants that reimburse local 
authority payments of social benefits - mainly rent 
rebates and rent allowances(
322
) - and capital grants 
from the lottery distribution funds.  
Local authority spending can also be analysed in 
terms of what the expenditure is for - such as 
education or social services. Or it can be broken 
down by economic category such as pay, 
procurement, subsidies, other grants and capital 
expenditure. Economic categories are used by the 
Office for National Statistics in the compilation of 
national accounts.  
Local Authority own expenditure is defined as the 
contribution of local authorities to Total Managed 
Expenditure (TME) as measured in national 
accounts. TME is a consolidated measure in the 
sense that transactions between parts of the public 
sector do not add to TME. So, for example, total 
local authority expenditure defined here excludes 
                                                          
(321) The block grants that central government give to local 
authorities are funded by a wide range of taxes.  
(322) As most social transfers are paid by central government 
agencies. Support for rents paid by local authorities (but 
ultimately funded by central government) is an exception. 
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capital grants paid to public corporations and 
interest paid to central government.  
Devolved country governments 
The devolved bodies are largely unable to use 
fiscal policy to influence economic performance or 
to deliver other distributive or redistributive goals. 
For instance, the current administrations in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have both called for 
the ability to reduce the rate of corporation tax 
imposed in their territory in order to attract more 
inward investment. Both have been rebuffed. As 
noted above the Scottish government does have the 
power to vary income tax by up to 3p in the pound, 
but this has not been used to date. 
The subnational governments’ lack of fiscal 
powers means they have no direct ability to 
influence the size of their own budgets. The UK 
government allocates to each of the three devolved 
territories a “block grant” out of its general tax 
revenues, which the devolved bodies then use to 
fund the public services for which they are 
responsible. The size of these grants is calculated 
principally via the Barnett Formula, based on the 
respective population shares of the four parts of the 
UK. (
323
) The advantage for the subnational 
governments is that they have complete autonomy 
over how to spend the grant.  
Weaknesses of Barnett formula: Lack of 
accountability; there is no clear relationship 
between taxes paid and services received. A 
devolved administration has little influence over 
the size of the block grant and revenues are not 
related to management or performance of the 
devolved administration’s economy. Overall 
budget is not needs-based (the Barnett formula is 
generous to the devolved governments and 
spending per head in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland is significantly higher than it is in 
England). The UK Government remains 
responsible for borrowing to meet any shortfall in 
tax revenues. 
Local authorities (applies to England, and in 
most policy areas to the rest of the UK) 
                                                          
(323) See http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/ 
research/rp98/rp98-008.pdf. 
Local governments are mainly funded by grants 
from central government but they also levy the 
Council tax.  
Local Authorities are also prevented from issuing 
their own debt, but they are permitted to borrow to 
finance capital investment. Prudential borrowing 
regimes for local authorities in England, Scotland 
and Wales (and for the Northern Ireland Executive 
in the case of Northern Ireland) were introduced in 
2004-05. HM Treasury is responsible for 
determining the overall affordability of the UK’s 
public sector debt levels against the general 
economic and fiscal environment, and for advising 
the UK Government if borrowing within the public 
sector needs to be constrained. 
The UK does not have local income taxes. 
4. Fiscal rules 
The UK government introduced a new fiscal 
framework after taking office in May 2010. The 
three key pillars are the setting of a new "fiscal 
mandate" targeting the cyclically-adjusted current 
balance, the setting of a net debt target and the 
establishment of the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR), an independent body tasked 
with producing the official forecast. The fiscal 
mandate requires that the cyclically-adjusted 
current budget be on track to be in balance by the 
end of a rolling 5-year forecast period, currently 
ending in 2016-17.  This is supplemented by a debt 
sustainability target which requires the public 
sector net debt as a percentage of GDP to be 
falling by 2015-16. The OBR must judge whether 
the chances of the government meeting the fiscal 
mandate and debt sustainability rule are greater 
than 50%.   
Government spending is set out in the Spending 
Review which is published every three or four 
years. This sets out multi-annual limits for 
predictable spending in every department through 
"departmental expenditure limits" (DELs). The 
remainder of spending, mainly social security, debt 
interest payments, public sector pensions and EU 
contributions, is classified as "annually managed 
expenditure" (AME) and is not capped in advance. 
The devolved administrations are financed through 
grants from central governments and cannot issue 
their own debt.   
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Due to the limited control over their overall 
budgets that the devolved country governments 
and local authorities have, and their very limited 
powers to borrow, the UK's overall fiscal strategy 
and its performance against fiscal rules are 
determined almost wholly by the central UK 
government. In the context of the size of overall 
UK tax and government spending any fiscal 
decisions made by subnational authorities have 
very limited impact. 
5. Other relevant institutional features 
There are a couple of recent and current reforms to 
subnational government with implications for 
subnational policy: 
 Abolition of RDAs: Following the 2010 
election the UK government decided to abolish 
the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in 
England. There were nine RDAs which sat 
above local authorities and below national 
government. The RDAs did not have any tax 
raising powers and had limited policy 
responsibilities and budgets but one of their 
main roles was in making use of EU funding 
streams. The RDAs did however have a 
significant impact on the implementation of the 
English European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) (2007-2013) programmes both in 
terms of management - the RDAs were 
intermediate implementing bodies- and match 
funding - the RDA budgets were an important 
source of match funding in the English 
programmes. 
 Localism: The current UK government is 
pursuing a 'localism' agenda, which seeks to 
give greater power and flexibility to local 
communities. This means giving local 
authorities (and other local groups, inside and 
outside government) more control over how 
they allocate their budgets, implement national 
policy and run services. Historically UK local 
authorities have been quite constrained by 
compartmentalised financial allocations from 
central government and detailed rules on how 
national policy should be implemented across 
the country. It is not yet clear how much of a 
difference the localism agenda will make in 
practice. However the (national) government's 
current plans for localism are more about the 
allocation of spending than its overall level and 
do not envisage major new borrowing powers 
for subnational government. Therefore they 
should not have a significant fiscal impact in 
aggregate. 
 
ANNEX 2 
Results of regressions on the impact of fiscal decentralisation 
on government expenditures and revenues 
 
 
Table IV.A2.2: Results of regressions with total revenues and tax burden of general government as dependent variable (LSDVC estimator, 
EU27, 1995-2010) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES totalrev totalrev totalrev totalrev taxburden taxburden totalrev taxburden
L.D 0.0235*** 0.0191** 0.0185** 0,0117 0,0114 0,00967 0.0194** 0.0154*
Rgrowth -3.697*** -3.612*** -2.333** -2.235** -3.643*** -2.350**
Expdec -0,000552 0,166 0,0297 0,0116 0,142 0,0402 0,0141 0,0292
Revdec -0,0863 -0.239** -0.218** -0.192** -0.253** -0.265*** -0.227*** -0.283***
Expdec* trsf -0,168 -0,131
Expcov 0.0308** 0.0372*** 0.0406*** 0.0359*** 0.0411*** 0.0397*** 0.0402*** 0.0465***
Ele -0.201* -0,0795 -0,0658 -0,0723 -0,107 -0,096 -0,0816 -0,103
L.infl 0,0034 -0,00538 -0,00458 0,00259 0,00312 -0,00428 0,00353
TO -0,108 -0,327 -0,299 0,111 -0,0995 -0,0683 -0,316 -0,142
L.og 0,00922
Revdec * tax 0,149 0,115 0.184*
L.rgrowth 0,536
Expdec * tax 0.146* 0.128*
Constant
Observations 405 375 375 348 373 373 375 373
Number of panel 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
R-squared  
Notes: List of variables: see Tables IV.3.4 and IV.A2.1 above. New variables added: totalrev = general government total revenues (% of GDP), 
taxburden = tax revenues of general government (% of GDP), Rgrowth = real growth rate of GDP, L.rgrowth = lagged real growth rate of GDP. 
***, **, *: coefficients estimates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Table IV.A2.1: Results of regressions with primary expenditure of general government as dependent variable (LSDVC estimator, EU27, 
1995-2010) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
VARIABLES primexp primexp primexp primexp primexp primexp primexp primexp primexp
lagdebt -0.0204* -0.0173 -0.0144 -0.0192 -0.0125 -0.00912 -0.0118 -0.00653 -0.0168
L. og. 0.190*** 0.166*** 0.159*** 0.166*** 0.173*** 0.219*** 0.220*** 0.223*** 0.188***
expdec -0.784*** -0.0405 -0.185*** -0.222*** -0.216*** -0.699*** -0.723*** -0.782*** -0.715***
revdec 0.800*** 0.346*** 0.437*** 0.803*** 0.212*** 0.863*** 0.865*** 0.864*** 0.957***
Expdec* trsf 0.792*** 0.577*** 0.607*** 0.691*** 0.662***
ele 0.123 0.116 0.0258 0.0311 0.0607 0.114 0.118 0.137 0.059
L infl 0.0290** 0.0259* 0.0355*** 0.0323*** 0.0264** 0.113*** 0.112** 0.117*** 0.0344***
tradeopen -0.736* -0.736 -0.850** -0.871** -0.965*** -1.056*** -1.027*** -1.084*** -0.672*
Expdec* tax -0.298**
expcov -0.109*** -0.0953*** -0.0683*** -0.0833*** -0.0805*** -0.0685*** -0.0848***
Expdec* decSoc 0.138
Expdec* decHealth 0.0405
Expdec* decGS 0.213**
Snownrevdec* %tax -0.524***
Snownrevdec* trsf 0.744***
Expdec* decWag -0.145
Observations 401 401 401 401 401 380 380 381 401
Number of panel 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27  
Notes: List of variables: see Table IV.3.4 above. New variables added: Primexp = general government primary expenditures (% of GDP), L.infl = 
lagged inflation rate, TO = Trade Openness (% of exports plus imports in GDP).  
***, **, *: coefficients estimates statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Member States 
BE Belgium 
BG Bulgaria 
CZ Czech Republic 
DK  Denmark 
DE Germany 
EE Estonia  
EI  Ireland 
EL  Greece 
ES  Spain 
FR  France 
IT  Italy 
CY Cyprus 
LV Latvia 
LT Lithuania 
LU  Luxembourg 
HU Hungary 
MT Malta 
NL  The Netherlands 
AT  Austria 
PL Poland 
PT  Portugal 
RO Romania 
SI Slovenia 
SK Slovakia 
FI  Finland 
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SE  Sweden 
UK  United Kingdom 
 
EA Euro area 
EU European Union 
EU-25 European Union, 25 Member States (excl. BG and RO) 
EU-27 European Union, 27 Member States 
EU-15  European Union, 15 Member States before 1 May 2004  
EU-10 European Union, 10 Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004  
(CZ, EE, CY, LV, LH, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK) 
Non-EU countries 
AU  Australia 
CA  Canada 
CH  Switzerland 
JP   Japan 
KO South Korea 
NO Norway 
NZ  New Zeeland  
US(A)  United States  
Currencies 
EUR  euro 
ECU  European currency unit 
BGL Bulgarian lev 
CZK  Czech koruna 
DKK  Danish krone 
EEK  Estonian kroon 
GBP  Pound sterling 
LTL Lithuanian litas 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2012 
 
306 
LVL Latvian lats 
HUF Hungarian forint 
RON New Rumanian leu 
SEK  Swedish krona 
SKK Slovak koruna 
CAD  Canadian dollar 
CHF  Swiss franc 
JPY  Japanese yen 
SUR  Russian rouble 
USD  US dollar 
Other  
AMC      Asset management company 
AMECO Macro-economic database of the European Commission 
CAPB Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
CMFB    Committee on monetary, financial and balance-of-payment statistics 
COFOG Classification of the functions of government 
DEA  Data envelope approach 
DG ECFIN Directorate-General Economic and Financial Affairs 
DGS      Deposit Guarantee Scheme  
DR Debt requirement 
DSGE Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
DWF      Discount window facility 
EAMS    Euro Area Member States 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECOFIN Economic and Financial Council 
EDP Excessive deficit procedure 
EERP European Economic Recovery Plan 
Part V 
Resources 
 
307 
EFC Economic and Financial Committee 
EFSF     European Financial Stability Facility   
ELA      Emergency Liquidity Assistance  
EMU   Economic and Monetary Union 
EPC Economic Policy Committee 
ESA(95) European System of National and Regional Accounts 
ESM       European Stability mechanism 
ESSPROS European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics 
EU KLEMS European database on capital, labour, energy, material and services 
FDI  Foreign direct investment 
FIRB     Foundation Internal Ratings Based  
GDP Gross domestic product 
GLS  Generalised least squares 
IBP Initial budgetary position 
ICT  Information and communication technologies 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INSEE   Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques 
ISCED   International Standard Classification of Education 
LGD       Loss Given Default  
LIME     Working group on methodology to assess Lisbon-related Structural Reforms 
LTC Long-term budgetary cost of ageing 
MTBF  Medium-term budgetary framework 
MTO Medium-term budgetary objective 
NAIRU  Non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary least squares 
PBB  Performance-based budgeting 
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PISA  Programme for International Student Assessment 
pp Percentage points 
PPS Purchasing power standard 
R&D Research and development 
RAMS  Recently acceded Member States 
RF          Resolution Funds 
RoEA Rest of euro area 
ROW Rest of the world 
SCPs Stability and convergence programmes 
SGP  Stability and Growth Pact 
SLS       Special liquidity scheme 
SSC Social security contributions 
TFP  Total factor productivity 
VAT Value added tax 
WGHQPF Working Group on the quality of public finance 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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Asset management company  Public or private 
body aiming at restructuring, recovering or 
disposing of nonperforming assets.  
Automatic stabilisers  Features of the tax and 
spending regime which react automatically to the 
economic cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a 
result, the budget balance in percent of GDP tends 
to improve in years of high growth, and deteriorate 
during economic slowdowns. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a 
forum for regular cooperation on banking 
supervisory matters aiming at enhancing the 
understanding of key supervisory issues and 
improving the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide. It also develops guidelines and 
supervisory standards in areas where they are 
considered desirable. In this regard, the Committee 
is best known for its international standards on 
capital adequacy; the Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision; and the Concordat on cross-
border banking supervision.  
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)  
Annual guidelines for the economic and budgetary 
policies of the Member States. They are prepared 
by the Commission and adopted by the Council of 
Ministers responsible for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (ECOFIN). 
Budget balance  The balance between total public 
expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a 
positive balance indicating a surplus and a 
negative balance indicating a deficit. For the 
monitoring of Member State budgetary positions, 
the EU uses general government aggregates. See 
also structural budget balance, primary budget 
balance, and primary structural balance. 
Budgetary rules  Rules and procedures through 
which policy-makers decide on the size and the 
allocation of public expenditure as well as on its 
financing through taxation and borrowing. 
Budgetary sensitivity  The variation in the budget 
balance in percentage of GDP brought about by a 
change in the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated 
to be 0.5 on average. 
Candidate countries  Countries that wish to 
accede to the EU. Besides the accession countries, 
they include Croatia and Turkey. 
Close-to-balance requirement  A requirement 
contained in the 'old' Stability and Growth Pact, 
according to which Member States should, over 
the medium term, achieve an overall budget 
balance close to balance or in surplus; was 
replaced by country-specific medium-term 
budgetary objectives in the reformed Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Code of Conduct  Policy document endorsed by 
the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005 setting 
down the specifications on the implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and the format and 
content of the stability and convergence 
programmes. 
COFOG  (Classification of the Functions of 
Government) A statistical nomenclature used to 
break down general government expenditure into 
its different functions  including general public 
services, defence, public order and safety, 
economic affairs, environmental protection, 
housing and community amenities, health, 
recreation, culture and religion, education and 
social protection. 
Composite indicator: a compilation of several 
indicators into a single index reflecting the 
different dimensions of a measured concept. 
Convergence programmes  Medium-term 
budgetary and monetary strategies presented by 
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. 
They are updated annually, according to the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Prior 
to the third phase of EMU, convergence 
programmes were issued on a voluntary basis and 
used by the Commission in its assessment of the 
progress made in preparing for the euro. See also 
stability programmes. 
Crowding-out effects  Offsetting effects on output 
due to changes in interest rates and exchange rates 
triggered by a loosening or tightening of fiscal 
policy. 
Cyclical component of budget balance  That part 
of the change in the budget balance that follows 
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automatically from the cyclical conditions of the 
economy, due to the reaction of public revenue and 
expenditure to changes in the output gap. See 
automatic stabilisers, tax smoothing and structural 
budget balance. 
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance  See 
structural budget balance. 
Defined-benefit pension scheme  A traditional 
pension scheme that defines a benefit, i.e. a 
pension, for an employee upon that employee's 
retirement is a defined benefit plan. 
Defined-contribution pension scheme  A scheme 
providing for an individual account for each 
participant, and for benefits based solely on the 
amount contributed to the account, plus or minus 
income, gains, expenses and losses allocated to the 
account. 
Demand and supply shocks  Disturbances that 
affect the economy on the demand side (e.g. 
changes in private consumption or exports) or on 
the supply side (e.g. changes in commodity prices 
or technological innovations). They can impact on 
the economy either on a temporary or permanent 
basis. 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes reimburse a limited 
amount of deposits to depositors whose bank has 
failed. From the depositors' point of view, this 
protects a part of their wealth from bank failures. 
From a financial stability perspective, this promise 
prevents depositors from making panic 
withdrawals from their bank, thereby preventing 
severe economic consequences. 
Dependency ratio A measure of the ratio of 
people who receive government transfers, 
especially pensions, relative to those who are 
available to provide the revenue to pay for those 
transfers. 
Direct fiscal costs (gross, net) of a financial 
crisis The direct gross costs are the fiscal outlays 
in support of the financial sector that increase the 
level of public debt. They encompass, for example, 
recapitalisation, purchase of troubled bank assets, 
pay-out to depositors, liquidity support, payment 
when guarantees are called and subsidies. The 
direct net costs are the direct gross cost net of 
recovery payments, such as through the sale of 
acquired assets or returns on assets. Thus, the net 
direct fiscal costs reflect the permanent increase in 
public debt. 
Direct taxes Taxes that are levied directly on 
personal or corporate incomes and property. 
Discretionary fiscal policy Change in the budget 
balance and in its components under the control of 
government. It is usually measured as the residual 
of the change in the balance after the exclusion of 
the budgetary impact of automatic stabilisers. See 
also fiscal stance. 
Early-warning mechanism  Part of the preventive 
elements of the Stability and Growth Pact. It is 
activated when there is significant divergence from 
the budgetary targets set down in a stability or 
convergence programme. 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)  
Formerly the Monetary Committee, the EFC is a 
Committee of the Council of the European Union 
set up by Article 114 of the. Its main task is to 
prepare and discuss (ECOFIN) Council decisions 
with regard to economic and financial matters. 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC)  Group of 
senior government officials whose main task is to 
prepare discussions of the (ECOFIN) Council on 
structural policies. It plays an important role in the 
preparation of the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, and it is active on policies related to 
labour markets, methods to calculate cyclically-
adjusted budget balances and ageing populations. 
Effective tax rate The ratio of broad categories of 
tax revenue (labour income, capital income, 
consumption) to their respective tax bases. 
Effectiveness The same concept as efficiency 
except that it links input to outcomes rather than 
outputs. 
Efficiency  Can be defined in several ways, either 
as the ratio of outputs to inputs or as the distance 
to a production possibility frontier (see also Free 
Disposable Hull analysis, Data Envelope analysis, 
stochastic frontier analysis). Cost efficiency 
measures the link between monetary inputs (funds) 
and outputs; technical efficiency measures the link 
between technical inputs and outputs. Output 
efficiency indicates by how much the output can be 
Part V 
Resources 
 
311 
increased for a given input; input efficiency 
indicates by how much the input can be reduced 
for a given input. 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (equivalent to 
lender-of-last- resort), the most traditional tool 
available to a central bank for dealing with 
financial instability. It includes both the provision 
of liquidity to the financial system as a whole 
through market operations, as well as emergency 
lending to individual banks. Not all liquidity 
injections aimed at preventing the spread of a 
liquidity problem relate to a crisis, as central banks 
routinely offer liquidity against specified collateral 
requirements in order to support the orderly 
functioning of markets. 
ESA95 / ESA79  European accounting standards 
for the reporting of economic data by the Member 
States to the EU. As of 2000, ESA95 has replaced 
the earlier ESA79 standard with regard to the 
comparison and analysis of national public finance 
data. 
European Financial Stability Facility is a 
company owned by Euro Area Member States 
created following the decisions taken in May 2010 
by the Council. EFSF is able to issue bonds 
guaranteed by EAMS for up to € 440 billion for 
on-lending to EAMS in difficulty, subject to 
conditions negotiated with the European 
Commission in liaison with the European Central 
Bank and International Monetary Fund and to be 
approved by the Eurogroup. EFSF has been 
assigned the best possible credit rating; AAA by 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings, Aaa by 
Moody’s. 
European semester New governance architecture 
approved by the Member States in September 
2010. It means that the EU and the euro zone will 
coordinate ex ante their budgetary and economic 
policies, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy, the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure. Based on previous 
discussions on Commission's Annual Growth 
Survey, each summer, the European Council and 
the Council of ministers will provide policy advice 
before Member States finalise their draft budgets.   
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)  A procedure 
according to which the Commission and the 
Council monitor the development of national 
budget balances and public debt in order to assess 
and/or correct the risk of an excessive deficit in 
each Member State. Its application has been 
further clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
See also stability programmes and Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Expenditure rules A subset of fiscal rules that 
target (a subset of) public expenditure. 
Foundation Internal Ratings Based framework 
used to set minimum regulatory capital for 
internationally active banks. The Basel II FIRB 
framework sets minimum regulatory capital 
requirements using a modified version of an 
industry model, the so-called Gaussian asymptotic 
single risk factor model of credit risk developed 
chiefly by Vasicek. 
Fiscal consolidation An improvement in the 
budget balance through measures of discretionary 
fiscal policy, either specified by the amount of the 
improvement or the period over which the 
improvement continues. 
Fiscal decentralisation  The transfer of authority 
and responsibility for public functions from the 
central government to intermediate and local 
governments or to the market. 
Fiscal federalism  A subfield of public finance 
that investigates the fiscal relations across levels of 
government. 
Fiscal governance Comprises all rules, regulations 
and procedures that impact on how the budget and 
its components are being prepared. The terms 
fiscal governance and fiscal frameworks are used 
interchangeably in the report. 
Fiscal impulse  The estimated effect of fiscal 
policy on GDP. It is not a model-free measure and 
it is usually calculated by simulating an 
econometric model. The estimates presented in the 
present report are obtained by using the 
Commission services’ QUEST model. 
Fiscal institutions Independent public bodies, 
other than the central bank, which prepare 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts, monitor 
the fiscal performance and/or advice the 
government on fiscal policy issues. 
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Fiscal rule A permanent constraint on fiscal 
policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator 
of fiscal performance, such as the government 
budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a major 
component thereof. See also budgetary rule, 
expenditure rules. 
Fiscal stance A measure of the effect of 
discretionary fiscal policy. In this report, it is 
defined as the change in the primary structural 
budget balance relative to the preceding period. 
When the change is positive (negative) the fiscal 
stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive). 
General government  As used by the EU in its 
process of budgetary surveillance under the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the excessive deficit 
procedure, the general government sector covers 
national government, regional and local 
government, as well as social security funds. 
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to 
and from the EU Budget. 
Government budget constraint  A basic 
condition applying to the public finances, 
according to which total public expenditure in any 
one year must be financed by taxation, government 
borrowing, or changes in the monetary base. In the 
context of EMU, the ability of governments to 
finance spending through money issuance is 
prohibited. See also stock-flow adjustment, 
sustainability. 
Government contingent liabilities Obligations 
for the government that are subject to the 
realization of specific uncertain and discrete future 
events. For instance, the guarantees granted by 
governments to the debt of private corporations 
bonds issued by enterprise are contingent 
liabilities, since the government obligation to pay 
depend on the non-ability of the original debtor to 
honour its own obligations. 
Government implicit liabilities  Government 
obligations that are very likely to arise in the future 
in spite of the absence of backing contracts or law. 
The government may have a potential future 
obligation as a result of legitimate expectations 
generated by past practice or as a result of the 
pressure by interest groups. Most implicit 
liabilities are contingent, i.e., depend upon the 
occurrence of uncertain future events. 
Growth accounting  A technique based on a 
production function approach where total GDP (or 
national income) growth is decomposed into the 
various production factors and a non-explained 
part which is the total factor productivity change, 
also often termed the Solow residual. 
Indirect taxation  Taxes that are levied during the 
production stage, and not on the income and 
property arising from economic production 
processes. Prominent examples of indirect taxation 
are the value added tax (VAT), excise duties, 
import levies, energy and other environmental 
taxes. 
Integrated guidelines  A general policy 
instrument for coordinating EU-wide and Member 
States economic structural reforms embedded in 
the Lisbon strategy and which main aim is to boost 
economic growth and job creation in the EU. 
Interest burden General government interest 
payments on public debt as a share of GDP. 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
Partnership between the EU and Member States 
for growth and more and better jobs. Originally 
approved in 2000, the Lisbon Strategy was 
revamped in 2005. Based on the Integrated 
Guidelines (merger of the broad economic policy 
guidelines and the employment guidelines, dealing 
with macro-economic, micro-economic and 
employment issues) for the period 2005-2008, 
Member States drew up three-year national reform 
programmes at the end of 2005. They reported on 
the implementation of the national reform 
programmes for the first time in autumn 2006. The 
Commission analyses and summarises these 
reports in an EU Annual Progress Report each 
year, in time for the Spring European Council. 
Loss Given Default The loss incurred if an obligor 
defaults. 
Maastricht reference values for public debt and 
deficits  Respectively, a 60 % general government 
debt-to-GDP ratio and a 3 % general government 
deficit-to-GDP ratio. These thresholds are defined 
in a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union. See also Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Maturity structure of public debt The profile of 
total debt in terms of when it is due to be paid 
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back. Interest rate changes affect the budget 
balance directly to the extent that the general 
government sector has debt with a relatively short 
maturity structure. Long maturities reduce the 
sensitivity of the budget balance to changes in the 
prevailing interest rate. See also public debt. 
Medium-term budgetary framework  An 
institutional fiscal device that lets policy-makers 
extend the horizon for fiscal policy making beyond 
the annual budgetary calendar (typically 3-5 
years). Targets can be adjusted under medium-
term budgetary frameworks (MTBF) either on an 
annul basis (flexible frameworks) or only at the 
end of the MTBF horizon (fixed frameworks).  
Medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) 
According to the reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact, stability programmes and convergence 
programmes present a medium-term objective for 
the budgetary position. It is country-specific to 
take into account the diversity of economic and 
budgetary positions and developments as well as 
of fiscal risks to the sustainability of public 
finances, and is defined in structural terms (see 
structural balance). 
Minimum benchmarks  The lowest value of the 
structural budget balance that provides a safety 
margin against the risk of breaching the Maastricht 
reference value for the deficit during normal 
cyclical fluctuations. The minimum benchmarks 
are estimated by the European Commission. They 
do not cater for other risks such as unexpected 
budgetary developments and interest rate shocks. 
They are a lower bound for the 'medium-term 
budgetary objectives (MTO). 
Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)  An indicator 
combining the change in real short-term interest 
rate and in the real effective exchange rate to 
gauge the degree of easing or tightening of 
monetary policy. 
Mundell-Fleming model  Macroeconomic model 
of an open economy which embodies the main 
Keynesian hypotheses (price rigidity, liquidity 
preference). In spite of its shortcomings, it remains 
useful in short-term economic policy analysis. 
NAIRU  Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment. 
Non-Keynesian effects  Supply-side and 
expectations effects which reverse the sign of 
traditional Keynesian multipliers. Hence, if non-
Keynesian effects dominate, fiscal consolidation 
would be expansionary. 
Old age dependency ratio  Population aged over 
65 as a percentage of working age population 
(usually defined as persons aged between 15 and 
64). 
One-off and temporary measures Government 
transactions having a transitory budgetary effect 
that does not lead to a sustained change in the 
budgetary position. See also structural balance. 
Outcome indicator Measures the ultimate results 
(outcomes) of policy choices (e.g. education 
attainment, healthy life years, economic growth).  
Output costs from a financial crisis This is the 
gap between the hypothetical output development 
without a crisis and the actual output realised 
against the back of the crisis. Various methods are 
available to calculate output losses, in particular 
either using the trend GDP growth or the level of 
GDP as a benchmark.  
Output gap  The difference between actual output 
and estimated potential output at any particular 
point in time. See also cyclical component of 
budget balance. 
Output indicator  Measures the technical results 
(outputs) of policy choices (e.g. number of 
university graduates, number of patents, life 
expectancy). 
Pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYG)  Pension 
system in which current pension expenditures are 
financed by the contributions of current 
employees. 
Pension fund A legal entity set up to accumulate, 
manage and administer pension assets. See also 
private pension scheme. 
Performance-based budgeting A budgeting 
technique that links budget appropriations to 
performance (outcomes, results) rather than 
focusing on input controls. In practice, 
performance-informed budgeting is more common 
which basis decisions on budgetary allocation on 
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performance information without establishing a 
formal link. 
Policy-mix  The overall stance of fiscal and 
monetary policy. The policy-mix may consist of 
various combinations of expansionary and 
restrictive policies, with a given fiscal stance being 
either supported or offset by monetary policy. 
Potential GDP The level of real GDP in a given 
year that is consistent with a stable rate of 
inflation. If actual output rises above its potential 
level, then constraints on capacity begin to bind 
and inflationary pressures build; if output falls 
below potential, then resources are lying idle and 
inflationary pressures abate. See also production 
function method and output gap. 
Pre-accession Economic Programmes (PEPs)  
Annual programmes submitted by candidate 
countries which set the framework for economic 
policies The PEPs consist of a review of recent 
economic developments, a detailed 
macroeconomic framework, a discussion of public 
finance issues and an outline of the structural 
reform agenda. 
Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance Framework 
(PFSF)  Framework for budgetary surveillance of 
candidate countries in the run up to accession. It 
closely approximates the policy co-ordination and 
surveillance mechanisms at EU level. 
Primary budget balance  The budget balance net 
of interest payments on general government debt. 
Primary structural budget balance  The 
structural budget balance net of interest payments. 
Principal components  A statistical technique 
used to reduce multidimensional data sets to lower 
dimensions for analysis. This technique provides a 
compression of a set of high dimensional vectors 
(or variables) into a set of lower dimensional 
vectors (or variables) and then reconstructing the 
original set summarizing the information into a 
limited number of values. 
Private pension schemes   The insurance contract 
specifies a schedule of contribution in exchange of 
which benefits will be paid when the members 
reach a specific retirement age. The transactions 
are between the individual and the insurance 
provider and they are not recorded as government 
revenues or government expenditure and, 
therefore, do not have an impact on government 
surplus or deficit. 
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy  A fiscal stance which 
amplifies the economic cycle by increasing the 
structural primary deficit during an economic 
upturn, or by decreasing it in a downturn. A 
neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance unchanged over the economic 
cycle but lets the automatic stabilisers work. See 
also tax-smoothing. 
Production function approach  A method to 
estimate the level of potential output of an 
economy based on available labour inputs, the 
capital stock and their level of efficiency. Potential 
output is used to estimate the output gap, a key 
input in the estimation of cyclical component of the 
budget. 
Public debt Consolidated gross debt for the 
general government sector. It includes the total 
nominal value of all debt owed by public 
institutions in the Member State, except that part 
of the debt which is owed to other public 
institutions in the same Member State. 
Public goods Goods and services that are 
consumed jointly by several economic agents and 
for which there is no effective pricing mechanism 
that would allow private provision through the 
market. 
Public investment  The component of total public 
expenditure through which governments increase 
and improve the stock of capital employed in the 
production of the goods and services they provide. 
Public-private partnerships (PPP)  Agreements 
that transfer investment projects to the private 
sector that traditionally have been executed or 
financed by the public sector. To qualify as a PPP, 
the project should concern a public function, 
involve the general government as the principal 
purchaser, be financed from non-public sources 
and engage a corporation outside the general 
government as the principal operator that provides 
significant inputs in the design and conception of 
the project and bears a relevant amount of the risk. 
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Quality of public finances  Comprises all 
arrangements and operations of fiscal policy that 
support the macroeconomic goals of fiscal policy, 
in particular economic growth. 
Quasi-fiscal activities  Activities promoting 
public policy goals carried out by non-government 
units. 
QUEST  The macroeconomic model of the EU 
Member States plus the US and Japan developed 
by the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission. 
Recently acceded Member States  Countries that 
became members of the EU in May 2004 and 
include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Two additional countries, 
Romania and Bulgaria joined in January 2007. 
Resolution Funds Privately financed funds whose 
function is to support crisis management 
authorities in their effort to avoid contagion 
between banks and limiting systemic risk. 
Ricardian equivalence Under fairly restrictive 
theoretical assumptions on the consumer’s 
behaviour (inter alia infinite horizon for decision 
making), the impact of fiscal policy does not 
depend on whether it is financed by tax increases 
or by a widening deficit. The basic reasoning 
behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and 
was revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s. 
Securitisation  Borrowing (issuing of bonds) with 
the intention of paying interest and capital out of 
the proceeds derived from assets (use or sale of) or 
from future revenue flows. 
Sensitivity analysis  An econometric or statistical 
simulation designed to test the robustness of an 
estimated economic relationship or projection, 
given various changes in the underlying 
assumptions. 
Significant divergence  A sizeable excess of the 
budget balance over the targets laid out in the 
stability or convergence programmes, that triggers 
the Early warning procedure of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
Size of the public sector  Typically measured as 
the ratio of public expenditure to nominal GDP. 
‘Snow-ball’ effect  The self-reinforcing effect of 
public debt accumulation or decumulation arising 
from a positive or negative differential between the 
interest rate paid on public debt and the growth 
rate of the national economy. See also government 
budget constraint. 
Social security contributions (SSC)  Mandatory 
contributions paid by employers and employees to 
a social insurance scheme to cover for pension, 
health care and other welfare provisions. 
Sovereign bond spread  The difference between 
risk premiums imposed by financial markets on 
sovereign bonds for different states. Higher risk 
premiums can largely stem from (i) the debt 
service ratio, also reflecting the countries' ability to 
raise their taxes for a given level of GDP, (ii) the 
fiscal track record, (iii) expected future deficits, 
and (iv) the degree of risk aversion. 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)  Approved in 
1997 and reformed in 2005, the SGP clarifies the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the 
surveillance of Member State budgetary policies 
and the monitoring of budget deficits during the 
third phase of EMU. The SGP consists of two 
Council Regulations setting out legally binding 
provisions to be followed by the European 
Institutions and the Member States and two 
Resolutions of the European Council in 
Amsterdam (June 1997). See also Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. 
Stability programmes  Medium-term budgetary 
strategies presented by those Member States that 
have already adopted the euro. They are updated 
annually, according to the provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. See also Convergence 
programmes. 
Stock-flow adjustment The stock-flow 
adjustment (also known as the debt-deficit 
adjustment) ensures consistency between the net 
borrowing (flow) and the variation in the stock of 
gross debt. It includes the accumulation of 
financial assets, changes in the value of debt 
denominated in foreign currency, and remaining 
statistical adjustments. 
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Structural budget balance The actual budget 
balance net of the cyclical component and one-off 
and other temporary measures. The structural 
balance gives a measure of the underlying trend in 
the budget balance. See also primary structural 
budget balance. 
Sustainability  A combination of budget deficits 
and debt that ensure that the latter does not grow 
without bound. While conceptually intuitive, an 
agreed operational definition of sustainability has 
proven difficult to achieve. 
SYMBOL SYstemic Model of Banking 
Originated Losses developed by a joint team of 
Commission services (Joint Research Centre and 
the Directorate-General for Internal Market and 
services of the European Commission) together 
with academic experts on banking regulation 
aiming at estimating the losses originated in the 
banking system. 
Tax elasticity A parameter measuring the relative 
change in tax revenues with respect to a relative 
change in GDP. The tax elasticity is an input to the 
budgetary sensitivity. 
Tax gaps  Measure used in the assessment of the 
sustainability of public finances. They measure the 
difference between the current tax ratio and the 
constant tax ratio over a given projection period to 
achieve a predetermined level of debt at the end of 
that projection period. 
Tax smoothing  The idea that tax rates should be 
kept stable in order to minimise the distortionary 
effects of taxation, while leaving it for the 
automatic stabilisers to smooth the economic 
cycle. It is also referred to as neutral discretionary 
fiscal policy. See also cyclical component of fiscal 
policy. 
Tax wedge  The deviation from equilibrium 
price/quantity as a result of a taxation, which 
results in consumers paying more, and suppliers 
receiving less. When referring to labour tax wedge 
more specifically, the tax wedge is usually 
regarded as the difference between the difference 
between the salary costs of an average worker to 
their employer and the amount of net income that 
the worker receives in return, the difference being 
represented by taxes including personal income 
taxes and compulsory social security contributions. 
Total factor productivity  Represents the share of 
total output not explained by the level of inputs 
(labour, capital or primary product). It is generally 
considered as a measure of overall productive 
efficiency. 
UMTS Third generation of technical support for 
mobile phone communications. Sale of UMTS 
licences gave rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 
2001. 
Welfare state Range of policies designed to 
provide insurance against unemployment, sickness 
and risks associated with old age. 
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European Union 
European Commission ec.europa.eu 
Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs 
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/index_en.htm 
Eurostat  epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
European Council consilium.europa.eu 
European Parliament www.europarl.europa.eu 
 
Economics and Finance Ministries 
Belgium  www.treasury.fgov.be/interthes Ministère des Finances - 
Ministerie van Financen 
Bulgaria www.minfin.bg Ministry of Finance 
Czech Republic www.mfcr.cz Ministry of Finance 
Denmark www.fm.dk Ministry of Finance 
Germany www.bundesfinanzministerium.de Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
Estonia www.fin.ee Ministry of Finance 
Ireland www.irlgov.ie/finance Department of Finance 
Greece www.mnec.gr/en/  Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Spain www.mineco.es/ Ministerio de Economía y 
Hacienda 
France www.finances.gouv.fr Ministère Économie, Finances et 
l'Industrie 
Italy www.tesoro.it Ministero dell’Economia e delle 
Finanze 
Cyprus www.mof.gov.cy Ministry of Finance 
Latvia www.fm.gov.lv Ministry of Finance 
Lithuania www.finmin.lt Ministry of Finance 
Luxembourg www.etat.lu/FI Ministère des Finances 
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Hungary www.p-m.hu Ministry of Finance 
Malta finance.gov.mt Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Affairs 
Netherlands www.minfin.nl Ministerie van Financien 
Austria www.bmf.gv.at Bundesministerium für Finanzen 
Poland www.mofnet.gov.pl Ministry of Finance 
Portugal www.min-financas.pt Ministério das Finanças 
Romania www.mfinante.ro Ministry of Finance 
Slovenia  www.gov.si/mf Ministry of Finance 
Slovak Republic www.finance.gov.sk Ministry of Finance 
Finland www.vn.fi/vm Ministry of Finance 
Sweden finans.regeringen.se Finansdepartementet 
United Kingdom  www.hm-treasury.gov.uk Her Majesty's Treasury 
 
Central Banks 
European Union www.ecb.int European Central Bank 
Belgium  www.nbb.be Banque Nationale de Belgique / 
Nationale Bank van België 
Bulgaria www.bnb.bg Bulgarian National Bank 
Czech Republic www.cnb.cz Czech National Bank 
Denmark www.nationalbanken.dk Danmarks Nationalbank 
Germany www.bundesbank.de Deutsche Bundesbank 
Estonia www.eestipank.info Eesti Pank 
Ireland www.centralbank.ie Central Bank of Ireland 
Greece www.bankofgreece.gr Bank of Greece 
Spain www.bde.es Banco de España 
France  www.banque-france.fr Banque de France 
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Italy www.bancaditalia.it Banca d'Italia 
Cyprus www.centralbank.gov.cy  Central Bank of Cyprus 
Latvia www.bank.lv Bank of Latvia 
Lithuania www.lb.lt Lietuvos Bankas 
Luxembourg www.bcl.lu Banque Centrale du Luxembourg 
Hungary www.mnb.hu National Bank of Hungary 
Malta www.centralbankmalta.com Central Bank of Malta 
Netherlands www.dnb.nl De Nederlandsche Bank 
Austria www.oenb.at Oestereichische  Nationalbank 
Poland www.nbp.pl Narodowy Bank Polski 
Portugal www.bportugal.pt Banco de Portugal 
Romania www.bnro.ro National Bank of Romania 
Slovenia  www.bsi.si Bank of Slovenia 
Slovak Republic www.nbs.sk National Bank of Slovakia 
Finland www.bof.fi Suomen Pankki 
Sweden www.riksbank.com Sveriges Riksbank 
United Kingdom www.bankofengland.co.uk Bank of England 
 
 
EU fiscal surveillance framework 
Stability and Growth Pact: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/index_en.htm?cs_mid=570 
Excessive deficit procedure: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy554_en.htm 
Early warning mechanism: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy1075_en.htm 
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Stability and convergence programmes: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy528_en.htm 
Sustainability of public finances: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy546_en.htm  
Quality of public finances 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary12186_en.htm 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/epc_publications_en.htm#Quality%20of%20public%20finances 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/index_en.htm 
 
Institute for National Accounts: www.inr-icn.fgov.be 
www.deutsche-rentenversicherung.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
